Belcher v. Lopinto

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JAYNE BELCHER ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 18-7368

JOSEPH LOPINTO, III ET AL. SECTION: “H”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are Defendant Jefferson Parish’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 110); Defendants CorrectHealth Jefferson, L.L.C. and

Ironshore Specialty Insurance Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 131);

and Defendants Joseph Lopinto and Newell Normand’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 132). On September 9, 2020, this Court issued an Order

granting Jefferson Parish’s Motion for Summary Judgment, denying

CorrectHealth Jefferson, L.L.C and Ironshore Specialty Insurance Co.’s Motion

for Summary Judgment, and granting Joseph Lopinto and Newell Normand’s

Motion for Summary Judgment; these reasons follow.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of Joshua Belcher’s suicide at the Jefferson Parish

Correctional Center (“JPCC”) in Gretna, Louisiana, where he was being held

as a pretrial detainee. The circumstances of Belcher’s death are as follows:

On August 7, 2017, Jefferson Parish officers found Joshua Belcher in his

vehicle, unconscious from apparent drug use. Upon learning that there was an

outstanding warrant for Belcher’s arrest in Florida, the officers transported

Belcher to JPCC. In Belcher’s first few days at JPCC, he exhibited multiple

symptoms of withdrawal, and was given prescription medication to assist with

his detox.1 On August 12, 2017, Belcher told JPCC staff that other inmates in

his pod had become “enemies” and that he feared for his life. Accordingly, JPCC

staff scheduled Belcher’s transfer to a different pod and moved Belcher to a

Southwing “holding cell.” On August 13, 2017, while in the Southwing, Belcher

attempted suicide by “tying a bed sheet around his neck and hanging from the

holding tank door handle.”2 When staff came to Belcher’s aid, Belcher became

“violent and erratic,” and “he was placed in [a] restraint chair for his safety

and the safety of others.”3 Belcher was subsequently moved to the infirmary

and placed on suicide watch.

David Jennings, a social worker for CorrectHealth Jefferson L.L.C.

(“CH”), was in charge of monitoring Belcher’s mental health while Belcher was

on suicide watch. Jennings conducted two, ten to twenty-minute, interviews

of Belcher while he was in the infirmary. In the second interview, on August

15, 2017, Jennings found that Belcher’s mental health had improved and

believed Belcher’s withdrawal symptoms to have abated. Shortly thereafter,

without conducting any psychological or diagnostic assessment, Jennings

discharged Belcher from suicide watch, authorized his release to general

population, and ordered that a follow-up evaluation be scheduled for one week

later.

1 The physician’s assistant who first examined Belcher at JPCC noted: “32 yo male is

presenting with a history of heroin and alcohol abuse. He reports using 1-2 grams of heroin

along with consuming a fifth of liquor per day . . . High ETOH Detox Protocol.” Doc. 139-7

at 2 (internal quotations omitted).

2 Doc. 132-3 at 2.

3 Doc. 131-4 at 36.

Belcher was moved from the infirmary into a cell in the “Administrative

Segregation pod” in the North Wing of the prison. In the Administrative

Segregation pod, cells accommodate one or two inmates and the inmates

remain in their cells for 23 hours per day. Belcher was the only inmate

assigned to his cell. On August 17, 2020, two days after his release from suicide

watch, Belcher was found dead in his cell as a result of a suicide by hanging,

effected by tying his bedsheet around the metal grating bars in his cell’s

window.

There were two other suicides that took place at JPCC in a nearly

identical manner right before and after Joshua Belcher’s suicide. On August

4, 2017, Jerome Bell was found dead in his cell from suicide. On September 27,

2017, Jatory Evans was found dead in his cell from suicide. Both suicides were

completed in the same way as Joshua Belcher’s: using bedsheets as nooses, tied

around the metal bars of cell windows. Like Belcher, both Jerome Bell and

Jatory Evans were discharged from suicide watch by the same CH employee

prior to committing suicide.

On August 3, 2018, Belcher’s parents, Jayne and Jimmy Belcher

(“Plaintiffs”), filed this suit, alleging violations of Section 1983 and state law

against Joseph P. Lopinto, III (in his individual capacity and in his official

capacity as the current Sheriff of Jefferson Parish); Newell Normand (in his

individual capacity and in his official capacity as the former Sheriff of Jefferson

Parish at the time of Joshua Belcher’s detention); Jefferson Parish (“the

Parish”); CH, the contracted healthcare provider for the JPCC; and Ironshore

Specialty Insurance Co. (“Ironshore”), the insurance provider for CH.

Plaintiffs bring five claims against Defendants in their First Amended

Complaint. Count I is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lopinto,

Normand, and CH for violations of Joshua Belcher’s Fourteenth and Eighth

Amendment rights under a failure to train/supervise theory.4 Count II is a

state law claim against Lopinto, Normand, and CH for intentional infliction of

emotional distress.5 Count III is a claim under § 1983 against Lopinto,

Normand, and CH for violations of Joshua Belcher’s Fourteenth Amendment

right to adequate medical care.6 Counts IV and V are claims addressing only

Defendant Jefferson Parish. Count IV is a claim under § 1983 for violations of

Joshua Belcher’s Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment Rights “and for failure

to provide Adequate Medical Care and [sic] Violation.”7 Count V is a state law

claim for gross negligence and intentional misconduct.8

Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that: (1) the Sheriff and the Jefferson

Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”) are responsible for the safety and security of

the inmates at the JPCC; (2) Jefferson Parish is responsible for maintaining

the brick-and-mortar JPCC building; (3) Jefferson Parish is responsible for

ensuring a contract is in effect to provide for healthcare services at JPCC; and

(4) Jefferson Parish contracted with CH to provide the healthcare services at

JPCC.

In the instant Motions, Defendant Jefferson Parish seeks dismissal with

prejudice of all claims against it; Defendants CH and Ironshore seek dismissal

with prejudice of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 deliberate indifference claims against them;

4 Doc. 32 at 13.

5 Id. at 14.

6 Id. at 14–15.

7 Id. at 16. The bracketed text “[sic]” is original to the First Amended Complaint.

8 Id. at 20. Presumably, this claim is brought under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:703,

which provides:

The parish and its governing authority shall not be liable for any action

arising as a result of the actions or inactions of the physician or health care

provider [for the parish jail] . . . unless the governing authority exercises

gross negligence or willful misconduct in the performance of its duties and

obligation imposed by this Section, and such gross negligence or willful

misconduct was a substantial factor in causing the injury.

and Defendants Lopinto and Normand seek dismissal with prejudice of all

§ 1983 claims against them in both their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiffs oppose. This Court will take each Motion in turn.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.”9 “As to materiality . . . [o]nly disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”10 Nevertheless, a dispute

about a material fact is “genuine” such that summary judgment is

inappropriate “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.”11

In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,

the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws

all reasonable inferences in his favor.12 “If the moving party meets the initial

burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden

shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts

showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”13 Summary judgment is

appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”14

“In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the

nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the

9 FED. R. CIV. P. 56.

10 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

11 Id.

12 Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).

13 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).

14 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

manner in which that evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence

must be sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the nonmovant on all issues

as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”15 The Court

does “not . . . in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party

could or would prove the necessary facts.”16 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued

existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported

motion.”17

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Before engaging with the substance of the Motions, an overview of the

law governing Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ Motions is necessary.

The delineation of the various defendants’ responsibilities with respect

to the JPCC is critical to any analysis and is set out here. First, Jefferson

Parish has two sole responsibilities: (1) to perform physical maintenance of all

parish jails and prisons18 and (2) to appoint a physician to attend to the

prisoners confined in parish jails or enter into a contract with a healthcare

provider to do so.19 In a case where the Parish has opted to contract with a

healthcare provider company, the Parish will have an additional responsibility

of abiding by its obligations under the healthcare services contract.20 Second,

CH (as the company contracted by Jefferson Parish to provide medical care to

the Parish’s inmates) has a duty to: (1) provide constitutionally adequate

15 Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir.

2004) (internal citations omitted).

16 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v. Liquid

Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).

17 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).

18 LA. REV. STAT. § 15:702.

19 Id. § 15:703.

20 Id. § 15:703(D) (noting that as it relates to a parish’s authority to contract with a healthcare

provider, “[t]he sole responsibility [of the parish] shall be . . . its contractual obligations

with [the] health care provider”).

medical care21 and (2) fulfill its obligations under the contract with the Parish.

Third, Defendants Lopinto and Normand, as current and former Sheriffs of

Jefferson Parish, are the “keeper[s] of the public jail.”22 Louisiana law

designates each parish’s Sheriff’s Office as the managing authority for the

functioning of parish jails.23 As such, they are responsible for the safety and

wellbeing of the people that they detain.24

Also relevant to each Defendant’s Motion is the law governing civil rights

claims by pretrial detainees. Pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners look to

different constitutional provisions for their respective rights to basic needs like

medical care and safety.25 Whereas the rights of a convicted state prisoner flow

from the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,

the rights of a pretrial detainee flow from both the procedural and substantive

due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Unlike convicted

prisoners, states cannot punish pretrial detainees.27 Thus, a pretrial detainee’s

due process rights are said to be “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment

protections available to a convicted prisoner.”28 These rights include the right

21 As a private corporation contracted to operate the medical services in JPCC, the company

and its employees are subject to liability as state actors under § 1983. See Grandpre v.

Correct Health, No. CV 16-1543, 2016 WL 4539442, at *8 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2016), report

and recommendation adopted sub nom. Grandpre v. Health, No. CV 16-1543, 2016 WL

4987265 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2016).

22 LA. REV. STAT. § 15:704.

23 Id.

24 “Sheriffs in Louisiana are final policy makers with respect to management of the jail. . . .

[This] policy-making authority over management of the jail is not the result of a delegation

from the Parish or any other local government entity,” but rather, the Louisiana

Constitution. Jones v. St. Tammany Par. Jail, 4 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613 (E.D. La. 1998) (citing

LA. CONST. art. 5 § 27).

25 Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 Id. (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).

to medical care and the right to protection from known suicidal tendencies, and

municipalities may be liable under § 1983 for violating these rights.29

“[T]he State’s obligation to prevent suicide may implicate a kaleidoscope

of related duties, including a duty to provide not only medical care, but also

protection from self-inflicted harm.”30 “When attributing violations of pretrial

detainees’ rights to municipalities, the cause of those violations is

characterized either as a condition of confinement or as an episodic act or

omission.”31 Nothing bars a plaintiff from pleading both theories in the

alternative.32 In all but one of the instant Motions, Plaintiffs fail to identify

which theory they are pursuing. “If Plaintiffs present sufficient factual

evidence as to both theories, then both theories may proceed to the jury.”33

DEFENDANT JEFFERSON PARISH

Jefferson Parish seeks dismissal of all claims against it—both federal

and state. The federal claim is rooted in constitutional principles, and the state

claim in state statutory and contractual law. The Parish’s Motion and

supporting briefs, however, appear on their face to only address the issues

relative to the federal claim. Plaintiffs’ opposition brief likewise fails to

delineate whether its arguments are in support of the federal or state claims.

This Court, therefore, had to parse through the parties’ arguments to

determine which, if any, were relevant to Plaintiffs’ state law claim.

Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to state whether they are pursuing a

conditions-of-confinement or episodic-acts-and-omissions claim. As a result,

29 Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2019); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

30 Hare, 74 F.3d at 644.

31 Garza, 922 F.3d at 632 (citing Hare, 74 F.3d at 644).

32 See Estate of Henson v. Wichita Cty., 795 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2015).

33 Nagle v. Gusman, No. CV 12-1910, 2016 WL 768588, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2016).

this Court has addressed the arguments of both parties in the context of both

claims.

I. Federal Claims

“[M]unicipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three

elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional

rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.”34 In attempting to hold

Jefferson Parish liable under § 1983 for Joshua Belcher’s suicide, Plaintiffs

aver that the Parish is a policymaker responsible for official policies that were

the moving force behind the violation of Joshua Belcher’s constitutional due

process rights to receive adequate medical care and be protected from known

tendencies of self-harm while in custody. While the parties argue over whether

the Parish was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of Mr.

Belcher, this Court must first determine whether the Parish is a “policymaker”

of “official policies” at JPCC. Indeed, if a complained-of policy cannot be

attributed to the Parish, then the Parish cannot be held liable as a

policymaker.35

According to Plaintiffs, “Jefferson Parish knew or should have known

that [CH] and the [JPSO] developed various policies that were deliberately

indifferent to detainees who were a suicide risk.”36 Plaintiffs aver that JPSO

and/or CH have (1) a policy of understaffing the JPCC infirmary and mental

health care unit; (2) a policy that allows social workers, not medical doctors, to

remove an inmate from suicide watch without reviewing certain data; (3) a

policy of releasing detainees from suicide watch straight into general

34 Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at

694).

35 “[T]he unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality through

some sort of official action or imprimatur.” Id.

36 Doc. 138 at 2.

population rather than using a step-down method; and (4) a policy of placing

prisoners who are suicide risks into cells that contain implements of suicide.

In so stating, Plaintiffs concede that the policies they identify as a moving force

in Joshua Belcher’s suicide were not policies of the Parish, but policies of CH

and the JPSO.37

The Parish cannot, however, be liable for the acts of CH and JPSO

through a theory of respondeat superior. Indeed, “Monell and later [Supreme

Court] decisions reject municipal liability predicated on respondeat superior,

because the text of section 1983 will not bear such a reading. Consequently,

the unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality

through some sort of official action or imprimatur.”38 The policies articulated

by Plaintiffs are policies that are not directly attributable to the municipality,

but rather, JPSO and/or CH.

It appears that the only “policy” directly attributable to Jefferson Parish

as a “policymaker,” based on a generous reading of Plaintiffs’ arguments, is a

de facto policy of not monitoring the policies and practices of CH and JPSO as

it relates to the treatment of detainees at JPCC. Even if this Court could find

that such a de facto policy existed, Plaintiffs must still demonstrate “both

municipal culpability and causation. Culpability includes both the involvement

of a municipal policymaker and affirmative municipal action.”39 Plaintiffs have

demonstrated neither.

To demonstrate municipal culpability, Plaintiffs must show “affirmative

municipal action,” and that the complained-of de facto policy is one of non-

37 This conclusion is bolstered by other statements made in Plaintiffs’ brief, such as,

“Jefferson Parish should have known that [CH] had a policy of releasing detainees from

suicide watch straight into the general population,” id. at 5, and the Parish “should have

known that CH was severely understaffing its infirmary.” Id.

38 Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578.

39 Id. n.17 (internal citation omitted).

action. Second, and more importantly, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate municipal

causation; they fail to explain how Joshua Belcher’s suicide was a result of the

Parish’s de facto policy of not monitoring JPSO and CH—and not a result of

the deficient policies and practices of CH and/or JPSO. Even if the Parish did

monitor and oversee the implementation of JPSO and CH policies, for example,

Plaintiffs nevertheless fail to demonstrate how this would have prevented

Joshua Belcher’s suicide. This is because the Parish has no authority to dictate

the medical care program at JPCC or the general management of the jail more

broadly.

“Sheriffs in Louisiana are final policy makers with respect to

management of the jail. . . . [This] policy-making authority over management

of the jail is not the result of a delegation from the Parish or any other local

government entity,” but rather, the Louisiana Constitution.40 “The Parish has

no authority to manage the Sheriff’s employees [and] [t]he Parish exercises no

power or discretion in the functioning of the Sheriff’s office or the jail.”41

Indeed, the Parish is only responsible for the physical maintenance of the

brick-and-mortar jail building42 and appointing a physician or contracting with

a health care provider to tend to the medical needs of detainees.43 As it relates

to the Parish’s authority to contract with a health care provider, “[t]he sole

responsibility [of the Parish] shall be . . . its contractual obligations with [the]

health care provider.”44

Plaintiffs aver that under the Parish’s contract with CH, the Parish has

a contractual obligation to audit and verify the performance of medical

40 Jones, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (citing LA. CONST. art. 5 § 27).

41 Id.

42 See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:702.

43 Id. § 15:703.

44 Id. § 15:703(D).

services. The contract, however, provides for no such obligation. Instead, the

contract only requires the Parish to (1) “[p]rovide facilities and equipment for

use in the medical program,” (2) “[d]esignate a representative who shall be

available to Provider as the contract coordinator,” (3) “[p]ay for the

replacement and/or repair of the medical facilities and/or equipment,” and (4)

“[m]aintain all medical facilities belonging to the Parish, and for use by

Provider, in a reasonable and prudent manner.”45 Plaintiffs appear to read

Section 10 of the contract as imposing a responsibility on the Parish to audit

and verify CH’s performance. Section 10 of the contract, however, only imposes

a responsibility on CH “to permit, at all reasonable times, authorized

representatives of the Parish to inspect and have access to . . . records . . . for

the purpose of auditing and verifying performance.”46 The contract, therefore,

does not impose an obligation on the Parish to run regular audits of CH’s

performance, but merely imposes an obligation on CH to permit the Parish

access to records in the event that the Parish does conduct an audit.

Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the Parish is a “policymaker” at JPCC

for purposes of § 1983 municipal liability. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ federal claims

against the Parish must therefore fail.

II. State Law Claims

Defendant Jefferson Parish seeks dismissal of all claims against it,

which would presumably include state law claims. The Defendant’s Motion did

not, however, specifically address Plaintiffs’ state law claims. In Count V of

their Complaint, Plaintiffs raised a state law claim against the Parish for gross

negligence and intentional misconduct.47 Plaintiffs fail to specify, but this

45 Doc. 138-3 at 5–6.

46 Id. at 8.

47 Doc. 32 at 20.

Court assumes that this claim is brought under Louisiana Revised Statutes

§ 15:703, which provides:

The parish and its governing authority shall not be liable for any

action arising as a result of the actions or inactions of the physician

or health care provider [for the parish jail] . . . unless the governing

authority exercises gross negligence or willful misconduct in the

performance of its duties and obligation imposed by this Section,

and such gross negligence or willful misconduct was a substantial

factor in causing the injury.

As earlier explained, the Parish’s responsibilities are limited to the

physical maintenance of the brick-and-mortar jail building48 and either

appointing physicians or contracting with health care providers to tend to the

medical needs of detainees.49 As it relates to the Parish’s authority to contract

with a health care provider, “[t]he sole responsibility [of the Parish] shall be . .

. its contractual obligations with [the] health care provider.”50 Plaintiffs do not

allege that the Parish was grossly negligent (or engaged in willful misconduct)

in contracting with CH or in maintaining the JPCC building. Instead,

Plaintiffs appear to argue that the Parish was grossly negligent and/or engaged

in willful misconduct in its execution of the contract with CH.

Plaintiffs aver that under the Parish’s contract with CH, the Parish has

a contractual obligation to audit and verify the performance of medical

services. For the reasons discussed above, however, the contract does not

impose an obligation on the Parish to run regular audits of CH’s performance,

but merely imposes an obligation on CH to permit the Parish access to records

in the event that the Parish does conduct an audit.

Plaintiffs also appear to argue, albeit less clearly, that the Parish was

grossly negligent and/or engaged in willful misconduct by not enforcing CH’s

48 See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:702.

49 Id. § 15:703.

50 Id. § 15:703(D).

compliance with the contract. According to Plaintiffs, CH was required to

provide monthly reports and notifications of sentinel events to the Parish.

Plaintiffs argue that by failing to enforce CH’s compliance with its

responsibilities under the contract, the Parish was grossly negligent and/or

engaged in willful misconduct. Plaintiffs, however, fail to provide this Court

with law that supports its position, and this Court was unable to locate a case

that found a Louisiana municipality liable for the inactions of its independent

contractor under a contract involving pretrial detainees.51

In sum, this Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of

proof to overcome Jefferson Parish’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs

failed to demonstrate a material issue of fact regarding the Parish’s status as

a “policymaker” for purposes of § 1983 municipal liability. Further, even

accepting Plaintiffs’ arguments under state law as true, Plaintiffs failed to

establish that the Parish’s inaction rises to the level of gross negligence or led

to Belcher’s suicide. Accordingly, Jefferson Parish’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted.

51 This Court did locate a test in which a municipality could potentially be liable for the

negligence of its independent contractor in Systems Contractors Corp. v. Williams & Assocs.

Architects, 769 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2000). There, the Louisiana appellate court noted

that, under Louisiana law, a principal is generally not liable for the offense committed by

an independent contractor while performing its contractual duties with two exceptions. Id.

at 781. The first exception exists where the work performed by the independent contractor

is ultra-hazardous. Id. The second exception exists when the principal reserves the right

to supervise or control the work of the independent contractor. Id. In Systems Contractors

Corp., the City of New Orleans (through the New Orleans Aviation Board) entered into a

contract with Williams and Associates Architects for renovations to the New Orleans

International Airport. Id. at 779. The court classified the City of New Orleans, a

municipality, as the principal and Williams and Associates Architects as an independent

contractor. Id. at 781. The court found that the City of New Orleans could not be liable for

the negligence of its independent contractor because neither exception to the test applied.

Id. at 782. Perhaps in the instant matter, the second exception may be applicable. Plaintiffs

did not, however, present such an argument, and this Court will not retrofit an argument

for them.

DEFENDANTS CORRECTHEALTH AND IRONSHORE

CH and Ironshore’s Motion for Summary Judgment seeks dismissal of

Plaintiffs’ federal claims.52 Having considered the Complaint and the parties’

briefings, it appears that Plaintiffs assert claims against CH arising from both

(a) the actions of its employees and (b) its own policies/customs.

I. Claims Arising from Actions of CH Employees

“The Court first recognizes that [CH] is the private corporation

contracted to operate the medical services within JPCC, and the company and

its employees are subject to liability as state actors under § 1983.”53 Here,

Plaintiffs did not sue any individual employees of CH, but rather the entity

itself. Because Plaintiffs only sued CH, the allegations and arguments

Plaintiffs make about CH employees appear to advance a theory of vicarious

liability, “which simply is not allowed in an action filed pursuant to § 1983.”54

This does not mean, however, that the actions taken by CH employees are

irrelevant to an analysis of CH’s potential § 1983 liability. Indeed, if CH

employee actions were taken pursuant to a policy or custom of CH, then CH

may be liable for that employee’s actions.55

II. Claims Arising from CH Policies/Customs

Because CH cannot be liable for the actions of its employees under a

theory of respondeat superior, Plaintiffs must show that the deprivation of

Joshua Belcher’s “constitutional right was pursuant to a custom, policy,

52 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims against CH and Ironshore survive summary

judgment.

53 Grandpre, 2016 WL 4539442, at *8.

54 Id. (holding that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against CorrectHealth for the actions of

CorrectHealth employees were not viable as a matter of law).

55 “Without a more concrete causal connection between CorrectHealth and the actions of its

employees, Plaintiff’s claim too closely mirrors simple vicarious liability which is

unsustainable in this § 1983 action.” Sears ex rel. Sears v. Lee, No. CIV.A. 08-3418, 2010

WL 324385, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2010).

ordinance, regulation or decision.”56 “The test to determine liability for a

private prison-management corporation under § 1983 is more or less identical

to the test employed to determine municipal or local government liability.”57

As previously articulated, municipal liability under § 1983 requires proof of

three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of

constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom.58

A. Whether CH is a Policymaker

An entity can only be considered a policymaker for § 1983 purposes if it

“takes the place of the governing body in a designated area of city

administration.”59 “Policymakers act in the place of the governing body in the

area of their responsibility; they are not supervised except as to the totality of

their performance.”60

Defendants do not refute that CH is an official policymaker for § 1983

purposes. To the contrary, CH’s own corporate representative, Jean Llovet,

testified that “[CH’s] policies control as to medical decisions and [CH] has

medical autonomy.”61 Additionally, as CH was selected by the Parish to run

JPCC’s medical care program, it acts in place of the municipal governing body.

CH is not supervised. Jefferson Parish has no control over CH policies

and practices, and JPSO “conceded that it provides no oversight of [CH’s]

policies, practices, or procedures” as it relates to CH suicide prevention

policies.62 Even if JPSO did have the authority to supervise CH, it is

56 Robichaux v. Lafourche Par. Det. Ctr., No. CV 17-5680, 2017 WL 5495791, at *8 (E.D. La.

Oct. 10, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-5680, 2017 WL 5483780

(E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2017).

57 Id. (citing Alfred v. Corr. Corp., No. 08-CV-0643, 2009 WL 789649, at *2 n.1 (W.D. La. Mar.

24, 2009)).

58 Id. at *9 (citing Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578).

59 Webster v. Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984).

60 Id. (quoting Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).

61 Doc. 148 at 8.

62 Doc. 136 at 5 (citing Doc. 136-3 at 4).

undisputed that it exercised no such authority over CH as it relates to the

events surrounding Joshua Belcher’s pretrial detention. Accordingly, CH is a

“policymaker” for purposes of § 1983 liability.

B. Identification of CH Policies/Customs

An official policy is:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is

officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s

lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have

delegated policy-making authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees,

which, although not authorized by officially adopted and

promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute

a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or

constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the

governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that

body had delegated policy-making authority. Actions of officers or

employees of a municipality do not render the municipality liable

under § 1983 unless they execute official policy as above defined.63

“[A] facially innocuous policy will support liability if it was promulgated with

deliberate indifference to the ‘known or obvious consequences’ that

constitutional violations would result.”64

Plaintiffs have pointed to numerous official, written policies and several

de facto policies of CH. Defendants make no argument to contest this element.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden.

C. Whether CH Policies/Custom were a Moving Force

Whether a policy can be fairly considered a “moving force” behind a

plaintiff’s constitutional violation requires an assessment of both culpability

and causation.65 The two types of claims in Fourteenth Amendment suits by

pretrial detainees against municipalities—episodic-acts-and-omissions claims

63 Webster, 735 F.2d at 841.

64 Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579.

65 Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 580.

or conditions-of-confinement claims—each have tests that address culpability

and causation. Plaintiffs, unfortunately, made no effort to identify which type

of claim they are pursuing. This Court, therefore, must interpret the parties’

arguments in the context of both claims.

1. Episodic Acts or Omissions

“To establish municipal liability in an episodic-act case, a plaintiff must

show (1) that the municipal employee violated the pretrial detainee’s clearly

established constitutional rights with subjective deliberate indifference; and

(2) that this violation resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted and

maintained with objective deliberate indifference.”66 “To apply [this] test, each

individual’s subjective deliberate indifference must be examined separately.”67

Accordingly, Plaintiffs must first point to a municipal employee who

violated Joshua Belcher’s constitutional rights.68 Plaintiffs point to one CH

employee, David Jennings. Plaintiffs contend that CH’s “seminal act of

deliberate indifference was ordering the removal of Josh from suicide watch.

Jenning’s [sic] decision to order Josh’s removal was borne from an abject failure

of policy, procedure, and practice of how to identify suicide risk.”69

Plaintiffs must show that Jennings violated Belcher’s rights with

subjective deliberate indifference.70 Once this showing is met, Plaintiffs must

establish how this violation emanated from a CH policy or custom that was

maintained with objective deliberate indifference.71

66 Garza, 922 F.3d at 634 (quoting Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2008))

(internal quotation marks omitted).

67 Lawson v. Dallas Cty., 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002).

68 Garza, 922 F.3d at 637.

69 Doc. 136 at 11.

70 Garza, 922 F.3d at 637

71 Id.

To make a showing of subjective deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must

show that a municipal employee (1) was aware of facts from which an inference

of a substantial risk of serious harm to an individual could be drawn and that

he (2) actually drew the inference.72 In other words, “a prison official may be

held liable . . . only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious

harm and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate

it.”73 A plaintiff need not show that the official’s response indicated a subjective

intention that the harm occur.74

“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial

risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including

inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a

prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was

obvious.”75

For example, if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence

showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was

longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by

prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the

defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information

concerning the risk and thus must have known about it, then such

72 Id. at 634.

73 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

74 Id. at 842 (“[A]n Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or

failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the

official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”).

CH and Ironshore urge this Court to adhere to a “subjective intention that the harm occur”

requirement. Indeed, this Court espoused such a standard in an Order and Reasons on

Jefferson Parish’s earlier Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 28 at 4. Subsequent to this Court’s Order

and Reasons, however, the Fifth Circuit in Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626 (5th Cir.

2019), clarified the subjective deliberate indifference standard. In Garza, the Fifth Circuit

noted that the “requirement” that a municipal official have a “subjective intention that the

harm occur” erroneously elevated the appropriate deliberate indifference standard as

articulated in Farmer v. Brennan. Id. at 634 (noting that the “‘intention’ requirement,

though taken from statements in decisions of our court, is contrary to the weight of our

case law and to the Supreme Court precedent from which our cases flow”).

75 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (internal citation omitted).

evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the

defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk.76

However, “it remains open to the official to prove that they were unaware even

of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety.”77

In the instant matter, this Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented

sufficient evidence that David Jennings acted with subjective deliberate

indifference to the serious medical needs of Joshua Belcher. Jennings was a

full-time employee of CH responsible for the mental health treatment of the

roughly 900 inmates at JPCC. Jennings is a licensed clinical social worker. On

August 13, 2017, Joshua Belcher attempted to commit suicide while he was

being detained at JPCC. As a result of this failed attempt, he was sent to the

infirmary and placed on suicide watch. Jennings evaluated Belcher twice: first

on August 14, 2017, and again on August 15, 2017, when he discharged him

from suicide watch. Plaintiffs aver, and Defendants do not dispute, that both

evaluations lasted less than twenty minutes.78 Defendants argue that on the

day Belcher was discharged from suicide watch, Jennings’ exam findings of

Belcher were normal. Jennings also asked him about suicidal ideations, and

Belcher denied having any.

Defendants argue that Jennings could not have had subjective

knowledge that Belcher presented a substantial risk of committing suicide

where the decedent denied having suicidal thoughts. Defendants cite to Minix

76 Id. at 842–43 (internal quotation marks omitted).

77 Id. at 844.

78 The approximately twenty minutes in which Jennings “evaluated” Belcher includes the

time in which Jennings observed Belcher on the infirmary cameras, spoke to the nurse

about Belcher’s behavior while in the infirmary, and then met with Belcher. It can

therefore be inferred that the time in which Jennings actually spoke with Belcher was

much less than twenty minutes. See Doc. 136-12 at 25–26. In fact, Jennings testified that

he normally spends “5 to 10 minutes, maybe 15 minutes” talking to the inmate during an

evaluation. Id. at 26.

v. Canarecci, a case from the Seventh Circuit, in support.79 In Minix, the

decedent attempted suicide in the month prior to his detention.80 He then spent

about a month in jail without any actual attempt at committing suicide and

was sent to suicide watch only because a blade was missing from his razor.81

After two days of observation on suicide watch, the decedent denied suicidal

ideation and “displayed no such strange behavior or any obvious signs that he

was an imminent suicide risk.”82 He committed suicide the day he was

discharged from suicide watch.83 The Seventh Circuit held that the employee

who discharged the decedent from suicide watch could not have been

subjectively deliberately indifferent to the decedent’s suicide risk because the

decedent denied suicidal ideations.84 Minix, however, is easily distinguishable

from the matter at hand.

Unlike the decedent in Minix, who made no prior suicide attempt while

in prison and was placed on suicide watch only because of a missing razor,

Belcher’s behavior at JPCC unambiguously evidenced his elevated risk for

suicide. At the time Jennings discharged Belcher from suicide watch on August

15, 2017, Jennings knew, at a minimum, that: (1) Belcher had made an actual

suicide attempt in JPCC on August 13, 2017; (2) Belcher had been experiencing

symptoms of withdrawal while at JPCC; and (3) less than two weeks prior, his

(Jenning’s) premature discharge of an inmate from suicide watch resulted in

the successful suicide of Jerome Bell. Despite this knowledge, Jennings

discharged Belcher from suicide watch after two interviews with Belcher, each

79 597 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 2010).

80 Id. at 828.

81 Id.

82 Id. at 833.

83 Id. at 829.

84 Id. at 833.

of which lasted less than twenty minutes, and without conducting a pertinent

diagnostic assessment.

A reasonable factfinder could therefore conclude that Jennings drew an

inference of a substantial risk of harm to Belcher from the very fact that

Belcher’s risk of suicide was obvious.85 Moreover, by ordering Belcher’s

discharge from suicide watch with full knowledge of Belcher’s high risk of self-

harm, a factfinder could easily find that Jennings disregarded that risk.

Having demonstrated that a reasonable factfinder could find Jennings

subjectively indifferent to Belcher’s substantial risk of harm, Plaintiffs must

also show how this violation emanated from a policy or custom that CH

maintained with objective deliberate indifference. Here too, Plaintiffs meet

their burden by demonstrating that Jennings was simply following CH policies

and practices when he discharged Belcher from suicide watch.

First, CH’s suicide prevention policy was authored by Jean Llovet, a

nurse and corporate representative for CH. Llovet has written no other suicide

prevention policies, and she testified that she was not qualified to make

decisions regarding the removal of someone from suicide watch.86 She even

acknowledged that she could not identify any industry standards or written

guidelines for completing a suicide risk assessment to determine when to

remove someone from suicide watch.87 Despite this, CH thought it was prudent

to have her author its suicide prevention policy.

Second, CH did not provide Jennings (or presumably, any of its other

employees) with written criteria to follow or standards to abide by when

determining whether an inmate should be removed from suicide watch.

85 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (internal citation omitted).

86 Doc. 136-4 at 18–19.

87 Id.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ expert testimony supports a finding of objective

deliberate indifference by CH as well. Dr. Jeremy Colley opined that the

psychiatric services received by Belcher at JPCC grossly departed from the

standard of care with regard to suicide risk assessment and management and

that these gross departures caused Belcher’s death by suicide.88 Dr. Colley

noted that CH policies and practices permitted Jennings to release Belcher

from suicide watch (a) without pertinent diagnostic testing or risk factor

assessment, (b) relying solely on the decedent’s own account of his mental

state, and (c) without developing a plan for treatment after discharge.89 Indeed,

Dr. Colley referred to CH’s suicide prevention policy as “the worst risk

assessment [he has] yet to encounter in [his] career.”90

Dr. Venters also identified deviations and deficiencies in CH policies that

paved the way for Joshua Belcher’s suicide. Specifically, Dr. Venters identified

deficiencies surrounding (1) CH’s policies for handling inmates with alcohol or

heroin withdrawal; (2) CH’s policies for placement and transfer of inmates with

suicide risk and other mental health problems; and (3) CH’s policies for

monitoring inmates after being discharged from suicide watch.91

Accordingly, the Court finds sufficient evidence to show that Jennings’

decision to discharge Belcher from suicide watch emanated from the policies

and practices of CH that were maintained and adopted with objective

deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs, therefore, can proceed to trial on an episodic-

acts-or-omissions theory of recovery against CH as outlined herein

2. Conditions of Confinement

88 Doc. 136-17 at 2.

89 Id. at 11.

90 Id. at 13.

91 See Doc. 136 at 22. This Court was unable to locate Dr. Venters’ expert report; it appears

Plaintiffs failed to attach it. Regardless, Dr. Colley’s expert report is sufficient to overcome

summary judgment on this issue.

“A condition is usually the manifestation of an explicit policy or

restriction: the number of bunks per cell, mail privileges, disciplinary

segregation, etc.”92 “[I]solated examples of illness, injury, or even death,

standing alone, cannot prove that conditions of confinement are

constitutionally inadequate.”93 “Rather, a detainee challenging jail conditions

must demonstrate a pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing for

his basic human needs; any lesser showing cannot prove punishment in

violation of the detainee’s Due Process rights.”94

“If a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate

goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the

purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not

constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.”95 Whatever the

condition or restriction may be, it “must be ‘not reasonably related to a

legitimate governmental objective’ and must cause the inmate’s constitutional

deprivation.”96

Thus, “[t]o maintain a condition-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must

show (1) a condition of an inmate’s confinement that is (2) not reasonably

related to a legitimate governmental interest and that (3) violated the inmate’s

constitutional rights.”97

In the instant Motion, Plaintiffs identify numerous written and de facto

policies of CH. Plaintiffs and Defendants also spend considerable time arguing

over whether these policies played a role in CH’s violation of Joshua Belcher’s

92 Shepherd v. Dallas Cty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009).

93 Id. at 454.

94 Id.

95 Garza, 922 F.3d at 632 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)).

96 Id. at 632–33 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 535).

97 Nagle, 2016 WL 768588, at *9 (citing Edler v. Hockley Cty. Comm’rs Court, 589 F. App’x

664, 668 (5th Cir. 2014)).

constitutional rights. Both parties fail, however, to make any argument about

whether these policies were reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

interest—an element necessary for a conditions-of-confinement claim.

Defendants, as the movants seeking dismissal of all federal claims against

them, bear the burden of showing no issue of material fact as to this condition-

of-confinement theory.98 As the issue was not briefed, the Court declines to

fully address the merits of Plaintiffs’ condition-of-confinement claim here.

The Court does find, however, that there is sufficient evidence for

Plaintiffs’ claim to survive summary judgment. As the Court detailed in the

previous section, there is evidence of serious deficiencies in CH’s assessment

and treatment of suicidal inmates. A reasonable factfinder could therefore

conclude that CH’s policies, or lack thereof, create a condition of confinement,

that is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest, and that

violates the constitutional rights of inmates at JPCC. Plaintiffs may therefore

proceed with this theory of recovery.

DEFENDANTS NEWELL NORMAND AND JOSEPH LOPINTO

Defendants Newell Normand and Joseph Lopinto are sued by Plaintiffs

in their individual and official capacities as current and former Sheriffs of

Jefferson Parish. These Defendants seek dismissal of all § 1983 claims against

them.99 This Court will assess each claim in turn.

I. Individual Capacity Claims

“Supervisory officials may be held [individually] liable only if: (i) they

affirmatively participate in acts that cause [a] constitutional deprivation; or

(ii) implement unconstitutional policies that causally result in plaintiff’s

98 Engstrom, 47 F.3d at 1462.

99 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims remain.

injury.”100 Plaintiffs present this Court with no evidence—and make no

allegations—of the individual involvement or participation of Defendants

Normand and/or Lopinto in the events surrounding Joshua Belcher’s suicide.

As a result, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Normand and Lopinto in

their individual capacities must fail.

II. Official Capacity Claims

“A suit against a government official in his official capacity is treated as

suit against the entity.”101 A suit against the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs in their

official capacities must therefore be treated as a suit against the municipal

entity of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office. Again, the test for municipal

liability requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and

a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or

custom.”102

A. Whether JPSO is a Policymaker

An entity can only be considered a policymaker for § 1983 purposes if it

“takes the place of the governing body in a designated area of city

administration.”103 “Policymakers act in the place of the governing body in the

area of their responsibility; they are not supervised except as to the totality of

their performance.”104

“Sheriffs in Louisiana are final policy makers with respect to

management of the jail . . . [This] policy-making authority over management

of the jail is not the result of a delegation from the Parish or any other local

100 Mouille v. City of Live Oak, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Thompkins v. Belt,

828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)).

101 Lee v. Morial, No. CIV. A. 99-2952, 2000 WL 726882, at *2 (E.D. La. June 2, 2000) (citing

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985)).

102 Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

103 Webster, 735 F.2d at 841.

104 Id. (quoting Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769 (en banc)).

government entity,” but rather, the Louisiana Constitution.105 “The Parish has

no authority to manage the Sheriff’s employees [and] [t]he Parish exercises no

power or discretion in the functioning of the Sheriff’s office or the jail.”106

Moreover, “[e]ach sheriff shall be the keeper of the public jail of his parish.”107

Because Sheriffs are the keepers of parish jails and the final

policymakers with respect to jail management, this Court finds that Sheriffs

Normand and Lopinto in their official capacities (hereinafter “JPSO”) are

“policymakers” for purposes of § 1983 liability.

B. Identification of JPSO Policies/Custom

Plaintiffs point to two varieties of policy and/or custom that they

attribute to JPSO: (1) those related to medical treatment and (2) those related

to jail management.

As to medical treatment, Plaintiffs attempt to place responsibility for

Joshua Belcher’s medical treatment with both CH and JPSO, arguing that the

two “share” medical responsibilities. As this Court has previously found,

however, CH is the only entity responsible for providing medical care to

inmates at JPCC. Plaintiffs also attempt to charge JPSO with liability for the

“practice[s] of the entire mental health and suicide prevention staff (one social

worker).”108 “Monell and later [Supreme Court] decisions,” however, “reject

municipal liability predicated on respondeat superior.” Consequently, the

unconstitutional conduct of JPSO must be directly attributable to the

municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur.”109 JPSO,

105 Jones, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (citing LA. CONST. art. 5 § 27).

106 Id.

107 LA. REV. STAT. § 15:704.

108 Doc. 139 at 10.

109 Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578.

therefore, cannot be liable for (1) the quality of medical care provided by CH or

(2) the actions/inactions of a CH employee.

Plaintiffs also argue that JPSO policies of jail management are

responsible for Belcher’s suicided. As Plaintiffs note:

The Sheriff is additionally liable for a reason other than assisting

to providing medical care. The Sheriff placed Josh into a cell where

another inmate who was also released from suicide watch

committed suicide . . . Josh was remanded to this particular cell

directly from suicide watch, escorted by at least one Sheriff’s

Deputy. The Sheriff’s Office chose which cell to place Josh into.110

Plaintiffs thus argue that JPSO had a custom of placing inmates who were a

known risk of suicide and/or who were discharged from suicide watch into cells

with implements of suicide and without proper monitoring standards.

Plaintiffs argue that this is a “custom” for § 1983 purposes, evidenced by the

suicides of Jerome Bell and Jatory Evans—which took place shortly before and

after Joshua Belcher’s and in a manner identical to Joshua Belcher.

The Court acknowledges that a policy or custom for § 1983 municipal

liability need not be a formal, written policy, but may be “[a] persistent,

widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not

authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well

settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.”111

Plaintiffs, however, have not presented sufficient evidence to establish that the

above described practices were official policy of JPSO at the time of Joshua

Belcher’s suicide.

It is true that Joshua Belcher, Jatory Evans, and Jerome Bell were all

transferred to isolation-type cells in the Administrative Segregation pod

following their time on suicide watch. There is no evidence, however, that

110 Doc. 139 at 4–5.

111 Webster, 735 F.2d at 841.

Joshua Belcher, Jatory Evans, and Jerome Bell were transferred to the

Administrative Segregation pod because they were leaving suicide watch. To

the contrary, there is evidence that extraneous circumstances led to JPSO’s

decision to transfer the inmates to those particular cells.112 Plaintiffs,

therefore, can only point to the existence of the one suicide preceding Belcher’s

as evidence of JPSO’s customary practice.

Plaintiffs look to the case of Woodard v. Correctional Medical Services of

Illinois, Inc., as supporting their proposition that the one prior suicide was

sufficient to evidence a JPSO policy.113 In Woodard, the Seventh Circuit found

that defendants “[do] not get a ‘one free suicide’ pass” and “that evidence of a

single violation of federal rights can trigger municipal liability if the violation

was a ‘highly predictable consequence’ of the municipality’s failure to act.”114

Woodard’s holding, however, does not create the corollary that one suicide is

sufficient to demonstrate municipal liability. Rather, the Woodard court’s

statements were made with respect to causation, finding that the lack of prior

suicides at the prison did not obviate the possibility that the defendant’s

policies led to the inmate’s suicide. Unlike in Woodard, Plaintiffs in the current

matter have not presented any evidence of practices constituting policy or

112 On August 13, Joshua Belcher informed JPSO that he felt his life was in danger because

of certain enemies he had made in the pod. Doc. 136-15 at 20. JPSO accordingly arranged

for his transfer to another cell. While in the Southwing “holding cell” awaiting transfer,

Belcher made his first suicide attempt. Security records for the following day indicate that

Belcher had been placed on suicide watch and “that once cleared, will be sent to

administrative segregation due to fears of safety.” Doc. 139-7 at 3. The evidence therefore

suggests that Belcher was released to the Administrative Segregation pod because of his

initial fear of other inmates, not because he was leaving suicide watch. Additionally, JPSO

records indicate that Jatory Evans “wanted to be placed into the Isolation Cell” because

“he was having problems with others on the tier and was afraid he would get into trouble.”

Doc. 136-14 at 5. These facts constitute the only evidence the Court could find as to why

the inmates were transferred to the Administrative Segregation pod.

113 368 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2004).

114 Id. at 129.

custom. “To prevail on a de facto policy theory, plaintiffs must demonstrate

that [JPSO’s] conduct was sufficiently extended or pervasive, or otherwise

typical of extended or pervasive misconduct by other officials.”115 As there is no

evidence that the transfer of inmates from suicide watch to Administrative

Segregation was typical conduct for JPSO, Plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate that such conduct constituted JPSO policy.

Additionally, even if such a practice existed, there is no evidence that the

custom of moving inmates into the Administrative Segregation pod was

enacted with the deliberate indifference necessary to support a finding of

liability.116 Rather, the evidence consistently demonstrates that any deliberate

indifference as to “the known or obvious consequences” of Belcher’s housing is

attributable to CH, not JPSO. In fact, Plaintiffs own expert repeatedly noted

that it was David Jennings who should have alerted JPSO to the dangers of

solitary housing. Plaintiffs’ expert found that it was Jennings who “fail[ed] to

even acknowledge the suicide risk that the next housing area will pose to Mr.

Belcher” and that it was Jennings’ approval of Belcher’s transfer to a

segregation unit that constituted a “gross deviation from NCCHC and

community standards for non-acutely suicidal patients.”117 Jennings himself

testified that he could have informed JPSO that Belcher required communal

housing or remained at an elevated suicide risk, but that he found such actions

unnecessary as he believed Belcher to be at a “low risk” for suicide.118 Plaintiffs

even characterize Belcher’s transfer to the isolation cell as inappropriate

115 Nagle, 2016 WL 768588, at *9 (quoting Estate of Hensen v. Wichita Cty., Tex., 795 F.3d

456, 465 (5th Cir. 2015)).

116 “[A] facially innocuous policy will support liability if it was promulgated with deliberate

indifference to the ‘known or obvious consequences’ that constitutional violations would

result.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579.

117 Doc. 139-7 at 8.

118 Doc. 136-12 at 37–39.

“healthcare procedure.”119 To find deliberate indifference on behalf of JPSO

would be to require JPSO to make an additional, independent examination of

Belcher’s mental health, which was not an obligation of JPSO.

Additionally, the Court notes that JPSO sent Belcher to Administrative

Segregation out of fears for his safety:120 a fact that cuts directly against a

finding of deliberate indifference.

Having already found that JPSO cannot be vicariously liable for the acts

or omissions of CH, this Court cannot find any evidence of JPSO policy or

custom sufficient to support a finding of municipal liability. Plaintiffs’ claims

against JPSO are accordingly dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Jefferson Parish’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 110) is GRANTED, and all claims against it are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Defendants CorrectHealth and Ironshore’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 131) is DENIED. All claims against these Defendants remain

pending, and Plaintiffs may proceed to trial on an (1) episodic-acts-or-

omissions theory of recovery and (2) a condition-of-confinement theory of

recovery.

Defendants Lopinto and Normand’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 132) is GRANTED, and all claims against them are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

119 Doc 139-8 at 6.

120 Doc. 139-7 at 3.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 2nd day of October, 2020.

Gg TRICHE MILAZZO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

32