Claudet v. Cytec Retirement Plan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CLAUDET CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 17-10027

CYTEC RETIREMENT PLAN ET AL SECTION "L" (1)

ORDER & REASONS

Pending before the Court is a Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement,

R. Doc. 75, and a Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Case Contribution Award,

R. Doc. 72. A final fairness was conducted on Wednesday, June 10, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. The Court

heard from both the advocates of the Settlement and the objector.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a reduction of retirement benefits. R. Doc. 12 at 1. Plaintiff Aman

Joseph Claudet is a retired beneficiary of Defendant Cytec Retirement Plan (“the Plan”). R. Doc. 12

at 1. In addition to Cytec Retirement Plan, Plaintiff brought claims against Defendant Cytec

Industries, Inc. (“Cytec”) and Defendant Solvay USA, Inc. (“Solvay”) on behalf of himself and at

least 320 similarly situated individuals who were allegedly purposefully deprived of retirement

benefits by Defendants. R. Doc. 12 at 1-2.

Mr. Claudet avers as an employee of Cytec, he participated in Cytec’s retirement plan,

which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). R. Doc. 12 at 3.

The plan allows participants to receive a “life annuity” that guarantees a monthly pension payment

for the remainder of a retiree’s life. R. Doc. 12 at 3. Married retirees can elect to receive a reduced

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monthly pension benefit in order to provide continuing benefits to a spouse that survives the retiree.

R. Doc. 12 at 4. The plan also contains a “pop-up feature,” pursuant to which a retiree who is

predeceased by his or her spouse or beneficiary will have the monthly benefit increased to the

Single Life Annuity benefit for the remainder of his or her life. R. Doc. 12 at 4.

Mr. Claudet retired in 2002 and began receiving benefits under the Plan. R. Doc. 12 at 5.

He elected the 100% continuing benefit option for his wife. R. Doc. 12 at 4. In 2014, the Plan was

amended, and in 2015, Defendant Solvay acquired Defendant Cytec. R. Doc. 12 at 5. In 2016, Mr.

Claudet received a letter from Solvay stating that his pension benefits had been “incorrectly

calculated” and that his benefits would be reduced. R. Doc. 12 at 6. Plaintiff sought clarification

of this change and through various communications with Defendants, learned that this reduction

in benefits, which was approximately $40 per month, was characterized as an actuarial cost

associated with the pop-up feature that had erroneously not been charged to the plan participants

electing such a feature. R. Docs. 12 at 6, 79 at 4. Accordingly, Mr. Claudet made an ERISA claim

for restoration of his benefits. R. Doc. 12 at 6. This claim was denied, and Mr. Claudet appealed

the denial. R. Doc. 12 at 7. Mr. Claudet’s appeal was also denied. R. Doc. 12 at 6. Having

exhausted his administrative appeals, he filed the present class action on behalf of himself and

others similarly situated.

Defendants answered the complaint, generally denying liability. R. Doc. 7. Defendants take

the position that the charge is justified because the relevant regulations require that a Qualified

Joint and Survivor Annuity be “at least as valuable as any other option form of benefit.” 26 C.F.R.

§ 1.401(a)-20. In Defendants view, the pop-up charge equalizes the value of the Qualified Joint

and Survivor Annuity with other optional forms of benefits. Further, Defendants raise eleven

defenses including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, limitation of remedies

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under ERISA, and statute of limitations. R. Doc. 7.

The Court granted Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to certify the class on May 16, 2018, defining

the class as:

All vested participants in the Cytec Retirement Plan who from January 1, 1994 to

December 31, 2013 elected a joint and survivor benefit option pursuant to the 1994

or 1997 Cytec Retirement Plan and were subject to a reduction of monthly benefits

as a result of the actuarial charges of the “pop-up” feature, as described in the Cytec

Retirement Plan 2015 Voluntary Correction Program (and their beneficiaries, if

they are deceased or incompetent).

R. Doc. 42. The Court approved a Classwide Notice on June 26, 2018. R. Doc. 48.

On January 24, 2019, the Court received notice that the parties had reach a tentative

settlement agreement, R. Doc. 59, and the case was administratively stayed pending approval. R.

Doc. 60. On February 4, 2020, the parties jointly filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of the

Settlement Agreement, Approval of Amended Class for Settlement Purposes, and Approval of

Class Notices. R. Doc. 62.

A preliminary fairness hearing was held on March 6, 2020. R. Doc. 69. At the hearing, the

parties explained that after years of contentious litigation and negotiation, they had reached a

Settlement Agreement that would provide $1.825 million to settle the claims of all class members.

After oral argument, the Court granted preliminary approval, finding that the Settlement was fair,

reasonable, adequate, and in the best interest of the class as a whole. The Court further approved

the proposed notices designed to alert all class members of their rights and responsibilities with

respect to the Settlement.

II. PENDING MOTION

A. Motion for Final Approval [R. Doc. 75]

As stated above, the Settlement Agreement obligates Defendants to pay approximately

$1.825 million to resolve the claims of all class members. Notably, the Settlement Agreement

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broadens the Class Definition to include:

All vested participants in the Plan who elected or have a right to elect an optional

joint and survivor benefit and who are, were or would be subject to a reduction of

monthly benefits as a result of the imposition of charges attributable to the cost of

the “pop-up” feature under the Plan’s optional joint and survivor benefits (and their

beneficiaries, if they are deceased or incompetent).

R. Doc. 62-2 at 10. This Class includes nearly 1,000 individuals. Essentially, the Settlement covers

not only vested plan participants whose benefits were reduced as a result of the pop-up actuarial

charge, but also those who will, in the future, receive such a charge. R. Doc. 62-2 at 4.

The Settlement provides for settlement funds to be divided among the “in pay” and “not in

pay” groups. R. Doc. 62-2 at 10. The “in pay” group consists of Class Members whose benefits

commenced on or before October 1, 2018. $1.540 million is allocated to this group and will

compensate these individuals with 75% of the cost arising from the pop-up charge. In contrast, the

“not in pay” group consists of individuals who have not yet elected, but may, in the future, choose

to elect a form of benefits for which a pop-up charge is applied. Because the number of individuals

in this group is unknown, the value of the “not in pay” group’s recovery cannot be determined, but

the actuarily based estimated value is $285,000.00. R. Doc. 62-2 at 10. Participating Class

Members agree to release all claims related to the implementation of the pop-up charge. R. Doc.

62-2 at 11. Class Members can elect to receive Settlement benefits in a variety of ways that are all

actuarially equivalent. R. Doc. 62-2 at 12. The Settlement will be administered by Defendants, at

Defendant’s sole cost, and individual recoveries shall not be reduced by attorney fees or other

costs, which were negotiated separately. R. Doc. 62-2 at 3.

Plaintiffs now seek final approval of the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs argue that final

approval is warranted because the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, in light of the Rule

23(e)(2) factors. R. Doc. 75-2 at 14. Notably, only one class member objects to the Settlement:

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class representative Mr. Claudet. R. Doc. 79.

B. Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Case Contribution Award [R.

Doc. 72]

Class Counsel additionally seeks an award of $350,000 in attorney fees, $37,000 in costs,

and a $5,000 Case Contribution Award to Mr. Claudet. R. Doc. 72 at 1. Class Counsel stresses that

the award will not be deducted from Class Members’ recovery under the terms of the Settlement

and argues that the requested award is reasonable in light of the twelve Johnson factors under

either a percentage analysis or a lodestar analysis.

III. LAW & DISCUSSION

The Court will consider whether final approval is warranted before turning to the requested

attorney fees and costs.

A. Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement

Under Rule 23, “[r]eview of a proposed class action settlement generally involves two

hearings,” the first of which is a “preliminary fairness” evaluation made by the Court. Manual for

Complex Litigation § 21.632 (4th ed. 2004). Indeed, within the Fifth Circuit it is routine to conduct

a preliminary fairness evaluation prior to the issuance of notice. See, e.g., Cope v. Duggins, 2001

WL 333102, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2001); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552, 555 (E.D. La.

1993). During this evaluation, the Court must “make a preliminary determination that the proposed

class satisfies the criteria set out in Rule 23(a) and at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b).”

Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.632. Additionally, the Court “must make a preliminary

determination on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms and must

direct the preparation of notice of the certification, proposed settlement, and date of the final

fairness hearing.” Id. During the preliminary evaluation, the Court will examine the submitted

materials and determine whether the proposed settlement appears fair on its face. See In re

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Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981). If the Court finds

portions of the proposed settlement problematic, it may indicate preliminary disapproval of the

agreement and recommend that the parties make certain revisions or modifications. See In re

Domestic Air Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 313 (N.D. Ga.1993).

After granting preliminary approval and allowing the notice process to move forward, the

Court conducts a more thorough and rigorous analysis of the same factors in order to determine

the appropriateness of granting final approval. Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.6; see also In

re OCA, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., 2008 WL 4681369, at *11 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2008).

“Counsel for the class and the other settling parties bear the burden of persuasion that the proposed

settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.631; In re Vioxx

Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 459 (E.D. La. 2006).

Having granted preliminary approval on March 6, 2020, the Court is now required to render

a determination on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the Settlement Agreement. Courts

may consider a large number of factors when conducting this inquiry. Traditionally, courts in the

Fifth Circuit consider the following six factors, from Reed v. General Motors Corp., when making

this determination: (1) the existence of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely

duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings; (4) plaintiffs’ probability of success; (5)

the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of class counsel, class representatives, and

absent class members. 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983).

Additionally, in 2018, Rule 23 was amended to provide uniform guidance regarding this

determination. Rule 23(e)(2) instructs courts to consider whether:

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class;

(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm's length;

(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:

(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;

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(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class,

including the method of processing class-member claims;

(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of

payment; and

(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and

(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The Advisory Committee’s notes to the 2018 amendments, however,

clearly indicate that the changes to the rule are meant to “focus the court and the lawyers on the

core concerns of procedure and substance that should guide the decision whether to approve the

proposal,” rather than “displace any factor” sanctioned by the circuit courts. Id. Accordingly, the

Court will consider the Rule 23 requirements as informed by the Reed factors.

1. Adequacy of Representation

The adequacy requirement mandates an inquiry into “the zeal and competence of the

representative[s'] counsel and . . . the willingness and ability of the representative[s] to take an

active role in and control the litigation and to protect the interests of absentees.” Berger v. Compaq

Comput. Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2001).

The Court has no concerns about the adequacy of representation here. Class Counsel

worked diligently to advocate for the entire class, as evidenced by their review of thousands of

documents, consultations with an actuarial experts, and the months-long negotiation of a

Settlement that provides each class member with 75% of their maximum recovery. The class

representative, Mr. Claudet, similarly played an active role in these negotiations and throughout

the duration of this litigation. This factor accordingly weighs in favor of approval.

2. Arm’s Length Negotiation

A strong presumption exists in favor of settlement if the district court determines that the

settlement resulted from arms-length negotiations between experienced counsel and was not

tainted by fraud or collusion. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d

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Cir. 2005); see also In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, MDL 2179, 295 F.R.D. 112,

146 (E.D. La. 2013); Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 830, 844 (E.D. La. 2007);

In re Train Derailment Near Amite Louisiana, MDL 1531, 2006 WL 1561470, at *19 (E.D. La.

May 24, 2006). Fraud or collusion, either actual or perceived, may be suspected when the attorneys

have made agreements amongst themselves regarding the allocation of attorney fees, especially

when the common benefit fee is deducted directly from the settlement fund. Courts must be

particularly diligent when evaluating a proposed settlement in which the fee award has been

negotiated by class counsel because pecuniary self-interest has long been cited by courts and

scholars as a threat to the performance of counsel’s professional and fiduciary obligations to class

members. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002); John

C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative

Litigation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 370, 385–93 (2002); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class

as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 958–60 & n. 132 (1998).

The Court is satisfied that this Settlement Agreement is the product of a hard-fought

negotiation between experienced counsel that occurred after significant discovery and motion

practice. Further, although attorneys’ fees and costs were negotiated by class counsel, raising the

specter of “pecuniary self interest,” these sums will be not be deducted from the overall Settlement

funds directed to Plaintiffs’ recovery, and the requested fees are subject to Court approval.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of final approval.

3. Adequacy of Relief

Determining whether the proposed relief is adequate requires the Court to consider several

of the Reed factors, namely, (1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation, (2)

the stage of the proceedings, (3) plaintiffs’ probability of success on the merits, (4) the range of

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possible recovery, and (5) the opinions of class counsel, class representatives, and absent class

members. Here, these factors all indicate that the proposed relief is adequate. The Court discusses

each factor in turn.

a. The Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation

This factor requires courts to compare the benefits and risks of the proposed settlement as

well as the potential future relief in light of the uncertainties of the litigation. In re Oil Spill by Oil

Rig Deepwater Horizon, 295 F.R.D. at 147.

This case has been active for almost three years, during which the parties have grappled

with complex questions of law and fact. The case involves the application of ERISA and presents

complicated questions involving plan interpretation, actuarial costs, and pension payments.

Thousands of documents have been reviewed and the parties have spent hundreds of hours

developing their respective cases with the help of actuarial experts. Proceeding to trial in this case

would greatly increase the number of hours worked by attorneys on both sides and generate

additional costs without the guarantee of a favorable verdict. Further, the Settlement requires

Defendants to bear the expenses associated with Settlement administration in addition to attorneys’

fees and costs generated during this litigation. This provision is particularly relevant because, were

this case to go to trial, an award of attorneys’ fees against the defendant would be at the Court’s

discretion after a consideration of whether the defendant’s actions were made in bad faith and

whether such an award would serve as a deterrent, among other factors. See Hardt v. Reliance

Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 256, 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2159, 176 L. Ed. 2d 998 (2010). Lastly,

proceeding to trial would necessarily delay the resolution of this matter to the detriment of the

entire class, which is largely composed of retirees of advances ages. Accordingly, this factor

weighs in favor of approval.

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b. The Stage of the Proceedings

The stage of the proceedings and the nature and extent of discovery can be significant

factors in evaluating the fairness of a settlement. This factor requires courts to consider “whether

the parties have obtained sufficient information to evaluate the merits of the competing positions.”

In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 295 F.R.D. at 148 (quoting In re Educ. Testing Serv.

Praxis Principles of Learning and Teaching: Grades 7–12 Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 612, 620 (E.D.

La. 2006)). “Thus, the question is not whether the parties have completed a particular amount of

discovery, but whether the parties have obtained sufficient information about the strengths and

weaknesses of their respective cases to make a reasoned judgment about the desirability of settling

the case on the terms proposed . . . .” Id. (quoting In re Educ. Testing Serv., 447 F. Supp. 2d at

620-21).

The Settlement Agreement at issue here is the product of almost three years of litigation.

During that time, the parties have engaged in extensive discovery, reviewed thousands of

documents, consulted fact and expert witnesses, and carefully examined the merits of the case from

both sides. This lengthy and deliberate process has provided the parties with sufficient information

to craft a mutually agreeable Settlement Agreement. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of

approval.

c. Plaintiffs’ Probability of Success on the Merits

This factor requires the Court to compare the relief offered by the Settlement and the likely

recovery if the case were to proceed to trial. Absent fraud or collusion, the probability of success

on the merits has been hailed as the most important Reed factor. See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d

1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982). In evaluating the probability of success, “the Court must compare the

terms of the settlement with the rewards the class would have been likely to receive following a

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successful trial.” DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 287 (W.D. Tex. 2007).

The likelihood of recovery if this case were to go to trial is inherently uncertain. Notably,

Defendants deny liability of any kind in this matter and would raise a formidable defense at trial.

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has provided little guidance about a key issue in this case; namely,

whether the decision to impose an actuarial charge violates ERISA. Although the Settlement

provides class members with only 75% of the maximum they could recover at trial, the Court notes

that this amount is reasonable in light of the complexities of the case and the very real possibility

that proceeding to trial would result in a verdict in favor of Defendants.

d. The Range of Possible Recovery

“[I]n any case there is a range of reasonableness with respect to a settlement—a range

which recognizes the uncertainties of law and fact in any particular case and the concomitant risks

and costs necessarily inherent in taking any litigation to completion . . . .” Newman v. Stein, 464

F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, after determining if any legal or factual obstacles exist, a

district court must inquire whether the settlement's terms fall within a reasonable range of recovery,

given the likelihood of the plaintiffs' success on the merits. When considering this factor, the Court

must remain aware that

[c]ompromise is the essence of settlement and the court should not make the

proponents of a proposed settlement justify each term of settlement against a

hypothetical or speculative measure of which concessions might have been gained;

inherent in compromise is a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest

hopes.

Nelson v. Waring, 602 F. Supp. 410, 413 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (quoting Cotton v. Hilton, 559 F.2d

1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977)).

Like any settlement, the Settlement Agreement at issue here is a compromise the provides

a large group of individuals with a significant, albeit not total, recovery for their alleged injury.

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The Settlement provides that each class member will receive 75% of the maximum they could

have received, as the terms of the Plan to which the parties are bound imposes a “hard cap on

recovery.” R. Doc. 75-2 at 20. This amount is free of costs and attorneys’ fees, both of which are

to be borne by the Defendants. Further, class members have the option to receive settlement funds

in a lump-sum payment or an ongoing annuity, which allows class members to select the method

of recovery that best comports with their “individual financial situation.” R. Doc. 75-2 at 20. The

Court finds that 75% is clearly within the range of possible recovery and accordingly, this factor

weighs in favor of final approval.

e. The Opinions of Class Counsel, Class Representatives, and Absent

Class Members

Class Counsel is intimately familiar with the case and the Settlement Agreement, and

therefore the Court will give weight to Class Counsel's opinion regarding the fairness of the

Settlement. See Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1330 (“[T]he trial court is entitled to rely upon the judgment

of experienced counsel for the parties.”). Class Counsel's opinion should be presumed reasonable

because they are in the best position to evaluate fairness due to an intimate familiarity with the

lawsuit. Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1979). However, the Court's

deference must not be so great that it blindly follows Class Counsel's recommendations. Id. Rather,

the Court must give Class Counsel's recommendations appropriate weight in light of all the factors

surrounding the Settlement. Id. (citing Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1215-

16 (5th Cir. 1978), and Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F. 2d 896, 900–01 (2d Cir. 1972)).

Here, Class Counsel strongly supports the Settlement and believes it is fair and reasonable

with respect to the entire class. However, Class Representative Mr. Claudet has declined to

participate in the Settlement. The Court recognizes Mr. Claudet’s decision but declines to allow

this sole dissenter from derailing the entire Settlement, which provides a substantial recovery to a

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large number of affected individuals. Additionally, no other class members have objected to the

Settlement, indicating that the Settlement is broadly agreeable.

4. Equitable Treatment of Class Members

This Rule 23 factor requires the Court to consider whether “the proposal treats class

members equitably relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(d). This inquiry involves a

determination of “whether the apportionment of relief among class members takes appropriate

account of differences among their claims.” Rule 23 (e)(2)(C), (D), Advisory Committee Notes to

2018 Amendments. This factor is clearly satisfied in the instant case, as the Settlement Agreement

provides that each class member shall receive 75% percent of their maximum potential recovery,

regardless of whether they currently are subject to a pop-up charge or will be subject to such a

charge in the future. Further, although the class is comprised of two groups—those “in pay” and

those “not in pay”—these groups are treated equitably because members of both groups will

receive 75% of their total damages. The in-pay group will receive retroactive benefits to

compensate for pop-up charges that were imposed in the past in addition to those that will be

imposed in the future. Although the not in pay group will only receive compensation for

prospective charges, this is equitable because, having not yet retired, members of this group have

not yet incurred any pop-up charges.

5. The Objections

Any Class Member who does not opt out may object to the Settlement under Rule 23(e)(4).

The absence or small number of objections may provide a helpful indication that the Settlement is

fair, reasonable, and adequate. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 217-

18 (5th Cir. 1981); Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1216–17 (stating that the higher the number of objectors,

the heavier the burden of proving fairness, and ruling that it was an abuse of discretion to approve

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a settlement opposed by the named plaintiff and 70% of class members); In re Warfarin Sodium

Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 254 (D. Del. 2002) (stating that though class reaction is an

indicator of class member support, courts must not place too much dependence on a small number

of objections); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt–Outs and Objectors in

Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1532-34 (2004)

(cautioning that reliance on low opt-out and objection numbers in any given case may be misplaced

given that the authors found opt-out and objection rates to be “trivially small in the mass of cases”).

However, a court may approve a class action settlement even if opposition exists. See Ayers v.

Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 368-73 (5th Cir. 2004) (“That several class members desire broader

relief . . . does not prevent judicial approval of this settlement agreement, which promises

substantial relief to the class.”). Nevertheless, courts must independently examine all objections to

determine if they have merit and whether they raise questions regarding the fairness of settlement.

See In re Corrugated Container, 643 F.2d at 217-18.

Courts have held that objections must be sufficiently clear and unambiguous for court

consideration; otherwise the party will be deemed to have waived their objection. Luevano v.

Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68, 77 (D.D.C. 1981). Moreover, objectors must comply with procedural

requirements stipulated in the Settlement Agreement, such as filing a written statement of

objection with the court in advance of the hearing and giving notice of intent to appear at the

fairness hearing. However, the court has discretion to permit objections at the fairness hearing

even if the party wishing to voice an objection has not filed a written statement in advance. See

e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 991, 1994 WL 599525, at *4-5

(E.D. La. Nov. 1, 1994); In re Prudential–Bache Energy Income P'ships Sec. Litig., 815 F. Supp.

177, 179 (E.D. La. 1993). Objections ought to focus on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy

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of the agreement, rather than “renegotiate terms of the settlement based on individual preferences.”

In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 295 F.R.D. at 152.

Mr. Claudet is the sole objector in this case, although as the class representative, he submits

his objection “on behalf of the entire class.” R. Doc. 79 at 3. Mr. Claudet explains that in his

opinion, informed by access to discovery documents, extensive communication with counsel, and

participation in the negotiation process, the “evidence is overwhelming, that the reductions in

pension payments at issue were illegal.” R. Doc. 79 at 4. He describes the Settlement, which

provides for only a 75% recovery, as akin to “a thief stealing money from you and, when, caught

red-handed, says it is really his money but will give 75% of it back if you help him.” R. Doc. 79

at 4. He further explains that although he participated in negotiations of the Settlement Agreement,

the ultimate Agreement contains features he disagrees with. He explains that the negotiations

convinced him “that the primary aim in the settlement agreement was, not to provide fair relief to

the class, but to satisfy the aims of the company.” R. Doc. 79 at 7. Ultimately, he advocates for the

“simplest settlement: Payment for 75% of benefits withheld, with interest, plus initiation or

resumption of monthly payments with the addition of 75% of the charge attributed to the pop-up

feature.” R. Doc. 79 at 7. He explains that this would require the class to be treated as one group

(rather than “in pay” and “not in pay” groups) and that Defendants would have to “modify

calculations so that the charge for the pop-up feature is reduced by 75% going forward” in addition

to paying interest. R. Doc. 79 at 8.

Mr. Claudet addressed the Court at the Final Fairness Hearing on June 10, 2020, explaining

his material objections to the Settlement and elucidating particular issues raised in his written

objection. Class Counsel responded to his objections both in writing, R. Doc. 82, and orally at the

Final Fairness Hearing. Class Counsel contends that Mr. Claudet has failed to consider the

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possibility that, were this case to go to trial, Defendants could prevail. Further, Class Counsel

explains that the claims process that Mr. Claudet characterizes as unnecessarily complicated is

actually beneficial to the class in that it allows class members to elect between three methods of

receiving Settlement Funds. Mr. Claudet’s proposed method, which involves a lump sum payment

for retroactive charges and an annuity for prospective charges, is one available option.

At the outset, the Court recognizes the significant time and effort Mr. Claudet has invested

in this litigation and the zeal with which he has represented the entire class. Mr. Claudet has been

heavily involved in the litigation, mediation, and negotiation of the Settlement Agreement at issue

here. His objections are articulate and thoughtful. Nevertheless, he has not persuaded the Court

that the Settlement is unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate. As an initial matter, Mr. Claudet does

not object to the value of the Settlement or argue that any of its material terms are unfair. Instead,

he takes issue with the manner in which Settlement funds are dispersed. However, as Class Counsel

indicates, Mr. Claudet’s preferred method of payment is available to all Class Members, who also

have the option of choosing other payment methods that may better suit their individual financial

circumstances.

Further, Mr. Claudet’s objection does not address the very real possibility that a trial on

the merits could leave approximately 1,000 individuals without any recovery what so ever.

Notably, the Settlement obligates Defendants to bear all fees and costs independently from funding

the Settlement itself, which is significant because even if Plaintiffs were to achieve a favorable

verdict at trial, they may not be entitled to receive attorney fees and costs from Defendants.

Accordingly, in the face of this complexity and uncertainty of litigation, the Settlement seems fair.

Moreover, to the extent Mr. Claudet believes the categorization of class members as “in

pay” and “not in pay” renders the Settlement inequitable, the Court disagrees. Mr. Claudet suggests

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that as currently defined, the class is comprised of individuals who may never receive settlement

benefits. However, it appears as though this objection is founded on a misunderstanding about who

is included in the “not in pay” group. The “not in pay” group consists of individuals who were not

retirees as of October 1, 2018, but who will retire at some point in the future. While it is true that

some future retirees may never reap the benefits of this Settlement, that is because some future

retirees may never elect a pension option for which a pop-up charge is imposed. These future

retirees will receive nothing because they will suffer no damages. Because the class is limited to

those individuals who elect an option for which the challenged charge is imposed, Mr. Claudet’s

argument lacks merit.

Lastly, the Court also rejects the argument that approval should be denied because Mr.

Claudet did not consent to the term sheet upon which the settlement was ultimately based. Mr.

Claudet has provided numerous documents detailing the communications between himself and

Class Counsel during the negotiation of this Settlement, and it appears to the Court as though Mr.

Claudet was appraised of developments in the negotiation. R. Doc. 38. 43–50. Additionally, it

appears as though Mr. Claudet’s concerns were addressed, many of his proposals implemented,

and explanations provided for requests that were impossible to achieve. Accordingly, the Court is

not swayed by Mr. Claudet’s objections.

6. Class Notice

Additionally, approval of a class settlement under Rule 23 requires that the proposed class

have received adequate notice of the settlement. Rule 23(c)(2)(b) requires that class members

receive “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(b).

Further, due process requires that notice to class members be “reasonably calculated, under all the

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an

17

opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,

314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950). Here, notice forms were mailed to the last known

addresses of each Class Member. Written in plain English, these forms appraised Class Members

of their legal rights and responsibilities, and advised them of the identity of Class Counsel and

their right to representation. The Court is satisfied that the notice program employed in the instant

case comports with due process and Rule 23.

Based on the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and

adequate and accordingly, final approval is warranted.

B. Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Class Contribution Award [R. Doc. 72]

At this juncture, the Court turns to the issue of attorney fees and costs.

1. Attorney Fees

“[U]nder the ‘American Rule,’ the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a

reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser.” Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean

Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561 (1986) (quotation omitted). Likewise, the attorney for the prevailing litigant

must generally look to his or her own client for payment of attorneys' fees. Since the nineteenth

century, however, the Supreme Court has recognized an equitable exception to this rule, known as

the common fund or common benefit doctrine, that permits the creation of a common fund in order

to pay reasonable attorney fees for legal services beneficial to persons other than a particular client,

thus spreading the cost of the litigation to all beneficiaries. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,

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594 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2010) (Kaplan, J., concurring).1 This equitable common fund doctrine

was originally, and perhaps still is, most commonly applied to awards of attorney fees in class

actions. See e.g., 5 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 15:53 (5th ed. 2019)

(discussing common fund doctrine in context of class actions).

Ultimately, attorney fees and costs, authorized by law or the agreement of the parties, must

be reasonable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). “The decision of an award of attorney fees in a common-fund

case is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must consider the unique

contours of the case.” Manuel for Complex Litigation § 14.121 (4th ed. 2004). Where, as here, an

award of attorney fees is negotiated by the parties and proposed to the court, the court must

scrutinize the reasonableness of the proposed award, rather than merely “ratify a pre-arranged

compact.” Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1328 (5th Cir. 1980). In other words, “[a] district

court is not bound by the agreement of the parties as to the amount of attorneys' fees. Id.

Although courts in the Fifth Circuit have typically relied on the lodestar method to

determine the reasonableness of an attorney fee award, the percentage method has been increasing

in popularity. The lodestar method entails multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended

on the litigation by an adjusted reasonable hourly rate. Many courts and commentators have noted

problems with the lodestar method including potential for manipulation, disincentive for an early

settlement, reward for excessive and wasteful attorney effort, and confusion and lack of

predictability in setting fees. See Vaughn R. Walker & Ben Horwich, The Ethical Imperative of a

1 Some authorities have commented on the “persistent and confusing identification of common-fund recovery

as an ‘exception’ to the American rule on attorneys' fees,” noting that in a common fund situation the funds are actually

distributed “among those aligned with the plaintiff rather than extract[ed] ... from the defeated adversary.” See

Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 30 Reporter's Note a (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1994) (quoting Thomas D. Rowe,

Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L.J. 651, 662 (1982)). Regardless of

specific taxonomy, the common-fund doctrine, as well as the Court's inherent power to assess fees to compensate

appointed managing attorneys, constitute departures from the traditional rule that each litigant bears his or her own

costs.

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Lodestar Cross-Check: Judicial Misgivings About “Reasonable Percentage” Fees in Common

Fund Cases, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1453, 1456 (2005) (summarizing Court Awarded Attorney

Fees: Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985)). In contrast, the percentage

method provides more predictability to attorneys and class members or plaintiffs, encourages

settlement, and avoids protracted litigation for the sake of racking up hours, thereby reducing the

time consumed by the court and the attorneys. Id. at 1456–57 (citing In re Activision Sec. Litig.,

723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1989)); accord In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 540 (3d Cir.

2009).

Although the Fifth Circuit has not explicitly endorsed a pure percentage method, it has

approved the use of a blended method when determining attorneys' fees in common benefit cases.

See Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 644 (5th Cir. 2012). The blended

method is usually used to ensure that the amount of the common benefit fee established by the

percentage method is reasonable. Under the blended method, the fee arrived at by the percentage

method is cross-checked by the lodestar method utilizing the twelve factors from Johnson v.

Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974). If the fee arrived at by the

percentage method is within “the ballpark” of the fee that would result from the lodestar method,

the reasonableness of the fee is more sustainable. The blended method has been used by many

district courts, including this one. See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640; In re

Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Batchelder

v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 525 (N.D. Miss. 2003).

The Court finds the blended percentage approach to be the best method for calculating

reasonable attorney fees in this litigation. As such, the Court will (1) determine the value of the

benefit claimants receive and assign an initial benchmark percentage, (2) determine whether the

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benchmark percentage should be adjusted in light of the Johnson factors, and (3) conduct a lodestar

analysis to determine whether the fee is indeed reasonable. The Court notes, however, that “[t]he

lodestar analysis is not undertaken to calculate a specific fee, but only to provide a broad cross

check on the reasonableness of the fee arrived at by the percentage method.” In re Vioxx Prods.

Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 652.

a. Valuation of Benefit & Determination of Benchmark Percentage

According to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the total value of the Settlement is

estimated to be $1,825,000.00. Specifically, $1,540,000.00 million is allocated to the “in pay”

group and will compensate these individuals with 75% of their potential damages arising from the

pop-up charge. Although the value of the “not in pay” group’s recovery cannot be determined, the

estimated value is $285,000.00. R. Doc. 62-2 at 10. Because this represents the total value

distributed to Class Members, the Court sees no reason to omit any portion of that fund from

consideration with respect to the reasonable amount of attorney fees.

Determining a reasonable benchmark percentage is an inquiry that must be addressed on a

case by case basis. An influential empirical study analyzing attorney fees in class action

settlements is instructive to this endeavor. See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d at

652; In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 733 F. Supp. 2d 997,

1012-15 (E.D. Wis. 2010); Murphy Oil, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 862-64; In re Educ. Testing Servs., 447

F. Supp. 2d at 630; Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1212 (S.D. Fla.

2006); In re Cabletron Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 30, 37 n. 12, 41 (D.N.H. 2006). Theodore

Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller’s detailed study, titled Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:

An Empirical Study, investigates the relationship between the amount recovered through a

settlement and the award of attorney fees. In particular, it explains that there exists “an

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overwhelming correlation between class recovery and attorney fees,” and that the benchmark

percentage should be determined by considering two specific Johnson factors: the customary fee

and awards in similar cases. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys’ Fees and

Expenses in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. Empirical Legal Studies 27, 74

(2004).

Here, Class Counsel asks the Court to award $350,000.00 in attorneys’ fees, which

represents just over nineteen percent of the total value of the Settlement. According to Eisenberg

and Miller’s study, the mean fee percentage in class actions producing recoveries between $1.4

million and $3.1 million is 26.5%, with a standard deviation of 10.9%. Eisenberg & Miller,

Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements, supra, at 73. Further, “fee requests

falling within one standard deviation above or below the mean should be viewed as generally

reasonable and approved by the court unless reasons are shown to question the fee.” Id. at 74. In

other words, a fee falling between 15.6% (approximately one standard deviation below) and 37.4%

(approximately one standard deviation above) is considered reasonable under this metric. The

requested fee award constitutes approximately 19% of the value of Settlement and accordingly

represents a reasonable benchmark.

b. Johnson Factors

The Court now considers the Johnson factors, addressing them in conjunction with the

circumstances of this case, to determine whether the requested fee award is reasonable.

i. The Time and Labor Required

As explained above, Class Counsel has spent almost 1,000 hours litigating this case, which

involved novel questions about a notoriously complex statute. These hours were spent writing,

researching, reviewing documents, consulting with experts, and ultimately negotiating a beneficial

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class-wide Settlement. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval.

ii. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions

This case presents complex and novel questions about the applicability and interpretation

of ERISA; namely, whether the challenged pension reduction was a “legitimate actuarial charge

or an illicit pension cutback.” R. Doc. 72-2 at 10. Accordingly, Class Counsel was required to

advocate for their clients and aim for a favorable outcome in the absence of clear guidance from

the Fifth Circuit. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of approval.

iii. The Skill Required to Perform the Legal Service Properly

The challenging legal questions and the nature of the class action required Class Counsel

to have specialized knowledge and legal skill in order to reach a favorable outcome. Specifically,

Class Counsel was required to employ this specialized knowledge and legal skill in interpreting

complex laws and regulations and calculating damages, which required consultation with actuarial

experts. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval.

iv. The Preclusion of Other Employment

Class Counsel in this instant matter is comprised of solo practitioners and attorneys from

small firms. Accordingly, undertaking the representation of the instant class necessarily required

counsel to both forgo other employment opportunities and invest a significant amount of time,

energy, and financial resources into the litigation. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of

approval.

v. The Customary Fee in Similar Actions

Courts in this district routinely award up to one-third of the total settlement award in

attorney fees. In re Harrah's Entm't, Inc., No. CIV. A. 95-3925, 1998 WL 832574, at *4 (E.D. La.

Nov. 25, 1998) (“The majority of common fund fee awards fall between twenty and thirty

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percent.”). Here, the requested award constitutes roughly nineteen percent of the settlement value,

which is lower than what the caselaw supports, but not so low as to give the Court pause.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval.

vi. Whether the Fee is Fixed or Contingent

Class Counsel litigated this matter on a contingency basis, undertaking significant risk and

requiring a substantial financial investment without guaranteed victory. R. Doc. 72-2 at 12. Class

Counsel explains it has also spent almost $50,000 litigating this case. Due to the risks associated

with the representation, this factor weighs in favor of approval.

vii. Time Limitations Imposed by the Clients or

Circumstances

This case did not involve any unusual time limitations. This factor accordingly has no

bearing on the reasonableness of the fee.

viii. The Amount Involved and the Results Obtained

Class Counsel secured a favorable result for each member of the class. Specifically, the

Settlement provides for each Class Member to recover 75% of the maximum amount they could

have obtained. Further, because attorney fees were negotiated separately and funded independently

from the Settlement, Class Members’ recoveries will not be diminished by the award of attorney

fees in this case. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval.

ix. The Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Attorneys

The Court has no reason to question the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys

in this case, all of whom are dedicated professionals with demonstrated commitments to their

clients. This factor weighs in favor of approval.

x. The Undesirability of the Case

The Court recognizes that the complex and novel questions presented in this case may

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make it “undesirable.” To the extent this factor applies, it weighs in favor of approval.

xi. The Nature and Length of the Professional Relationship

This factor is neutral, as there did not exist a professional relationship between Class

Counsel and Claudet before the initiation of this lawsuit. R. Doc. 72-2 at 14.

xii. Awards in Similar Cases

The Court has already noted that courts within this district customarily approve awards of

up to one-third of the total settlement value. See, e.g., In re Harrah's, 1998 WL 832574, at *4.

Attorney fee awards in ERISA class actions within the Fifth Circuit and other jurisdictions further

support the conclusion that 19% of the total settlement value is a reasonable award. See, e.g.,

Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co., 248 F.R.D. 455, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (awarding 30% of

settlement value as attorney fees in an ERISA class action); In re Colgate-Palmolive Co. ERISA

Litig., 36 F. Supp. 3d 344, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (awarding 25% of settlement value as attorney

fees in an ERISA class action); Bezio v. Gen. Elec. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 162, 167 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)

(same); Reyes v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Int'l Pension Fund, 281 F. Supp. 3d 833,

861 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (same); In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1271 (D.

Kan. 2006) (awarding less than 16% of settlement value as attorney fees in an ERISA class action).

c. Lodestar Cross-Check

The final step of the blended method is to cross-check the benchmark percentage with an

abbreviated lodestar analysis. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, MDL 2179,

2016 WL 6215974, at *19 (E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2016) (citing In re Vioxx, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 659)

(“[T]he loadstar cross-check is a streamlined process, avoiding the detailed analysis that goes into

a traditional lodestar examination.”). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours

reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate for the work performed. Strong v. BellSouth

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Telecommunications, Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 850 (5th Cir. 1998). The appropriate hourly rate must be

based on “prevailing community standards for attorneys of similar experience in similar cases.”

Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1993).

Class Counsel has logged over 950 hours of attorney time during the pendency of the

litigation, and paralegals and law clerks billed just over 100 additional hours. R. Doc. 72-2 at 4.

Class Counsel suggests using an hourly rate of $350 per hour for the hours worked by Charles

Stiegler and Christopher Williams, a rate that is “in line with their years of experience, knowledge,

and the going rate for attorneys with comparable experience in the Eastern District of Louisiana.”

R. Doc. 72-2 at 7. Class Counsel suggests using $750 per hour for hours worked by Susan Martin

and $500 per hour for hours worked by Jennifer Kroll, justifying these elevated fees by reference

to their legal specialties and nationwide expertise for which there is no applicable prevailing

community standard in this district. R. Doc. 72-2 at 7. Class Counsel lastly suggests that $150 per

hour is an appropriate rate for the work performed by paralegals and law clerks. The Court agrees

that these rates are reasonable.

Class Counsel has submitted time records maintained in electronic billing systems to

confirm the hours expended by each attorney or para-professional in this matter. The records

reflect that Charles Steigler worked 320.8 hours, Christopher Williams worked 137.4 hours, Susan

Martin worked 246.78 hours, Jennifer Kroll worked 247.6 hours, Trudy Mahabir (paralegal)

worked 100.5 hours, and Nick Kuntz (law clerk) worked 1.4 hours. R. Doc. 72-2 at 8–9. The Court

agrees that these hours are justified by the complexity of the case and nature of the work performed,

which included extensive discovery, consultations, and negotiations. Applying these rates to the

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hours billed, the lodestar method reveals an award of $484,540.00.2 Notably, Class Counsel has

requested only $350,000.00, significantly less than what a lodestar calculation would support.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the requested award is reasonable.

2. Costs

“Typically, class action counsel who create a common fund for the benefit of the class . . .

are entitled to reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.” In re Pool Prod.

Distribution Mkt. Antitrust Litig., MDL 2328, 2015 WL 4528880, at *18 (E.D. La. July 27, 2015).

The reimbursement of costs and expenses seeks not to reward attorneys for their work but restore

the status quo. However, the requested expenses may not “cannibalize the entire . . . settlement.”

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d at 196. Accordingly, the Court must review the

estimated expenses for which reimbursement is sought and determine whether the total requested

sum is fair to the settlement class.

Here, Class Counsel seeks an award of $37,000.00 in cost reimbursements. R. Doc. 72-2

at 14. Class Counsel explains that although it actually incurred $53,420.60 in costs, Defendants

have agreed to pay only $37,000.00 in conjunction with the Settlement. R. Doc. 72-2 at 15. In view

of the nature and circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that an award of $37,000.00 is

appropriate, particularly because it in no way diminishes the recovery of each individual class

member.

2 Class Counsel suggests the lodestar amount, based on these figures, should be $496,920. R. Doc. 72-2 at

9. However, the Court believes this number is overstated by $12,380, and presumes Class Counsel erroneously

calculated the lodestar by valuing the work performed by Jennifer Kroll by $550, rather than $500. The Court’s

calculation is based on the following:

Charles Steigler: 320.8 hours x $350/hour = $112,280.00

Christopher Williams: 137.4 hours x $350/hour = $48,090.00

Susan Martin: 246.78 hours x $750/hour = $185,085.00

Jennifer Kroll: 247.6 hours x $500/hour = $123,800.00

Trudy Mahabir: 100.5 hours x $150/hour = $15,075.00

Nick Kuntz: 1.4 hours x $150/hour = $210.00

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3. Class Contribution Award

Lastly, courts “commonly permit payments to class representatives above those received

in settlement by class members generally.” Smith v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 338,

367-68 (S.D. Miss. 2003); see In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., MDL 928, 939 F. Supp. 493, 503-04

(N.D. Miss. 1996). Such additional payments are justified in part by the fact that class

representatives must be familiar with the case in order to be adequate representatives and are often

deposed. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action

Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006).

Here, Class Counsel seeks a $5,000 award for Mr. Claudet. Notably, Mr. Claudet has been

intimately involved in this litigation from its inception, reviewing documents, communicating with

counsel, attending the mediation, and providing constructive feedback throughout the entire

process. Accordingly, the Court finds that this award is warranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, R.

Doc. 75, is GRANTED, and the Settlement Agreement is hereby APPROVED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs

and Case Contribution Award, R. Doc. 72, is GRANTED. Counsel are awarded $350,000.00 in

attorney fees and $37,000.00 in costs. Class Representative Aman Joseph Claudet is awarded

$5,000.00 as a case contribution award. In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, these fees,

costs, and awards are to be paid by Defendants, which amounts are in addition to the amounts to

be received by Class Members.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 12th day of June, 2020.

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Eldon E. Fallon

United States District Judge

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