Tolbert v. Gusman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NATASHA TOLBERT ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 18-8359 C/W 18-10053

MARLIN GUSMAN ET AL. SECTION: “H”(1)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendants Deputy Kaja Harrell, Sgt. Melvin Sparks,

Kevin Lewis and Keiara Williams’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 73).

For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Natasha Tolbert, Bridget Armstrong, and India Butler bring

this action on behalf of their minor children for the wrongful death of Narada

Mealey, an inmate at the Orleans Justice Center (“OJC”).1 Plaintiffs allege

that Mealey did not receive proper medical treatment while incarcerated,

resulting in his death. Plaintiffs bring state law medical malpractice claims

and federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two groups of

1 Case number 18-8359 brought by Tolbert and Armstrong was consolidated with

case number 18-10053 brought by India Butler.

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defendants: those in law enforcement and those involved in the medical

treatment of Mealey. In this motion, the law enforcement defendants—Deputy

Kaja Harrell, Sgt. Melvin Sparks, Kevin Lewis and Keiara Williams—move for

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims against them. Plaintiffs have not

opposed this Motion. The Court may not, however, simply grant the instant

Motion as unopposed. The Fifth Circuit approaches the automatic grant of

dispositive motions with considerable aversion.2 Instead, the proper inquiry

to an unopposed motion for summary judgment is to determine whether the

facts advanced in the motion and supported by appropriate evidence make out

a prima facie case that the movant is entitled to judgment.3

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”4 A genuine issue

of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.”5

In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,

the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws

2 See, e.g., Servicios Azucareros de Venezuela, C.A. v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc.,

702 F.3d 794, 806 (5th Cir. 2012); Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006)

(per curiam); John v. State of Louisiana (Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. and Univs.), 757 F.2d

698, 709 (5th Cir. 1985).

3 See Adams, 465 F.3d at 164; Eversley, 843 F.2d at 174.

4 Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).

5 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

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all reasonable inferences in his favor.6 “If the moving party meets the initial

burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden

shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts

showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”7 Summary judgment is

appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”8 “In response to a

properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must

identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that

evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to

sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the non-

movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”9 “We do not . . . in the absence

of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the

necessary facts.”10 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual

dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”11

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has brought suit against Movants under § 1983 in their

individual and official capacities. Movants argue that these claims should be

dismissed because: (1) the official capacity claims against them are redundant;

6 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997).

7 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).

8 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

9 John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th

Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

10 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.

Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).

11 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).

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(2) Plaintiffs cannot show they acted with deliberate indifference to Mealey’s

medical needs; and (3) Movants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Official Capacity Claims

First, Movants argue that the official capacity claims against them

should be dismissed because they are redundant of the official capacity claim

that Plaintiffs brought against Sheriff Marlin Gusman. Official capacity suits

“generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity

of which an officer is an agent.”12 Accordingly, the official capacity claims

against Movants and Gusman are indeed duplicative claims against the

Sheriff’s Office.13 However, since the filing of this motion, Plaintiffs voluntarily

dismissed their official capacity claim against Gusman. Therefore, Movants’

argument for dismissal on this ground must fail.

B. Individual Capacity Claims

Movants next argue that Plaintiffs cannot succeed on their individual

capacity § 1983 claims because Plaintiffs cannot show that Movants acted with

deliberate indifference to Mealey’s medical needs. “A prison official shows

deliberate indifference if ‘the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.’”14 A plaintiff can show deliberate indifference

12 Simmons v. City of Columbus, 425 F. App'x 282, 284 (5th Cir. 2011).

13 See Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal

of § 1983 claims against “all of the municipal officers and two of the employees of the Corps

of Engineers in their official capacities, as these allegations duplicate claims against the

respective governmental entities themselves”).

14 Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).

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by showing that an official “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,

intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that

would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.”15

Movants present evidence that Mealey received medical care while at

OJC from Defendant Correct Care Solutions, LLC and its employees. Movants

argue that there is no evidence that they interfered with or delayed this

medical treatment. Further, “prison officials who are not medical professionals

are entitled to rely on the opinions of medical professionals.”16 Because

Plaintiffs have failed to respond to this Motion, they have not presented any

evidence creating a material issue of fact as to their § 1983 claims against

Movants in their individual capacities. Accordingly, those claims are

dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 individual capacity claims against

Deputy Kaja Harrell, Sgt. Melvin Sparks, Kevin Lewis, and Keiara Williams

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

15 Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 2017).

16 Clark v. Banks, No. 1:16-CV-208-HSO-JCG, 2018 WL 1866619, at *5 (S.D. Miss.

Jan. 2, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:16CV208-HSO-JCG, 2018 WL

783075 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 2018).

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New Orleans, Louisiana this 16th day of April, 2020.

□□ TRICHE LL, ¢

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE