The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
E.H., BY AND THROUGH HER NEXT CIVIL ACTION
FRIEND, ALTHEA ABRON
VERSUS NO. 19-10613-WBV-DMD
ARTHUR BARRILLEAUX, ET AL. SECTION D(3)
ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint,1
Defendants Mary Beth Crovetto, Melissa Martin Stilley, and Tangipahoa Parish
School System School Board’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,2 and
Defendants Arthur Barrilleaux and Brett Chatelain’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim.3 After considering the briefs submitted by the parties and the
applicable law, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint4 is
GRANTED; Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim5 by Defendants Mary Beth
Crovetto, Melissa Martin Stilley, and Tangipahoa Parish School Board System is
1 R. Doc. 33. This matter is fully briefed. See R. Doc. 34 for Defendants Mary Beth Crovetto, Melissa
Martin Stilley, and Tangipahoa Parish School System School Board’s Response in Opposition. See R.
Doc. 39 for Plaintiff’s Reply.
2 R. Doc. 14. This matter is fully briefed. See R. Doc. 17 for Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition. See R.
Doc. 21 for Defendants’ Reply.
3 R. Doc. 22. See R. Doc. 23 for Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition.
4 R. Doc. 33.
5 R. Doc. 14.
GRANTED; and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Arthur Barrilleaux
and Brett Chatelain6 is DENIED.
I. Background
Plaintiff submits that on March 28, 2019, E. H., a 14 year old student, was
engaged in a fight with another student in the courtyard at Ponchatoula Junior High
School.7 Plaintiff claims that she was accosted by faculty members who “arrived to
break up the fight.”8 Mr. Brett Chatelain, a teacher, allegedly grabbed E. H. and put
her hands behind her back.9 E.H. fell to the ground as a result of the forceful restraint.
Plaintiff claims that Mr. Chatelain placed his knee in E. H.’s chest and then
alternated between having his hand and forearm on her throat. At that time, Mr.
Barrilleaux, a teacher, allegedly held E.H.’s legs and dragged her on the concrete
while yelling expletives at her. Plaintiff contends that the faculty members grabbed
her and slammed her on a table, which resulted in her head hitting the table multiple
times: “During the course of the attack[,] E. H. slammed her head at least 5 times.”10
After the incident, E.H. was taken to the Children’s Hospital in New Orleans,
Louisiana, where she was diagnosed with a concussion.11
Plaintiff states that the School Board, Principal Crovetto, and Superintendent
Stilley “took no actions against the two teachers,” immediately after the incident and
6 R. Doc. 22.
7 See R. Doc. 1, p. 5.
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See R. Doc. 1, p. 9.
11 See id.
that Mr. Chatelain and Mr. Barrilleaux were not fired until more than a month
later.12 Plaintiff claims that since the “attack,” E.H. has exhibited symptoms of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).13
Plaintiff sued Defendants Arthur Barrilleaux and Brett Chatelain, in addition to
the Tangipahoa Parish School Board System, Principal Crovetto, and Superintendent
Stilley, claiming 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment violations, negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and physical abuse
of a minor.14 Defendants maintain that their actions did not rise to the level where
the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.
All Defendants filed motions to dismiss15 for failure to state a claim, and if that
argument fails, all Defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity. After
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss filing, Plaintiff filed this Motion For Leave to File
Amended Complaint.
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading
once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
12 See R. Doc. 1, p. 10.
13 See id.
14 See R. Doc. 1.
15 See R. Docs. 14, 22.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's
leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.
Plaintiff filed her complaint on May 21, 2019. A Scheduling Order was issued
thereafter and provides that amendments to pleadings shall be filed no later than
October 9, 2019, in accordance with Local Rule 7.6.16 Plaintiff moved to amend her
complaint on November 15, 2019, more than a month after the Scheduling Order
deadline. Because a Scheduling Order had already issued in this case, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) applies, and Plaintiff must show good cause for the
scheduling order to be modified.17 If the Plaintiff can show good cause, the more
liberal standard of Rule 15 applies to the Court’s decision to grant or deny leave to
amend the complaint.18
It is within a trial court’s discretion to grant or deny a motion to amend a
complaint after a Scheduling Order has been issued.19 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has applied a four-part test to determine whether a
district court’s refusal to modify its scheduling order was an abuse of discretion. The
factors to be considered are: (1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave
for amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing
the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.20 In
reviewing the limited discretion that Rule 15 provides, the Supreme Court lists five
16 See R. Doc. 28.
17 “A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16
(b)(4).
18 See S &W Enterprises, L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003).
19 See id. at 535.
20 See id. at 536.
considerations in determining whether to deny leave to amend a complaint: “undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the
amendment.”21 Absent a substantial reason, the Court must entertain a presumption
in favor of granting parties leave to amend.22
III. Analysis
The Court weighs the four-part test concerning Rule 16 to determine whether
Plaintiff has shown good cause for leave to amend the complaint. As to the first factor,
the explanation by a plaintiff for the failure to timely move to amend, Plaintiff asserts
that “failure to [timely] file was due to no ruling being issued as to the motions to
dismiss filed by the five defendants and no notice that Plaintiff’s Complaint would
not survive scrutiny.”23 The Court is not persuaded by this argument. In fact, the
Court notes that, if this argument held water, then no plaintiff would move to amend
a complaint until a motion to dismiss was granted which, on its face, would appear
too late.
Plaintiff also argues that she had no notice that her initial complaint was
lacking.24 In their Opposition, Defendants point out that Plaintiff had been on notice
21 Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962).
22 See Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2004).
23 See R. Doc. 39.
24 See R. Doc. 33-1, p. 6.
at least since June 2019 of the information that the amendment will contain.25
Specifically, the defendants direct the Court to allegations the plaintiff made in her
response in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss.26 The plaintiff’s response
quotes a news article published on May 13, 2019, and was filed on June 18, 2019,
reflecting that Plaintiff has this information at least since June 2019. Plaintiff quotes
the same news article in the proposed amended complaint.
The first factor falls in favor of Defendants and in favor of denying the Motion to
Amend the Complaint. The second factor is the importance of the amendment.
Plaintiff states that the amendment is massively important because otherwise “there
will be no recourse as to multiple defendant [sic] and no opportunity for Plaintiff’s
claims to have a determination on the merits.”27 Defendant does not respond to the
Plaintiff’s argument regarding this particular factor. The Court finds that this factor
weighs in favor of Plaintiff in this particular inquiry of the analysis.
The third factor, the potential prejudice to Defendants, weighs in favor of allowing
the Amendment. This case is still relatively new, and little, if any, discovery has
taken place. In fact, this trial court has issued a stay of discovery pending a ruling on
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Further, trial is not scheduled until April 27, 2020.
This factor goes hand in hand with the fourth factor, the availability of a continuance
to cure such prejudice. If the Court determines that prejudice may occur, the Court
may grant a continuance in this matter to afford the parties a reasonable time to
25 See R. Doc. 34.
26 See R. Docs. 34, p. 2; 17-1, p. 8.
27 R. Doc. 33-1, p. 6.
respond to the new pleading. Because a stay of discovery is in effect, it is likely that
the parties will each need time to conduct reasonable discovery. The third and fourth
factors weigh, slightly, in favor of Plaintiff.
Because the Court finds that the factors under Rule 16 weigh in favor of Plaintiff,
the Court now conducts an analysis under Rule 15, which requires an analysis of
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the
amendment.”28
Defendants argue that leave to amend the complaint should be denied because the
amendments would be futile. The “futility” of amendments to a complaint is measured
by whether “the amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted” under “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule
12(b)(6).”29
In this matter, all defendants have filed motions to dismiss. For the sake of judicial
efficiency, the Court will analyze those motions to dismiss with the plaintiff’s motion
to amend her complaint. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the
complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8, which requires, “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”30 To
28 Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962).
29 Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading’s language, on its face, must demonstrate
that there exists plausibility for entitlement to relief.31 “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”32
In determining whether it is plausible that a pleader is entitled to relief, a court does
not assume the truth of conclusory statements; rather it looks for facts which support
the elements of the pleader’s claim.33 Factual assertions are presumed to be true, but
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
alone are not enough to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion.34 Although a complaint need not
contain detailed allegations, the allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
beyond speculation.35
Even if the proposed amended complaint is granted, Defendants reiterate the
argument in their motion to dismiss that the proposed pleading still fails to establish
governmental liability against the School Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
requires a plaintiff to show that (1) an official policy; (2) promulgated by the
governmental policymaker; (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a
constitutional right.36 “It is well-established that a city is not liable under § 1983 on
the theory of respondeat superior.”37 “A municipality is almost never liable for an
31 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
32 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
33 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
34 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
35 See id.
36 See Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009).
37 Id.
isolated unconstitutional act on the part of an employee; it is liable only for acts
directly attributable to it ‘through some official action or imprimatur.’”38 Official
policy usually “exists in the form of written policy statements, ordinances, or
regulations, but it may also arise in the form of a widespread practice that is so
common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal
policy.”39 A policy is official only “when it results from the decision or acquiescence of
the municipal officer or body with final policymaking authority over the subject
matter of the offending policy.”40 For a plaintiff to recover, she must show the policy
was implemented by the municipality’s policymaker.41 Regarding the third prong of
proving municipal liability, the plaintiff must show there is a direct causal link
between the policy and the violation.42
In her proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff adds to the complaint the fact that
in a letter, Defendant School Board Superintendent Melissa Martin Stilley referred
to the actions of Defendant Barrilleaux and Chatelain as “too forceful and out of line
with teacher expectations.”43 The letter allegedly states that the physical altercation
exhibited unprofessional behavior, inappropriate comments, repeated threats, and
unnecessary excessive force, “which are violations of the Tangipahoa Parish School
System Employee Conduct Policy.”44 In her proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff
38 Id., citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
39 Id., internal quotation marks and citation omitted.
40 Id., internal quotation marks and citation omitted.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 848.
43 R. Doc. 33-2, p. 10.
44 Id.
adds numerous quotes and statements from media outlets indicating that teachers at
Ponchatoula Jr. High School want “guidelines for how to address student discipline”
and “want policy that states what they should and shouldn’t do.”45 Plaintiff further
alleges in the proposed amended complaint that Defendant Arthur Barrilleaux was
quoted to say numerous times in the media outlets that he was not trained by the
Tangipahoa Schools on how to handle student fights: “Specifically, Mr. Barrilleaux
told The Advocate, ‘he neither received nor was offered the behavior response training
the Tangipahoa Parish School Board has contracted for its teachers.’”46 These
statements are conclusory and do not establish the existence of any official policy or
custom—in fact, the plaintiff appears to assert that there is no official policy. Further,
the quote attributed to Defendant Barrilleaux appears to indicate that some policy
may have been in place; however, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to indicate
any details of such policy. The plaintiff has not plead facts sufficient to establish
governmental liability. Defendants Barrilleaux and Chatelain were not policy-
making officials, and plaintiff has not established any fact that their actions were
taken pursuant to any policy or widespread practice established by the School
Board.47
Plaintiff alleges, “At all relevant times, Principal Crovetto was responsible for the
daily functioning of Ponchatoula Jr. High School including hiring and firing of faculty
and staff, performance evaluation of faculty and staff, ensuring a climate conducive
45 R. Doc. 33-2, p. 11.
46 R. Doc. 33-2, p. 12.
47 See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
to education, monitor student achievement, monitor school safety and a multitude of
other managerial tasks.”48 Plaintiff provides that Mary Beth Crovetto was employed
as principal by the School System/School Board.49 Plaintiff claims that Mary Beth
Crovetto and Melissa Martin Stilley are personally liable for the alleged actions of
Mr. Barrilleaux and Mr. Chatelain under the Fourteenth Amendment:
Principal Crovetto and Superintendent Stilley are personally liable to
E.H. for Mr. Chatelain and Mr. Barrilleaux’s violations of E.H.’s
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because: (a)
they were acting under the color of law; (b) they knew or should have
known that Mr. Chatelain and Mr. Barrilleaux had a history of
confrontational, abusive, and/or violent interactions with students in
the past; (c) they exercised deliberate indifference toward the
constitutional rights of E.H. by failing to take action that was obviously
necessary to prevent an abusive or violent attack by Mr. Chatelain
and/or Mr. Barrilleaux; and (d) the violation of E.H.’s constitutional
rights were made possible and/or caused by the deliberate indifference
of Principal Crovetto and Superintendent Stilley.
R. Doc. 33-2, p. 11. “To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law. Section 1983 imposes liability for violation of rights protected by the
Constitution, not for violations of duties arising out of tort law.”50 Section 1983
applies local government entities and persons.51 However, local governments and
persons, supervisory officials, “may not be found vicariously liable for the actions of
their subordinates under § 1983.”52 Supervisors can be liable for “deliberate
48 R. Doc. 33-2, p. 4.
49 See id.
50 Bank of New York Mellon v. Smith, 180 So. 3d 1238, 1243 (La. 2015).
51 See Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452 (5th Cir. 1994).
52 Id.
indifference.”53 Plaintiff has a substantive due process right to bodily security.54 The
Fifth Circuit has adopted a test, “which determines the personal liability of school
officials in physical sexual abuse cases.”55 Although the Plaintiff does not allege
sexual abuse, the Court finds the test applies in the case at hand alleging physical
abuse, and the plaintiff must show:
(1) the defendant learned of facts or a pattern of inappropriate . . .
behavior by a subordinate pointing plainly toward the conclusion that
the subordinate was . . . abusing the student; and
(2) the defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference toward the
constitutional rights of the student by failing to take action that was
obviously necessary to prevent or stop the abuse; and
(3) such failure caused a constitutional injury to the student.
Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff
alleges that Principal Crovetto and Superintendent Stilley knew or should have
known Mr. Chatelain and Mr. Barrilleaux had a history of confrontational, abusive,
and/or violent interactions with students in the past, and that they exercised
deliberate indifference toward the constitutional rights of E.H. by failing to take
action that was obviously necessary to prevent an abusive or violent attack against
Plaintiff. These are conclusory statements. Plaintiff does not allege any facts to
support allegations that Mr. Chatelain and Mr. Barrilleaux had a history of violent
interactions, nor does Plaintiff allege any facts to support that Principal Crovetto and
Superintendent Stilley knew or should have known that Mr. Chatelain and Mr.
Barrilleaux had any such history.
53 Id.
54 See id. at 454.
55 Id.
Defendants note that Plaintiff “also appears to be attempting to make state
law negligent training allegations as to the School System/School Board.”56 That
would require more from Plaintiff than the mere conclusions stated in the proposed
pleading:
A claim against an employer for the torts of an employee based on the
employer's alleged direct negligence in hiring, training, or supervising
the employee is generally governed by the same duty-risk analysis used
for all negligence cases in Louisiana. That is, in order to recover against
an employer for its own negligence, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving each of five separate elements: duty, breach of duty, cause-in-
fact, scope of liability or scope of protection, and damages.
Pelitire v. Rinker, 18-501 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/17/19) 270 So. 3d 817, 837. Plaintiff has not
proven these five elements of duty, breach of duty, cause-in-fact, scope of liability,
and damages, with regard to Defendants Mary Beth Crovetto, Melissa Martin Stilley,
and Tangipahoa Parish School System School Board. The Court finds that the
proposed pleading would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in regard to those
defendants. Thus, the Court grants Defendants Mary Beth Crovetto, Melissa Martin
Stilley, and Tangipahoa Parish School System School Board’s Motion to Dismiss57
and those defendants are dismissed from this action.
Allowing Plaintiff to amend the complaint would be futile against some
defendants but not all. Defendants Barrilleaux and Chatelain move to dismiss the
plaintiff’s claims, stating that the allegations are broad, conclusory, and not grounded
in reality. The Court finds that the allegations stated in the amended complaint meet
56 R. Doc. 34, p. 7.
57 R. Doc. 14.
the generic pleading requirements of Rule 8 as to Defendants Barrilleaux and
Chatelain. The Court is not making a determination as to the merits of Defendants’
Barrilleaux and Chatelain’s Motion to Dismiss.58 The Court denies the motion to
dismiss without prejudice on this basis alone.
IV. Conclusion
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint (R. Doc. 33) is GRANTED;
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Mary Beth Crovetto
and Melissa Martin Stilley, individually and in their official capacities, and
Tangipahoa Parish School System School Board’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim (R. Doc. 14) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims against these defendants
are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Arthur Barrilleaux
and Brett Chatelain’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (R. Doc. 22) is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this the 18th day of February, 2020.
WENDY B. 4 TER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
58 Doc. 22.