“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.”
How later courts described this case
- “If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.”
- “This Court has never indicated that the requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas also apply to the pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to dismiss.”
- “In reviewing claims of sexual discrimination brought under Title IX, whether by students or employees, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CYNTHIA GOLDIN MURO CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 19-10812
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SECTION “R” (4)
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
AND AGRICULTURAL AND
MECHANICAL COLLEGE
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Louisiana State University’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.1 Plaintiff’s complaint contains adequate
facts to state a claim under Title IX for denial of medically necessary
maternity leave. As to that claim, the Court denies the motion. Plaintiff’s
complaint fails to state a claim for unlawful termination from the dental
program because of pregnancy. The Court grants the motion with respect to
that claim, with leave to amend.
1 R. Doc. 14.
I. BACKGROUND
This Title IX case arises out of the alleged wrongful termination of a
dental resident at LSU. The complaint contains the following factual
allegations. The plaintiff, Cynthia Goldin Muro, was a resident in LSU’s
School of Dentistry Prosthodontics Graduate Program.2 In the fall of 2017,
Muro became pregnant.3 At four months into her pregnancy, in late January
or early Feburary 2018, she reached out to the interim program director and
the department chair concerning her rights to maternity leave.4 She was told
that LSU did not have a student maternity leave policy.5 In June 2018, LSU
informed Muro that she was to register for classes beginning in mid-August
and should keep up remotely in the meantime.6
Muro gave birth during the summer of 2018.7 On August 16, 2018, the
program director emailed Muro and stated: “Extenuating medical
circumstances aside, our agreement in June was that you would return as a
full-time student for one-half of the Summer semester, while completing
didactic assignments at home[.]”8 The director also advised Muro that she
2 R. Doc. 1 ¶ 1.
3 Id. at 4 ¶ 18.
4 Id. at 4 ¶ 19.
5 Id. at 4 ¶ 20.
6 Id. at 5 ¶¶ 28-30.
7 Id. at 5 ¶ 33.
8 Id. at 5-6 ¶ 34.
was to return as a full-time student on August 27, 2018, or she would have
the option of withdrawal or dismissal from the program.9
Muro returned to the program as a full-time student on August 27,
2018, while suffering from post-partum depression.10 In September, she
informed the program director that she was diagnosed with and struggling
with post-partum depression.11 Around October 12, 2019, the interim
program director referred Muro to the Campus Assistance Program. In her
written referral to the Campus Assistance Program, the program director
stated that Muro “has difficulty completing assignments, appears very tired,
and reports post-partum depression.”12 Muro underwent a Fitness for Duty
evaluation and was cleared on October 29, 2018.13 Six months later, in April
2019, LSU terminated Muro from the program.14
Muro sued LSU, arguing the school violated Title IX by failing to
provide her with medically necessary maternity leave and ultimately
terminating her from the program.15 The plaintiff requests declarative and
injunctive relief, including an order reinstating her as a student in LSU’s
9 Id. at 6 ¶ 35.
10 Id. at 6 ¶ 37.
11 Id. at 6 ¶ 38.
12 Id. at 6-7 ¶¶ 40-41.
13 Id. at 7 ¶¶ 43-44.
14 Id. at 7 ¶ 46.
15 Id. at 7 ¶ 48.
Dentistry Program.16 LSU moved to dismiss Muro’s claims under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Muro did not plead sufficient
facts to support the elements of her prima facie case.17
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view
the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75
F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). The Court must resolve doubts as to the
sufficiency of the claim in the plaintiff’s favor. Vulcan Materials Co. v. City
of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). But to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a party must plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). The claim must be dismissed if there are insufficient factual
allegations to raise the right to relief above the speculative level, Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there
is an insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). The
16 Id. at 8.
17 R. Doc. 14.
Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must limit its review to the
contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto. Brand Coupon
Network, L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014).
The Court may also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or
an opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the
pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The parties debate what Muro must plead at this stage to avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim. As both parties recognize, courts
analyze sex discrimination cases under Title IX by looking to the body of law
developed under Title VII. See, e.g., Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101
F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In reviewing claims of sexual discrimination
brought under Title IX, whether by students or employees, courts have
generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims
under Title VII.”). The defendant urges that the Court apply the McDonnell
Douglas framework here, which requires showing (1) that the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class, (2) that the plaintiff suffered an adverse action,
and (3) that discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor for the
defendant’s actions.18 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). But as Muro properly points out, the Supreme Court has held
that in Title VII cases, a plaintiff need not plead facts sufficient to establish a
prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive a
motion to dismiss. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511
(2002) (“This Court has never indicated that the requirements for
establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas also apply to the
pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to
dismiss.”).
But a plaintiff must do more than merely provide notice of his or her
claim, as Muro suggests. The case Muro relies upon for this proposition,
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506, was decided before the Supreme Court clarified
the pleading standard in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 505 U.S. 544 (2007), and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Although Swierkiewicz’s primary
holding—that a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas at the pleading stage—is still good law, a plaintiff must
still plead facts sufficient to raise the right of relief above a speculative level.
See Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555.
18 R. Doc. 14-1 at 5.
In interpreting Swierkiewicz’s holding post-Twombly and Iqbal, the
Fifth Circuit has held that a plaintiff must still “plead sufficient facts on all of
the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim to make [her] case
plausible.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir.
2016) (emphasis added) (citing Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322 331 (5th
Cir. 2013)). The Fifth Circuit has held that the two ultimate elements a
plaintiff must plausibly plead to support a disparate treatment claim are “(1)
an adverse employment action, (2) taken against plaintiff because of her
protected status.” Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767
(5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted).
With limited exceptions not applicable here, Title IX bars sex
discrimination by universities accepting federal funds. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . .”). Courts have held that discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions is a form of sex
discrimination prohibited by Title IX. See, e.g., Conley v. Nw. Fla. State
Coll., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1076-79 (N.D. Fla. 2015); Bakewell v. Stephen F.
Austin State Uni., 975 F. Supp. 858, 887 n.39 (E.D. Tex. 1996). Put another
way, an adverse action taken against a student on the basis of pregnancy or
pregnancy-related conditions is taken because of her sex.
Indeed, the Code of Federal Regulations directly addresses the issue of
pregnancy discrimination under Title IX. “A recipient shall not discriminate
against any student, or exclude any student from its education program . . .
on the basis of such student’s pregnancy . . . or recovery therefrom.” 34
C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1). Moreover, when a school does not have a leave policy
for its students, the school “shall treat pregnancy . . . and recovery therefrom
as a justification for a leave of absence for so long a period of time as is
deemed medically necessary by the student’s physician, at the conclusion of
which the student shall be reinstated to the status which she held when the
leave began.” Id. § 106.40(b)(5). Courts have also found that “protections
against pregnancy discrimination do not end with the pregnancy itself;
pregnancy discrimination also can be based on medical conditions related to
pregnancy.” See, e.g., Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, No. 13-02063, 2015 WL
6123209, at *19 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 19, 2015). And there “is no serious question
that post-partum depression is a medical condition related to pregnancy and
childbirth.” Id. at *18.
Here, Muro claims she faced pregnancy discrimination in two ways.
First, that she was denied medically necessary leave following pregnancy,
and second, that she was unlawfully terminated from the dental program.19
The Court examines each claim in turn.
Muro first claims that she was denied medically necessary maternity
leave because she was forced to return to the program with post-partum
depression.20 LSU argues Muro fails to state a claim because she alleges that
the University gave her some requested maternity leave, following which she
returned to school in August, but she has not pleaded that she requested
additional maternity leave to recover from her pregnancy-related post-
partum depression.21
LSU’s argument fails because, considering the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, Muro pleads facts sufficient to demonstrate that
she was denied medically necessary maternity leave. Specifically, she points
to emails between the interim program director and herself that demonstrate
that the program would not entertain additional maternity leave for Muro in
spite of any “extenuating circumstances.”22 The complaint states that in
August 2018, the interim program director emailed Muro stating
“Extenuating medical circumstances aside, our agreement in June was that
19 R. Doc. 1 at 7 ¶ 48.
20 R. Doc. 1 at 5-7.
21 See R. Doc. 14-1 at 6; R. Doc. 24 at 4-5.
22 R. Doc. 1 at 5-6 ¶ 34.
you would return as a full time student for one half of the Summer semester,
while completing didactic assignments at home.”23 The email continued: “I
met with [the Dean of Academic Affairs] today and we have agreed that you
are to return as a full-time student on Monday, August 27, 2018. If you
are unable to return as a full time student on this date, you will be given the
option of withdrawal from the Prosthodontic program or dismissal from the
program.”24
The phrase “extenuating medical circumstances aside” suggests that
LSU was aware of a pregnancy-related medical circumstance that could
require additional medically-necessary leave and yet the university still
required her to return. Further, LSU said Muro had to return as a full-time
student on August 27, 2018, and if she was unable to, she faced dismissal.
Her allegations plausibly claim that she was not provided medically-
necessary maternity leave, as she alleges she was required to return on
August 27, 2018, on pain of dismissal, even if she was “unable to return as a
full time student,” and irrespective of “extenuating circumstances.”25
23 Id. (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 6 ¶ 35 (emphasis in original).
25 R. Doc. 1 at 5-6 ¶ 34.
Muro also claims that she was unlawfully terminated from the dental
program in April 2019.26 In its motion to dismiss, LSU focuses heavily on
the nearly six-month long gap between October 29, 2019, when Muro was
cleared for duty, and April 19, 2019, when Muro was actually terminated
from the program.27 LSU argues the six months that are not accounted for
in the complaint are fatal to Muro’s claim, as they foreclose a plausible
conclusion that Muro was terminated because of her pregnancy or recovery
therefrom. The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that
her pregnancy or recovery from it was reason for her termination.
Muro fails to connect her termination to her pregnancy or a pregnancy
related condition. This follows because although Muro has properly alleged
that her work was suffering as a result of post-partum depression as late as
October 2018, LSU referred her to the Campus Assistance Program and
required her to undergo a Fitness for Duty evaluation to ensure that she was
able to perform her job. Following this evaluation, Muro was formally
cleared and returned to work on October 29, 2018.28 And it was not until
April 19, 2019—nearly six months later—that Muro was terminated.
26 Id. at 7 ¶¶ 46, 48.
27 See R. Doc. 24 at 5-6.
28 R. Doc. 1 at 7 ¶ 44-45.
Muro provides nothing to link her pregnancy-related post-partum
depression in October to her termination over five months later. She does
not make any allegations of continued post-partum depression; nor does she
plead that her work continued to suffer as a result of any pregnancy-related
condition after she was cleared for duty. Indeed, in the claims for relief,
Muro’s complaint states that LSU discriminated against her in violation of
the law by “failing to provide her with medically necessary maternity leave
and ultimately terminating her from the Program,”29 but she provides
nothing to link the two. The only effort Muro makes to link her termination
to her pregnancy is one line in the complaint’s preliminary statement which
alleges that “As a result of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct, Defendant
dismissed Dr. Goldin from the Program in Spring 2019.”30 But this is just
the sort of conclusory allegation the Court need not credit. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 681. Because Muro alleges no facts linking her termination to her
pregnancy, she has not plausibly alleged that the termination was because of
her pregnancy or a pregnancy-related condition. Therefore, she cannot
succeed on this claim.
29 R. Doc. 1 at 7 ¶ 48.
30 Id. at 2 ¶ 4.
Although Muro has not plausibly pleaded facts linking her termination
from the program to her pregnancy, this does not mean that she could not
do so. The Court therefore finds it appropriate to grant Muro leave to amend
so that she may have the opportunity to plead facts plausibly linking her
termination to her pregnancy or pregnancy-related condition. “The Court
should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“If the underlying facts
or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief,
he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.”).
When deciding whether leave to amend should be given, the Court considers
multiple factors, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the
part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the amendment.” Foman, 371
U.S. at 182. The Court finds none of these factors present here. The Court
will therefore provide Muro with leave to amend within twenty-one days of
entry of this Order.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES
IN PART the defendant’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). This dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the
plaintiff may file an amended complaint within twenty-one days of this
Order.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _7th _ day of November, 2019.
7~ SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14