The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JARVIS BROWN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 19-12432
ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF’S SECTION “R” (1)
OFFICE, ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Jarvis Brown’s section 1983 complaint1 and motion
for a preliminary injunction and restraining order.2 The Court has reviewed
de novo the complaint,3 the record, the applicable law, the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation,4 and the petitioner’s objections.5
Because the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Brown’s complaint
is frivolous, the complaint is dismissed. And because the plaintiff offers no
legal basis for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, his
motion is likewise dismissed.
1 R. Doc. 4.
2 R. Doc. 8.
3 R. Doc. 4.
4 R. Doc. 6.
5 R. Doc. 7.
In 2016, Jarvis was found guilty of three counts of armed robbery, one
count of possession of marijuana, and one count of access device fraud. See
State v. Brown, 219 So. 3d 518, 523 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2017), writ denied, 243
So. 3d 1061 (La. 2018). He was sentenced to sixty years’ imprisonment. Id.
In September 2019, Jarvis filed this section 1983 action against the Orleans
Parish Sheriff’s Office and numerous other state officials, requesting
damages for wrongful imprisonment.6 Jarvis states in his complaint that he
believes he is wrongfully imprisoned, and seeks release and damages in the
amount of $400 billion.7
Because the plaintiff is incarcerated, his complaint is subject to the
screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which require that the Court
review “as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court should
dismiss the complaint if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” Id. at 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A
complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Reeves v.
Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). The Magistrate Judge correctly
6 R. Doc. 4.
7 Id. at 7.
determined that in addition to a “myriad [of] other obstacles”,8 the plaintiff’s
action lacks an arguable basis in law because Brown’s suit it is barred by Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such a
determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.
512 U.S. at 486-87. In his objections, the plaintiff does not respond to the
Magistrate Judge’s analysis of Heck. Instead, he only restates his claims and
makes new allegations regarding correctional officer misconduct that were
not included in his complaint. Because Heck bars the plaintiff’s suit, it must
be dismissed.
The plaintiff also filed a motion that he stylized as an “order to show
cause for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.”9 This
filing largely restates the plaintiff’s arguments that he is wrongfully
imprisoned. A temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy.”
See Miss. Power & Light Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). Because of
8 R. Doc. 6 at 2.
9 R. Doc. 8.
this, a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction will be granted
only where “(1) there is a substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail
on the merits; (2) there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm will
result if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury outweighs
the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) the granting of the
preliminary injunction will not disserve public interest.” Clark v. Prichard,
812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987).
Here, the plaintiff has not attempted to address these requirements,
and in any event fails to meet them. For example, the plaintiff has not shown
that there is a substantial likelihood he would succeed on the merits, as a
motion for a temporary restraining order or injunction is not a proper vehicle
to challenge a state court conviction. Nor has the plaintiff made a showing
or irreparable harm. And because the plaintiff must prove a required
element, the court must deny his motion. Clark at 993 (“The party seeking
such relief must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each of the four
elements enumerated before a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction can be granted.”).
For the reasons in the Report and Recommendation, the plaintiff’s
complaint is frivolous. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s
complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Additionally, the plaintiff’s
motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order is
DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _31st__ day of October, 2019.
SARAH 8S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE