Hatfield v. Vannoy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JIMMY HATFIELD CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 16-10933

DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN SECTION: “E”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge

Michael North recommending the petition for federal habeas corpus relief, filed by

Petitioner Jimmy Hatfield, be dismissed with prejudice.1 Petitioner timely objected to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.2 For the reasons that follow, the Court

adopts the Report and Recommendation as its own, and hereby DENIES WITH

PREJUDICE Petitioner’s application for relief.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana,

for second-degree murder of Herbert Joseph Shiloh.3 On April 10, 2010, Shiloh was found

dead in the apartment of Chiquita Spikes, who was Shiloh’s girlfriend and Petitioner’s

former girlfriend.4

1 R. Doc. 12. This Order refers to documents on this Court’s CM/ECF docket as “R. Doc. [#]” and refers to

the record before the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which consists of a paper docket only, as

“R. Vol. [#]” For reference, the paper docket is split into nine volumes; the bottom of each page has been

marked for citation purposes.

2 R. Doc. 13.

3 R. Doc. 3 at 21.

4 State v. Hatfield, 2013-0813 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/2/14), 155 So. 3d 572, 577, writ denied, 2014-1648 (La.

3/27/15), 162 So. 3d 383 [hereinafter State Appellate Opinion]. In the State Appellate Opinion, the

Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal summarizes the facts found at trial.

At trial, Spikes testified that, on April 9, 2010, the night before Shiloh was found

dead, Petitioner followed Spikes, who was with her friend Shante Whitley, to several

dance clubs.5 Spikes testified that Petitioner approached her and asked her to dance and

to kiss him.6 When she refused, he pushed her, making her head hit a wall.7 Spikes

testified that Petitioner called her repeatedly, and Petitioner’s cell phone records showed

he called 45 times between 2:11 a.m. and 7:25 a.m. on the morning of April 10, 2010.8

Spikes’ friend Whitley testified at trial for the State.9 Whitley confirmed Spikes’

testimony that Petitioner followed Spikes, had a physical altercation with her, and called

her repeatedly throughout the night.10 Whitley also testified that Petitioner called

Whitley’s cell phone and left a voicemail message, which was played for the jury.11

Searle Brown also testified for the State.12 He testified that, early in the morning of

April 10, 2010, Petitioner called him and said the person who his “baby momma messing

with” had “got into it” and that he had been shot.13 Petitioner’s phone records showed the

call took place at 6:10 a.m. on April 10, 2010.14

Cell phone records showed Petitioner was in the vicinity of Spikes’ apartment

between 5:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. on April 10, 2010.15 The State’s theory of the case was

that Petitioner went to Spikes’ apartment and shot and killed Shiloh during this thirty-

5 Id. at 578.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 578, 579.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 579.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 584.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id. at 589.

minute period.16 By 7:25 a.m., Petitioner had checked into the East Jefferson Hospital to

be treated for a gunshot wound, and he had an alibi for all times after 7:25 a.m.17

Shiloh’s body was discovered around 7:00 p.m. on April 10, 2010.18

Dr. Richard Tracy performed the autopsy on the victim.19 He offered an opinion

with respect to Shiloh’s time of death based on the lividity of the body, which is

discoloration on the skin caused by the gravitational settling of the blood.20 Dr. Tracy

testified on direct examination that, based on the lividity of the body, death could have

occurred as early as 4:00 a.m. on April 10, 2010 and as late as four to six hours before

discovery.21 On cross examination, he admitted that, at a meeting on July 11, 2012, he

stated the victim died after 9:00 a.m., but that he could not exclude the possibility Shiloh

died as early as 4:00 a.m.22 On redirect examination, he stated he “could not scientifically

exclude the possibility that the victim was killed between 5:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m.”23

On October 25, 2012, following a four-day trial, a jury found Petitioner guilty as

charged.24 His motion for a new trial was denied.25 Petitioner was sentenced to life

imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence.26 Petitioner’s motion to reconsider the sentence was also denied.27

Petitioner appealed the conviction. Among other assignments of error, Petitioner

argued the trial court erred in (1) denying him the right to cross examine Dr. Tracy using

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 584.

19 Id.

20 Id. at 584–85.

21 Id. at 585.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 577.

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 Id.

the book Medicolegal Investigation of Death, by Werner Spitz (“the Spitz Treatise”),

which he argued was a “learned treatise” pursuant to Louisiana Code of Evidence article

803(18)28 and (2) preventing the defense from cross examining Brown about an open

warrant for Brown’s arrest and Whitley about a pending felony charge.29 On July 2, 2014

the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. On

March 27, 2015, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s application for a writ

of certiorari without assigning additional reasons.30

Petitioner timely filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus on June 17, 2016.31

He claims the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment when it limited his cross-examination of Dr. Tracy using the Spitz Treatise,

his cross-examination of Brown regarding an open warrant for Brown’s arrest, and his

cross-examination of Whitley regarding a pending felony charge against her.32 The State

opposes.33

On August 15, 2017, Magistrate Judge Michael North issued a Report and

Recommendation recommending that Petitioner’s application for federal habeas corpus

relief be dismissed with prejudice.34 The Magistrate Judge determined that any error in

the trial court’s rulings did not have a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the

verdict and found Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.35 On August 29, 2017,

Petitioner timely filed objections to the Report and Recommendation.36

28 Id. at 589.

29 Id. at 605.

30 2014-1648 (La. 3/27/15), 162 So. 3d 383.

31 R. Doc. 1.

32 Id. at 2.

33 R. Doc. 4.

34 R. Doc. 12.

35 Id. at 36.

36 R. Doc. 13.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the Court must

conduct a de novo review of any of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions to which a party

has specifically objected.37 As to the portions of the report that are not objected to, the

Court needs only determine whether these portions are clearly erroneous or contrary to

law.38

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

federal court must defer to the decision of the state court on the merits of a pure question

of law or a mixed question of law and fact unless that decision “was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.”39 A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly

established federal law if: “(1) the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing

law announced in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court decides a case differently

than the Supreme Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”40 AEDPA

requires that a federal court “accord the state trial court substantial deference.”41

ANALYSIS

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right “to be confronted with the

witnesses against him.”42 This clause allows the accused the opportunity to cross-examine

witnesses.43 Accordingly, a Confrontation Clause violation may occur if the accused is

37 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of

the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which an objection is made.”).

38 Id.

39 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

40 Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06.

41 Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015).

42 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

43 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316–17

(1974)).

improperly denied an opportunity to cross-examine a witness.44 Nevertheless, trial judges

retain the discretion to impose reasonable limitations on cross-examination for, among

other reasons, “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”45 The right to cross-examine

allows the defendant “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-

examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might

wish.”46 Louisiana appellate courts review Confrontation Clause claims based on a trial

judge’s decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.47

Furthermore, Confrontation Clause violations are subject to a harmless-error

analysis.48 “For reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas petitioners ‘are not

entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in

“actual prejudice.”’”49 Actual prejudice occurs when the error “had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”50 This actual prejudice

requirement is known as the Brecht standard.51

In AEDPA cases, when a federal habeas petitioner contests a state court’s

determination that a constitutional error was harmless, the Brecht standard does not

abrogate the limitations on federal habeas relief AEDPA sets out,52 but rather “subsumes”

the requirements AEDPA imposes.53 As a result, a federal habeas court need not formally

44 Id.

45 Id. at 679.

46 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)).

47 State v. Cyrus, 2011–1175, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/5/12), 97 So.3d 554, 565 (citing State v. Richardson,

97–1995, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99), 729 So.2d 114, 122).

48 Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007); Fratta v. Quarterman, 536 F.3d 485, 507 (5th Cir. 2008).

49 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

50 Id. at 2198 (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)). Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

51 Id.

52 In reviewing a harmless error decision under AEDPA, “a federal court may not award habeas relief under

§ 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.” Fry, 551 U.S. at 119.

53 Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2197.

apply both Brecht and AEDPA.54 “In sum, a prisoner who seeks federal habeas corpus

relief must satisfy Brecht, and if the state court adjudicated his claim on the merits, the

Brecht test subsumes the limitations imposed by AEDPA.”55 Accordingly, with respect to

Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claims, this Court applies the Brecht test in determining

whether any error was harmless.

I. Exclusion of the Spitz Treatise

At trial, during defense counsel’s cross-examination of State expert witness Dr.

Tracy, defense counsel elicited testimony that Dr. Tracy taught the subject matter in the

Spitz Treatise and that the Spitz Treatise was a “preeminent book” in the field and “the

kind of book that many pathologists all over the country rely upon.”56 However, Dr. Tracy

also stated he would “hate to see it in evidence.”57 The State objected to putting the Spitz

Treatise in evidence and, after an unrecorded bench conference, the trial court sustained

the State’s objection.58 Out of the hearing of the jury, defense counsel stated on the record

the following objection to the trial court’s ruling:

[W]hat Werner Spitz says is essentially that lividity is fixed

after eight to ten hours. Therefore, it simply would not be

possible to see the dual lividity on the body that Dr. Tracy

testified to after more than ten hours from when the body is

found, which was—is a very essential point from the defense.59

The defense called Dr. Collie Trant as an expert witness in anatomic and forensic

pathology, and the State called Dr. James Traylor as a rebuttal witness in the field of

forensic pathology.60 During the defense’s cross-examination of Dr. Traylor, defense

54 Id. (quoting Fry, 551 U.S. at 119–20).

55 Id. at 2199.

56 State Appellate Opinion at 590.

57 Id. at 591.

58 Id.

59 Id. at 591.

60 Id. at 585–86.

counsel elicited testimony with respect to the Spitz Treatise’s statements regarding

lividity.61

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued the trial court violated his rights under the

Confrontation Clause in denying him the right to cross examine Dr. Tracy using the Spitz

Treatise.62 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit did not analyze this constitutional argument,

instead ruling on the correctness of the trial court’s exclusion of the Spitz Treatise under

article 803(18) of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, which creates an exception to the rule

against hearsay for learned treatises “established as reliable authority by the testimony or

admission of the witness.”63 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit found, in light of Dr. Tracy’s

statement that he would “hate to see” the Spitz Treatise in evidence, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Tracy’s testimony did not establish the Spitz Treatise

was a reliable authority.64 The Fourth Circuit also found that, even if the trial court had

erred, any error was harmless because the jury heard Dr. Traylor’s testimony regarding

lividity, and all the experts testified they could not exclude the possibility Shiloh died

between 5:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m.65 The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s writ

without assigning additional reasons.66

The Magistrate Judge assumed arguendo the state trial court erred in excluding

the Spitz Treatise, but found the Louisiana Fourth Circuit’s determination that any

resulting error was harmless was a reasonable application of the Supreme Court’s

Confrontation Clause caselaw.67 Petitioner objects, arguing the introduction of the

61 Id. at 592.

62 Id. at 589.

63 LA. CODE. EVID. art. 803(18).

64 State Appellate Opinion at 591.

65 Id. at 591–92.

66 2014-1648 (La. 3/27/15), 162 So. 3d 383.

67 R. Doc. 12 at 30.

textbook would have allowed him to fully cross-examine the witness and effectively

establish his alibi.68 He contends that, if the court had allowed the textbook to be

introduced, the treatise would have established evidence contrary to Dr. Tracy’s

testimony and would have rebutted Dr. Tracy’s conclusion on the time of death.69

“The mere violation of a state’s evidentiary rules does not in itself invoke habeas

review,” and this Court must determine only whether any “error was of such a magnitude

as to deny fundamental fairness to the criminal trial, thus violating the due process

clause.”70 This Court does not review the correctness of the state courts’ application of

state evidentiary rules.

In this case, Petitioner argues his rights under the Confrontation Clause were

violated when the state trial court limited the scope of his cross-examination of Dr. Tracy

by preventing him from using a learned treatise.71 The correctness of the state trial court’s

ruling on the hearsay issue is distinct from the issue of whether a Confrontation Clause

violation occurred.72 The alleged Confrontation Clause violation is the constitutional

question before this Court. With respect to the Confrontation Clause, the United States

Supreme Court has explained:

The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure

for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. . . .

Cross-examination is the principal means by which the

believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are

tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge

to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the

cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness'

68 R. Doc. 13 at 3.

69 Id.

70 Woods v. Estelle, 547 F.2d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 1977).

71 R. Doc. 13 at 3.

72 Although “hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,”

the United States Supreme Court has been “careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions

with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements.” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814

(1990) (citations omitted).

story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the

cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach,

i.e., discredit, the witness.73

However, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-

examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever

extent, the defense might wish.”74

Petitioner raised his Confrontation Clause claim before the Louisiana Fourth

Circuit, and the court adjudicated the issue on the merits, for purposes of AEDPA.75 As a

result, this Court determines whether the Louisiana Fourth Circuit’s finding of no

Confrontation Clause violation is contrary to clearly established federal law, as

established by Supreme Court precedent. The United States Supreme Court has not

addressed whether failure to admit potential impeachment evidence under an established

exception to the hearsay rule during the testimony of an expert witness constitutes a

violation of the Confrontation Clause. In light of the lack of precedent on the issue and

the facts of the case, this Court finds the Louisiana Fourth Circuit’s ruling was not

contrary to clearly established federal law.

Even if the exclusion of the Spitz Treatise did violate the Confrontation Clause, this

Court finds, under Brecht, that Petitioner has not met his burden of showing actual

prejudice resulted from the exclusion. The introduction of the Spitz Treatise would have

done little to bolster Petitioner’s argument that Shiloh died after 9:00 a.m. Dr. Tracy

testified that estimating time of death based on levity was a “crude guess” or “crude

73 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1974).

74 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985).

75 See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011) (“By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim

‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2). There is

no text in the statute requiring a statement of reasons. The statute refers only to a ‘decision,’ which resulted

from an ‘adjudication.’”).

judgment call.”76 The jury also learned the contents of the textbook statement on lividity

when Dr. Traylor testified that, although lividity generally becomes fixed after eight to

twelve hours, these times depend on temperature.77 The Court notes that none of the three

forensic pathologists who testified could exclude the possibility that Shiloh died between

5:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m.78 Furthermore, there was considerable other evidence of

Petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner’s cell phone location established that he was relatively close

to the location where the victim was shot.79 He spoke to Mr. Brown on the phone, stating

that he had an altercation with the victim.80 Petitioner’s version of events concerning his

own gunshot wound had numerous inconsistencies and was not supported by any

evidence.81 As a result, the Court concludes Petitioner has not shown the evidentiary

ruling actually prejudiced him by having a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this basis.

II. Limitation on the Cross-Examination of Brown and Whitley

The state trial court prevented Petitioner from cross examining Brown regarding

an alleged open warrant for his arrest and from cross examining Whitley regarding a

pending felony charge against her.82 Petitioner argues these limitations violated the

Confrontation Clause.

76 R. Vol. 6 at 63–65.

77 R. Vol. 7 at 225–35.

78 Id. at 29.

79 Id.

80 Id.

81 Id.

82 State Appellate Opinion at 605.

A. Cross-examination of Searle Brown

Brown’s parole officer testified at trial that Brown had not violated the terms of his

parole for three years.83 The State represented on appeal that the open warrant was “for

failure to pay fines and fees in Baton Rouge.”84 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit found this

information was not probative or serious enough to undermine the witness’ credibility

and stated, “If the matter of which defense counsel sought to question Mr. Brown about

was serious enough to undermine his credibility, it can be presumed that his parole officer

would have known of it and that it would have constituted a parole violation.”85 As a

result, the appellate court found Petitioner had failed to show the trial court abused its

discretion in sustaining the State’s objection.86 But even assuming arguendo the trial

court had erred, the appellate court also found beyond a reasonable doubt the error was

harmless.87 The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s writ application without

assigning additional reasons.88

The Magistrate Judge found that “Hatfield had ample opportunity to expose

potential bias or motivation on the part of Mr. Brown” because after “[t]he State initially

brought out on direct examination Mr. Brown’s prior convictions and the fact that he was

currently on parole and would be for several more months,” “Defense counsel had the

opportunity to explore these topics at length with Mr. Brown during her cross-

examination, searching for information that would suggest bias or motivation for his

testimony, before she asked about the open warrant.”89 As a result, the limitation on

83 Id.

84 Id. at 606.

85 Id.

86 Id.

87 Id. at 607.

88 2014-1648 (La. 3/27/15), 162 So. 3d 383.

89 R. Doc. 12 at 35–36.

cross-examination did not have a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the

verdict.90 The Magistrate Judge found the state appellate court’s finding of harmlessness

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.

Petitioner objects, arguing the evidence was material.91 Because petitioner objects, the

Court will review this Confrontation Clause claim de novo.92

This Court finds the state appellate court’s finding that the trial court did not

violate the Confrontation Clause is not contrary to clearly established federal law. In

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, a trial court “prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that [the

witness] would be biased as a result of the State's dismissal of his pending public

drunkenness charge.”93 The Supreme Court explained that, “[b]y thus cutting off all

questioning about an event that the State conceded had taken place and that a jury might

reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his

testimony, the court's ruling violated respondent's rights secured by the Confrontation

Clause.”94 However, the Supreme Court cautioned, “trial judges retain wide latitude

insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,

confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only

marginally relevant.”95

In United States v. Hamilton, the federal district court limited cross-examination

concerning a witness’s pending misdemeanor charges.96 The United States Fifth Circuit,

90 Id.

91 R. Doc. 13 at 5–6.

92 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

93 475 U.S. at 679.

94 Id.

95 Id.

96 48 F.3d 149, 155 (5th Cir. 1995).

interpreting United States Supreme Court Confrontation Clause precedent,97 found the

limitation was not an abuse of discretion because the witness “testified that he had

received no promises by anyone in connection with his testimony” and “even stated that

he was unaware of his pending warrant.”98 Similarly, in this case, Brown testified he was

unaware of any pending warrants. As a result, the state trial court did not violate

Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause in limiting the cross-examination of

Brown. The state appellate court’s finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

did not contravene clearly established federal law regarding the scope of cross-

examination.

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit also found that, even if the trial court had erred, the

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.99 During the State’s direct examination

of Brown, the State brought out Brown’s prior convictions and the fact he was on

parole.100 Defense counsel asked Brown if there was a warrant out for his arrest, and

Brown testified he was not aware of any.101 As a result, the Court finds that, even if the

state trial court had overruled the State’s objection and admitted evidence of a pending

arrest warrant, the evidence would not have been likely to show bias or motive to testify

falsely, and it would not have had a substantial or injurious influence on the verdict.

Petitioner has not met his burden of showing actual prejudice under Brecht.

97 Although lower federal court precedent does not constitute “clearly established Federal law” for purposes

of AEDPA, the Court may look to lower federal court interpretations of Supreme Court precedent in

determining whether law is clearly established. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006).

98 Id.

99 Id. at 607.

100 R. Vol. 7 at 127–29.

101 Id. at 132.

B. Cross-examination of Shante Whitley

With respect to Petitioner’s challenge to the limitation on his cross-examination of

Whitley regarding her pending charge of aggravated battery, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit

found that, because Whitley was close friends with Spikes, “one can surmise that their

close friendship would have been an overriding motive” to testify falsely.102 The appellate

court found and the trial court could reasonably have found minimal the probative value

of evidence of a pending charge in light of Whitley’s friendship with Spikes.103 The

appellate court also found beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless.104 The

Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed without assigning additional reasons.105

The Magistrate Judge found “questionable” the Louisiana Fourth Circuit’s

rationale, but found the error was harmless because most of Whitley’s testimony was

cumulative to Spikes’ testimony.106 The Magistrate Judge noted Whitley’s testimony

regarding the phone call was verified by independent phone records, and the actual

voicemail recording was played for the jury.107 As a result, the Magistrate judge found

reasonable the state appellate court’s determination that any error was harmless.108

Petitioner objects.109

In United States v. Alexius, a federal district court limited cross-examination

concerning a witness’s pending felony charges in federal court.110 The United States Fifth

Circuit, interpreting United States Supreme Court Confrontation Clause precedent,

102 State Appellate Opinion at 606.

103 Id.

104 Id. at 607.

105 2014-1648 (La. 3/27/15), 162 So. 3d 383.

106 R. Doc. 12 at 34.

107 Id.

108 Id.

109 R. Doc. 13 at 4–5.

110 76 F.3d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 1996).

distinguished Hamilton and found the district court abused its discretion because (1) “a

witness is more likely to attempt to curry favor with prosecutors if he is facing

felony charges,” (2) the pending charges were federal and the trial was in federal court,

and (3) the credibility determination was critical to the defendant’s case.111

In this case, defense counsel and Whitley engaged in the following exchange on

cross-examination:

Q. Now, Ms. Whitley, coming to court to testify in this case,

that’s not the only reason you’re in this building today, is it?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. You had your own court case today, didn’t you?112

At that point, the prosecutor objected, and his objection was sustained. Like the witness

in Alexius, Whitley had a pending felony charge. In fact, she had a proceeding in another

section of the same court on the same day and lied about it when initially questioned about

it. Under Alexius, Whitley’s pending felony charge is relevant to show her motive for

testifying falsely, and the fact she was friends with Spikes does not reduce the probative

value of evidence of her pending charge. However, the Supreme Court has not ruled

directly on this issue, and this Court finds the Louisiana Fourth Circuit’s finding no

Confrontation Clause does not conflict with clearly established federal law, as established

by United States Supreme Court precedent.

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit found any error in connection with Whitley’s

testimony to be harmless. At trial, the State played the recording of the voicemail

Petitioner left Whitley, during which he stated the victim wasn’t “playing games” and that

111 Id.; see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (finding a Confrontation Clause violation

when the “trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that [a witness] would be biased as a result

of the State's dismissal of his pending public drunkenness charge”) (emphasis in original).

112 R. Vol. 6 at 165–66.

it was “over with.”3 The voicemail spoke for itself, regardless of whether or not the jury

found Whitley credible. Moreover, Whitley testified she had been friends with Spikes for

over sixteen years,!!4 which could also call into question her motive for testifying. This

Court finds Petitioner has not met his burden of showing, under Brecht, that any error

resulted in actual prejudice to him. The Court denies Petitioner’s request for habeas relief

on the basis of the state trial court’s limitation on his cross-examination of Brown and

Whitley.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court approves the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation!§ and adopts it as its opinion in this matter.

IT IS ORDERED that the petition of Jimmy Hatfield for issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of September, 2019.

>“ atti —

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

u3 Td. at 159.

114 Id. at 148.

5 Td.

17