Bryant v. Department of Public Safety And Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KEITH BRYANT CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 19-10324

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SECTION “T”(2)

SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS ET AL.

ORDER ON MOTIONS

APPEARANCES: None (on the briefs)

MOTION: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, Record Doc.

No. 12; (2) Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery and Reset

Deadlines, Record Doc. No. 14

O R D E R E D:

(1), (2): GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as provided herein. Defendants’

motion to dismiss this case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds

is pending and noticed for submission on September 18, 2019. Record Doc. No. 13.

“Generally, a plaintiff may not obtain discovery against a party asserting qualified

immunity until the Court first finds that the pleadings assert facts sufficient to overcome

the qualified immunity defense.” Nelms v. City of Waxahachie, 2008 WL 11425663, at

*1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2008) (citing Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Servs., 41

F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1995)). In Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995),

the Fifth Circuit held that when defendants raise a qualified immunity defense, the

district court “may ban discovery . . . and may limit any necessary discovery to the

defense of qualified immunity.” (Emphasis added). “If the complaint alleges facts to

overcome the defense of qualified immunity, the district court may then proceed . . . to

allow the discovery necessary to clarify those facts upon which the immunity defense

turns.” Wicks, 41 F.3d 991 at 995 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The doctrine of qualified immunity offers a shield against civil liability for

government employees “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” . . . . “[W]hether an official protected by qualified

immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official

action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action,

assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time

it was taken.”

Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).

The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that

“[q]ualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). . . . [I]mmunity is “effectively lost if a

case is erroneously permitted to go to trial” . . . . Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 526–27 . . . (1985). This court has applied Mitchell to trial court

discovery orders that, through overbreadth, effectively deprive public

officials of an immunity from suit. Wicks[, 41 F.3d at 994–95.]

One of the most salient benefits of qualified immunity is protection

from pretrial discovery, which is costly, time-consuming, and intrusive,

Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986). Consequently,

this court has established a careful procedure under which a district court

may defer its qualified immunity ruling if further factual development is

necessary to ascertain the availability of that defense. As we explained in

Wicks, supra, a district court must first find “that the plaintiff’s pleadings

assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified

immunity.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 . . . (2009)

(directing that a plaintiff must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on

its face”– excluding statements that are “no more than conclusions” which

are “not entitled to the assumption of truth”). Thus, a plaintiff seeking to

overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with

equal specificity. After the district court finds a plaintiff has so pled, if the

court remains “unable to rule on the immunity defense without further

clarification of the facts,” it may issue a discovery order “narrowly tailored

to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim.” Lion

Boulos [v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507–08 (5th Cir. 1987)].

Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012).

2

Applying these standards, plaintiff's request for an order requiring responses to

his discovery requests at any time while the qualified immunity motion to dismiss is

pending and for sanctions is denied. Instead, defendants will be required to respond

and/or object to the subject discovery requests only if and after the court denies the

pending motion to dismiss. In their motion to stay, defendants state that they “may

conduct discovery” if their motion is denied. Record Doc. No. 14-1 at p. 3. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that all discovery is temporarily stayed as follows. Discovery

may commence only if and after the pending motion to dismiss is denied, in which case

defendants must provide their responses and/or objections to the subject discovery no

later than 21 days after entry of the court’s order denying the motion to dismiss. All

objections are specifically preserved.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ request in its motion to reset

deadlines is denied as premature. The current deadlines to complete discovery and to file

pretrial motions do not occur until February 11 and 18, 2020, respectively. Record Doc.

No. 9. It appears at this time that ample time to complete discovery will remain available

if the court denies the motion to dismiss. If not, a new motion to extend deadlines may

be filed.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day of September, 2019.

JOSEPH C. WILKINSON, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CLERK TO NOTIFY:

HON. GREG GERARD GUIDRY