“The motion is not properly considered a motion for “new trial” because there was no trial.”
How later courts described this case
- “The motion is not properly considered a motion for “new trial” because there was no trial.”
- “Although the parties and the district court all proceeded to deal with plaintiff's motion as one for “new trial,” neither the parties nor the court identified whether it was a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(2) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). As this was a motion 2002
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHRISTOPHER VERDIN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 18-548
CHARLES COOK, ET AL. SECTION "B"(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative,
for reconsideration. Rec. Doc. 98. Defendants Charles Cook and Joe
Cehan filed a response in opposition, which was adopted by
defendants Jerry Larpenter and Cody Guilbeaux. Rec. Docs. 106,
109. Defendants Larpenter and Guilbeaux subsequently filed a
supplemental memorandum in opposition. Rec. Doc. 111. For the
reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of this case are laid out in greater detail in the
Order and Reasons granting defendants’ motions for summary
judgment and are incorporated by reference here. Rec. Docs. 95,
96. In brief, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations
in connection with his arrest on May 13, 2015. Rec. Doc. 1.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant officers used excessive force in
his arrest and retaliated against him for exercising his First
Amendment Rights. Id. at 4-6.
The Court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity, finding plaintiff failed to meet
his burden of showing that defendants had violated clearly
established law. Rec. Docs. 95, 96. The Court subsequently entered
judgment in favor of defendants. Rec. Doc. 97. Plaintiff now files
the instant motion for new trial, or in the alternative, motion
for reconsideration.
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Plaintiff seeks a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) on the
grounds that summary judgment in favor of defendants is against
the weight of the evidence, or in the alternative, reversal of the
judgment entered against him pursuant to Rule 59(e), on the grounds
that there is clearly established law supporting his argument
against defendants’ qualified immunity defense. Rec. Doc. 98.
Plaintiff argues that federal jurisprudence establishes that
defendants violated his clearly established rights. Rec. Doc. 98-
1 at 3-6. Plaintiff provides, for the first time in the instant
motion, cases he asserts establish a body of law showing plaintiff
had a clearly established right to: 1) be free from being pinned
to the ground with an officer’s knees in his back, (citing
Martinez-Aguero v Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006), Cry v.
Dillard, 2017 WL 2172944 (S.D. Miss. May 16, 2017), Davis v. Hinds
County, Mississippi, 2017 WL 4228659 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2017),
Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298 (5th Cir.2017)); and
2) be free from being yanked from a police vehicle and slammed
against the car while restrained (citing Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d
492 (5th Cir. 2008), Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d 656 (5th Cir.
2015), Scott v. Farris, 2005 WL 517500 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 2005),
Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298 (5th Cir.2017)). Id.
Therefore, plaintiff argues that any reasonable police officer
would be on notice that defendant officers’ conduct violated
plaintiff’s clearly established rights and defendants are not
entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 7-8. Additionally,
plaintiff cites a case that he asserts clearly establishes his
right to be free from retaliation against his protected speech
after his arrest and placement in the police vehicle. Id. at 9
(citing White v. Jackson, 2014 WL 99976 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2014).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A Rule 59(e) motion calls into question the correctness of a
judgment.1 In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir.
1 This motion is not properly considered a motion for “new trial” because there
was no trial. A motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) is appropriate for cases
that have been tried to a jury or to the Court. Because the Court disposed of
this case on motion for summary judgment, the correct vehicle for
reconsideration of the Court’s judgment is a motion to alter or amend a judgment
under Rule 59(e). See Montgomery v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 WL 1870279, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. May 16, 2011), aff'd, 459 F. App'x 424 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The
motion is not properly considered a motion for “new trial” because there was no
trial.”); Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher's Choice, Inc. ., 1999 WL 1032798
(N.D.Tex. Nov.10, 1999) (Although denominated as a motion for “new trial,” it
obviously is not such a motion. As Rule 59(a) makes clear, a motion for new
trial is appropriate when the case has been tried to a jury or to the court.
The court disposed of this case on motion for summary judgment.”); Jones v. W.
Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Although the parties
and the district court all proceeded to deal with plaintiff's motion as one for
“new trial,” neither the parties nor the court identified whether it was a
motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(2) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). As this was a motion
2002). Rule 59(e) serves “the narrow purpose of allowing a party
to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Basinkeeper v. Bostick, 663 F. App'x 291,
294 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d
468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989)). Amending a judgment is appropriate under
Rule 59(e): “(1) where there has been an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) where the movant presents newly discovered
evidence that was previously unavailable; or (3) to correct a
manifest error of law or fact.” Berezowsky v. Rendon Ojeda, 652 F.
App'x 249, 251 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma,
Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 2012)). Because Rule 59(e) has
a “narrow purpose,” the Fifth Circuit has “observed that
[r]econsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary
remedy that should be used sparingly.” Id. (quoting Templet v.
HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004)). Thus, “a motion
for reconsideration is not the proper vehicle for rehashing
evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered
or raised before the entry of judgment.” Id. (quoting Templet, 367
F.3d at 479).
Reconsideration of the previous judgment is not appropriate
because plaintiff’s newly offered legal arguments could have been
made at the time of his original filing. The entirety of
essentially for reexamination of an order finally disposing of an action prior
to trial, we presume that it was a motion for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P.
59(e).”)
plaintiff’s motion consists of providing caselaw to remedy the
deficiency of his previous responses to defendants’ motions for
summary judgment, which failed to identify existing precedent that
clearly established his allegedly violated rights. Plaintiff seeks
to now show the Court that a body of relevant caselaw exists which
places the lawfulness of defendant officer’s conduct beyond
debate, as required by the Supreme Court when a plaintiff seeks to
defeat a qualified immunity defense. See D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577, 581 (2018).
However, none of the cases plaintiff cites to in support of
his motion were published after this Court’s judgment and should
have been included in plaintiff’s original opposition. When
defendants invoked the qualified immunity defense in their motions
for summary judgment, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove
that the defense was not available to them by showing that they
had violated a right that was “clearly established” at the time of
the defendant officials’ conduct. See Vann v. City of Southaven,
884 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hanks v. Rogers, 853
F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017)). Supreme Court precedent required
plaintiff to establish this element by showing that a body of
relevant case law and existing precedent placed the lawfulness of
defendants’ actions beyond debate.2 See D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
2 The Supreme Court also held that there may be a rare obvious case where the
unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing
precedent does not address similar circumstances. D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577, 581 (2018). Summary judgment was granted in this case because
plaintiff failed to show that he had a clearly established right
supported by relevant case law in his response. A Rule 59(e) motion
does not provide plaintiff a second chance to oppose defendants’
motions for summary judgment by making such a showing. Plaintiff
does not identify an intervening change in controlling law, newly
discovered evidence that was previously unavailable, or a manifest
error. Rather, plaintiff submits legal arguments for consideration
that were available to him at the time of his original filing, but
which he failed to make. However, “a motion for reconsideration is
not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or
arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry
of judgment.” Id. (quoting Templet, 367 F.3d at 479). Therefore,
plaintiff has not identified a proper basis upon which to alter or
amend this Court’s judgement.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 26th day of June, 2019.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
577, 581 (2018). The Court held in the Order and Reasons granting defendants’
motion for summary judgment that we did not consider this case to be that “rare
obvious case” and plaintiff does not appear to seek reconsideration of that
finding in the instant motion.