Opinion

Wright v. Google, LLC

Court
District Court, W.D. Kentucky
Filed
Jan 13, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.2%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

LOUISVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-CV-00602-RGJ-CHL

THOMAS WRIGHT, Plaintiff,

v.

GOOGLE, LLC, et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Stay Lawsuit Pending Limited Discovery on Execution

of Binding Arbitration Agreement filed by Defendant Google, LLC (“Google”). (DN 8.) Plaintiff

Thomas Wright (“Plaintiff”) has filed a response (DN 22), to which Google filed a reply (DN 31).

Therefore, the motion is ripe for review.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed this action in the circuit court for Jefferson County, and

on September 24, 2021, the case was removed to this Court. (DN 1; DN 1-1.) Plaintiff alleges

that he was injured due to a defect in his Pixel 4 XL smartphone and brings claims for negligence

and strict liability against all defendants as well as breach of warranty and state consumer

protection claims against Google. (DN 1-1, at PageID # 11, 14–37.) On October 4, 2021,

Defendants Cellular Sales of Kentucky, LLC and Cellular Sales of Knoxville, Inc. moved to

compel arbitration. (DN 5.) On October 15, 2021, Google filed the instant motion, which seeks a

stay this case pending limited discovery to determine whether Plaintiff entered into a binding

arbitration agreement covering his claims against Google. (DN 8.)

Google states that the Pixel 4 XL smartphone setup process requires users to accept an

arbitration agreement and allows them to opt out of the agreement through an optional procedure.

(Id. at PageID # 122.) Google seeks discovery “related to certain identifying information Google

needs in order to confirm Plaintiff went through the Pixel 4 XL setup process (which would have

included acceptance of the agreement to arbitrate) and did not thereafter exercise his right to opt

out under the applicable terms of the agreement.” (DN 8-1, at PageID # 130.) Google states that

such discovery “includes, but is not limited to: usernames, serial numbers, email addresses,

registration information, account numbers, receipts, and other identifying information related to

Plaintiff and the purchase of his device.” (Id.)

In response, Plaintiff states that he “opposes the blanket stay of the entire matter but would

agree to provide Google 30 days from the Court’s determination of the subject motion to seek the

information outlined in its motion prior to seeking any discovery from that defendant and another

30 days to file whatever motion it deems appropriate following that discovery period.” (DN 22,

at PageID # 168–69.) In reply, Google asserts that “thirty days does not account for any

unanticipated delays the parties may encounter in limited discovery.” (DN 31, at PageID # 225.)

It thus “suggests sixty (60) days to conduct its limited discovery, and an additional fourteen (14)

days thereafter within which to bring a motion to enforce its rights under any applicable arbitration

provision.” (Id.) Google also opposes Plaintiff’s proposal that the stay be limited to discovery

from Google, which it argues “ignores the prejudicial and preclusive effects such a procedural

maneuver may have on Google, as well as the Court’s interests in judicial economy.” (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

It is “well established that the scope of discovery is within the sound discretion of the trial

court.” Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1240 (6th Cir. 1981). This includes

“broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that may

dispose of the case are determined.” Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 719 (6th Cir. 1999). In

assessing whether to stay discovery otherwise permitted under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, courts must consider “the burden of proceeding with discovery upon the party

from whom discovery is sought against the hardship which would be worked by a denial of

discovery.” Baker v. Swift Pork Co., No. 3:15-CV-663-JHM, 2015 WL 6964702, at *1 (W.D. Ky.

Nov. 10, 2015) (citations omitted). Generally, “the filing of a case dispositive motion is

insufficient to warrant a stay of discovery.” Brown v. Danson Inc., No. 1:11-cv-820, 2012 WL

3600100, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2012); see also Baker, 2015 WL 6964702, at *2-3.

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court addresses Google’s assertion that a stay is mandatory. (See

DN 8-1, at PageID # 130.) Google cites to Stanton Health Facilities LP et al. v. Fletcher, 454

S.W.3d 312 (Ky. App. 2015) as requiring a stay “while the parties engage in limited discovery

regarding the Plaintiff’s execution of the arbitration agreement.” (Id.) In Stanton the court

reviewed a trial court’s order deferring a ruling on a motion to compel arbitration and allowing the

parties to proceed to pretrial discovery. 454 S.W.3d at 314. The court noted that “[t]he plain

language of KRS 417.060 directs that a trial court ‘shall proceed summarily’ to the determination

of a motion to compel arbitration. KRS 417.060(4) requires a trial court to stay ‘[a]ny action or

proceeding’ pending the determination of a motion to compel arbitration.” Id. at 315. The court

therefore found “that the trial court erred by allowing discovery to proceed on the merits of the

underlying claim while the motion to compel arbitration was pending.” Id. Here, even assuming

that a decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals was binding on this Court’s disposition of the

instant motion, Stanton does not apply because Google has not filed a motion to compel arbitration.

Google has not cited any authority that mandates a stay under these circumstances. That said, the

reasoning relied upon in Stanton is not irrelevant to the Court’s balancing of the relevant burdens

and hardships.

Courts recognize a strong presumption in favor of arbitration. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos.,

LLC, 747 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2014). If Google prevails in compelling arbitration, it will be on

a showing of its “right not to litigate the dispute in a court and bear the associated burdens.” Blinco

v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004). The Fourth Circuit has aptly

described those burdens:

[A]llowing discovery to proceed could alter the nature of the dispute

significantly by requiring parties to disclose sensitive information

that could have a bearing on the resolution of the matter. If we later

hold that the claims were indeed subject to mandatory arbitration,

the parties will not be able to unring any bell rung by discovery, and

they will be forced to endure the consequences of litigation

discovery in the arbitration process.

Levin v. Alms & Associates, Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2011).

Here, the limited stay will allow Google to explore the arbitrability of Plaintiff’s claims

against it, while denying the stay and requiring Google “to proceed to defend an action in [federal]

court would destroy the contractual right to arbitration.” Stanton, 454 S.W.3d at 314.

On the other hand, the Court sees little basis for a finding that a limited stay would prejudice

Plaintiff. The only grounds for his objection to Google’s request is that he “entitled to discover

facts and documents related to his claims against all Defendants in a timely manner pursuant to

FRCP 26.” (DN 22, at PageID # 168.) The Court recognizes that it “must tread carefully in

granting a stay of proceedings since a party has a right to a determination of its rights and liabilities

without undue delay.” Ohio Envtl. Council v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1977)

(citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936)). However, the Court is unconvinced

that a limited stay prejudices Plaintiff’s right. This case is still in nascent stages; the recently

issued scheduling order established a discovery deadline of November 1, 2022, well over ten

months from now. (DN 34.) Plaintiff will be equally situated to diligently conduct discovery upon

the conclusion of a sixty-day stay. Additionally, the Court agrees with Google that the stay is in

the interest of judicial economy because it will allow the Court to consider all motions to compel

arbitration at the outset of the case. Therefore, the Court will grant Google’s request for a stay

pending limited discovery related to Plaintiff's agreement to arbitrate his claims.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. DN 8is GRANTED.

2. Discovery in this matter is STAYED pending Google’s limited discovery as to Plaintiffs

execution of a binding arbitration agreement, which shall be completed on or before March

15, 2022.

3. Google shall file any motion to compel arbitration on or before March 29, 2022.

Colin H Lindsay, Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

January 12, 2022

ce: Counsel of record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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