Brown v. Wier

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

SOUTHERN DIVISION at PIKEVILLE

TERRANCE BROWN,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 7: 24-022-KKC

V.

JUDGE ROBERT WIER, et al., MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER

Defendants.

*** *** *** ***

Plaintiff Terrance Brown is a federal prisoner who is currently confined at the United States

Penitentiary (“USP”)-Big Sandy located in Inez, Kentucky. Proceeding without an attorney,

Brown has filed a civil complaint against the Hon. Robert E. Wier (United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of Kentucky), the Hon. Danny C. Reeves (United States Chief Judge for

the Eastern District of Kentucky), and the Hon. Joseph M. Hood (retired United States District

Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky). [R. 1]1 Brown has paid the $350.00 filing fee and the

$55.00 administrative fee in full. [R. 1-2]

Because Brown is a prisoner seeking redress from officers and/or employees of a

governmental entity, the Court must conduct a preliminary review of his complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. A district court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607-08 (6th

1 Although this case was originally assigned to Judge Wier, because Judge Wier is named as a

Defendant, he previously entered an Order sua sponte recusing himself from presiding over this

case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i). [R. 5] Thus, Brown’s “Motion to Appoint New Judge

Cir. 1997). The Court evaluates Brown’s complaint under a more lenient standard because he is

not represented by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Burton v. Jones, 321

F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). At this stage, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as

true, and his legal claims are liberally construed in his favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Even so, the Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or

unwarranted factual inferences.” Moderwell v. Cuyahoga Co., Ohio, 997 F.3d 653, 659 (6th Cir.

2021) (quotations omitted).

While the allegations of Brown’s complaint are vague and disjointed, it is apparent that

Brown’s complaint relates to the resolution prior matters that he has had before this Court. By

way of background, since March 2023, Brown has filed with the Court a series of brief letters,

habeas corpus petitions, and civil rights complaints. Most of these documents share a common

narrative thread: Brown alleges that during surgery years ago, doctors implanted a “pen register”

into his body which both records and transmits information about him, causing mental distress. In

his submissions, Brown has requested that the Court direct federal or state law enforcement

personnel to investigate the circumstances of his confinement in federal prison, and/or to grant

relief against those federal or state officials who failed to investigate or ameliorate the suffering

attendant to his condition. However styled, the Court has dismissed Brown’s filings without

prejudice because the relief he sought was not available from the Court; his pleading failed to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted; or his allegations were too tenuous to invoke the Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction. In most instances, the Court sent Brown the forms necessary to file a

new civil complaint or habeas corpus petition if he wished to seek relief available through those

mechanisms. See generally Brown v. USP Big Sandy, No. 7:23-CV-27-REW (E.D. Ky. 2023);

Brown v. USP Big Sandy, No. 7:23-CV-41-REW (E.D. Ky. 2023); Brown v. Governor Beshear,

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No. 3:23-CV-68-GFVT (E.D. Ky. 2023); Brown v. USP Big Sandy, No. 7:23-CV-83-REW (E.D.

Ky. 2023); Brown v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 7:23-CV-87-REW (E.D. Ky. 2023); Brown

v. USP Big Sandy, No. 7:24-CV-6-REW (E.D. Ky. 2024).

In his complaint filed in this case, Brown alleges that he has sought to report a “malice 4th

amendment violation of a human being” to “the Federal Court of jurisdiction in which discovery

was made,” and has sought “emergency relief” through several different “court proceeding

attributes; lettered correspondence, motions, and a habeas corpus applications.” [R. 1 at p. 2] He

claims that he complied with all instructions and referred to government witnesses, but no relief

has been granted and a “conspiracy is continuing with deception of simple medical malpractice.”

[Id.] Brown further states:

These filings were not made based on prison conditions but reporting a serious

offense that I am enduring with daily injury that I was unaware of until I reported.

I assumed these abnormals I’m experiencing internally were sequenced from

depression of atmosphere and malnutrition until things continued to get worse and

this subject of requested relief was verified thru a facility body scan. Also a person

who had knowledge of this crime and what was really going on. Negligence, I have

not been afforded the proper relief.

[Id. at p. 3]

His complaint alleges violations of his rights under “the fourteenth amendment, with

detailed knowledge of my fourth amendment right, and knowledgeable USCS 4 misprision in

effort to grant or relay emergency relief thru governmental agency.” [Id. at p. 4] As relief, he

seeks injunctive relief to “fully report matter” and “negligence compensation of enduring injury

and emotional distress also of constitutional rights (previously mentioned) during time frame of

court contact seeking relief.” [Id. at p. 8]

However, after reviewing Brown’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, it

will be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. As an initial matter,

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federal notice pleading requires, at a minimum, that the complaint advise each defendant of what

he allegedly did or did not do that forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim against him. Grinter v.

Knight, 532 F. 3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F. 3d 617, 626 (6th

Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiff must state a plausible constitutional violation against each individual

defendant - the collective acts of defendants cannot be ascribed to each individual defendant.”)

(citations omitted). This requirement applies notwithstanding that Brown is not represented by a

lawyer, as “[e]ven a pro se prisoner must link his allegations to material facts…and indicate what

each defendant did to violate his rights…” Sampson v. Garrett, 917 F. 3d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 2019)

(citing Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010); Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F. 3d 673, 684

(6th Cir. 2008)).

Brown’s complaint fails to meet these minimum requirements, as he makes no allegation

that any of the named Defendants did anything at all, much less advise each of them of what they

allegedly did or did not do that forms the basis of Brown’s claims against them. While Judge Wier

presided over several of Brown’s prior cases, it does not appear that either Judge Reeves or Judge

Hood had any involvement in Brown’s prior litigation. Regardless, while Brown claims that his

constitutional rights have been violated (albeit upon grounds that are ambiguous or entirely

unstated), he does not attribute any of these asserted violations of his rights to any named

Defendant, or indeed any person at all.

More critically, Brown’s claims against Defendants are barred by judicial immunity.

Judges have long been entitled to absolute judicial immunity from claims arising out of their

performance of functions integral to the judicial process. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55

(1967). Indeed, “[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity

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of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction,” and this

“settled principle of law” was not abolished by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 554.

“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of

damages,” and, accordingly, is “not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence

of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citations omitted). See also Forrester v. White 484 U.S. 219, 225

(1988) (judicial immunity “insulate[es] judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled

litigants.”). Principles of judicial immunity are so strong that judges are protected from suit “even

when they perform judicial acts in excess of their authority, even when such acts are allegedly

done maliciously or corruptly.” Id. at 355-56 (citation omitted). In accordance with these

principles, federal courts will permit suit against judges only when they act “in the clear absence

of jurisdiction.” Id. at 351-52. See also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.

While Brown’s allegations are vague, the only possible connection between any of the

named Defendants and Brown’s claims regarding his prior litigation is that Judge Wier presided

over several of Brown’s prior cases. Without question, presiding over a civil or habeas case falls

squarely within the role of a trial judge. See Huffer v. Bogen, 503 F. App’x 455, 459 (6th Cir.

2012) (“[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature

of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations

of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”) (quoting Stump v.

Sparkman,, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). Moreover, Brown makes no allegation that any of the

Defendants (particularly Judge Wier, the Judge assigned to all but one of Brown’s cases) acted

outside of the scope of their jurisdiction in any of Brown’s prior cases. Thus, Brown’s claims

against the Defendants are barred by judicial immunity.

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For all of these reasons, Brown’s complaint will be dismissed on initial screening.

Moreover, because Defendants are entitled to immunity from Brown’s claims, this dismissal will

be with prejudice.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Brown’s Motion to Appoint New Judge for Action [R. 3] is DENIED as moot;

2. Brown’s Complaint [R. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

3. This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket.

4. A corresponding Judgment will be entered this date.

This 2™ day of April, 2024.

se. axon fi Gas tee

hoes «OO 2

Wee Me. KAREN EK. CALDWELL

We ct Ee * UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

“Se” EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY