HAWKINS v. KNIGHT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

RAYMOND HAWKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:22-cv-01434-JMS-MKK

)

WENDY KNIGHT Warden, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Raymond Hawkins, currently an inmate at New Castle Correctional Facility, filed this

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he was an inmate at Correctional

Industrial Facility ("CIF"). Defendants Wendy Knight and Adriana Jacho have moved for

summary judgment. Dkt. [48]. For the reasons below, that motion is DENIED.

I.

Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment,

the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir.

2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because

those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A

court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need

not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d

562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the basis for its motion

and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must

support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions,

documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in

opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered

undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

II.

Factual Background

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the Court views

and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Hawkins and draws all reasonable

inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 572–73.

In April and May 2022, Mr. Hawkins was an inmate in general population at CIF, housed

in C-Dorm. Dkt. 49-1, p. 10-11. At CIF, the cells in general population, including those in C-

Dorm, do not have toilets. Dkt. 49-2, p. 1. The cells in A-Dorm, a segregation unit, do have

individual toilets in each cell. Id. Mr. Hawkins had been in segregation in A-Dorm in late March

2022 but moved to C-Dorm in early April. Dkt. 57-1, p. 79. Mr. Hawkins thereafter was not eligible

for placement in segregation. Dkt. 49-2, p. 1.

In C-Dorm, there are four shared restrooms, two on each floor. Id. During the day, inmates

are allowed outside their cells and thus have free access to the restrooms. Id. at 2. During

lockdowns or between the hours of 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. (when inmates are confined to their cells),

inmates can press a call button to ask a guard to allow them to use a restroom. Id. During count

times, which occur six times a day and usually last approximately thirty minutes, inmates generally

are not allowed out of their cells for safety and security reasons. Id. During lockdowns, CIF policy

provided that inmates should be offered use of the restroom every two hours. Id.

CIF had a physician, whom Mr. Hawkins recalled was named Dr. Savino, who used to

regularly write restroom passes for inmates who needed to use the restroom more frequently than

every two hours during lockdowns, due to medical problems or prescription medication side

effects. Dkt. 49-1, pp. 32. However, Warden Knight directed Dr. Savino to stop issuing such

passes. Id. at pp. 34, 38. Thereafter, Dr. Savino put up a sign in her office noting the every-two-

hours bathroom policy and that she could no longer issue medical exceptions to that policy. Id. at

33-34. When Mr. Hawkins sought to obtain a medical pass for more frequent restroom use due to

medication he was taking (hydrochlorothiazide and tamsulosin), Dr. Savino referred him to

Warden Knight's no-exceptions two-hour policy and did not issue such a pass. Id. Individual

guards, in their discretion, could still allow inmates to use the restroom more frequently than every

two hours. Id. at 39. Mr. Hawkins indicated in his deposition that some guards would be generous

with allowing restroom breaks for inmates with known medical issues, and others would not be

and would insist that no break was required for at least two hours. Id. at 39-40. Mr. Hawkins also

stated in his deposition that inmates being denied adequate restroom access was a "big problem"

at CIF. Id. at 32.

From April 30 to May 1, 2022, Sgt. Jacho was the officer in charge of Mr. Hawkins's part

of C-Dorm. Dkt. 49-3, p. 1. She had access to each inmate's medical information. Id. at p. 2. In the

evening hours of April 30 and continuing into May 1, C-Dorm went on lockdown because of an

incident involving another inmate or inmates who had to be moved to segregation. Id. The

lockdown began at about 9:20 p.m. Dkt. 49-1, p. 51. Sgt. Jacho helped escort the inmate(s) out of

C-Dorm and returned about 20-25 minutes later. Id. at pp. 46, 48. When Sgt. Jacho first returned

to C-Dorm, Mr. Hawkins and other inmates asked her if they could use the restroom; she ignored

the requests. Id. at 59. Other guards did not come through Mr. Hawkins's part of C-Dorm until

close to midnight to offer restroom breaks—a delay of approximately 2.5 hours since the last pre-

lockdown opportunity to use the restroom. Id. By that time, Mr. Hawkins had urinated on himself.

Id. It is not precisely clear when Mr. Hawkins urinated on himself—more or less than 2 hours after

the previous restroom break. Mr. Hawkins asked for permission to wash himself, but he was not

allowed to do so and was directly ordered by Sgt. Jacho to return to his cell 5 minutes after he had

been let out. Dkt. 57-1, p. 4.

After this incident, Mr. Hawkins and the other C-Dorm inmates were not given another

opportunity to use the restroom for almost 3 hours. Id. at pp. 4-5. Again, Mr. Hawkins urinated on

himself, and was denied the opportunity to clean himself when he finally was allowed to use the

restroom. Id. Although Sgt. Jacho did not personally direct Mr. Hawkins to return to his cell

without cleaning up after this second incident, a guard told him that he was following orders from

Sgt. Jacho. Id. at 5. Also, guards told Mr. Hawkins that they had been ordered by Sgt. Jacho to

uphold Warden Knight's every-two-hours limit on restroom access. Id. at 3.

About 2 days after these incidents, Mr. Hawkins developed a painful and irritating rash on

his thighs where he had urinated on himself. He ties the rash to not being able to clean up after

urinating on himself, and Defendants have designated no evidence to the contrary.

At all relevant times, Warden Knight was the CIF warden. Dkt. 49-2, p. 1. She did not have

any control over which inmates were placed at or transferred to CIF, which is governed by the

Indiana Department of Correction Central Office. Id. at 2. She was not personally aware of Mr.

Hawkins's medical conditions or medications and was not present in C-Dorm on April 30-May 1,

2022. Id. at 3. She has had no formal medical training. Id.

III.

Discussion

A. Conditions of Confinement

Under the Eighth Amendment, "prisoners cannot be confined in inhumane conditions."

Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 720 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

832 (1994)). Adequate facilities to wash and use the toilet are among the minimal civilized

measures of life's necessities that must be afforded prisoners. Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 684

F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); Vinning–El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007).

Defendants argue that Mr. Hawkins was not prevented from requesting restroom access

during the April 30-May 1 lockdown. Dkt. 50, p. 6 (citing dkts. 49-2, p. 2 and 49-3, p. 4).

Therefore, they claim, Mr. Hawkins was not subjected to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement. But, being able to request restroom access is much different than actually being

granted access. On that point, there are genuine issues of material fact. Viewing that dispute in a

light most favorable to Mr. Hawkins, he was not actually granted restroom access for well over 2

hours on 2 separate occasions on April 30-May 1, because of a combination of Warden Knight's

termination of inmates' ability to obtain medical passes to use the restroom more often and Sgt.

Jacho's orders to her subordinates to strictly adhere to the every-two-hour limit. Because of those

delays and Mr. Hawkins's prescription medications, he was twice forced to urinate on himself.

And, because of Sgt. Jacho's orders, Mr. Hawkins was unable to clean himself off after these

incidents and developed a painful and irritating rash as a result. A reasonable jury that believed

Mr. Hawkins's version of these events may conclude that, having been denied adequate access to

the restroom, he was denied the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities. See Gillis v.

Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A lack of heat, clothing, or sanitation can violate the

Eighth Amendment.”) (collecting cases). Cf. also Rose v. Carey, No. 1:06-CV-1504-SEB-JMS,

2008 WL 4443229, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2008) (holding defendants were entitled to summary

judgment on claim of lack of adequate access to prison restroom facilities where defendants were

not alleged to "have unnecessarily delayed [plaintiff's] access to a restroom in circumstances where

there was a medical need for that access").

B. Personal Responsibility

Both Defendants also argue that there is a lack of any evidence that either were personally

involved in the incidents at issue. "'To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish

that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.'" Whitfield

v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th

Cir. 1995)). For this purpose, each defendant is considered independently. Id. "[I]ndividual

liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation."

Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted) (citing

Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983)) ("Section 1983 creates a cause of action

based on personal liability and predicated upon fault. An individual cannot be held liable in a §

1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.... A causal

connection, or an affirmative link, between the misconduct complained of and the official sued is

necessary.")). Whether supervisory personnel at a prison are sufficiently involved in an alleged

constitutional violation such that they may be liable for damages often depends on that person's

knowledge of, and responsibilities regarding, the alleged harm.

Something more than generalized knowledge and inaction is required for personal

responsibility. Although what additional allegations are required are case-specific, two scenarios

are illustrative. First, a defendant could be actually engaged with the underlying issue such that

personal responsibility is present. See, e.g., Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026, 1032-33 (7th

Cir. 2016) (holding that the Warden could be held personally responsible for the harm caused by

cold prison conditions because the evidence showed he "had actual knowledge of the unusually

harsh weather conditions, that he had been apprised of the specific problem with the physical

condition of [the plaintiff's] cell (i.e., the windows would not shut), and that, during the time period

of [the plaintiff's] complaint, the warden toured the segregation unit himself"). Or second, personal

responsibility can be present when the underlying issue is the direct responsibility of the individual

in question, rather than one for his or her subordinates. Compare id.; Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d

1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Warden was personally responsible for the alleged

cell conditions because the Warden "not only knew about the problems but was personally

responsible for changing prison policies so that they would be addressed"), with Burks, 555 F.3d

at 595 (holding that the supervisor at issue was not personally responsible; "[t]he Governor, and

for that matter the Superintendent of Prisons and the Warden of each prison, is entitled to relegate

to the prison's medical staff the provision of good medical care."). And even if "a supervisor is not

involved in day-to-day operations, [her] personal involvement may be found if [s]he is involved

in ‘creating, applying, or interpreting a policy’ that gives rise to unconstitutional conditions."

Stewart v. Precythe, 91 F.4th 944, 949 (8th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted).

i. Warden Knight

It is undisputed that Warden Knight did not know anything personally about Mr. Hawkins's

medically-based need to use the restroom more than every 2 hours, that she had no say in whether

to accept him as an inmate at a facility that does not have toilets in all cells, and that she had no

personal involvement in the events of April 30-May 1, 2022. However, if Mr. Hawkins's version

of events is accepted as it must be for purposes of summary judgment, she did directly and

personally forbid CIF medical staff from issuing passes for more frequent restroom access for

those inmates who might need it due to medical necessity. In other words, she overrode the medical

staff's judgment on this point and replaced it with her own, despite her lack of formal medical

training. After this new policy was put in place, CIF guards exercised widely varying discretion in

whether or how often they would allow inmates to use the restroom during a 2-hour lockdown

period. And on April 30-May 1, the policy was strictly applied in such a way that directly led to

Mr. Hawkins twice urinating on himself.

The Court acknowledges some uncertainty as to whether Mr. Hawkins urinated on himself

more or less than 2 hours after his last opportunities to use the restroom. But, even if the Court

were to accept that Mr. Hawkins's two accidents occurred more than two hours after his last

opportunity to use the restroom, that is, longer than allowed by the official CIF restroom policy

authorized by Warden Knight, there still remains the fact (viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to Mr. Hawkins) that the accidents could have been avoided if Warden Knight had not

completely done away with medical passes allowing for more frequent restroom breaks for those

inmates who needed them. A reasonable jury could conclude that Warden Knight was personally

involved in crafting and implementing a policy that led to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement. Cf. Rose, 2008 WL 4443229, at *4 (holding defendant was not deliberately

indifferent to plaintiff's need to use the restroom more frequently where he advised plaintiff to

discuss with medical staff whether he had a medical issue that required special restroom access).

ii. Sgt. Jacho

Sgt. Jacho contends that because of her handling of the lockdown incident on April 30-

May 1, and her not being directly in Mr. Hawkins's section of C-Dorm during much of that time

frame, she had no personal involvement in Mr. Hawkins's deprivation of restroom access.

However, Mr. Hawkins's version of events is that when she did return to that part of the dorm after

taking the inmate(s) to segregation, many inmates including himself called out and requested

restroom access, and she ignored them. Also, Mr. Hawkins asserts there were repeated such

demands to use the restroom that Sgt. Jacho should have been able to hear, even if she was not

directly in his unit. He also claims Sgt. Jacho directly ordered him to return to his cell without

washing after the first incident. Finally, he asserts that he was repeatedly informed by other guards

that Sgt. Jacho was insisting on strict implementation of Warden Knight's no-exceptions every-

two-hours limit on restroom access. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Sgt.

Jacho did not merely fail to adequately supervise her subordinates or fail to respond to complaints

about them, but that she was directly involved in creating unconstitutional conditions of

confinement.

C. Qualified Immunity

Finally, both Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity. "[Q]ualified

immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct 'does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).

"To overcome the defendant’s invocation of qualified immunity, [a plaintiff] must show both (1)

that the facts make out a constitutional violation, and (2) that the constitutional right was 'clearly

established' at the time of the official's alleged misconduct." Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705

F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 2013). This "clearly established" standard ensures "that officials can

'reasonably . . . anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.'" Reichle v.

Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987)).

To be "clearly established," a constitutional right "must have a sufficiently clear foundation in

then-existing precedent." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). Given this

emphasis on notice, clearly established law cannot be framed at a "high level of

generality." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). "A rule is too general if the

unlawfulness of the officer's conduct 'does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the

rule] was firmly established.'" Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641).

Although "a case directly on point" is not required, "precedent must have placed the . . .

constitutional question beyond debate." White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (cleaned up). Put

slightly differently, a right is clearly established only if "every reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015).

"The Supreme Court's message is unmistakable: Frame the constitutional right in terms granular

enough to provide fair notice because qualified immunity 'protects all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 546 (7th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (quotation marks omitted)). Qualified

immunity thus "balances two important interests— the need to hold public officials accountable

when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officers from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

As this Court noted in another case involving lack of restroom access at CIF, "[i]t was well-

established at the time of [Mr. Hawkins's] allegations that a lack of sanitation can violate the Eighth

Amendment." May v. Knight, No. 1:20-cv-01792-JMS-DML, 2022 WL 2802396, at *4 (S.D. Ind.

July 18, 2022) (citing Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493; Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989);

and Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165, 1171 (7th Cir. 1987)). Even if Mr. Hawkins "has not pointed to

a case that is directly on point to this case, existing precedent has put the constitutional question

beyond debate." Id. (citing Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741).

The Court also believes Warden Knight had been put on notice by the Seventh Circuit,

before 2022, that a strict every-two-hours restroom opportunity during lockdowns, while

constitutional as a general matter, in fact potentially could be unconstitutional as applied to inmates

with a demonstrated medical need to use the restroom more frequently. In White v. Knight, 710 F.

App'x 260, 261-62 (7th Cir. 2018), the Court upheld the general constitutionality of the every-two-

hours policy. But, the Court added, "[w]e can leave to one side the question whether Farmer would

require a different analysis for a prisoner who alleges that his particular need for an exemption

from a general bathroom policy arises from a medical condition that is known to the defendants at

the relevant time." Id. The plaintiff in that case had mentioned to a guard having a medical need

to use the restroom more frequently, but "neither of the complaints makes anything of this

medication issue . . . ." Id. Here, Mr. Hawkins's alleged medical need to use the restroom more

frequently is a key part of his complaint. And even though he does not allege that Warden Knight

personally knew of his need to use the restroom more frequently, she should have been aware after

the White case that a blanket no-exceptions, every-two-hours policy could lead to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement for inmates with special medical needs to use the restroom more

frequently.

In sum, because Mr. Hawkins has submitted evidence that he was denied adequate restroom

facilities and sanitation, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their qualified

immunity defense.

IV.

Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Dkt. [48]. There is sufficient

designated evidence from which a reasonable jury might conclude he was subjected to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement by the personal actions of both Defendants.

The Court now sua sponte reconsiders Mr. Hawkins's motion for counsel, dkt. 3, and will

attempt to recruit counsel to represent him through final judgment. However, the clerk is directed

to send Mr. Hawkins a form motion for assistance with recruiting counsel. Because this form

contains the terms of accepting counsel, Mr. Hawkins must complete the form and return it no

later than July 1, 2024, if he seeks the Court's assistance. Mr. Hawkins's failure to timely complete

and return the form will be construed as abandonment of his request for counsel. The Magistrate

Judge is requested to set the matter for a telephonic status conference once recruited counsel has

appeared or if Mr. Hawkins abandons his request for counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 5/30/2024 -

Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge

oo ‘United States District Court

Distribution: Southern District of Indiana

All ECF-registered counsel of record via email

RAYMOND HAWKINS

885871

NEW CASTLE - CF

NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels

1000 Van Nuys Road

P.O. Box E

NEW CASTLE, IN 47362

Magistrate Judge Klump's Chambers

12