COUCH v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

LOGAN COUCH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 1:22-cv-02351-SEB-KMB

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

Order Discussing Motion for Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

and Denying Certificate of Appealability

For the reasons explained in this Order, the motion of Logan Couch for relief pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255 must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court

finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.

I. The § 2255 Motion

A motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive means by which a federal

prisoner can challenge his conviction or sentence. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343

(1974). A court may grant relief from a federal conviction or sentence pursuant to § 2255 "upon

the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was

in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(a). "Relief under this statute is available only in extraordinary situations, such as an error

of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has occurred which

results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878-79 (7th Cir.

2013) (citing Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996); Barnickel v. United States,

113 F.3d 704, 705 (7th Cir. 1997)).

II. Factual Background

On August 18, 2020, Mr. Couch was charged with one count of Unlawful Possession of a

Firearm by a Convicted Felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). United States v. Couch, 1:20-

cr-225-SEB-TAB-1 ("Cr. Dkt."), dkt. 5. Mr. Couch pleaded guilty and waived his right to appeal

his conviction or sentence. Id. dkt. 33 (Plea Agreement). The plea agreement did not contain any

sentencing guidelines stipulations. Id.

According to the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), Mr. Couch's base offense level

was 20 because of his prior felony Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury conviction. Dkt. 41 ¶ 23. His

final adjusted offense level was 19. Id. ¶ 32. With a criminal history category of VI, his advisory

guidelines range was 63-78 months. Id. ¶¶ 61, 117. Mr. Couch did not object to the PSR. At the

change of plea and sentencing hearing, the Court adopted the PSR's findings and sentenced Mr.

Couch to 66 months' imprisonment with 3 years of supervised release to follow. Id. dkt. 43.

III. Discussion

In support of his § 2255 motion, Mr. Couch argues principally that his counsel failed to

provide constitutionally effective representation by not objecting to the use of his Indiana battery

conviction as a crime of violence for the purpose of calculating his base offense level under the

Sentencing Guidelines.1

1 Mr. Couch claimed in his petition both that the Court erred in calculating his base offense level and that

his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this error. In response, the United States argues that Mr.

Couch waived any direct challenge to his sentence in his plea agreement. Dkt. 7 at 5. Mr. Couch agrees in

his reply that he waived a direct challenge to the calculation of his sentence, dkt. 8 at 1, but presses his

argument that his counsel performed deficiently. The Court will therefore focus its analysis on Mr. Couch's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel bears the burden of showing (1) that

trial counsel's performance fell below objective standards for reasonably effective representation,

and (2) that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–

94 (1984); Resnick v. United States, 7 F.4th 611, 619 (7th Cir. 2021). If a petitioner cannot establish

one of the Strickland prongs, the Court need not consider the other. Groves v. United States, 755

F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2014). To satisfy the first prong of Strickland, the petitioner must direct the

Court to specific acts or omissions of his counsel. Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d 455, 458 (7th

Cir. 2009). The Court must then consider whether in light of all of the circumstances counsel's

performance was outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id. To satisfy the

second prong, the petitioner "must show that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable

probability that the result would have been different." Perrone v. United States, 889 F.3d 898, 908

(7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

Mr. Couch argues that his Indiana battery conviction should not have been treated as a

crime of violence under the Guidelines and that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to

raise this objection. Under the Guidelines, if a defendant, like Mr. Couch, committed a firearms

offense "subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a

controlled substance offense," then his base offense level begins at 20. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).

To qualify as a crime of violence under this provision, a crime must be punishable by imprisonment

for more than one year and have "as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person of another." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1); see also § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1 (borrowing

definition of crime of violence from § 4B1.2(a)). Based on § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), the PSR determined

Mr. Couch's base offense level to be 20, because of his prior conviction for felony battery. Cr. Dkt.

41 ¶ 23.

In support of his argument that this conclusion was incorrect, Mr. Couch points out that,

under Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), a crime with a mens rea of recklessness

does not qualify as a crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA").2 He goes

on to argue that Indiana battery can be committed by "making contact in an accidental or incidental

way…" and therefore, under Borden, cannot be used as a violent felony to enhance his base offense

level. But Indiana battery does not have a mens rea of recklessness. Instead, Indiana battery

requires the offensive touching be done "knowingly and intentionally." Ind. Code 35-42-2-1(a)

(eff. July 1, 2016).

Next, to the extent Mr. Couch argues that, regardless of the applicable mens rea, his battery

conviction is not a crime of violence, the Seventh Circuit has held directly that Indiana battery

resulting in bodily injury3 qualifies as a crime of violence under the ACCA. United States v. Love,

7 F.4th 674 (7th Cir. 2021) ("It is self-evident in the strict sense that physical force which resulted

in bodily injury was capable of causing bodily injury.");4 see also Douglas v. United States, 858

F.3d 1069, 1071 (7th Cir. 2017) ("[F]orce that actually causes injury necessarily was capable of

causing that injury and thus satisfies the federal definition."). The type of force necessary to

amount to a violent felony "is not much more severe than mere unwanted or offensive touching."

2 Mr. Couch was not sentenced under the ACCA, but the Seventh Circuit "refer[s] to cases dealing with the

ACCA and the career offender guideline provision interchangeably." United States v. Edwards, 836 F.3d

831, 834 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Taylor, 630 F.3d 629, 633 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010)).

3 The PSR describes the conviction as Battery Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury, but then notes in the

criminal history section that Mr. Couch pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense. Cr. Dkt. 41 ¶¶ 23, 52.

As reflected in the PSR's offense conduct section and in the factual basis in the plea agreement, this

conviction was actually for Battery Resulting in Moderate Bodily Injury. Either way, Mr. Couch was

convicted of committing a battery that resulted in injury, which, as discussed, is enough to qualify as a

crime of violence.

4 Mr. Couch argues that Love holds that Indiana battery resulting in bodily injury is not a crime of violence,

but Love clearly states that a touching resulting in bodily injury, which is required by the statute, "is enough

for the ACCA." 7 F.4th at 681.

Love, 7 F.4th at 679. Because Mr. Couch's battery conviction qualifies as a crime of violence, his

counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to its use to enhance his sentence.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained in this Order, Mr. Couch is not entitled to relief on his § 2255

motion. There was no ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, his motion for relief pursuant

to § 2255 is DENIED and this action is dismissed with prejudice. Judgment consistent with this

Entry shall now issue and the Clerk shall docket a copy of this Order in No. 1:20-cr-225-SEB-

TAB. The motion to vacate, Cr. Dkt. [53], shall also be terminated in the underlying criminal

action.

V. Denial of Certificate of Appealability

A habeas petitioner does not have the absolute right to appeal a district court's denial of his

habeas petition, rather, he must first request a certificate of appealability. See Miller—El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003); Peterson v. Douma, 751 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014). Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 proceedings,

and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the Court finds that Mr. Couch has failed to show that reasonable jurists

would find "it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional

right" and "debatable whether [this Court] was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,

529 US. 473, 484 (2000). The Court therefore denies a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 3/29/2024 Su \ Buy | of

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

LOGAN COUCH

17741-028

CANAAN - USP

CANAAN U.S. PENITENTIARY

Inmate Mail/Parcels

P.O. BOX 300

WAYMART, PA 18472

Kelsey Massa

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (Indianapolis)

kelsey.massa@usdoj.gov