COLEMAN v. KELLAMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

ROBERT D. COLEMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:21-cv-00375-JPH-MJD

)

S. KELLAMS, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Robert D. Coleman, a prisoner at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility,

alleges that Officer S. Kellams violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using

excessive force against him. Officer Kellams has filed a motion for summary

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, her

motion is GRANTED.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, which is a way

of resolving a case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment

is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any of the material facts,

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Pack v.

Middlebury Comm. Schs., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A "genuine

dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

"Material facts" are those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572-73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-

finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is only

required to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3);

it is not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially

relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).

"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving party

may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at

325.

II. Background

The incident that is the subject of Mr. Coleman's allegations occurred on

May 1, 2021, at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility where Mr. Coleman was

confined to a cell on the upper range of a segregation unit. (Id.; dkt. 1 at 2). The

defendant, Officer Samantha Kellams, was a correctional officer cleaning out a

nearby cell. (Id.). Mr. Coleman exposed his penis to Officer Kellams and another

female correctional officer and masturbated for two minutes. Officer Kellams

ordered him to stop. Mr. Coleman did not comply, so Officer Kellams sprayed

him with mace to get him to comply. These facts are undisputed as the incident

was captured on video. (Dkt. 60-2 Manual Filing).

The video begins with Officer Kellams and another female correctional

officer ascending the stairs of Mr. Coleman's range. (Dkt. 60-2 at 00:01).

Mr. Coleman immediately opens the cuff port of his cell, which is located at the

top of the stairs. (Id. at 00:02). When Officer Kellams and her colleague reach the

top of the stairs, Mr. Coleman exposes his penis and starts fondling himself. (Id.

at 00:10 – 00:16). As Officer Kellams passes his cell, she orders him to stop. (Id.

at 00:16).

Officer Kellams and her colleague then begin cleaning out the cell four

down from Mr. Coleman. (00:16 – 01:00). Mr. Coleman continues masturbating.

(Id.). When Officer Kellams exits the cell four down, Mr. Coleman moves closer

to his cuff port and continues masturbating. (01:00 – 01:10). Officer Kellams

then turns and walks back toward the stairs, at which time Mr. Coleman sticks

his penis through the cuff port, continues masturbating, and starts striking his

penis against the cuff port walls. (Id. at 01:30 - 01:40).

Officer Kellams stops, puts down the items in her hands, and confers with

her colleague. (Id. at 01:40 – 01:45). She removes a can of mace from her belt

and approaches Mr. Coleman's cell. (Id. 01:45 – 01:48). Mr. Coleman steps back,

continues masturbating, and sticks his left forearm through the cuff port. (Id.).

Officer Kellams warns Mr. Coleman that she is going to mace him if he doesn't

stop, but he continues, so Officer Kellams deploys the mace. (Id. at 01:48 –

01:55; dkt. 60-1 at 48). Mr. Coleman shouts at Officer Kellams the whole time.

(Dkt. 60-2 at 01:48 – 01:55).

When Officer Kellams steps away from Mr. Coleman's cell, he immediately

sticks his penis through the cuff port and resumes masturbating. (Id. at 01:55 –

02:00). Officer Kellams gives more verbal orders to stop, but Mr. Coleman is

undeterred. (01:59 – 02:15). Eventually, Officer Kellams picks up her items and

walks down the stairs. (Id. 02:10 – 02:15). Mr. Coleman sticks his left arm

through the cuff port and continues masturbating while watching Officer

Kellams and her colleague leave the unit. (Id. at 02:15 – 2:34). Immediately

thereafter, two male correctional officers enter the range, remove Mr. Coleman

from his cell, and take him to a decontamination shower. (Id. at 02:50 – 06:45;

dkt. 60-1 at 56).

Before this incident, Mr. Coleman thought Officer Kellams was "cool."

(Dkt. 60-1 at 42). She knew he liked to expose himself to the women working at

the prison, and he didn't think she would use force to make him stop.1 (Id.).

Mr. Coleman did not suffer long-term injuries. (Id. at 67). He experienced

burning during urination for a few days, and he had a couple blisters, which the

medical staff told him to rinse with cold water. (Id. at 67, 75-76).

1 Mr. Coleman had "a similar incident" earlier that day with another female correctional

officer. (Dkt. 60-2 at 15).

III. Discussion

Officer Kellams argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity for using

mace to try to get Mr. Coleman to stop masturbating and cover himself after he

ignored her verbal order to stop. (Dkt. 61 at 5-6).

A. Legal Standard

Qualified immunity protects government officials from damages liability

"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" at the

time that the conduct occurred. Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 545

(7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).

Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the

burden of defeating it once the defendants raise it. Archer v. Chisolm, 870 F.3d

603, 613 (7th Cir. 2017). To do so, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant

violated a constitutional right, when construing the facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff; and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time

of the alleged violation, such that it would have been clear to a reasonable actor

that his conduct was unlawful. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

A failure to show either is fatal for the plaintiff's case, and courts may begin (and

possibly end) with either inquiry. Id. at 236.

To be "clearly established," a constitutional right "must have a sufficiently

clear foundation in then-existing precedent." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583

U.S. 48, 63 (2018). The principle of fair notice pervades the qualified immunity

doctrine. Campbell, 936 F.3d at 545. Qualified immunity applies unless the

specific contours of the right "were sufficiently definite that any reasonable

official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating

it." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014).

Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law cannot be framed

at a "high level of generality." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).

"A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct 'does not follow

immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.'" Wesby,

138 S. Ct. at 590 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, (1987)).

Existing caselaw must "dictate the resolution of the parties' dispute," Comsys,

Inc. v. Pacetti, 893 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 2018). While "a case directly on point"

is not required, "precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question

beyond debate,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551, (2017) (quotation marks

omitted).

Put slightly differently, a right is clearly established only if "every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that

right." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015). "The Supreme Court’s

message is unmistakable: Frame the constitutional right in terms granular

enough to provide fair notice because qualified immunity 'protects all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Campbell, 936 F.3d

at 546 (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quotation marks

omitted)).

B. Analysis

As a general matter, the Constitution prohibits prison officials from

maliciously or sadistically inflicting pain on prisoners. E.g. Stockton v. Milwaukee

County, 44 F.4th 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2022). Five factors govern whether a guard's

use of force violates the Eighth Amendment: (1) the need for the application of

force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (3)

the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; (4) the guard's efforts

to temper the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent of the plaintiff's

injuries. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1992).

Here, Officer Kellams used brief, non-lethal force by spraying Mr. Coleman

with mace for a few seconds after he refused to follow her direct order that he

stop masturbating. (Dkt. 60-2 at 01:48 – 01:55). His injuries were minor and

went away after a week. (Dkt. 60-1 at 67).

Mr. Coleman has not shown that Officer Kellams' decision to use mace

after he disobeyed her order to stop masturbating and cover himself was clearly

unconstitutional. (Dkt. 60-2). He has not provided a "closely analogous case

finding the alleged violation unlawful," shown "such a clear trend . . . that we

can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right by controlling

precedent was merely a question of time," or shown that Officer Kellams'

conduct was "so egregious and unreasonable that no reasonable official could

have thought he was acting lawfully." Id. at 620-21.

Instead, using mace is appropriate "when reasonably necessary . . . to

subdue recalcitrant prisoners." Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 757 (7th Cir.

2010); see also Kervin v. Barnes, 144 Fed. App'x 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005) ("This

court has held that prison guards may use chemical sprays when reasonably

necessary to subdue recalcitrant prisoners, for orders must be obeyed, and there

are only so many choices available to correctional officers when inmates refuse.").

Courts afford great deference to prison officials in determining when use of force

is necessary. Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The

responsible institutional personnel on the spot are in a better position to

determine when [mace] is necessary than the courts. Clearly, the use of a

chemical agent in dangerous quantities is justified only in narrowly defined

circumstances but the use of nondangerous quantities of the substance in order

to prevent a perceived future danger does not violate 'evolving standards of

decency' or constitute an 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'").

Mr. Coleman has not identified a reasonable, alternative method that

Officer Kellams could have used to get him to comply with her order. At his

deposition, he argued that she should have closed his cuff port or called for

backup. (Dkt. 60-1 at 43). But closing his cuff port was not possible, as Mr.

Coleman had stuck his entire left forearm through the cuff port to hold it open

when Officer Kellams approached his cell. (Dkt. 60-2 at 01:45 – 01:48).

Regardless, no clearly established law requires prison officials to let Mr. Coleman

expose himself to female correctional officers so long as his cuff port remains

closed. Nor does clearly established law require female correctional officers to

wait for backup before dealing with repugnant behavior of prisoners. Instead,

prison officials have substantial discretion in deciding what steps are

appropriate to get a prisoner to comply with reasonable orders. That's true here

when, as explained above, the amount of force used was reasonable under the

circumstances.

Last, Mr. Coleman argues that Officer Kellams' conduct was clearly

unconstitutional because the mace came in contact with his genitals. This

argument is a nonstarter—Officer Kellams' use of mace was in direct response

to Mr. Coleman's refusal to obey her order, stop masturbating, and cover his

genitals. There's no designated evidence of gratuitous or intentional targeting of

his genitals with mace.

IV. Conclusion

Officer Kellams' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. [59].

Final judgment in accordance with this Order shall now issue.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/22/2023

Sjamu Patrick lbanlove

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

ROBERT D. COLEMAN

179553

WESTVILLE - CF

WESTVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Inmate Mail/Parcels

9501 South 1100 West

WESTVILLE, IN 46391

Carlton Wayne Anker

Lewis and Wilkins LLP

anker@lewisandwilkins.com

Laura Brown

Lewis and Wilkins LLP

brown@lewisandwilkins.com

Eric Ryan Shouse

Lewis And Wilkins LLP

shouse@lewisandwilkins.com