EINES v. MAYNARD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

BRIAN EINES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:21-cv-00354-JPH-CSW

)

MAYNARD, )

EDMONDS, )

SERGEI, )

ZATECKY, )

ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICES )

LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

Brian Eines alleges that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment

by serving him chicken that had been stored for several hours at room

temperature. Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment. For the

reasons that follow, summary judgment is GRANTED.

I.

Preliminary Matters

The Court addresses several pending motions before getting to the merits

of the motions for summary judgment.

A. Mr. Eines's request for summary judgment

In his response to Defendants' summary judgment motions, Mr. Eines

requests that summary judgment be entered in his favor. Dkt. 122. This

request is denied because it is untimely—having been filed two months after

the deadline for filing a motion for summary judgment, dkt. 107—and fails on

the merits because, as explained in this Order, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment.

B. Mr. Eines's emergency motion to stay

Mr. Eines has filed an emergency motion to stay proceedings, arguing

that the Court never ruled on his filing at docket entry 83, which asserts that

Defendants failed to produce video evidence and log books. Dkt. 129. To the

extent docket entry 83 seeks relief separate from Mr. Eines's related motion for

production of video evidence and log books, see dkt. 82, that request is denied

for the reasons outlined in the Court's previous orders on this issue. See

dkt. 88 ("Defendants have already produced all relevant video evidence.");

dkt. 107 ("Defendants notified the Court that Plaintiff was able to view the

video footage on August 3, 2022, and that they could not locate any additional

video or log books."). Mr. Eines's emergency motion to stay proceedings is

therefore DENIED. Dkt. [129]. Defendants' summary judgment motions are

fully briefed and ready for disposition.

C. Objection to Benefiel Declaration

In his summary judgment response, Mr. Eines objects to Defendant

Aramark's reliance on a declaration from Aaron Benefiel, a current Aramark

employee who was not employed by Aramark at the time of the events at issue

in this case. Mr. Benefiel was not disclosed as a witness, and he lacks

personal knowledge of the events in this action. Dkt. 125 at 10. The Court will

therefore disregard Mr. Benefiel's declaration and any assertions of fact relying

solely on the declaration.

II.

Standard of Review

Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, which is a

way of resolving a case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary

judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any of the

material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Comm. Schs., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021).

A "genuine dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). "Material facts" are those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572−73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-

finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is only

required to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(3); it is not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that

is potentially relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74

(7th Cir. 2017).

"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving

party may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district

court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's

case." Id. at 325.

III.

Factual Background

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under

Rule 56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable

to [Mr. Eines] and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in [his] favor." Zerante v.

DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

A. Food service at Pendleton

Mr. Eines was confined in H Cell House at Pendleton Correctional

Facility in November 2020. Dkt. 116-1 at 10:14−19 (Eines Deposition). H Cell

House is a restricted general population unit that houses inmates with

disciplinary histories. Id. at 11:16−17. Inmates are confined to single cells and

do not have cellmates. Id. at 11:21−12:1.

Staff for Defendant Aramark provide meals to inmates at Pendleton.

Dkt. 116-2 ¶¶ 7−9. Inmates receive three meals: breakfast comes by itself in

the early morning (around 4:00 a.m.) and lunch and dinner come together later

in the day (between 9:00 a.m. and noon). Dkt. 116-1 at 16:4−18:11.

For the lunch and dinner delivery, the tray consists of a Styrofoam

clamshell holding the lunch items and a sack holding the dinner items.

Dkt. 115-2 ¶¶ 7, 8. After an Aramark employee delivers inmates' trays to the

cell house, IDOC correctional officers begin sorting the trays based on the

dietary needs for each range within the cellhouse. Dkt. 116-2 ¶ 11. On a

normal day, it takes about an hour to sort and distribute the trays. Id. ¶ 15.

Inmates at Pendleton receive an "enhanced" meal on holidays. Dkt. 116-2

at 36−37. These meals contain more food items than the typical meal. Id.

According to Defendants, delivery of these meals is often slower because they

require more time to sort. Dkt. 116-2 ¶ 16. However, Mr. Eines testified that

these meals would usually arrive the same time as a regular lunch. Dkt. 116-1

at 38.

The IDOC has promulgated a policy that establishes standards for food

services programs at IDOC facilities. See Dkt. 123 at 10−33, IDOC Policy

No. 04-01-301. Pendleton's "Facility Directive" provides, among other things,

that food that must be stored at a specific temperature shall be served within

four hours after being removed from temperature control; otherwise it shall be

discarded. Id. at 2 ¶ E. This standard comes from Indiana State Department

of Health regulations. See 410 Ind. Admin. Code §§ 7-24-193.

B. Mr. Eines's allegations of food poisoning

Mr. Eines experienced food poisoning beginning on November 25, 2020.

That day, Aramark served a holiday lunch tray in recognition of Thanksgiving.

Dkt. 116-2 ¶ 18. The tray consisted of baked chicken, ham, mashed potatoes,

and pumpkin pie. Dkt. 116-1 at 35. Before this day, Mr. Eines had never

experienced nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea because of contaminated food at

Pendleton. Dkt. 116-1 at 28−29. Indeed, most of the food Mr. Eines ate was

from the prison commissary, not meal trays issued by the prison. Id. at 64

(Mr. Eines reporting that he "very seldom[ly]" ate prison-issued food and that

"90 percent" of the food he ate was from the prison commissary).

Correctional Officers Z. Maynard and S. Edmonds were assigned to

Mr. Eines's range in H Cell House on November 25. Dkt. 116-2 ¶ 4; Dkt. 116-1

at 33−34. Their responsibilities included sorting the holiday lunch trays and

distributing them to inmates. Dkt. 116-1 at 34. Officer J. Sergei was the

officer in charge of the unit. Id.

The parties present competing versions of what happened during the

delivery and distribution of the lunch meal.

According to Defendants, Aramark employees and inmates prepared the

food trays and delivered them on a food cart to H Cell House. During delivery,

some trays toppled over due to the wind. Dkt. 116-2 ¶ 19. Officers ordered

replacement trays, which were prepared and delivered "multiple hours later"

than the first round of trays. Id. ¶ 27.

According to Mr. Eines, the food cart containing the lunch trays arrived

at H Cell House sometime around 10:25 a.m.1 See Dkt. 122 at 2. Although he

1 Mr. Eines testified in his deposition that he did not know exactly when the food cart

arrived. Dkt. 116-1 at 30. However, in his response, Mr. Eines states the cart arrived

at H Cell House at 10:24:16 a.m. based on a video that he reviewed in discovery.

See Dkt. 79 ¶ 2. The video is not designated in the summary judgment record.

could not see from his cell when the food cart arrived, inmates were yelling

"trays on the unit," so he knew when the trays arrived. Dkt. 116-1 at

34:23−35:5. Mr. Eines did not receive his tray until approximately 3:00 p.m.,

or perhaps as late as 4:00 p.m. Id. at 32:3−33:15.

During delivery of the lunch trays, Mr. Eines told Officer Maynard that

the inmates needed new trays because they had been out for a while. Id. at

39:4−8. Officer Maynard responded that the trays had arrived thirty minutes

before being distributed. Dkt. 1 at 4, ¶ 23; dkt. 116-1 at 34:6−17. But

Mr. Eines did not believe him. Dkt. 116-1 at 34:13 ("It was obviously a lie.");

id. at 34:25−35:5 ("We knew how long the trays had been sitting out there

because when the trays arrive on the unit, inmates yell. 'Trays on the unit.

Trays in the cell house.' Everybody yells. They sound off. 'Trays in the cell

house.' So we knew when the trays had arrived."). Mr. Eines did not eat his

dinner sack, and he ate only the chicken from the lunch tray. Id. at 71:15−19

("That's all I ate. All I ate was that chicken."). He did not examine the chicken

before he ate it, but there was no unusual smell or visible contamination. Id.

at 41:18−42:3.

Later that evening, Mr. Eines began experiencing nausea, vomiting, and

diarrhea. Id. at 52:22−53:7. He spoke with someone late at night from the

medical staff and was told to drink a lot of fluids. Id. at 56:5−9. Mr. Eines's

symptoms lasted less than 24 hours. Id. at 53:23−54:1. Mr. Eines submitted

a healthcare request to be seen by the medical provider, but he missed the

appointment because his unit was on lockdown. Id. at 57:11−58:23. He never

spoke about the matter with any medical professional after November 25.

Id. at 59:24−60:4.

IV.

Discussion

Mr. Eines alleges that Defendants Officer Maynard, Officer Edmonds,

Officer Sergei, Warden Zatecky (the "IDOC Defendants"), and Aramark violated

the Eighth Amendment by serving him chicken that had been stored for several

hours at room temperature. Dkt. 1. The IDOC Defendants argue that they are

entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

Dkt. 117 at 10. Aramark argues that Mr. Eines has not designated evidence to

support a policy claim under Monell. Dkt. 112 at 7-9.

A. Qualified immunity

"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.

7, 11 (2015). This "clearly established" standard ensures "that officials can

'reasonably . . . anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for

damages.'" Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987)). Qualified immunity thus "balances two

important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they

exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officers from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

The "difficult part" of the qualified-immunity test is "identifying the level

of generality at which the constitutional right must be clearly established."

Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013). A "high level of

generality" is not appropriate; instead, the question is "whether the law was

clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the public official when he

acted." Id. While "a case directly on point" is not required, "precedent must

have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly,

580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (cleaned up). In other words, a right is clearly

established only if "every reasonable official would have understood that what

he is doing violates that right." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015).

When the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is raised, "the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it." Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir.

2019). To meet that burden and overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff

must "show both (1) that the facts make out a constitutional violation, and (2)

that the constitutional right was 'clearly established' at the time of the official's

alleged misconduct." Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir.

2013). The failure to do so means a plaintiff "cannot defeat" a "qualified

immunity defense." Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2013)

(reversing summary judgment grant because plaintiff did not identify a

sufficiently analogous case or explain why defendant's actions were plainly

excessive); Soriano v. Town of Cicero, 521 F. App'x 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2013).

Here, the Court exercises its discretion to begin with the "clearly

established" prong of the test. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Findlay, 722 F.3d

895 at 899 (noting that the court is "free to consider first whether the right is

clearly established if doing so will conserve judicial resources."). It's beyond

debate that the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide

"nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions

which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well-being of the

inmates who consume it." Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 2015)

(cleaned up). But the alleged "unlawfulness of [Defendants'] conduct does not

follow immediately from" this highly generalized rule. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64.

The Court assumes for purposes of resolving the motions for summary

judgment that Mr. Eines's food tray was stored at room temperature for more

than four hours before it was served to him.2 See dkt. 116-1 at 42:13−43:8.

Even so, Mr. Eines must identify a case that's sufficiently analogous to the

facts here that it puts the IDOC Defendants on notice that serving the chicken

violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Smith v. Finkley, 10

F.4th 725, 737 (7th Cir. 2021) ("Once the defense is raised, it becomes the

plaintiff's burden to defeat it."). Mr. Eines, however, points to no controlling

precedent that inmates have a constitutional right to not be served hot food

that had been stored at room temperature for several hours.

Instead, Mr. Eines argues that Indiana prison regulations require cooked

food to be served within four hours after being removed from temperature

2 Because the Court assumes that Mr. Eines's version of events is true for summary

judgment purposes, the parties' disputes regarding the existence of additional video

evidence and log books are immaterial. See dkts. 78, 88, and 107 (orders addressing

discovery disputes regarding video evidence and log books).

control, see Dkt. 123 at 2 ¶ 3. But "the failure of officials to comply with

departmental regulations or even state law does not necessarily violate the

Constitution." Courtney v. Butler, 66 F.4th 1043, 1052 (7th Cir. 2023). And

Mr. Eines has not cited a case from which the defendants would have known

that the failure to comply with the regulation amounted to a constitutional

violation.

Nor has he explained why Defendants' actions so obviously violated the

Eighth Amendment that any reasonable person would have known they were a

violation. See Findlay, 722 F.3d at 900. Moreover, the Court's review of Eighth

Amendment case law does not reveal controlling precedent showing that

serving Mr. Eines the chicken was "so obvious that a reasonable person

necessarily would have recognized it as a violation of the law." Leiser, 933 F.3d

at 701. On the contrary, there are cases holding that a single instance of

unintentional food poisoning will never give rise to an Eighth Amendment

violation. See George v. King, 837 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A] single

incident of unintended food poisoning, whether suffered by one or many

prisoners at an institution, does not constitute a violation of the constitutional

rights of the affected prisoners."); Gloster v. Tanna, No. 16 C 10428, 2017 WL

6523155, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2017) (same). These cases undermine any

argument that it was beyond debate that the IDOC Defendants would have

known that serving the chicken to Mr. Eines was a constitutional violation.

As the Seventh Circuit has explained, the failure to identify a sufficiently

analogous case or explain why defendant's actions were plainly excessive is

fatal to overcoming a qualified immunity defense. Findlay, 722 F.3d at 900;

Soriano, 521 F. App'x at 567. The IDOC Defendants are therefore entitled to

summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

B. Section 1983 Claims against Aramark

To prevail on his § 1983 claim against Aramark, "a plaintiff must

ultimately prove three elements: (1) an action pursuant to a [corporate] policy,

practice, or widespread custom; (2) culpability, meaning that policymakers

were deliberately indifferent to a known risk that the policy would lead to

constitutional violations; and (3) causation, meaning the [corporate] action was

the 'moving force' behind the constitutional injury." Hall v. City of Chicago, 953

F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir. 2020); Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782,

790 (7th Cir. 2014) (courts apply the same standard for § 1983 claims brought

against municipalities to private corporations that contract with the state).

Unless the unconstitutional results of the municipality's actions were "patently

obvious," the plaintiff "must prove a prior pattern of similar constitutional

violations resulting from the policy." Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,

18 F.4th 214, 236 (7th Cir. 2021).

Here, Mr. Eines identifies only one instance of food poisoning allegedly

resulting from an inmate being served food stored at room temperature. No

reasonable jury could find Monell liability from this one occurrence. Calderone

v. City of Chicago, 979 F.3d 1156, 1164 (7th Cir. 2020) ("One single incident

cannot suffice; rather, [a plaintiff] must show a series of constitutional

violations.") (cleaned up).

Mr. Eines argues that Aramark's policy or widespread practice of relying

on uncertified and inadequately trained prison staff to distribute meals caused

an Eighth Amendment violation. Dkt. 122 at 14-15. But even if a jury could

find the existence of such a policy or practice from the designated evidence, Mr.

Eines's claim against Aramark nonetheless fails because is not "patently

obvious" that the lack of specialized training of prison staff regarding food

safety caused constitutional violations. Dean, 18 F.4th at 236. With no

evidence of ongoing instances of food poisoning resulting from serving meals

that were stored for several hours at room temperature, there is no evidence

that would have put Aramark on notice of the need for additional training or

supervision. On the contrary, he testified that this was the first instance of

food poisoning he experienced at Pendleton. Dkt. 116-1 at 28:22−29:5. And

aside from this incident, his lunch and dinner trays were usually delivered

within a three-hour window. Dkt. 116-1 at 18:9−11.

Based on the undisputed evidence, a reasonable jury could not find that

Aramark was deliberately indifferent through its corporate action. Dean,

18 F.4th at 236. Aramark is therefore entitled to summary judgment.

V.

Conclusion

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, dkts. [110] and [115], are

GRANTED. Final judgment shall enter by separate order.

The motion to strike Mr. Eines's surreply, dkt. [127], is DENIED.

Mr. Eines's emergency motion to stay proceedings, dkt. [129], is

DENIED, as is his request for summary judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/21/2023

SJamu Patrick lbanlove

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

BRIAN EINES

988189

PUTNAMVILLE - CF

PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Electronic Service Participant — Court Only

All Electronically Registered Counsel

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