MORALES v. KIJAKAZI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

MORGAN M.1, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:22-cv-01834-KMB-RLY

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

)

Defendant. )

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION

Plaintiff Morgan M. applied for disability insurance benefits from the Social Security

Administration ("SSA") on February 19, 2020, alleging an onset date of August 31, 2019. [Dkt.

10-2 at 11.] Her application was initially denied on September 8, 2020, [dkt. 10-3 at 11-12], and

upon reconsideration on December 7, 2020, [id. at 27]. Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Mary

Ann Poulose conducted a hearing on March 21, 2022. [Id. at 41.] The ALJ issued a decision on

May 2, 2022, concluding that Morgan was not entitled to receive disability insurance benefits. [Id.

at 20.] The Appeals Council denied review on July 11, 2022. [Id. at 2.] On September 16, 2022,

Morgan timely filed this civil action asking the Court to review the denial of benefits according to

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [Dkt. 1.]

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides benefits to individuals who cannot

obtain work because of a physical or mental disability." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1151

1 To protect the privacy interests of claimants for Social Security benefits, and consistent with the

recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to

use only the first names and last initials of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial

review opinions.

(2019). Disability is the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months."

Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).

When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court's role is limited to

ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists for

the ALJ's decision. Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327. "[S]ubstantial evidence" is "evidence that 'a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597,

601 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154). "Although this Court reviews the record

as a whole, it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the SSA by reevaluating the facts, or

reweighing the evidence to decide whether a claimant is in fact disabled." Stephens, 888 F.3d at

327. Reviewing courts also "do not decide questions of credibility, deferring instead to the ALJ's

conclusions unless 'patently wrong.'" Zoch, 981 F.3d at 601 (quoting Summers v. Berryhill, 864

F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2017)). "[E]ven under deferential standard of review for social security

disability cases, an [ALJ] must provide a logical bridge between the evidence and [the]

conclusions." Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations

omitted).

The SSA applies a five-step evaluation to determine whether the claimant is disabled.

Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)). The

ALJ must evaluate the following, in sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has a

severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of

the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can

perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work

in the national economy.

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 13, 2000) (citations

omitted). "If a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found

disabled. If a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four.

Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of

performing work in the national economy." Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).

After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant's residual

functional capacity ("RFC") by evaluating "all limitations that arise from medically determinable

impairments, even those that are not severe." Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).

In doing so, the ALJ "may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling." Id. The ALJ uses

the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant can perform his own past relevant work

and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (v).

If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's

decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327. When an ALJ's

decision does not apply the correct legal standard, a remand for further proceedings is usually the

appropriate remedy. Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2021). Typically, a remand is also

appropriate when the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v.

Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005).

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Morgan was 27 years old on August 31, 2019, the alleged onset date. [Dkt. 10-4 at 4.]

Morgan is a high school graduate, [dkt. 10-2 at 16], and she previously worked as a material

handler, [id. at 19].2

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the SSA in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) and concluded that Morgan was not disabled. [Id.

at 13-20.] Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:

• At Step One, Morgan had not engaged in substantial gainful activity3 since August 31,

2019, the alleged onset date. [Id. at 13.]

• At Step Two, Morgan had the following severe impairment: circadian rhythm disorder.4

[Id. at 14.]

• At Step Three, Morgan did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. [Id. at 15.]

• After Step Three but before Step Four, Morgan had the RFC "to perform a full range of

work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: no ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds, or exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights, operation of heavy

machinery, or commercial driving." [Id. at 16.]

2 The relevant evidence of record is set forth in the Parties' briefs and need not be repeated here.

Specific facts relevant to the undersigned's disposition of this case are discussed below.

3 Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity that is both substantial (i.e., involves

significant physical or mental activities) and gainful (i.e., work that is usually done for pay or

profit, whether or not a profit is realized). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a).

4 "Circadian rhythm disorders, also known as sleep-wake cycle disorders, are problems that occur

when your body’s internal clock, which tells you when it’s time to sleep or wake, is out of sync

with your environment." https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/circadian-rhythm-

disorders#:~:text=Circadian%20rhythm%20disorders%2C%20also%20known,cycles%20about

%20every%2024%20hours.

• At Step Four, relying on the testimony of the vocational expert ("VE") and considering

Morgan's RFC, the ALJ concluded that Morgan was able to perform her past relevant

work as a material handler.5

III. DISCUSSION

Morgan makes three assertions of error regarding the ALJ's decision: (1) that the ALJ failed

to incorporate into the RFC mild mental limitations assessed by state agency psychological

consultants, (2) that the ALJ failed to develop the record by relying exclusively on her lay

evaluation of raw medical data to determine Morgan's functional limitations from her sleep

disorder, and (3) that the ALJ failed to adequately evaluate Morgan's subjective complaints. Each

of Morgan's arguments will be addressed in turn.

A. The ALJ did not err by allegedly omitting mild mental limitations from the RFC.

Morgan claims that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to incorporate into the

RFC or explain her rejection of mild mental limitations assessed by two state agency consultants

whose opinions the ALJ found persuasive. [Dkt. 12 at 12.] According to Morgan, both state

agency psychological consultants opined that she had mild limitations in interacting with others;

concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace; and adapting and managing herself. [Id.] Despite

finding these opinions persuasive, Morgan asserts that the ALJ did not include any corresponding

restrictions related to her mild mental limitations in the RFC and that the ALJ's decision is silent

as to why mental limitations were omitted from the RFC. [Id. at 13.] Even if her mental limitations

were only mild in nature, Morgan claims that remand is required here because the ALJ still needed

to explain how these limitations factored into the RFC or alternatively explain why these

limitations did not merit non-exertional limitations in the RFC. [Id. at 15.] Accordingly, Morgan

5 Having determined that Morgan could perform her past relevant work, the ALJ did not proceed

to Step Five and thus did not determine whether jobs existed in significant numbers in the national

economy that Morgan could perform.

argues that the hypothetical posed to the VE was incomplete, and the VE's testimony does not

amount to substantial evidence. [Id. at 17.]

In response, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ reasonably determined that Morgan

did not require accommodations for her mild mental limitations. [Dkt. 14 at 8.] The Commissioner

argues that Morgan incorrectly assumes her mild mental impairments automatically translate to

work limitations. [Id. at 8-9.] According to the Commissioner, the ALJ reasonably relied on the

opinions of the state agency psychologists that concluded that Morgan had mild impairments in

the area of mental functioning but did not find any work-related limitations. [Id. at 10.] The

Commissioner also contends that Morgan has not pointed to any objective record evidence

contradicting the state agency psychologists' opinions and that Morgan relies only on her

unsupported subjective allegations that she requires certain workplace limitations for her mild

mental impairments. [Id.] Thus, the Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the

ALJ's determination that Morgan's mental impairments were non-severe and did not affect her

ability to work. [Id. at 14.]

In reply, Morgan reiterates her allegation that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing

to include any mental limitations in the RFC or explain why mild limitations were omitted. [Dkt.

15 at 3.]

"Although the RFC assessment is a function-by-function assessment … the expression of

a claimant's RFC need not be articulated function-by-function; a narrative discussion of a

claimant's symptoms and medical source opinions is sufficient." Knox v. Astrue, 9327 F. App'x.

652, 657 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). The individual claiming disability bears

the burden of proof at steps one through four of the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the

SSA. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 898 (7th

Cir. 2021). "It [is the claimant's] burden to establish not just the existence of the conditions, but

to provide evidence that they support specific limitations affecting her capacity to work." Weaver

v. Berryhill, 746 F. App'x 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2018).

Morgan cites Mark M. and several other non-binding cases from the Northern District of

Illinois as support for her argument that an ALJ has an obligation "to explain either how the RFC

incorporate[d] restrictions caused by Claimant's mild mental limitations, or, alternatively, why the

ALJ believed that the mild mental limitations did not merit a non-exertional limitation in the RFC."

Mark M. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 17960687, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2022). However, the

Commissioner cites several decisions from this District that the Court finds persuasive on the issue

here. For instance, Palomo v. Colvin held that a finding of mild limitations at Step Two "did not

obligate the ALJ to include mental limitations in the RFC" and that "a mild limitation will not

ordinarily be preclusive of one's ability to work." 2015 WL 926208, at *13-14 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 3,

2015) (citing Baker v. Astrue, 2011 WL 3585613, at * 6 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2011)). Similarly, in

McClure v. Colvin, the claimant argued that the ALJ should have incorporated mild mental

limitations into the RFC. 2013 WL 4509848, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2013). But the court

disagreed, finding that "a mild limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace actually indicates

that there was no more than minimal limitation, and therefore it is not relevant to the RFC

assessment." Id.

The Court finds Palomo and McClure persuasive here because they are consistent with the

fact that it is the claimant's burden to establish not just the existence of limitations but to provide

evidence that they support specific work-related limitations as well. See Weaver, 746 F. App'x at

579. Morgan has not cited any objective record evidence or medical opinion evidence indicating

that she requires specific workplace limitations because of her mild mental limitations. Although

state agency psychological consultants Drs. Horton and Neville assessed Morgan with mild mental

limitations, they did not include any work-related limitations in their opinions or indicate in any

other way that Morgan would require specific workplace restrictions. [See dkt. 10-3 at 7-12, 21-

24.] The ALJ also relied on the opinion of consultative psychological examiner Dr. Kadlec, who

similarly did not recommend any work-related mental restrictions. [Dkt. 10-7 at 299-303.] In fact,

the ALJ's finding of mild mental impairments indicates no more than minimal limitations, which

is especially true given that the ALJ found Morgan could perform unskilled work. See Palomo,

2015 WL 926208, at *14 (acknowledging that "a mild limitation in concentration could

conceivably affect [a claimant's] ability to maintain highly skilled employment," but the same is

not true for only skilled work) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpt.

P, App'x 1 § 1200(F)(2) (explaining that a mild limitation means that "[y]our functioning … on a

sustained basis is slightly limited") (emphasis added).

Although the ALJ acknowledged Morgan's mild mental limitations, she also expressly

found that such limitations were non-severe and caused only "a minimal limitation in [Morgan's]

ability to do basic work activities." [Dkt. 10-2 at 15.] The Court does not find Morgan's argument

to present reversible error; rather, it seems to be an invitation for this Court to reweigh the

evidence, which it cannot do. See Chad R. v. Saul, 2020 WL 4344926, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Jul. 29,

2020) ("Plaintiff's claim that the RFC should have accounted for mild limitation in adapting and

managing himself represents to some extent an invitation for this Court to reweigh the evidence,

which it cannot do."). Morgan does not point to any objective record evidence indicating that she

requires additional limitations; instead, she merely speculates and points to her own subjective

testimony that her mild limitations would require her to be absent from work or be off task. This

is insufficient to show reversible error. See Dudley v. Berryhill, 773 F.App'x 838, 843 (7th Cir.

2019) ("When no doctor's opinion indicates greater limitations than those found by the ALJ, there

is no error."). The Court concludes that Morgan has not met her burden to show reversible error

in the ALJ's decision on the points she raises in this section.6

B. The ALJ did not evaluate raw medical data or otherwise fail to develop the record.

Morgan argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because she allegedly formulated

the physical RFC limitations without any expert medical opinion and instead relied on her

subjective interpretation of raw medical data. [Dkt. 12 at 18.] Specifically, Morgan claims that

the ALJ relied exclusively on her lay knowledge to interpret the polysomnogram and sleep latency

study results to formulate the RFC, which the ALJ did not have sufficient medical expertise to do.

[Id. at 18-19.] In Morgan's view, the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination or

requested medical expert testimony at the hearing to interpret the sleep study test and assess

Morgan's functional limitations from Circadian Rhythm Disorder. [Id. at 21.]

In response, the Commissioner argues that Morgan mischaracterizes the record when

claiming that the ALJ "interpreted" raw medical data. [Dkt. 14 at 14.] Morgan ignores that the

ALJ's finding that the study overall demonstrated no evidence of hypersomnia was not the ALJ's

interpretation. [Id.] Rather, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ merely accepted the

interpretation of the sleep specialist who conducted the study, Dr. Levine. [Id.] According to the

Commissioner, Dr. Levine interpreted the data and determined that, despite quickly falling asleep

during the first two naps of the study, the results "show[ed] no evidence of hypersomnia." [Id.

(quoting dkt. 10-7 at 355).] Thus, the Commissioner claims that it was appropriate for the ALJ to

6 Morgan's claim that the hypothetical posed to the VE did not adequately reflect all of her

limitations and restrictions is premised on the same claim that the ALJ did not adequately account

for her mild mental limitations. Accordingly, Morgan's arguments about the hypothetical posed to

the VE fail for the same reasons.

rely on the interpretation of a medical test performed by Morgan's own treatment provider. [Id. at

14-15.] Further, the Commissioner asserts that Dr. Levine's findings were reviewed by another

sleep specialist, Dr. Asis, and the ALJ adopted Dr. Asis's limitations for Morgan with respect to

driving, heavy machinery, and hazards. [Id. at 15.]

In reply, Morgan maintains that, without an expert medical opinion, the ALJ was left to

decide on her own how to interpret the sleep study result. [Dkt. 15 at 5.] And she reiterates her

argument that the ALJ subjectively concluded that because only the first two naps were positive

for hypersomnia, Morgan's allegation of disabling excessive sleepiness was inconsistent with the

record. [Id.] This conclusion, according to Morgan, constitutes an impermissible lay opinion that

the ALJ was not qualified to assess. [Id. at 6.] In addition, Morgan claims that the ALJ did not

explain why she decided to accept one portion of the sleep study that showed no hypersomnia

while rejecting the other portion of the sleep study that showed evidence of hypersomnia. [Id.]

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that an ALJ may not "play

doctor" and "interpret 'new and potentially decisive medical evidence' without medical scrutiny."

McHenry v. Berryhill, 911 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677,

680 (7th Cir. 2014)). It is not error, however, for an ALJ to merely restate a physician's findings

regarding the interpretation of a claimant's exams or procedures. Durham v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th

1089, 1095 (7th Cir. 2022) (It was not error when "the ALJ did not attempt to interpret, on his

own, the significance of any . . . medical tests or procedures," but rather "relied, as he should, on

the conclusions of [the claimant's] treating physicians.")

Here, there is nothing indicating that the ALJ interpreted raw medical data. Instead, the

ALJ's decision makes clear that the ALJ merely adopted sleep specialist Dr. Levine's findings from

Morgan's February 2017 Multiple Sleep Latency Study.7 After conducting five separate tests, Dr.

Levine concluded that Morgan had a "mean sleep latency of 11.5 minutes (normal > 10 minutes)"

and concluded that the findings "show[ed] no evidence of hypersomnia." [Dkt. 10-7 at 355.]

Accordingly, the ALJ reasonably concluded that the tests "overall demonstrated no evidence of

hypersomnia." [Dkt. 10-2 at 17.] This conclusion is entirely consistent with the Multiple Sleep

Latency Report, and because the ALJ simply reiterated what Dr. Levine determined through the

study, the ALJ was not "interpreting" medical data as Morgan suggests.

The Court also rejects Morgan's claim that the ALJ erred because she "chose to go with no

hypersomnia on naps 3, 4, and 5 while completely ignoring a finding of hypersomnia on nap 1 and

2." [Dkt. 15 at 6. (internal quotation marks omitted).] The ALJ did not "choose" to give findings

of no hypersomnia greater weight than findings of hypersomnia or otherwise step beyond the data

and provide her own evaluation of the significance of the data. Again, the Multiple Sleep Latency

Report shows that Dr. Levine calculated a mean sleep latency of 11.5 minutes after compiling the

results from all five naps and made an overall conclusion that the study did not show evidence of

hypersomnia. Nevertheless, the ALJ acknowledged that the test "proved positive for hypersomnia

on her first 2 naps" and accommodated Morgan's complaints of "excessive sleepiness" by limiting

her to work "requiring no ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or exposure to unprotected heights or

operation of heavy machinery." [Dkt. 10-2 at 17.] The ALJ accepted Dr. Levine's findings and

did not attempt to interpret this data or "play doctor" in any way, and it was entirely appropriate

for the ALJ rely on Dr. Levine's interpretation of this data.

7 "In the multiple sleep latency test (MSLT), a person is given 4-5 opportunities to sleep every two

hours during normal wake times. The specialist uses the test to measure the extent of daytime

sleepiness (how fast the patient falls asleep in each nap, also called sleep latency), and also how

quickly REM sleep begins." https://stanfordhealthcare.org/medical-

conditions/sleep/narcolepsy/diagnosis/multiple-sleep-latency-test.html.

The ALJ also appropriately relied on medical opinion evidence in formulating the RFC.

Morgan argues that the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination or requested medical

expert testimony to properly interpret the sleep study test and assess plaintiff's functional

limitations. But Dr. Levine interpreted his Multiple Sleep Latency Study and provided a clear

conclusion, so there was no need for further medical interpretation. In terms of functional

limitations, the RFC limits Morgan to "no ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or exposure to hazards such

as unprotected heights, operation of heavy machinery, or commercial driving." [Dkt. 10-2 at 16.]

This is consistent with Dr. Asis's recommendation against driving and operating heavy machinery,

[dkt. 10-7 at 339], and Morgan has not cited any medical opinion evidence indicating that the ALJ

failed to adopt any recommended functional limitations. Thus, the Court can trace the ALJ's

reasoning in formulating the RFC, and it is clear that the ALJ did not interpret any medical

evidence.8 For these reasons, the Court concludes that Morgan has not met her burden to show

reversible error in the ALJ's decision on the points she raises in this section.

C. The ALJ did not fail to adequately evaluate Morgan's subjective complaints.

Morgan claims that the ALJ improperly evaluated testimony pertaining to the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of Morgan's symptoms for one reason: the ALJ mischaracterized

the record by finding that "[n]othing in the medical evidence of record demonstrates that [Morgan]

has undergone any treatment." [Dkt. 12 at 24.] Morgan points out that she takes multiple

medications and that her treatment consists of regular follow-ups and compliance with her

prescribed medication regimen. [Id.] Morgan also asserts that she was hospitalized in 2019 for

8 While Morgan's main contention here is that the ALJ improperly interpreted the Multiple Sleep

Latency Test, she does claim in her briefing that the ALJ also inappropriately interpreted a

polysomnogram. [Dkt. 12 at 18.] Review of the decision shows that the ALJ did note this

polysomnogram but did not draw any conclusions about this study and did not interpret any raw

data from it. Thus, the Court notes that this argument is also not a basis for remand.

severe depression and continued to receive mental health treatment after her hospitalization. [Id.

at 25.] Thus, Morgan claims that, by allegedly finding that she had not undergone any treatment,

the ALJ did not adequately evaluate whether Morgan's subjective symptoms were consistent with

the treatment she received. [Id.]

In response, the Commissioner contends that Morgan takes the ALJ's statement out of

context. [Dkt. 14 at 18.] In fact, the Commissioner claims that the ALJ repeatedly acknowledged

and discussed Morgan's treatment with medications. [Id.] The Commissioner also points out that,

under the regulations, the ALJ is instructed to consider the claimant's medications. [Id.] But a

separate factor under the regulations is "treatment, other than medication" that the claimant has

received. [Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(v)).] Read in context, the Commissioner argues

that the ALJ's finding that Morgan had not "undergone any treatment" was merely the ALJ's

consideration of the relevant regulatory factors, and the ALJ was merely distinguishing medication

treatment and other types of treatment. [Id. at 18-19.] Thus, the Commissioner claims that it was

reasonable for the ALJ make such a finding because Morgan did not engage in any treatment other

than conservative medication management. [Id. at 19.]

Morgan asserts in her reply brief that she rests on the arguments made in her opening brief.

[Dkt. 15 at 7.]

When assessing a claimant's subjective symptoms, an ALJ will complete a two-step

process. First, the ALJ will "consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable

physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual's

symptoms, such as pain." SSR 16-3p (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 5180304, at *3. Second,

"once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to

produce an individual's symptoms is established," the ALJ will "evaluate the intensity and

persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an individual's

ability to perform work-related activities." Id. The ALJ will not evaluate an individual's symptoms

based solely on objective medical evidence unless the objective medical evidence supports a

finding that the claimant is in fact disabled. Id. at *4-5. The ALJ will consider factors including

(but not limited to) the claimant's daily activities and the effectiveness of the claimant's

medications or treatment. Id. at *7-8. The court must afford the ALJ's determinations special

deference, and it will only reverse if the ALJ's determination is patently wrong. Larson v. Astrue,

615 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2010); Engstrand v. Colvin, 788 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2015).

The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ's statement on which Morgan relies

for this argument is taken out of context. Read in context, it is clear that over multiple paragraphs

of the decision, the ALJ did adequately consider Morgan's treatment that consisted of medication

management. For example, the ALJ expressly recognized that Morgan's "medication regimen and

treatment history are … inconsistent with her allegations of disability;" that Morgan "admitted she

experiences symptom improvement with medication;" that Morgan "reported that taking Vyvanse

helped her excessive daytime sleepiness, and it gave her a boost within a few minutes;" that a

January 2022 treatment note indicated that "Vyvanse 40 mg and Ritalin 5 mg was helping her;"

and that "[a]lthough [Morgan] alleged various side effects from the use of medications, office

treatment notes, do not note that [Morgan] complained of experiencing any medication-related

side effects." [Id. at 17-18.] In fact, Morgan even block quotes much of the ALJ's express

consideration of her medication treatment in her own briefing, thereby acknowledging the ALJ's

reasoned analysis. [See dkt. 12 at 24.]

In light of the ALJ's discussion of Morgan's medication treatment, the Court agrees with

the Commissioner that the statement Morgan challenges was simply the ALJ noting that Morgan

did not pursue any other treatments aside from her medication regimen. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(v) (outlining the different factors that the SSA will consider, including "[t]he type,

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication" and "[t]reatment, other than medication,

you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms") (emphasis added). A

commonsense reading of this portion of the ALJ's opinion does not support Morgan's argument

because the opinion clearly shows that the ALJ was aware of and considered Morgan's medication

treatment. See Fanta v. Saul, 848 F. App'x 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that "[w]hen

reviewing an ALJ's opinion, we give the opinion a commonsensical reading rather than nitpicking

it") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Morgan also claims that the ALJ failed to consider certain treatments, including "multiple

visits with the Indiana Neuroscience Center for Circadian Rhythm Disorder," her hospitalization

in 2019 for severe depression, and mental health treatments with Nurse Practitioner Davis. [Dkt.

12 at 24-25.] But the ALJ did expressly consider Morgan's 2019 hospitalization, explaining that

Morgan "underwent treatment due, in part, to her reported abuse of Vyvanse" and that "[f]rom

May 2019 to June 2019, [Morgan] received mental health treatment for worsening depression."

[Dkt. 10-2 at 14-15.] Additionally, Morgan's record citation for her "mental health treatment" with

Nurse Practitioner Davis does not contain any evidence of mental health treatment beyond

managing Morgan's anxiety, depressive disorder, and poor focus with Lexapro, Abilify, and

Strattera. [Dkt. 10-7 at 74.] And with respect to her claim that she had multiple visits with the

Indiana Neuroscience Center, Morgan cites a single medical record that merely summarizes

Morgan's symptoms and provides that her treatment consisted of medication. [Dkt. 10-7 at 311.]

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Morgan has not met her burden to show reversible error in

the ALJ's decision on the points she raises in this section.

IV. CONCLUSION

The standard for disability claims under the Social Security Act is stringent. Plessinger v.

Berryhill, 900 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2018). "The Act does not contemplate degrees of disability

or allow for an award based on partial disability." Williams-Overstreet v. Astrue, 364 F. App'x

271, 274 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 285 (7th Cir. 1985)). "Even

claimants with substantial impairments are not necessarily entitled to benefits, which are paid for

by taxes, including taxes paid by those who work despite serious physical or mental impairments

and for whom working is difficult and painful." /d. Taken together, the Court can find no legal

basis presented by Morgan to reverse the ALJ's decision that she was not disabled during the

relevant period. Therefore, the decision below is AFFIRMED. Final judgment shall issue

accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/13/2023 Koll 1 Ronn

Kellie M. Barr

United States Magistrate Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All ECF-registered counsel of record via email

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