SIDWELL v. SEARLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

CHESTER SIDWELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:23-cv-00870-JRS-TAB

)

CARLY SEARLES, )

)

Defendant. )

Order on Various Motions

I. Introduction

This is a civil rights case removed from state court. Pro se plaintiff Sidwell alleges

he lost his unborn child when a police station's full-body scanner caused his girlfriend

to miscarry. Now before the Court are various motions: Sidwell's Motion to Appoint

Counsel, (ECF No. 8); Sidwell's Motion for Jury Trial, (ECF No. 9); Searles' Motion

for Screening of Complaint, (ECF No. 10); and Sidwell's Motion for Default Judgment,

(ECF No. 11).

II. Discussion

A. Procedural Matters

Sidwell gives his address as the Bartholomew County Jail, which makes him a

prisoner within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). Because

he seeks redress from a governmental employee, the Court must screen his complaint

and dismiss any portion that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In determining whether the complaint

states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d

714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). To survive dismissal,

[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints like Sidwell's are

construed liberally and held to "a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by

lawyers." Cesal, 851 at 720.

Searles' Motion for Screening of Complaint, (ECF No. 10), which reminds the

Court of its screening obligation under the PLRA, is granted.

Searles' Motion also requests an extension of time to answer Sidwell's Complaint.

That is a sensible request—ordinarily, when the PLRA applies, this Court screens

complaints before they are served, and so only complaints that pass screening need

an answer. Now while that motion has been pending the usual deadline to answer

has passed. Sidwell, vigilant in his cause, has thus filed a Motion for Default

Judgment. (ECF No. 11). While the Court is impressed by his diligence, Sidwell

should bear in mind that the courts are about real justice, not technical gotchas.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The time it has taken the Court to consider

and decide these motions cannot fairly count against Searles, whose motion was made

in good faith. The Motion for Default Judgment, (ECF No. 11), is therefore denied.

Sidwell requests that the Court appoint counsel to help him. Litigants in federal

civil cases do not have a constitutional or statutory right to court-appointed counsel.

Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2018). Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

gives courts the authority to "request" counsel. Mallard v. United States District

Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). As a practical matter, there are not enough lawyers

willing and qualified to accept a pro bono assignment in every pro se case. See Olson

v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Whether to recruit an attorney is a

difficult decision: Almost everyone would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are

too many indigent litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these

cases."). To appoint counsel, the Court in its discretion must find that the plaintiff

has tried to obtain counsel and that the plaintiff needs the help counsel would

provide. Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021). Here, then,

appointment of counsel is not appropriate: Sidwell has not shown that he has tried to

obtain counsel, and Sidwell's filings to this point are lucid and sensible. The Court

finds him competent to litigate his own case at this stage in the proceedings. Sidwell's

Motion to Appoint Counsel, (ECF No. 8), is denied.

Finally, Sidwell has filed a Motion for Jury Trial. (ECF No. 9). Insofar as Sidwell

intends this as a jury trial demand, it is well taken: disputes of fact are in the last

resort decided by the jury. But there are many procedural steps before trial, in which

the parties get to learn about the underlying facts and test the applicable law.

Sidwell may not avoid those steps and jump straight to trial. To that extent, his

Motion for Jury Trial, (ECF No. 9), is denied.

B. Screening

With procedural matters resolved, the Court turns to screening the Complaint.

As explained above, the question is whether the Complaint describes a situation that,

if true, amounts to a legal wrong.

Sidwell's Complaint is admirably "short and plain," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), indeed

better in that regard than some trained counsel. But "Rule 8(a)(2) specifies the

conditions of the formal adequacy of a pleading. It does not specify the conditions of

its substantive adequacy, that is, its legal merit." Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco

Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999). So it is possible for a clearly written

complaint to describe facts that, however unfortunate, do not amount to a legal

wrong. That is exactly what has happened here.

Sidwell claims that Searles, a correctional officer employed by the Bartholomew

County Sheriffs Department, "put Amber Nicole David through the body scanner

machine at the intake at the Bartholomew County Jail after being notified that she

was pregnant with a child." (Complaint 2, ECF No. 1-2.) After Searles had done that,

she "then was told by Captain Tyler Stillabower that she was not suppose[d] to put

pregnant women through the body scanner[.]" (Id. (emphasis added).) And David

miscarried the child—Sidwell's unborn child—two days later. (Id.) That is, according

to Sidwell, Searles' "negligence"—in putting his pregnant girlfriend through a full-

body scanner—caused him to lose his child. (Id.)

Needless to say, the loss of a child is a terrible thing. The courts have long

recognized that parents have liberty interests in "the care, custody, and control of

their children" protected by the Due Process clause, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,

65 (2000), which interests include the physical well-being of the child, Ingraham v.

Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977). The Court is willing to assume arguendo that those

interests comprehend parents' relationships to their unborn children, as well. So a

state officer that wantonly harmed Sidwell's child would be answerable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Sidwell's constitutional rights. Here, though, Sidwell

makes it clear that Searles' behavior was "negligence," not intentional wrongdoing.

Sidwell alleges that Searles had already put David through the scanner when she

was told that it was regarded as dangerous.1 It was, at most, a thoughtless mistake;

it was not an intentional "deprivation" of Sidwell's rights—and "the Due Process

Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended

loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328

(1986).

Sidwell's Complaint also mentions the Eighth Amendment2 and its protection

against "medical deliberate indifference." (Complaint 2, ECF No. 1-2.) But Searles

1 Though not dispositive to the Court's decision, as a factual matter, the scanner probably

was not dangerous. Millimeter-wave scanners of the sort commonly encountered in airports

and police stations are low-energy devices that do not use ionizing radiation and pose very

low risks to human health. Even x-ray scanners are unlikely to cause problems. The CDC

writes "[m]ost of the ways a pregnant woman may be exposed to radiation, such as from a

diagnostic medical exam or an occupational exposure within regulatory limits, are not likely

to cause health effects for a fetus." See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,

Radiation and Pregnancy: A Fact Sheet for Clinicians,

https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/emergencies/prenatalphysician.htm; CDC, Radiation

from Airport Security Screening, https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/airport_scan.htm.

2 If Sidwell and David were at the jail as pretrial detainees, which seems likely, then the

Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, would apply, and the analysis would

proceed as above. The Court gives the Eighth Amendment analysis for completeness' sake.

was not indifferent to Sidwell's medical needs; she was at worst indifferent to David's

or to the child's. The "general rule [is] that a litigant must assert his own legal rights

and cannot assert the legal rights of a third party." Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727,

739 (7th Cir. 1999). But even if the Court were to allow Sidwell to assert a third

party's rights here, the standard for an Eighth Amendment violation is "deliberate

indifference," which requires "a showing that the official was subjectively aware of

the risk." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). As discussed above, Sidwell

alleges that Searles did not know of the risk until after the scan was done, so she

could not have had the subjective awareness that would make her conduct

"deliberate."

With Sidwell's two constitutional arguments thus disposed of, there is nothing left

for this Court in the complaint, even if the facts as alleged do give Sidwell a state-law

claim against Searles. "[A] claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out

their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the

Eleventh Amendment. . . . [T]his principle applies as well to state-law claims brought

into federal court under pendent jurisdiction." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).

III. Conclusion

The Court granted Searles' Motion for Screening of Complaint, (ECF No. 10);

denied Sidwell's Motion for Default Judgment, (ECF No. 11); denied Sidwell's

Motion to Appoint Counsel, (ECF No. 8); and denied Sidwell's Motion for Jury Trial,

(ECF No. 9).

The Court then screened Sidwell's Complaint, which, despite its formal merits,

does not advance any claim cognizable in this Court. His federal constitutional rights

were not violated in the facts as alleged, and this Court has no power to address any

concurrent violations of state law. Sidwell's Complaint is therefore dismissed with

prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Sidwell has until August 18, 2023, within which to show cause why

judgment dismissing this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted should not issue. The failure to do so within the time allowed will result in

dismissal without further notice.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 08/14/2023

JAMES R. SWEENEY II, JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

CHESTER SIDWELL

Bartholomew County Jail

543 2nd Street

Columbus, IN 47201

Lisa A. Baron

KNIGHT, HOPPE, KURNIK & KNIGHT, LTD.

lbaron@khkklaw.com

Rosemary L. Borek

Knight Hoppe Kurnik & Knight, LTD

rborek@khkklaw.com