WARE v. WILLIAMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

RAYDEZ WARE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:23-cv-00434-JPH-TAB

)

WILLIAMS Sgt, )

TERRY Officer, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND

DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff Raydez Ware is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Pendleton

Correctional Facility. He filed this civil rights action alleging that Officer Terry

slammed his hands in a tray slot in the presence of Sergeant Williams and that

Officer Terry and Sergeant Williams denied his requests for medical treatment in

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Dkt. 2. Because Mr. Ware is a

"prisoner," this Court has an obligation to screen the complaint before service on

the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).

I. Screening Standard

When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To

determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same

standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).

Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The

Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d

714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).

II. The Complaint

The complaint alleges claims against Officer Terry and Sergeant Williams.

Mr. Ware states that, on August 3, 2022, he asked Officer Terry and Sergeant

Williams if he could take his shower. But Sergeant Williams denied his request

and told him to "cuff up before I tase you." Dkt. 2 at 3. When Mr. Ware asked

what he had done wrong, Officer Terry told him to remove his hands from the

tray slot and began screaming at him. Sergeant Williams then took out his taser

and ordered Mr. Ware to "move or cuff up." Id. Mr. Ware again questioned

Sergeant Williams, who responded, "move now before I tase you." Id. Officer Terry

then slammed the tray slot door down on Mr. Ware's hands. When Mr. Ware

screamed that his hands were caught in the tray slot, she lifted the door, and he

removed his hands. Officer Terry then pulled the tray slot door closed and locked

it. Mr. Ware questioned Sergeant Williams about whether he saw Officer Terry

slam the tray slot on his hands, but Sergeant Williams denied witnessing this

conduct.

Mr. Ware repeatedly asked Officer Terry and Sergeant Williams to take him

to medical to obtain treatment for his hands, but they ignored his requests. The

next day, during a walkthrough, Officer Terry called him a "crybaby" and stated,

"I didn't even slam it that hard on you." Id.

Subsequently, Mr. Ware submitted a medical health request but did not

receive medical treatment for thirteen days. On August 16, 2022, Officer Terry

escorted him to medical for his appointment. Mr. Ware requested a different

officer but was told that, if he did not go with Officer Terry, this would be

construed as a refusal to attend his appointment. During his appointment, the

medical provider told him that his hands were fractured. On the way back to his

cell, Officer Terry and another officer joked about Mr. Ware's intent to sue Officer

Terry and she responded that this was not the first time that she had been sued.

Mr. Ware seeks declaratory judgment, punitive damages, and compensatory

damages for his injuries.

III. Discussion of Claims

To begin, Mr. Ware's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim shall

proceed against Officer Terry in her individual capacity. The use of excessive

force can support a viable claim under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319

(1986) (noting that the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual

punishment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain). Because

Mr. Ware has alleged sufficient facts to state an excessive force claim, this claim

shall proceed.

Additionally, Mr. Ware's Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim

shall proceed against Sergeant Williams in his individual capacity. An officer's

failure to intervene to prevent excessive force can support an Eighth Amendment

claim. Stewardson v. Biggs, 43 F.4th 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2022) ("It is clearly

established that '[a]n officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other

law enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is

liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason to know . . . excessive force was

being used,' and 'the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent

the harm from occurring.'"). Because Mr. Ware has alleged sufficient facts to

state a failure to intervene claim, this claim shall proceed.

Finally, Mr. Ware's Eight Amendment deliberate indifference claims shall

procced against Officer Terry and Sergeant Williams in their individual

capacities. Denial of medical care for a known serious medical need can support

a deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)

(construing Estelle); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (noting that the

prisoner must allege "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."). Because Mr. Ware has alleged

sufficient facts to state deliberate indifference claims, these claims shall

proceed.

This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the

Court. All other claims have been dismissed. If Mr. Ware believes that additional

claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court, he shall

have through August 4, 2023, in which to identify those claims.

IV. Service of Process

The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process

to defendants Officer Terry and Sergeant Williams in the manner specified by

Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the complaint filed on March 10, 2023, dkt.

[2], applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of

Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Order.

The clerk is directed to serve the Indiana Department of Correction

employees electronically.

Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to

Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 7/13/2023

Sjamu Patrick ltawloe

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

RAYDEZ WARE

269944

PENDLETON - CF

PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Electronic Service Participant — Court Only

Electronic service to Indiana Department of Correction:

Sergeant Williams

Officer Terry

(All at Pendleton Correctional Facility)