MOORE v. CHAVIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

BRIAN S. MOORE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:22-cv-01783-SEB-KMB

)

JOHN M.T. CHAVIS Judge in his personal )

capacity, )

MELISSICA FLIPPEN of the Marion County )

DRCB, in her personal capacity, )

ALEYNE WOOD Case Manager at Marion )

County DRCB, in her personal capacity, )

EMILY LAGENE ANGEL GAL, in her )

personal capacity, )

MEGAN L. GEHRING in her personal )

capacity,

KRISTY L. MOORE in her personal capacity, )

ROBIN B. NIEHAUS in her personal )

capacity,

ANGELA SWENSON in her personal )

capacity,

THE STATE OF INDIANA, )

CHELSEA A. SHELBURNE, )

KIDS' VOICE OF INDIANA, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR LACK OF

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising

jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced." Jakupovic v. Curran, 850

F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sykes v. Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Prob. Div., 837 F.3d

736, 741−42 (7th Cir. 2016)). On September 9, 2022, Plaintiff Brian Moore, who is

proceeding pro se, filed this cause of action against eleven Defendants associated with his

child custody case in state court. The crux of Mr. Moore's Complaint is that he has been

harmed by a series of orders issued by the judge overseeing his child custody case, which

among other things required his parenting time with his children to be supervised. In their

seven motions to dismiss, all Defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Moore's Complaint

in its entirety, some on the grounds that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

required under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because we conclude that the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine does, indeed, bar our exercise of jurisdiction over Mr. Moore's

Complaint, we shall dismiss this cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We begin by noting that pro se complaints, such as that filed here by Mr. Moore, are

construed liberally and held "to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers." Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

omitted). One basis for dismissal advanced in the motions to dismiss Mr. Moore's

Complaint is based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Other enumerated grounds for dismissal have been advanced as

well. Because "we are required to consider subject-matter jurisdiction as the first question

in every case, and we must dismiss this suit if such jurisdiction is lacking," we need not

reach Defendants' other grounds for dismissal. Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902 (quoting

Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2014)).

To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff

bears the "burden of supporting the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint by

competent proof." Davis v. City of Indianapolis, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023 WL 1966028, at

*2 (S.D. Ind. 2023) (quoting Int'l Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207, 1210

(7th Cir. 1980)). Despite being faced with this burden, Mr. Moore has failed to respond to

any of the motions to dismiss.1 When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, we are required to accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations

and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. (quoting Ezekiel v. Michel, 66

F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995)). However, we "may properly look beyond the

jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been

submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.'" Id.

(quoting Ezekiel, 66 F.3d at 897). Many of the state court's orders challenged by Mr.

Moore have in their entirety been attached to the motions to dismiss, which we properly

consider in the following subject matter jurisdiction inquiry.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Mr. Moore is divorced from Defendant Kristy Moore, who is the mother of their two

minor children, E.M. and G.M.2 The impetus for this lawsuit was a series of orders issued

1 The Court notes and the docket reflects that Mr. Moore has not made a single filing in this

cause of action since September 9, 2022, when he filed his Complaint and Summons

information.

2 The parties' filings contain the names of Mr. Moore's minor children who, under Rule 5.2(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should have been identified only by their initials. To

protect their privacy interests, the Court will use only the children's initials. If the parties file

anything further with the Court, they are admonished to use only the children's initials.

in Mr. Moore and Ms. Moore's child custody case by the Honorable John Chavis, Marion

County Superior Court Judge, who is named as a Defendant in this lawsuit. Judge

Chavis's orders limited the amount of Mr. Moore's parenting time and required that it be

supervised. Mr. Moore's challenge to each of these orders is identical—that the court

erred in failing to make a specific finding of physical endangerment or emotional

impairment pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-14-4-1 before imposing the restriction

on his parenting time.3

On April 29, 2019, the children's pediatrician filed a complaint with the Indiana

Department of Child Services ("DCS"), alleging that Mr. Moore was abusing and/or

neglecting his children, prompting DCS to open an investigation into the alleged abuse

and/or neglect. On June 17, 2019, Mr. Moore met with DCS Family Case Manager

("FCM") Channing Reed and generally cooperated with FCM Reed's investigation. Mr.

Moore also offered to allow DCS to inspect his home, but that offer was declined. Two

days thereafter, FCM Reed met with the children and Ms. Moore at her home. Mr.

Moore's children reported to FCM Reed that they felt safe in his home, and the children

and Ms. Moore all denied that there was any abuse or violence. On June 20, 2019, Mr.

Moore received an email from Ms. Moore's attorney, Robin Niehaus, alleging that he was

3 Specifically, Indiana Code section 31-17-4-1(a) provides:

A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable parenting time

rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time by the

noncustodial parent might endanger the child's physical health or significantly

impair the child's emotional development.

refusing to cooperate with the DCS investigation, and informing Mr. Moore that she was

filing a motion with the court for an order preventing him from having any parenting time

altogether or requiring that his parenting time be supervised until such time as he

cooperated with DCS. Ms. Neihaus is also named as a Defendant in the Complaint.

On June 25, 2019, Ms. Moore filed a motion requesting that Judge Chavis: (1) modify

the parenting time arrangement currently in place that allowed Mr. Moore to have

extended, unsupervised parenting time with the children, (2) immediately cease parenting

time due to mental abuse, (3) allow Mr. Moore only supervised parenting time, (4) order

Mr. Moore to undergo anger management and parenting classes, (5) and order him to pay

Ms. Moore's attorney's fees. On June 27, 2019, the court issued an order granting Ms.

Moore's request for a Guardian ad Litem ("GAL") to represent their children, and

appointing Kids' Voice of Indiana for that purpose. Kids' Voice is also named as a

Defendant in Mr. Moore's lawsuit.

On July 9, 2019, FCM Reed issued her Assessment of Alleged Child Abuse or

Neglect, concluding that the allegation against Mr. Moore was unsubstantiated. On July

23, 2019, Judge Chavis conducted a hearing on Ms. Moore's motion to modify Mr.

Moore's parenting time, during which FCM Reed confirmed the accuracy of her

assessment and noted that Mr. Moore had cooperated with the DCS investigation. Ms.

Moore allegedly did not provide any evidence that Mr. Moore might endanger the

children's physical health or significantly impair their emotional development. Because

the children and Mr. Moore had by that time been separated for only thirty-seven days,

Judge Chavis explained that in his judgment supervised parenting time was necessary and

an appropriate pathway towards the reuniting of Mr. Moore and his children. Mr. Moore

objected both to the supervision of his parenting time and to Judge Chavis's alleged

failure to articulate a specific finding of endangerment, as Mr. Moore believed was

legally required. Judge Chavis responded by informing Mr. Moore that: "If it's a

preliminary motion[,] you're not entitled to [the Court issuing special factual findings and

conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A)]."4 Docket No. 1, at 7. That same day,

the Court also granted Ms. Moore's Emergency Request for Specific Ban of Behavior

against Mr. Moore, and prohibited him from going to the home, property or street in front

of the home of Ms. Niehaus, or within fifty feet of her car, or to the building or parking

lot of her office.

The preliminary nature of Judge Chavis's decision to supervise Mr. Moore's parenting

time is reflected in his July 25, 2019 order summarizing the events of the hearing

conducted on July 23, 2019. In this order, Judge Chavis stated that Ms. Moore appeared

in person and by her counsel, Ms. Neihaus, that Mr. Moore appeared in person and pro

se, and that the children's GAL, Kids' Voice, appeared by its attorneys Emily Angel and

Chelsea Shelburne, both of whom have also been named as Defendants in Mr. Moore's

4 Specifically, Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) provides:

In the case of issues tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the

court shall determine the facts and judgment shall be entered thereon pursuant to

Rule 58. Upon its own motion, or the written request of any party filed with the

court prior to the admission of evidence, the court in all actions tried upon the facts

without a jury or with an advisory jury (except as provided in Rule 39) shall find

the facts specially and state its conclusions thereon.

Complaint. The order further noted that during the hearing witnesses were sworn,

testimony was heard, and evidence was considered by Judge Chavis, resulting in the

issuance of the following order:

1. Ms. Moore shall retain primary physical custody of the children.

2. Mr. Moore shall have supervised parenting time with the children, which the

Court may reconsider after reviewing the supervisor's notes.

3. Mr. Moore's "supervised parenting time shall be at his own expense. The

parenting time supervisor shall be an agency or private supervisor selected

by the Domestic Relations Counseling Bureau (DRCB). Kids' Voice shall

provide DRCB with options for supervised parenting time."

4. Ms. Moore and Mr. Moore "shall be mindful of their tone and shall not name

call or make disparaging comments about one another both in front of the

children, individually or collectively, or otherwise."

5. "The parties shall not coach the children, individually or collectively, or

otherwise."

6. "The parties shall not discuss with or inform the children, either individually

or collectively, of any of the issues being litigated in these proceedings."

7. "Neither party shall employ the use of quotes in correspondence. Neither

party shall draw or color on any correspondence between parties."

8. "The parties shall be referred to the DRCB and are ordered to follow all

directions of the DRCB regarding services and appointments. This order

includes following all recommendations of any service providers."

9. "The DRCB shall conduct a custody evaluation. Both parties shall cooperate

with the DRCB in completing the custody evaluation. As a part of the custody

evaluation, the DRCB shall conduct home visits with both" Ms. Moore and

Mr. Moore.

10. "Both parties shall submit to a psychological evaluation and follow the

recommendations made by the evaluator. [Ms. Moore] and [Mr. Moore] and

Father shall submit proof to this Court that they have completed the

psychological evaluations and followed the recommendations contained

within the evaluation."

11. Mr. Moore "shall submit to anger management courses as referred by the

DRCB."

12. Mr. Moore "shall participate in parenting classes as referred by the DRCB."

13. "Neither party shall go to the home or office of any individual (attorney or

otherwise) working in a professional capacity in this matter without an

express invitation or scheduled appointment."

14. "Due to the contentiousness between the parties, the Court shall conduct an

in-camera interview of the children. …There will be no record made of the

interview. Neither the Parties nor counsel shall be permitted to attend or even

be around the 5th floor, west wing of the City-County Building when the

interview is conducted. In the event that any party asks the children what was

discussed in the interview and that matter is proven in Court, the Court shall

consider this act a violation of the Court's Order, will find the violating party

in contempt of court and will fashion an appropriate sanction."

Docket No. 31-1, at 1−3. It is unclear precisely when the court's interview of Mr. Moore's

children occurred, but we note that under Indiana Code section 31-17-4-1, "[t]he court

may interview the child in chambers to assist the court in determining the child's

perception of whether parenting time by the noncustodial parent might endanger the

child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional development." Ind.

Code § 31-17-4-1(b). On August 16, 2019, Mr. Moore moved to reconsider Judge

Chavis's July 25, 2019 order, arguing that supervised parenting time was erroneously

ordered because there was no specific finding of endangerment or impairment by the

court. This motion was denied by the court on August 23, 2019. Mr. Moore also sought to

appeal the July 25, 2019 order to the Indiana Court of Appeals, but the appeal was

denied.

Due to Mr. Moore's lack of progress with the DRCB, Judge Chavis sua sponte issued

an interim order on September 18, 2019, which addressed, among other things, Mr.

Moore's refusal to sign the contract for supervised parenting time services "because he

does not have findings from the court regarding supervised parenting time [and] stating

that it would be 'fraudulent' for him to sign." Docket No. 31-4, at 2. The Court explained

that Mr. Moore had "misconstrued the meaning and intent of the Contract," as it "does

not require that the visiting parent provide a copy of the findings of fact and conclusions

of law; especially where there has yet to be a complete adjudication of the merits of the

allegations raised in the various motions." Id. "Simply put," the supervised parenting time

provider "only required [Mr. Moore] to bring a copy of the Court's July 25, 2019 Order

with him to the intake assessment." Id. "Furthermore, the [July 25, 2019] Order clearly

states the findings upon which [the provider] was to conduct supervised parenting time."

Id. Judge Chavis explained that the order issued on July 25, 2019 was "an interim order

indicating that, while this custody action remains pending, [Mr. Moore] shall have

supervised parenting time with his children and that supervision of parenting time would

be overseen by either an agency or private supervisor selected by DRCB." Id. at 2−3. The

court "further set parameters for how parenting time should be conducted and how

interaction with the children should take place." Id. at 3. Thus, Mr. Moore's "concern that

executing the contract would be fraudulent is without merit and is essentially a pretext for

avoiding the directives of the Court." Id. The court advised Mr. Moore that it would

"continue to review DRCB's progress reports leading up to the November 7, 2019 final

hearing." Id. It also would not "entertain any further allowances or accommodations in

order to compel [Mr. Moore] to comply with the [c]ourt's directives." Id. Mr. Moore filed

a motion to correct errors as to the court's order from September 18, 2019, and also tried

to appeal the order to the Indiana Court of Appeals. Both were denied.

On October 29, 2019, Kids' Voice filed a motion to be released as the children's GAL

and to withdraw its attorneys' appearances in the case, based on Mr. Moore's concerning

behavior. Kids' Voice explained that it was extremely alarmed by Mr. Moore appearing

unannounced at Ms. Niehaus's home and sending what Kids' Voice's counsel would

consider to be "threatening letters" to Ms. Niehaus. Docket No. 31-5, at 1−2. Because of

his behavior, Kids' Voice did not "feel comfortable assigning a volunteer GAL to conduct

home visits and otherwise do an investigation in this case, due to concerns for their

safety." Id. at 2. The Court conducted a status hearing on November 7, 2019, and granted

Kids' Voice's motion that same day. On November 20, 2019, attorney Megan Gehring

was appointed by Judge Chavis to serve as the children's GAL. She is also named as a

Defendant in Mr. Moore's present cause of action.

On December 6, 2019, another status conference was conducted in the child custody

case, and Judge Chavis issued an order later that day finding that Mr. Moore had

completed parenting classes and anger management services, that the parties agreed that

Mr. Moore and his children should undergo reunification therapy, and that a modification

of the supervised parenting time as previously ordered was warranted. On March 16,

2020, attorney Angela Swenson filed an appearance on behalf of Ms. Moore. Ms.

Swenson is also named as a Defendant in the present cause of action.

On June 12, 2020, Judge Chavis issued sua sponte an interim order regarding Mr.

Moore's supervised parenting time in which he explained that Mr. Moore's parenting time

had been supervised since the July 23, 2019 hearing with a "later modification that

allowed for a hybrid supervised parenting time model where [his] visitation would

include brief periods of unsupervised time during the supervised visits." Docket No. 21-3,

at 1. The court further stated that it had intended to address the status of supervised

parenting time at a hearing scheduled for April 15, 2020. However, on April 3, 2020, the

court vacated that hearing based upon the public health emergency occurring in Indiana

relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the court, having reviewed all reports

submitted by Mr. Moore's parenting time supervisor, sua sponte ordered that:

supervised parenting time needs to remain in place for the time being.

However, because of the gradual progress that [Mr. Moore had] made

regarding his parenting techniques and the apparent warming of relations

with his children, the Court finds that an increase in supervised parenting

time is in order. This increase is additionally warranted because summer has

begun which should provide a little more scheduling flexibility for

supervised visitation.

Id. at 2. Judge Chavis also ordered "an increase in supervised parenting time on Mondays

from the original 4 hours to 7 hours on that day. Because the Court is increasing

parenting time on this day, the Court terminates the hybrid model and imposes full

supervision for the duration of any given visit, not just Mondays." Id. The order further

advised that the court would review and analyze future reports from the parenting time

supervisor to "determine if the Court needs to return to the visitation model that has

governed Mr. Moore's parenting time up to this point." Id. Mr. Moore moved to correct

errors in court's June 12, 2020 order, arguing again that Judge Chavis erroneously

restricted his parenting time without the requisite finding of endangerment or impairment.

This motion was denied by the court.

On August 25, 2020, Mr. Moore moved to continue the final hearing set for

September 2, 2020, stating in part that the final hearing should be converted to a status

conference to discuss the modification or abolition of the supervised parenting time

arrangement. On August 27, 2020, the Court granted the motion and set a status

conference on September 2, 2020, to address the issues raised by Mr. Moore.

At this hearing, Ms. Moore appeared in person and by her counsel, Ms. Swenson. Mr.

Moore and Ms. Gehring, the children's GAL, also appeared in person at the hearing. "The

Court, after hearing from the witnesses, receiving arguments from the parties and

otherwise being duly advised in the premises," issued the following order on September

4, 2020:

1. "At the September 2, 2020 hearing, [Mr. Moore] testified that he has

established positive relationships with the children during his supervised

parenting time. He has improved how he interacts with the children.

However, [Mr. Moore] argued that the addition of a third party in his

parenting time is keeping him and the children from returning to

normalcy with regard to a parent-child relationship."

2. "[Mr. Moore] disagrees with [his parenting time supervisor's] parenting

suggestions believing that it keeps him from adequately parenting his

children, specifically [G.M.], and from directing them as he deems

appropriate."

3. "[Mr. Moore] testified that [G.M.] is often fatigued during his visits with

him and this is matter of contention for [Mr. Moore]. [G.M.] has

significant allergies and [Mr. Moore] believes that he should be more

involved with [G.M.]'s medical treatment."

4. "[Mr. Moore] seeks unsupervised parenting time and requests that the

Court order [Mr. Moore] to be responsible for transporting the children

to and from their medical appointments or at least be allowed to attend

medical appointments."

5. "For support on lifting supervised parenting time, [Mr. Moore] referred

to a statement from the GAL in her March 7, 2020 report where she stated

that she would be comfortable with the supervisor steeping out as the

children would have their reunification therapist to whom they could

express their concerns."

6. "[Ms. Moore] testified that she has continued concerns about [Mr.

Moore]'s ability to interact positively with the children without guidance

and direction from [his parenting supervisor]. [Ms. Moore] argues that

each visit that [Mr. Moore] has with the children, there is always a

moment when [his parenting supervisor] has to redirect [Mr. Moore] to

make more positive choices in his interaction with the children. [Ms.

Moore] further expressed significant concerns about [Mr. Moore]

transporting the children to and from medical appointments and even

being allowed to attend the medical appointments. In essence, she argues

that his participation in the medical appointments would be disruptive to

the children.

7. In her testimony, the GAL clarified her statement about reunification

therapy in lieu of continued supervised parenting time. She explained that

once reunification therapy began that she would feel more comfortable

with unsupervised parenting time as the children could confide in the

reunification therapist to address concerns during [Mr. Moore]'s

visitation. However, she disputed the notion that mere participation in the

initial intake screening was sufficient for her to be satisfied that

reunification therapy was underway and that unsupervised parenting time

could be lifted. The GAL wanted to see progress made with reunification

therapy first.

8. Pursuant to the Court's authority to enter interim orders pending final

hearing and based upon the best interests of the children, the Court denies

[Mr. Moore]'s request to lift unsupervised parenting time. Evie Jacobs, of

the LOTUS Group will serve as the family's reunification therapist. The

Court orders the GAL to advise Ms. Jacobs about the current supervised

parenting time restriction and to have Ms. Jacobs submit a report to the

GAL, who will in tum file an updated report to the Court, should Ms.

Jacobs believe that the time is right to lift unsupervised parenting time.

9. Furthermore, it is clear from the interaction between the parties at the

hearing and during the pendency of this matter that difficulties still exist

between [Mr. Moore] and [Ms. Moore]. The Court is concerned that [Mr.

Moore] transporting the children to and from or even his presence at the

children's medical appointments would have a negative impact on the

children at this juncture. The Court denies [Mr. Moore]'s request to

transport the children to and from or attend their medical appointments.

10. However, [Mr. Moore] needs to be made aware of the status of the

children's health and wellness. Therefore, [Ms. Moore] shall make sure

to promptly provide medical information about the children to [Mr.

Moore]. Any questions or concerns that [Mr. Moore] has about the

children's treatment regime should be discussed with Ms. Jacobs and the

GAL.

11. Once the family has been immersed in reunification therapy, the Court

orders the GAL to obtain a report from Ms. Jacobs on her best estimate

for when she believes reunification therapy will be completed. Upon

receipt of that estimate, the Court will schedule a final hearing soon

thereafter.

Docket No. 21-4, at 1−4. Mr. Moore unsuccessfully moved to correct errors in this order,

claiming again that the court needed to make a specific finding of endangerment. In

denying this motion, the court explained that "hearing in this matter has not concluded

and no final judgment has been issued. The hearing on September 2, 2020 was a status

conference." Docket No. 1, at 10. Judge Chavis expressly denied Mr. Moore's motion to

correct errors because the order that was issued on September 2, 2020, "was not a final

order but a status conference held at [Father's] request." Id. Mr. Moore tried to appeal

Judge Chavis's order denying his motion to correct errors, but his appeal was dismissed.

In early 2021, the child custody case was transferred from Judge Chavis to Judge

Marie Kern of the Marion County Superior Court. On March 30, 2021, Judge Kern issued

an order approving a mediated agreement between Mr. Moore and Ms. Moore.

1. Joint Legal - No change to current order as to joint legal custody and in-

person participation at doctor appointments. However, [Mr. Moore] shall be

allowed to attend doctor appointments virtually. [Ms. Moore] shall provide

advanced notice of the appointments.

2. [Mr. Moore]'s supervised parenting time shall continue. However, the goal

is to phase in parenting time until [Mr. Moore] has IPTG parenting time in

full. The phase-in is to be completed within 6 months provided that the

Reunification Therapist (RT) agrees upon and implements each phase-in and

ultimately the IPTG. Once [Mr. Moore] achieves IPTG parenting time, then

that shall be the existing order for parenting time. And any change to that

order shall require a new petition be filed with the Court.

The RT shall make the final decisions on phased-in parenting time but only

after agreement of the kids' therapists.

3. To accomplish the Reunification therapy, the Reunification therapist shall

consult with the personal therapists of the children, the supervisor, and the

parents. The RT shall include both parents and children in the reunification

therapy and shall consider each of their concerns. The RT shall not maintain,

or require confidentiality between the reunification therapy sessions by the

children, or parents with regard to the parents, GAL, and Court. The RT shall

ensure that the children have opportunities for 1 on 1 sessions with the RT,

and without the parents present to ensure they can speak freely with the RT.

4. If the need arises, and a parent petitions the Court, and the Court agrees to

change RTs, then each parent shall propose 2 RTs within 48 hours to the

Court. The Court shall pick one of them for the parties within another 48

hours. The choices shall be picked from the children's Medicaid insurance

listing.

5. This agreement resolves all pending custody and parenting times petitions

with this Court. The hearing on April 26th and April 27th shall be vacated.

Docket No. 21-5, at 1−2.

When the case at bar was filed, Mr. Moore averred that the goal of unsupervised

parenting time had still not been achieved. He also claims that his relationship with G.M.

has been strained, as evidenced by a police officer informing Mr. Moore, after G.M. had

"fled" from Mr. Moore, that G.M. was "terrified" of him. Id. at 11. Mr. Moore's

relationship with E.M. is also allegedly strained and has not returned to the "more

harmonious level" that it was prior to both the DCS investigation and the restriction on

Mr. Moore's parenting time imposed and upheld numerous times by Judge Chavis. Id.

The publicly available docket for the child custody case indicates that on March 25, 2022,

Mr. Moore moved to modify the custody and parenting time arrangement imposed by

Judge Kern's order. The case remains pending based on the new issues raised by Mr.

Moore's motion on March 25, 2022.

On September 9, 2022, Mr. Moore filed this federal lawsuit, alleging that Judge

Chavis's orders requiring supervised parenting time without a finding of endangerment

under Indiana Code section 31-17-4-1(a) violated his constitutional rights, and caused

him financial and emotional harm. Specifically, Count I of Mr. Moore's Complaint

asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Judge Chavis for violating his Due Process

Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, based on

Judge Chavis's restriction of Mr. Moore's parenting time without a specific finding of

endangerment. In Count II, Mr. Moore advances a claim for "Financial Deprivation

Associated with Denial of Parenting Rights," claiming that he has "incurred great

financial cost of paying for the unwarranted Court Orders for Supervised Parenting Time,

for various fees associated with requirements by the Court, for loss of productive time

and earnings as a result of continuing to challenge the unwarranted Court Orders for

Supervised Parenting Time." Docket No. 1, at 14. In Count III, Mr. Moore alleges a claim

against unspecified Defendants for "Alienation of Affections between Father and

Children," claiming that his relationships with his children have been irreparably harmed

by the court-ordered supervision of his parenting time with them. Finally, in Count IV,

Mr. Moore alleges pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the State of Indiana and Judge

Chavis violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, based on the State's failure to provide a means for a review and remedy of

parenting time restrictions, which it has provided for other cases without a finding of

endangerment, when Judge Chavis "deliberately chose not to offer such review" to Mr.

Moore, and instead subjected him to "a deprivation without stating a cause as is done for

others." Id. at 15.

Mr. Moore seeks declaratory relief based on a finding that all Defendants violated his

rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by restricting his parenting time

without a finding of endangerment. He seeks an order from our Court to "adjudge,

decree, and declare the rights and other legal relations with the subject matter here in

controversy." Id. at 16. He also seeks awards of compensatory and punitive damages

against all Defendants, along with costs and attorney's fees, despite his pro se status. All

Defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Moore's Complaint in its entirety. Mr. Moore,

however, has chosen not to file a response to any of the seven motions to dismiss.

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The well-entrenched Rooker-Feldman doctrine emanated from two cases in which

"the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended,

complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and

rejection of that judgment." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Inds. Corp., 554 U.S. 280,

291 (2005); see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District Court of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). "Plaintiffs in both cases,

alleging federal-question jurisdiction, called upon the District Court to overturn an

injurious state-court judgment." Exxon Mobil, 554 U.S. 284 at 291−92. Title 28 U.S.C. §

1257, as long interpreted, vests authority to review a state court's judgment solely in the

Supreme Court. Id. at 292. Thus, "the District Courts in Rooker and Feldman lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly summarized the

doctrine as follows:

Lower federal courts are not vested with appellate authority over state courts.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising

jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. The

rationale for the doctrine is that no matter how wrong a state court judgment

may be under federal law, only the Supreme Court of the United States has

jurisdiction to review it.

Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902 (quoting Sykes, 837 F.3d at 741−42).

"To determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction, we apply a

two-step analysis." Andrade v. City of Hammond, Ind., 9 F.4th 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2021).

"First, we consider whether a plaintiff's federal claims are 'independent' or, instead,

whether they either 'directly' challenge a state court judgment or are 'inextricably

intertwined with one.'" Id. (quoting Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387,

391 (7th Cir. 2019)). "The 'inextricably intertwined' determination hinges on whether the

federal claim alleges that the injury was caused by the state court judgment, or

alternatively, whether the federal claim alleges an independent prior injury that the state

court failed to remedy." Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742 (quoting Taylor v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg.

Ass'n, 374 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004)). "Put another way, we ask 'whether the district

court is essentially being called upon to review the state court decision.'" Hadzi-Tanovic

v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902). "If

not, and[,] if the plaintiff's alleged injury is 'independent' of the judgment, then Rooker-

Feldman does not bar federal court jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Andrade, 9 F.4th at 950).

"But if they 'directly' challenge or are 'inextricably intertwined' with a state-court

judgment, then we move on to step two." Andrade, 9 F.4th at 950. "At step two, we

determine 'whether the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state

court proceedings.'" Id. (quoting Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902). "Only if the plaintiff did

have such an opportunity does Rooker-Feldman strip federal courts of jurisdiction." Id.

Despite its frequent applications, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is itself a narrow

rule. Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902 (citing Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006)).

"[F]ederal jurisdiction does not terminate automatically on the entry of judgment in a

state court, as independent claims are jurisdictionally firm." Id. (internal citations

omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the pendency of an action

in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court

having jurisdiction." Exxon–Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

292 (2005) (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). The doctrine is

instead "confined to the cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name:

cases brought by state-court losers ... inviting district court review and rejection of [those

state court's] judgments." Id. at 294. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently held in

J.B. v. Woodward that because the plaintiff had "filed his federal lawsuit while the

domestic relations court's proceedings over [the specific parenting time dispute] remained

ongoing, he [was] not a state-court loser" for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

997 F.3d 714, 723 (7th Cir. 2021). The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held, however, that

"interlocutory orders entered prior to the final disposition of state court lawsuits are not

immune from the jurisdiction-stripping powers of Rooker-Feldman." Bauer v. Koester,

951 F.3d 863, 867 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742). In other words, for a

federal claim to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a final state court judgment

must have been entered prior to the federal claim being brought, and "there must be no

way for the injury complained of by [the] plaintiff to be separated from [the] state court

judgment" or order issued prior to the final judgment. Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 903

(quoting Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742).

The case before us presents a somewhat complicated application of the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine because Mr. Moore's underlying child custody case is still pending in

state court. The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, however,

provides guidance to us in this situation. There, plaintiff's federal claims arose out of a

child custody suit in Illinois state court between the plaintiff and her ex-husband. Hadzi-

Tanovic, 62 F.4th at 396. "After the state court issued an order requiring that [the

plaintiff's] parenting time with her children be supervised," she filed suit in federal court,

alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against her ex-husband, the children's

GAL, and the state court judge. Id. All three defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the state court judge additionally moved to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), invoking "several doctrines

that restrict access to the federal courts: Rooker-Feldman, abstention under Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and the domestic-relations

exception to federal jurisdiction." Id. at 398. The district court had found that "none of

these doctrines was a 'perfect fit for the facts of this case,' but it concluded that dismissal

was warranted on general abstention principles." Id. (quoting Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson,

2021 WL 5505541, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2021)). The district court had questioned

whether the lawsuit "concerned a final order, as Rooker-Feldman requires, given both the

state court's ongoing supervision of custody and child support arrangements and [the

plaintiff's] pending motion for relief from [the trial court's order requiring supervised

parenting time]." Id. The district court "concluded that abstention was nevertheless

appropriate" because any finding in the plaintiff's favor "would require the federal court

to 'examine and criticize' the state court's application of family law," and any judgment in

the plaintiff's favor "could then be used to interfere with the state court proceedings, and

that, the court concluded, would be an 'unacceptable intrusion into the domain of the state

domestic relations court.'" Id. at 398−399 (quoting 2021 WL 5505541 at *6).

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did

apply. The Court first explained that the "challenged state court judgment in this case was

'rendered before the district court proceedings commenced,' so that [the plaintiff] was a

'state-court loser.'" Id. at 399−400. Specifically, the state court judge had "issued his

order requiring that [the plaintiff's] parenting time be supervised on June 13, 2018," and

the Illinois appellate court dismissed plaintiff's appeal on January 13, 2020. The state

court judge's order was "therefore final well before [the plaintiff] filed this federal lawsuit

on June 12, 2020." Id. at 400. The Seventh Circuit understood the district court's concern

that "the order might not be final given the state court's 'continuing management' of child

custody issues," but explained that the plaintiff was "challenging an order that was final

when she filed this federal lawsuit." Id. "State law determines the finality of a state

judicial decision." Id. (quoting Mehta v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 681

F.3d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that, because state law so provided, a state court

'interim' order suspending plaintiff's attorney license was final for purposes of Rooker-

Feldman)). Applying Illinois law, the Seventh Circuit determined that the state court

judge's June 13, 2018 order was "final for Rooker-Feldman purposes even though the

state court may modify the order in the future." Id.

Under Indiana law, "[a]n interlocutory order is one made before a final hearing on the

merits and requires something to be done or observed but does not determine the entire

controversy." In re Paternity of C.J.A., 3 N.E.3d 1020, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)

(quoting Bacon v. Bacon, 877 N.E.2d 801, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). A final judgment,

meanwhile, "disposes of all claims as to all parties." Id. (citing Ind. App. Rule 2(H);

Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). In the decision In re

Paternity of C.J.A., the Indiana Court of Appeals was considering an appeal from a child

custody order that contained the following language:

The [c]ourt's temporary award of primary physical possession to Mother

shall become a final order without the need for further hearing if Mother

restores her residence in Tippecanoe County on or before March 31, 2013.

In accordance with Indiana law, however, a final order remains subject to the

Court's continuing jurisdiction. In the event the order becomes final, Father

shall have liberal parenting time with [the child] … If Mother fails to re-

establish her residence in Indiana by March 31, 2013, [the child's] best

interests would be served by and primary physical custody shall be awarded

to Father on April 1, 2013, without the need for further hearing.

Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals ultimately determined that the appealed order was a

final judgment, explaining that "[i]n its order, the trial court resolved the issue of primary

physical custody of [the child], although custody is dependent on Mother's decision as to

where she will reside." Id. "The temporary award of custody expires 'no later than March

31, 2013,' and the court ruled that Mother will retain custody if she chooses to reside in

Indiana." Id. "However, Father will automatically obtain primary physical custody of [the

child] on that date without any further hearing if Mother remains in South Carolina." Id.

"When read in its entirety," the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded, "the order clearly

adjudicates custody and parenting time regarding [the child], and the trial court expressly

states that no further hearing is required." Id. "Importantly, absent appeal, the order

resolves all custody and parenting time issues unless and until one of the parties files a

subsequent motion to modify custody and/or parenting time." Id.

Here, applying Indiana law, we conclude that the series of orders issued by Judge

Chavis—and challenged directly by Mr. Moore—are all interlocutory orders. Judge

Kern's order issued on March 30, 2021, however, is a final judgment disposing of the

specific custody/parenting time dispute that was the subject of Judge Chavis's

interlocutory orders. As in C.J.A., though Judge Kern's order was dependent on future

events, the finality of the order was not eroded because it provided automatic options

without the need for further involvement of the court, absent a parties' new petition.

Specifically, Judge Kern's order stated that the phase-in to unsupervised parenting time

was to be completed within six months, provided that the Reunification Therapist agreed

upon and implemented each step of the phase-in. The Reunification Therapist was to

make the appropriate final decisions on phased-in parenting time with the agreement of

the children's therapists. Once Mr. Moore achieved full unsupervised parenting time,

"that shall be the existing order for parenting time. And any change to that order shall

require a new petition be filed with the [c]ourt." Docket No. 21-5, at 1. Indeed, the order

specified that if any need arose for a change of Reunification Therapist, the parties must

file a new petition with the court. In addition, the order expressly provided that it

"resolve[d] all pending custody and parenting times petitions with this Court," allowing

Judge Kern to vacate the upcoming final hearing, which was similar to the court's order

in C.J.A. Id. at 1−2.

The finality of Judge Kern's order is not affected by the ability either party has to

move to modify it in the future, by the fact that Mr. Moore did move to modify the

custody/parenting time arrangement on March 25, 2022, or by the fact that the custody

case remains pending as to his new motion. See C.J.A., 3 N.E.3d at 1028; Hadzi-Tanovic,

62 F.4th at 400. Judge Kern's March 30, 2021 order embodied a final disposition of the

dispute and was final when Mr. Moore initiated this lawsuit on September 9, 2022. See

Hadzi-Tanovic, 62 F.4th at 400 ("the court noted that the order might not be final given

the state court's 'continuing management' of child custody issues. We understand the

concern, but [the plaintiff] is challenging an order that was final when she filed this

federal lawsuit."). Because Mr. Moore is challenging interlocutory orders that were

entered prior to the final disposition of his custody case, his federal lawsuit is "not

immune from the jurisdiction-stripping powers of Rooker-Feldman." Bauer, 951 F.3d at

867 (quoting Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742). Mr. Moore is thus a "state court loser," as that

phrase has been used in Rooker-Feldman parlance. He has filed this action "after the state

proceedings ended," such that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may apply. Andrade, 9 F.4th

at 950 (quoting Exxon−Mobil, 544 U.S. at 281). Accordingly, we now shall undertake the

required two-step analysis to determine whether the doctrine does, in fact, bar an exercise

of our jurisdiction over this case.

At the first step of the Rooker-Feldman analysis, we consider whether Mr. Moore's

"federal claims are 'independent' or, instead, whether they either 'directly' challenge a

state court judgment or are 'inextricably intertwined with one.'" Id. (quoting Swartz, 940

F.3d at 391). "The 'inextricably intertwined' determination hinges on whether the federal

claim alleges that the injury was caused by the state court judgment, or alternatively,

whether the federal claim alleges an independent prior injury that the state court failed to

remedy." Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742 (quoting Taylor, 374 F.3d at 532). "Put another way, we

ask 'whether the district court is essentially being called upon to review the state court

decision.'" Hadzi-Tanovic, 62 F.4th at 399 (quoting Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 902). For the

doctrine to apply, "there must be no way for the injury complained of by a plaintiff to be

separated from a state court judgment." Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742 (citing Exxon–Mobil, 544

U.S. at 293; Commonwealth Plaza Condo. Ass'n v. City of Chi., 693 F.3d 743, 746 (7th

Cir. 2012); Kelley v. Med–1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Here, it is plain to see that there is no way for the injuries complained of by Mr.

Moore to be separated from Judge Chavis's orders. Id. In Count I, Mr. Moore bases his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Judge Chavis on the alleged violation of his Due Process

Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by Judge

Chavis issuing court orders that required supervision of his parenting time, without

having made a specific finding of endangerment under Indiana Code section 31-17-4-

1(a). He seeks not only a declaration that these orders were unconstitutional, but also

requests that our court "adjudge, decree, and declare the rights and other legal relations

with the subject matter here in controversy." Docket No. 1 at 16. As such, Mr. Moore's

claim directly challenges Judge Chavis's orders. His alleged injury for which he seeks

redress—the imposition of supervised parenting time without a specific finding of

endangerment under Indiana Code section 31-17-4-1(a)—flows directly from Judge

Chavis's orders. Any ruling in favor of Mr. Moore would "require us to contradict the

state court's orders," but "Rooker-Feldman bars review of claims that allege injury caused

by a state-court order." Bauer, 951 F.3d at 866 (citing Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

908 F.3d 1050, 1062 (7th Cir. 2018); Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391).

In Count II of his Complaint, Mr. Moore seeks to recover for the "Financial

Deprivation Associated with Denial of Parenting Rights," claiming that he has "incurred

great financial cost of paying for the unwarranted Court Orders for Supervised Parenting

Time, for various fees associated with requirements by the Court, for loss of productive

time and earnings as a result of continuing to challenge the unwarranted Court Orders for

Supervised Parenting Time." Docket No. 1, at 14. Specifically, Mr. Moore challenges

Judge Chavis's orders requiring that he: (1) must have supervised parenting time, for

which he must pay between $25 to $30 an hour, (2) attend and pay for anger management

and parenting classes, (3) undergo and pay for a psychological evaluation, and (4) attend

and pay for family reunification therapy. He levels direct challenges to Judge Chavis's

orders in his lawsuit. Moreover, Mr. Moore alleges that he incurred injury in the form of

lost productive time and earnings, based on the time he spent seeking to reverse Judge

Chavis's "unlawful parenting time restriction." Id. As such, this claim is inextricably

intertwined with Judge Chavis's orders. See Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391. Indeed, the injuries

for which Mr. Moore seeks redress stemmed entirely from Judge Chavis's orders, and any

finding in favor of him would "require us to contradict the state court's orders," which,

again, is precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits. Bauer, 951 F.3d at 866 (citing Moore,

908 F.3d at 1062).

In Count III, Mr. Moore advances a claim against unspecified Defendants for the

"Alienation of Affections between Father and Children," claiming that his relationships

with his children have been irreparably harmed by the court-ordered supervision of his

parenting time with them and that he has "lost unrecoverable moments of joy and comfort

associated with the unrestricted parenting time that he would have had with the children

absent the false allegations, denial of rights, and omissions by the Defendants." Docket

No. 1, at 15. Each named Defendant, per Mr. Moore's description, contributed to this

deprivation by either seeking this restriction on his parenting time without a finding of

endangerment, or by not objecting to the imposition of the restriction by Judge Chavis

absent the finding of endangerment. Again, this claim is without doubt inextricably

intertwined with Judge Chavis's orders because the injury Mr. Moore cites—the strained

relationship with his children based on the supervision of his time with them—was the

consequence of several orders issued by the state court. See Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391

("Because the injury the Swartzes protest—the seizure and subsequent permanent

placement of their livestock—was effectuated by several orders of the [state court], their

claims are inextricably intertwined with state court judgments."). To emphasize, we say

again: the injuries for which Mr. Moore seeks redress resulted from Judge Chavis's

orders, and any finding in favor of Mr. Moore would necessarily "require us to contradict

the state court's orders," which is precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits. Bauer, 951

F.3d at 866 (citing Moore, 908 F.3d at 1062).

Finally, in Count IV, Mr. Moore frames another 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the

State of Indiana and Judge Chavis for violating his rights under the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that the State has provided for the review

and remedy of other similar child custody cases in which parenting time was erroneously

restricted without the issuance of a finding of endangerment, but here the State, through

Judge Chavis, "deliberately chose not to offer such review" to Mr. Moore, choosing

instead to subject him to "a deprivation without stating a cause as is done for others." Id.

This claim—like the § 1983 claim alleged in Count I—is clearly a direct challenge to

Judge Chavis's court orders. Having concluded that all of Mr. Moore's claims either

directly challenge or are inextricably intertwined with state-court orders, we move to

consider step two in the Rooker-Feldman analysis. Andrade, 9 F.4th at 950.

Mr. Moore's "claims are barred under Rooker-Feldman only if he had a reasonable

opportunity to raise the issues in state court proceedings." Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 904.

"The 'reasonable opportunity' inquiry focuses not on ripeness, but on difficulties caused

by 'factor[s] independent of the actions of the opposing part[ies] that precluded' a plaintiff

from bringing federal claims in state court, such as state court rules or procedures." Id.

(quoting Taylor, 374 F.3d at 534–35). Here, nothing suggests that Mr. Moore did not

have a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue of whether Judge Chavis needed to make

a specific finding of endangerment under Indiana Code section 31-17-4-1(a); indeed, Mr.

Moore did—by his own admissions and allegations—raise this issue on numerous

occasions to the Indiana trial and appellate courts to no avail.

Because Mr. Moore's claims fail to overcome both steps of the Rooker-Feldman

analysis, this suit is barred "because any finding in favor of [Mr. Moore] would require us

to contradict the state court's orders." Bauer, 951 F.3d at 866 (citing Moore, 908 F.3d at

1062); see also McCray v. Alejandro R., 2021 WL 3418812, at *2 (S.D Ind. Aug. 4,

2021) (Barker, J.) (holding that "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts

from reviewing or overturning a state court's decisions, including one related to parental

custody."). Were it not for Judge Chavis's orders, none of Mr. Moore's alleged injuries

would ever have been incurred by him. Bauer, 951 F.3d at 866. "To the extent [Mr.

Moore] wishes to contest a ruling related to his custody rights, he must pursue that claim

via appellate review in the state court." McCray, 2021 WL 3418812 at *2.

Even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine were not applicable here, Seventh Circuit

precedent would still compel us to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. In J.B. v.

Woodward, the plaintiff had "filed his federal lawsuit while the domestic relations court's

proceedings over [the specific parenting time dispute] remained ongoing, [so] he [was]

not a state-court loser" for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 997 F.3d at 723.

Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit concluded that even though the doctrine was not an

"exact fit," the "principles of comity, equity, and federalism counsel us to abstain from

exercising jurisdiction over [the plaintiff's] § 1983 claims." Id. at 724. "To insist on literal

perfection" of Rooker-Feldman or other abstention doctrines would "risk[] a serious

federalism infringement" because the domestic relations proceeding remained ongoing in

state court, and the plaintiff's "complaint makes plain that the entire design of his federal

action: to receive a favorable federal constitutional ruling that can be used affirmatively

or offensively to shape—or perhaps change—the direction and course of the state court

proceedings." Id. at 723. The plaintiff's "requests for declaratory and injunctive relief

reinforce this observation." Id. "Indeed, granting declaratory or injunctive relief would

provide [the plaintiff] with an offensive tool to take to state court to challenge that judge's

orders." Id. "In these circumstances, federal courts need to stay on the sidelines." Id. "The

adjudication of [the plaintiff's] due process claims threaten interference with and

disruption of local family law proceedings—a robust area of law traditionally reserved

for state and local government—to such a degree as to all but compel the federal

judiciary to stand down." Id. (citation omitted); see also McCray, 2021 WL 3418812, at

*2 ("It is well-established that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate child custody disputes."). Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the

complaint's dismissal under the "foundational principles of our federal system." J.B., 997

F.3d at 725. Thus, we hold that if we had not found the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar

jurisdiction over Mr. Moore's Complaint, the Seventh Circuit's decision in J.B. would

compel that we abstain from exercising jurisdiction here.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Mr. Moore's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED without

prejudice. See Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 904 (citing Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, 384

F.3d 437, 438-39 (7th Cir. 2004)). Mr. Moore shall hhve FOURTEEN DAYS in which

to show cause why final judgment with prejudice should not enter against him. We

GRANT the following Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1): [Docket No. 17], [Docket No. 20], [Docket No. 37], and [Docket No. 39].° We

DENY AS MOOT the following Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6): [Docket No. 10], [Docket No. 30], and [Docket No. 33].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

BRIAN S. MOORE

6038 PRIMROSE AVENUE

INDIANAPOLIS, IN 46220

Denise Faye Hayden

Denise F. Hayden, Attorney at Law

dhayden@lacylawoffice.com

> We note that Docket No. 37 is granted under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, not the domestic-

relations exception.

32

Logan C. Hughes

Reminger Co. LPA - Cleveland

lhughes@reminger.com

Andrew W. Hull

HOOVER HULL TURNER LLP

awhull@hooverhullturner.com

Curtis T. Jones

BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP (Indianapolis)

cjones@boselaw.com

John P. Lowrey

City of Indianapolis

john.lowrey@indy.gov

Amanda L.B. Mulroony

HOOVER HULL TURNER LLP

amulroony@hooverhullturner.com

Erica Lee Sawyer

INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL

Erica.Sawyer@atg.in.gov

Anthony Simonton, Jr.

Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart

anthony.simonton@ogletree.com

John Carl Trimble

LEWIS WAGNER, LLP

jtrimble@lewiswagner.com