CHANLEY v. CITY OF EVANSVILLE INDIANA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

EVANSVILLE DIVISION

KRISTI CHANLEY Special Administrator )

of the Estate of Terry Chanley, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 3:21-cv-00155-JPH-MPB

)

CITY OF EVANSVILLE INDIANA, )

MARIO REID, )

CODY SMITH, )

RYAN EAGLESON, )

COREY NUTT, )

WILLIAM T. GEORGE, )

MATTHEW HENRICH, )

BEN BRASHER, )

PAUL KLEIN, )

CHRISTOPHER SEIBERT, )

PATRICK MCDONALD, )

RAY ANTHONY SMITH, JR., )

KYLE THIRY, )

GARRETT VANFLEET, )

TRENDON AMUZIE, )

DAVID BROWN, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Terry Chanley died after being shot by an Officer from the Evansville

Police Department. Kristi Chanley, as special administrator of Mr. Chanley's

estate, sued the City of Evansville and fifteen police officers. Defendants have

filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. [55]. For the

reasons below, that motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I.

Facts and Background

Because Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings under

Rule 12(c), the Court accepts and recites the well-pleaded facts in the

complaint as true. Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2017)

(applying the 12(b)(6) standard to a motion made under 12(c)).

In the late afternoon on October 28, 2019, Terry Chanley's vehicle ran off

the road in Evansville, Indiana, and struck a utility pole. Dkt. 1 at 4. Officer

Mario Reid from the Evansville Police Department was the first responder. Id.

at 1, 4. Mr. Chanley and Officer Reid spoke for about 30 seconds before Officer

Reid asked Mr. Chanley to show his hands and get out of the vehicle. Id. at 4.

Mr. Chanley complied. Id. A few seconds later, Officer Reid shot at Mr.

Chanley twice; after a few more seconds, he shot at him a third time; and after

a few more seconds, a fourth time. Id. Mr. Chanley fell to the ground, hit by

two shots—one in the hand and one in the liver. Id. at 4–5.

For about twenty minutes afterward, Officer Reid and other responding

officers watched Mr. Chanley "lying on the ground, motionless, bleeding, and

faintly breathing." Id. at 6. They "saw him close his eyes and then stop

breathing." Id. During that time, officers shouted at Mr. Chanley and pointed

their guns at him, but he did not respond. Id. They provided no medical

assistance until the end of the twenty minutes, when they approached Mr.

Chanley "and determined that he was dead." Id.

In October 2021, Kristi Chanley—as special administrator of Mr.

Chanley's estate—brought this action against the City of Evansville and fifteen

Evansville Police Department officers ("Officers"), including Officer Reid,

alleging Fourth Amendment violations, Monell liability against the city, and

state-law claims. Dkt. 1. Defendants have moved for partial judgment on the

pleadings. Dkt. 55.

II.

Applicable Law

Defendants may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for

judgment on the pleadings after the parties have filed a complaint and

answer. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same

standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Gill, 850 F.3d at 339. To

survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must "contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially plausible claim is

one that allows "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

When ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court will "accept the well-

pleaded facts in the complaint as true," but will not defer to "legal conclusions

and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim."

McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).

III.

Analysis

A. Qualified Immunity on Failure to Provide Medical Care

Count 1 of the complaint alleges that the Officers violated the Fourth

Amendment by failing to provide medical care to Mr. Chanley once he became

unresponsive. Dkt. 1 at 11–12. The Officers argue that they're entitled to

qualified immunity on that claim because "an arrestee's Fourth Amendment

right to medical care . . . was not a clearly established right on October 28,

2019." Dkt. 56 at 4.1 Ms. Chanley responds that Seventh Circuit precedent

shows that the right was clearly established. Dkt. 78 at 6–10.

Qualified immunity "protects government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). To defeat a qualified-immunity defense, a plaintiff

must show two elements: (1) the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that

"the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation." Id. The second element ordinarily requires a plaintiff "to show some

settled authority" that is "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would

have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 702. In other

1 The parties do not agree what other Fourth Amendment claims are alleged in Count

1, but the Officers have moved for judgment on the pleadings on only the medical-care

claim. See dkt. 1 at 11–12; dkt. 86 at 1.

words, "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate." Id.

To meet that burden, Ms. Chanley relies primarily on Estate of Perry v.

Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2017). There, officers provided no medical care

to a pretrial arrestee who suffered a seizure, soiled himself, and complained

that he was in pain and could not breathe. Id. at 455–56. The Seventh Circuit

held that qualified immunity did not entitle the officers to summary judgment

because "by 2010 . . . the failure to take any action in light of a serious medical

need [of a pretrial arrestee] would violate" the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 460

("A right is 'clearly established' if it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable

official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.").2

Ms. Chanley's complaint pleads facts that invoke that right. She alleges

that after Mr. Chanley was shot and fell, he was bleeding and "motionless

throughout the ordeal." Dkt. 1 at 6. She also alleges that the Officers "saw

him close his eyes and then stop breathing," and that he "did not move or

respond" when Officers yelled at him. Id. Yet the Officers provided no medical

care and did not allow emergency medical personnel who were on the scene to

provide medical aid to Mr. Chanley for about twenty minutes. Id. at 6–7. In

2 Inexplicably, the Officers do not discuss or even cite Estate of Perry—a precedential

opinion—in their initial brief, instead arguing that in an unpublished case, Royal v.

Norris, 776 F. App'x 354, 355 (7th Cir. 2019), "the Seventh Circuit held that the right

to medical care was not clearly established." Dkt. 56 at 4. But Royal explicitly

recognized "an arrestee's Fourth Amendment right to medical care." 776 F. App'x at

358 (citing Estate of Perry, 872 F.3d at 460). Moreover, Royal distinguished Estate of

Perry, explaining that the officers—unlike the officers in Estate of Perry who "fail[ed] to

take any action"—took multiple steps to determine if the defendant had a serious

medical need and "asked paramedics to independently evaluate him." Id.

sum, the complaint alleges that Mr. Chanley had a serious medical need that

was obvious to the Officers and the Officers did nothing to help him. That is

enough—at the pleadings stage—to bring this case within the Fourth

Amendment right that Estate of Perry found to be clearly established. See 872

F.3d at 460.

Nevertheless, the Officers argue in reply that Ms. Chanley paints with too

broad a brush by relying on the general right recognized in Estate of Perry.

Dkt. 86 at 3. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Estate of Perry itself

rejected the argument that a plaintiff must identify a "case with the exact same

fact pattern." 872 F.3d at 460. It was enough that Seventh Circuit precedent

established that it violated the Fourth Amendment to take no action in the face

of a serious medical need. Id. The same is true here, at least at this stage.

Second, the Officers' opening brief made only the general argument that

there was no clearly established Fourth Amendment obligation to provide

medical care. Dkt. 56 at 3–5. Only after Ms. Chanley rebutted that argument

with Estate of Perry did they argue that it was reasonable to delay medical care

based on specific facts—that Mr. Chanley was unrestrained and had one hand

beneath him. Dkt. 86 at 4–5. Notwithstanding waiver, it's not clear at this

stage that those facts take this case outside of Estate of Perry since he was

motionless and required medical care for gunshot wounds. Moreover, the

complaint alleges that Officers still provided no medical care after they saw that

Mr. Chanley was unresponsive and had stopped breathing. See dkt. 1 at 6.

The Officers are therefore not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on

Count 1's medical-care claim based on qualified immunity. See Roldan v.

Stroud, 52 F.4th 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2022) ("Rarely do we see qualified immunity

awarded at the pleading stage. The reason is because determinations of

qualified immunity most often depend on facts a plaintiff is not required to

plead at the outset of litigation to avoid dismissal.").

B. Monell Claims against the City of Evansville

Municipalities cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "for the misdeeds

of employees." Flores v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021).

Instead, the "critical question under Monell is whether a policy or custom of a

municipal entity caused a constitutional deprivation." Gonzalez v. McHenry

County, Illinois, 40 F.4th 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining liability under

Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Monell liability applies

"only if those violations were brought about by (1) an express policy; (2) a

widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a decision by an agent

with final policymaking authority." Id.; see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378 (1989) (allowing failure-to-train Monell claims).

In Counts 2 and 3, the complaint alleges Monell claims based on

policies—or the lack of policies—that fail to restrain excessive force and failure

to train. Dkt. 1 at 13–16.3 The City argues that these counts fail to state a

claim because the complaint relies on "bare assertions and legal conclusions"

3 The parties refer to the failure-to-train claim as a "Canton claim," after City of Canton

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Supreme Court case addressing Monell claims

based on inadequate training.

instead of asserting facts that could plausibly state a Monell claim. Dkt. 56 at

5–13. Ms. Chanley responds that her allegations, while broad, allege a "lack of

specific policies and training . . . and establish a direct causal connection

between the policy or practice and [Mr. Chanley's] injuries and death." Dkt. 78

at 11–16.

In the complaint, Ms. Chanley broadly alleges, for example, that

Evansville:

• had "written policies and training . . . [that] were the moving force

behind and caused [Mr. Chanley's] injuries";

• knew of its police department's "unconstitutional patterns and

practices and . . . that the same gave rise to a risk of violations of

citizens' federal rights," yet "made a deliberate and/or conscious

decision to disregard the known risk of harm that would result";

• "made a deliberate and/or conscious decision to disregard the

known risk of harm that would result from [its] unconstitutional

patterns and practices";

• "failed to provide adequate training to its officers on the use of

force, resulting in the personal injury to and death of" Mr.

Chanley; and

• "was aware that deprivation of the constitutional rights of citizens

was likely to result from its lack of training and the failure to

modify its training."

Dkt. 1 at 13–16.

"[F]ederal courts may not apply a heightened pleading standard—more

stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure—in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability."

White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016). In White, the

Seventh Circuit found that the district court erred in dismissing a claim that

"was based upon the sole allegation that [the officer] acted in accordance with a

widespread practice of the police department of the City of Chicago when

seeking a warrant." Id. at 843. More recently, the Seventh Circuit explained

that a Monell claim should proceed even on the sole allegation that the

municipality had an unconstitutional practice "so widespread and well-settled

that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law." Regains v. City of

Chicago, 918 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2019). Here, Ms. Chanley has alleged at

least that much, so she has stated Monell claims. See White, 829 F.3d at 844.

Nevertheless, Evansville insists that Ms. Chanley's allegations are too

conclusory, relying on McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611 (7th Cir.

2011) and assorted district-court opinions. See dkt. 56 at 5–11. But the claim

in McCauley failed for a different reason—the policy that the complaint alleged

there was not unconstitutional. 671 F.3d at 619 ("McCauley's factual

allegations are entirely consistent with lawful conduct."). Here, by contrast,

Ms. Chanley alleges failure to restrain excessive force and failure to train. Dkt.

1 at 13–16. And Evansville's cited district court cases are primarily from other

districts, are not binding here, and regardless are not unanimous. See Snukis

v. Taylor, No. 3:21-cv-135-TWP-MPB, 2022 WL 2305697 (S.D. Ind. June 27,

2022) (holding, under White v. City of Chicago, that virtually identical

allegations stated Monell claims against Evansville).

None of this is to say how "this case will look after all parties have had

the chance to develop the factual record," but the "allegations are enough to

survive" the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Flores, 997 F.3d at 734.

C. Unopposed Dismissals

Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on

(1) all state-law claims against the Officers in their individual capacities, (2) the

state-law claims in Counts 5 and 64 in their entirety, and (3) the prayer for

equitable relief. Dkt. 56 at 12–15. Ms. Chanley does not oppose those

requests. Dkt. 78 at 16–17; dkt. 86 at 16–17. Count 5 (negligence in

supervising and retaining) and Count 6 (negligence in training) are therefore

DISMISSED. Count 4 (negligence) and Count 8 (wrongful death) are

DISMISSED against the Officers in their individual capacities. The prayer

for equitable relief is DISMISSED.

IV.

Conclusion

Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part. Dkt. [55]. Counts 5 and 6 and the prayer for equitable

relief are dismissed and Counts 4 and 8 are dismissed against the Officers in

their individual capacities. The motion is otherwise denied.

The assigned Magistrate Judge is asked to hold a status conference to

clarify the remaining claims5 and to address settlement and the remaining case

deadlines.

4 The heading for this section of Defendants' brief refers to Counts 8 and 9, but the

argument and reply brief refer to and analyze Counts 4 and 5. Dkt. 56 at 14; dkt. 86

at 9–10.

5 Ms. Chanley mentions in a footnote that Count 1 includes Fourth Amendment failure

to intervene and failure to supervise claims, dkt. 78 at 6 n.1, but Defendants briefly

respond that the complaint was insufficient to provide notice of those claims, dkt. 86

at 1.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 3/30/2023

S) anus Patch lhawlove

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All electronically registered counsel

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