The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
HENRY JOHNSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:22-cv-01481-JPH-MG
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,1 )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
Pending before the Court is in this Federal Tort Claims Act case is a Motion to Vacate
Pretrial Schedule and Stay Discovery, [Filing No. 43], filed by Defendant the United States of
America (the "Motion"). Defendant asks to stay discovery and other deadlines in this case until
the Court rules of Defendant's pending Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment (the "Dispositive Motion"). [Filing No. 43 at 1 (citing Filing No. 40).]
Plaintiff's response to the instant Motion is lodged within his Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) Motion,2 [Filing
No. 46], which asks the Court to set aside his obligation to respond to the Dispositive Motion until
he is able to conduct discovery on issues raised in the Dispositive Motion. Defendant's reply in
support of its Motion is contained within its opposition to Plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) Motion.
[Filing No. 49.] The Motion is thus ripe for the Court's decision.
1 The Clerk is DIRECTED to correct the caption to reflect that the United States of America is the
Defendant, rather than Defendant John Votaw. [See Filing No. 9 at 3-4 (noting that the only claim
proceeding is an FTCA negligence claim against the United States and that Mr. Votaw was to
remain a defendant for the limited purpose of service of process).]
2 The Court only addresses the arguments contained in Plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) Motion and
Defendant's reply thereto that relate to the relief requested in Defendant's Motion, i.e., staying
discovery and deadlines. The Court does not address the parties' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) arguments.
A. Legal Standard
District courts have "extremely broad discretion in controlling discovery." Jones v. City of
Elkhart, Ind., 737 F.3d 1107, 1115 (7th Cir. 2013). The party seeking a stay of discovery "bears
the burden of proof to show that the Court should exercise its discretion in staying the
case." United States ex rel. Robinson v. Indiana Univ. Health, Inc., 2015 WL 3961221, at *1 (S.D.
Ind. June 30, 2015). In order to satisfy this burden, the "movant must show that good cause exists
for the stay" of discovery. Id. The Court evaluates three factors to determine if good cause exists:
"[1] the prejudice or tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party; [2] whether or not the issues
will be simplified ...; and [3] whether or not a stay will reduce the burden of litigation on a
party." Johnson v. Navient Solutions, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1007 (S.D. Ind. 2015).
"Filing a motion to dismiss does not automatically stay discovery." Red Barn Motors, Inc.
v. Cox Enters., Inc., 2016 WL 1731328, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 2, 2016). As a general matter, "a
stay of discovery is warranted only when a party raises a potentially dispositive threshold issue
such [as] standing, jurisdiction, or qualified immunity." Id. at *3. And, "courts disfavor stays of
discovery because they bring resolution of the dispute to a standstill." Am. Senior Communities,
LLC v. Burkhart, 2019 WL 415614, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 1, 2019) (alternation and internal
quotation marks omitted) (denying stay and noting that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, the Court has the
duty to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding").
B. Discussion
Defendant argues that a stay of discovery and other deadlines is appropriate because the
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) argument raised in the Dispositive Motion is the issue of statute limitations
that could dispose of the entire case. [Filing No. 43 at 1.] Defendant also points out that the
Motion has been filed early in the timeline of this case and that it is not likely that the Court will
issue a ruling on the Dispositive Motion prior to the current discovery deadline in May 2023.
[Filing No. 43 at 2.] Defendant argues that staying discovery and other deadlines will save the
parties and the Court time, resources, and money. [Filing No. 43 at 2.]
In response, Plaintiff argues that the pendency of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) is not typically a good reason to stay discovery and cites cases from this District stating
as much. [Filing No. 46 at 4-5.] Furthermore, Plaintiff points out that as the party seeking to stay
discovery, it is Defendant's burden to establish "good cause" for a stay, addressing the factors of
prejudice, simplification of issues, and the burden of litigation, and says that Defendant has failed
to carry that burden. [Filing No. 46 at 7.] Plaintiff also argues that discovery will be necessary to
respond to Defendant's Dispositive Motion arguments about statute of limitations and exhaustion,
stating that facts may show that tolling is appropriate. [Filing No. 46 at 5-6.]
Defendant replies that Plaintiff does not need discovery to respond to the Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) statute of limitations argument in its Dispositive Motion because that argument rests
"solely [on] the allegations that [Plaintiff] himself asserted in his Amended Complaint." [Filing
No. 49 at 3.] Defendant argues that contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, its Motion provided good
cause to stay discovery because the Motion explained that "it would be a waste of money, time,
and resources for the parties to engage in discovery until the Court has decided whether the suit is
barred by the statute of limitations," and "[o]bviously, if the suit is time-barred, the issues will be
simplified and the burden of litigation will be eliminated." [Filing No. 49 at 4 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).]
Here, the primary argument advanced by Defendant in support of its Motion is that it has
filed the Dispositive Motion. This unadorned argument, without more, is an insufficient basis to
stay the case. As to the first factor, a stay of discovery would prejudice Plaintiff as he seeks
information from Defendant that may assist him in responding to certain arguments about
exhaustion and the statute of limitations advanced by Defendant in its Dispositive Motion. On the
second factor, it is not evident not the undersigned that the pending Dispositive Motion will
simplify issues. Of note, the Seventh Circuit has stated that Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions
premised on a statute of limitations affirmative defenses are "irregular" because "complaints need
not anticipate and attempt to plead around defenses." Chicago Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian
House, Inc., 770 F.3d 610, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. N. Trust Co., 372 F.3d
886, 888 (7th Cir. 2004)). On the third factor—the burden of litigation—discovery in this case
should be fairly limited, addressing the communications between Plaintiff and Defendant and the
payment history for Plaintiff's benefits. Certainly, Defendant has not established that discovery
would be so burdensome that it constitutes sufficient cause to set aside the typical timing and
staging of a civil case. Thus, all three factors weigh against issuing a stay of all discovery.
The Court also observes that the denial of a blanket stay does not mean that proportional
discovery at this stage is without boundaries. If Defendant believes that particular requests from
Plaintiff are overly burdensome and disproportional to the needs of this case, it can seek relief
from the Court.
Furthermore, while no motion is currently pending from the parties, the Court can address
any case schedule deadlines that may need to be adjusted in light of Recruited Counsel's recent
appointment to this case. Before filing any such motion, however, the parties are to meet and
confer about proposed adjustments.
C. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Stay, [43], is DENIED.
The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer about any proposed case schedule
adjustments that may be necessary.
The CLERK is DIRECTED to correct the caption to reflect that the United States of
America is the Defendant, rather than Defendant John Votaw.
Date: 3/22/2023
ario Garcia
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution to all counsel of record via ECF.
Distribution via U.S. Mail to:
Mr. Henry Johnson
1107758
Nevada Correctional Center
PO Box 7000
Carson City, NV 89702