DAVIS v. DELAWARE COUNTY SHERIFF TONY SKINNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

CLIFFORD DAVIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:22-cv-00274-MKK-JRS

)

DELAWARE COUNTY SHERIFF TONY )

SKINNER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Partial

Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt. [26]. For the reasons set forth below, this Court,

having fully reviewed the matter, hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN

PART the present motion.

I. Background1

In this case, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Delaware County Circuit Court

on January 7, 2022, alleging that eleven individual Defendants and the City of

Muncie violated his constitutional rights during his incarceration at the Delaware

County Jail. (Dkt. 1-2).2 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on February 14, 2021,

Defendant Walker handcuffed Plaintiff too tightly, while Defendant Cardinal

"shoved Plaintiff violently into the van" and Defendant Walters "grabbed the

1 In the Plaintiff's response brief, he agrees to dismiss all claims against Defendants Curtis, Pagel,

and Roberts. (Dkt. 31 at 1). The Court will only address facts as to those Defendants as needed.

2 The Court must take all facts pleaded in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences

and facts in favor of Plaintiff. See infra.

shackles on Plaintiff's leg and squeezed as tightly as he could cutting off circulation

to Plaintiff's left leg." (Dkt. 1-2 at 2-3).

After Plaintiff arrived at the Delaware County Jail, Defendants Cardinal and

Walters "began assaulting Plaintiff including bending his leg in such a way so as to

inflict pain." (Id. at 3.). Defendants Cardinal and Walters also punched Plaintiff "in

the face several times without reason and for the sole purpose of gratuitously

causing Plaintiff pain." (Id.). During this alleged assault, Defendants Walthour and

Skinner "were personally present and did nothing to prevent the assault, even

though they had a meaningful opportunity to intervene" "while Plaintiff was being

choked and punched while in handcuffs and in shackles." (Id.). At some point while

at the Delaware County Jail, "Plaintiff was denied medical care by Officer Hannis

and Officer Rowe and Officer Keppler." (Id.). "Officer Bowman also refused Plaintiff

medical care and falsely claimed that Plaintiff was throwing food at officers." (Id.).

Defendants removed the case to this Court on February 7, 2022. (Dkt. 1). All

individual Defendants filed their answer on February 10, 2022, (Dkt. 3), and the

City of Muncie filed its answer on February 14, 2022, (Dkt. 6). The City of Muncie

was dismissed by agreement of the parties on February 28, 2022. (Dkts. 9, 10).

On September 26, 2022, the individual Defendants filed the present Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings, seeking dismissal of a number of Plaintiff's claims.

(Dkt. 26). Their brief in support of said motion was filed on October 4, 2022. (Dkt.

27). Plaintiff filed a response on October 17, 2022, (Dkt. 31), and Defendants filed a

reply on October 21, 2022, (Dkt. 32).

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II. Legal Standard

Motions for judgment on the pleadings are brought under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(c), which tests the sufficiency of claims based on the pleadings.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Pleadings 'include the complaint, the answer, and any written

instruments attached as exhibits.'" Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply

Co., 983 F.3d 307, 312-13 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows,

Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998)). The standard is nearly

identical to that for a motion to dismiss; the "only difference . . . is timing." Id. at

313.

The Court will grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings if "it appears

beyond doubt that the nonmovant cannot prove facts sufficient to support its

position . . . ." Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Columbia Ins. Grp., Inc., 972 F.3d 915, 919 (7th

Cir. 2020); see also Federated, 983 F.3d at 313 ("the moving party must demonstrate

that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved") (quoting N. Ind. Gun &

Outdoor Shows, 163 F.3d at 452)). In making its decision, the Court must take all

facts pleaded in the complaint as true and "draw all reasonable inferences and facts

in favor of the nonmovant." Wagner v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 840 F.3d

355, 358 (7th Cir. 2016). At this stage, Plaintiff must only present a "claim to relief

that is plausible on its face." Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 2017)). He need not include

every detail, but rather "only needs to include 'enough details about the subject-

matter of the case to present a story that holds together.'" Id. (quoting Catinella v.

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County of Cook, 881 F.3d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 2018)). "District courts should not allow

motions for judgment on the pleadings to deprive the non-moving party of the

opportunity to make its case." Federated, 983 F.3d at 313.

III. Analysis

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has agreed not to proceed on any claims against

Defendants Curtis, Pagel, or Roberts. (Dkt. 31 at 1). As such, the Court will not

address arguments as to those Defendants, and those claims shall be dismissed. The

Court will address the remainder of Defendants' arguments in turn.

i. Fourth and Eighth Amendment Claims

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no Fourth or Eighth Amendment

claim against any of the Defendants because he was neither an arrestee nor a

convicted prisoner at the time of the incidents bringing rise to this lawsuit. (Dkt. 27

at 4-5; Dkt. 32 at 2-6). Plaintiff maintains in response that a determination of his

status at the Delaware County Jail "come[s] down to questions of evidence and of

disputed facts," and so Defendants' motion should be denied at this time. (Dkt. 31 at

5).

Defendants are correct that generally speaking (a) the Fourth Amendment

applies at the time of an arrest and until an arrestee has benefitted from a judicial

determination of probable cause, (b) the Fourteenth Amendment's due process

clause applies to pretrial detainees, and (c) the Eighth Amendment applies after a

conviction. (Dkt. 27 at 4; Dkt. 32 at 5). However, the Seventh Circuit has confirmed

that the outlines of when the Fourth Amendment protection ends, and the

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Fourteenth Amendment protection begins, are not always clear. See Mitchell v.

Doherty, 37 F.4th 1277, 1284 (7th Cir. 2022) ("When exactly the [Fourth]

amendment recedes—and other constitutional protections might begin—remains

unanswered."). As such, it is possible that Plaintiff could put forward plausible

claims under each of the three amendments, depending on his status at the time of

the allegations in question.

At this stage, Plaintiff indicates that his status is in dispute (and potentially

unknown or unclear at the time he filed his response in October 2022). (Dkt. 31 at

5). It can be inferred from the Complaint that at the time of events at issue, he fell

into one or more of the possible categories: arrestee; detainee; or convicted.

Defendants urge the Court to look beyond the pleadings to answer the

question of Plaintiff's status. But the language of their opening brief seems to

recognize at least some degree of uncertainty. (See Dkt. 27 at 5 ("Surely during this

time, Mr. Davis had benefitted from a judicial determination of probable cause.")

(emphasis added)). Defendants quickly pivot away from this ambiguity, however,

and cite to the docket of a Delaware County criminal case in which Plaintiff was

charged and "incarcerated . . . at all times relevant to the complaint." (Id.). That

docket shows, they assert, that the Plaintiff "had an initial hearing on January 4,

2021," at which time a probable cause determination must have been made,

assuming adherence to Indiana Code. (Dkt. 32 at 4-5). Plaintiff objects to this

conclusion and the assumption of procedural adherence, noting that "timely

probable cause determinations have not always been a consistent occurrence in

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Indiana." (Dkt. 31 at 5).

While the docket cited to by Defendants certainly gives the impression that a

probable-cause determination was held in that particular case, it does not

definitively answer that question. Nor is it difficult to imagine a scenario where an

individual was detained on more than one matter and therefore potentially fell into

different detention categories for each case.

Because the Court is required to view all facts and inferences in favor of the

Plaintiff here, the Court must conclude that a material issue of fact remains to be

resolved, i.e., Plaintiff's status at the operative times. Therefore, judgment as to

Plaintiff's Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims is premature at this time.

Accordingly, Defendants' motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's Fourth and Eighth

Amendment claims.

Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that he will likely need additional factual

material to survive a summary judgment motion.

ii. Claims Against Defendants Keppler, Bowman, and Rowe

Next, Defendants Keppler, Bowman, and Rowe assert that no Eighth

Amendment claim exists, and that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim

against them for inadequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment3. (Dkt.

27 at 7-8; Dkt. 32 at 6-7). As noted previously, however, the Court is permitting the

3 In the reply brief, Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's First Amendment claim against these

Defendants should be dismissed. (Dkt. 32 at 7). However, new arguments that could have been

raised in the initial brief may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief. See GEFT Outdoor,

L.L.C. v. City of Westfield, 491 F. Supp. 3d 387, 396 (S.D. Ind. 2020). Accordingly, the Court will not

consider Defendants' First Amendment argument at this time.

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Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims to survive at this time because a material

issue of fact exists as to Plaintiff's status while in the Delaware County Jail during

the incidents in question.

Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims will proceed as well. As a starting

point, these allegations are sufficient to allege that Plaintiff had a serious medical

need. Defendants do not appear to argue to the contrary. Rather, they claim that

the Complaint fails to put them on notice of the particularities of each claim. (Dkt.

27 at 7).

To be sure, Defendants are correct that they are each "entitled to know what

he or she did that is asserted to be wrongful." Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d

815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013). But this is not a case where the Complaint rests on "a

theory of collective responsibility." Id. Rather, Plaintiff specifies which Defendants

failed to provide care, at least to a degree sufficient to satisfy the pleading standard

applicable here.

Plaintiff has alleged that he was punched and choked while he was

handcuffed and shackled, thrown violently into a vehicle, and had his leg squeezed

so tightly that circulation was cut off, and that Defendants Keppler, Bowman, and

Rowe refused to provide him medical care. Although the Complaint itself does not

detail when or in what manner care was denied, a reasonable inference can be

drawn in favor of Plaintiff that Defendants denied Plaintiff's request(s) for

assistance after the alleged assault. This inference is strengthened by the

handwritten filing attached to the Complaint that alleges specific actions – or

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inaction – taken by Defendants Rowe, Keppler, and Bowman, (Dkt. 1-2 at 9). See N.

Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, 163 F.3d at 452 ("Rule 12(c) permits a judgment based

on the pleadings alone," which "include the complaint, the answer, and any written

instruments attached as exhibits").

At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiff has presented a sufficient claim for

inadequate medical care. Again, however, this is not to say that this claim would

survive a summary judgment motion. Rather, the Court is merely concluding that

Plaintiff has met the relatively low bar of providing sufficient facts at this motion to

dismiss stage. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Plaintiff's status at the

Delaware County Jail is still disputed, which will in turn affect what standard the

Court will eventually use to evaluate the sufficiency of his claims. For these

reasons, Defendants' motion as to inadequate medical care claims is denied.

iii. Failure to Intervene Claims

Next, Defendants Skinner and Walthour argue that the failure to intervene

claims against them should be dismissed. (Dkt. 27 at 9-10; Dkt. 32 at 7-8).

Specifically, Defendants maintain that failure to intervene claims are not consistent

with Supreme Court precedent. Citing to a recent Seventh Circuit concurrence

speculating as much, Defendants urge the Court to find that these claims fail as a

matter of law. (Dkt. 27 at 9-10; Dkt. 32 at 8). Alternatively, Defendants argue that

the Plaintiff has failed to plead this claim with certainty. (Dkt. 27 at 10).

At this time, the Seventh Circuit has recognized failure to intervene cases

when an officer (who is present) knows "that a citizen's rights are being infringed"

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and has "a realistic opportunity to intervene." Doxtator v. O'Brien, 39 F.4th 852,

864-65 (7th Cir. 2022). The Complaint alleges that Defendants Walthour and

Skinner "were personally present and did nothing to prevent the assault, even

though they had a meaningful opportunity to intervene." (Dkt. 1-2 at 3). Nothing

more is required at this stage. Accordingly, Defendants' motion as to the failure to

intervene claims is denied.

iv. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants Skinner, Walthour, Keppler, Bowman, and Rowe assert

that they are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff "cannot establish from

his Complaint that each individual defendant . . . violated his clearly established

Fourteenth Amendment rights." (Dkt. 27 at 12-13 (emphasis in original); see also

Dkt. 32 at 9-10).

"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "A state official is protected by qualified

immunity unless the plaintiff shows: '(1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was "clearly established" at the time of

the challenged conduct.'" Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 350–51 (7th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).

Because a qualified immunity defense turns so much "on the facts of the

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case," a "complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified

immunity grounds." Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). The

plausibility standard applicable at this stage of the litigation "creates tension . . .

between developing the requisite facts for a well-informed qualified immunity

determination and preserving a government official's right to avoid the burdens of

pretrial matters, including discovery." Reed, 906 F.3d at 548.

As noted previously, the status of Plaintiff during his time in the Delaware

County Jail is a disputed fact at this time. As such, it cannot be determined

whether Defendants are entitled to an affirmative defense of qualified immunity on

Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims, because it is not yet decided whether the

Fourteenth Amendment is the appropriate standard to apply on these facts.

Whether Plaintiff can prove his allegations remains to be seen. And this

order should not be read to say that Defendants can never be found entitled to

qualified immunity. But at this stage of the litigation, the disputed status of

Plaintiff prevents such a finding. Accordingly, Defendants' motion as to qualified

immunity is denied.

As a final point, the Court notes that although Plaintiff states he is

proceeding on his claims against the "Delaware County Sheriff," (Dkt. 31 at 2), the

Complaint contains no allegations against the Sheriff in his official capacity, and

neither the caption of the case nor the parties' submitted and approved case

management plan (CMP) contain reference to the Sheriff in his official capacity. If

Plaintiff wishes to proceed with an official capacity claim, that issue will need to be

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resolved within fourteen (14) days of this Order.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion for Partial Judgment on

the Pleadings, Dkt. [26], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Because Plaintiff has agreed to voluntarily dismiss claims against

Defendants Curtis, Pagel, and Roberts, (Dkt. 31 at 1), Defendants' motion as to the

claims against these three Defendants is GRANTED, all claims against Defendants

Curtis, Pagel, and Roberts are DISMISSED, and the Clerk is directed to terminate

these parties from the docket.

In all other respects, Defendants' motion is DENIED.

The parties are ordered to file their Statement of Claims or Defenses within

fourteen (14) days of this Order. As noted in the CMP, doing so requires that

"consistent with the certification provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), the party with

the burden of proof shall file a statement of the claims or defenses it intends to

prove at trial, stating specifically the legal theories upon which the claims or

defenses are based." (Dkt. 15 at 4).

So ORDERED.

Date: 2/16/2023 Mp LN

M. Kendra Klump

United States Magistrate Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All ECF-registered counsel of record via email

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