Opinion

BRUMITT v. SMITH

Court
District Court, S.D. Indiana
Filed
Jan 25, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.7%

stating officer had "no reason to believe an offender was armed" after offender "punch[ed] [officer] at least three times in the face and placing his hands on [officer's] throat"

How later courts described this case

  • stating officer had "no reason to believe an offender was armed" after offender "punch[ed] [officer] at least three times in the face and placing his hands on [officer's] throat"
  • affirming district court's denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment stage in part because of remaining disputes of material fact regarding whether officer had time to recalibrate degree of force necessary
  • finding officer acted reasonably by responding with deadly force when a vehicle he had stopped began accelerating toward him as he approached on foot
  • disregarding unauthenticated expert report and rejecting belated attempt to cure authenticity defect on surreply

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

EVANSVILLE DIVISION

CHARLES BRUMITT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-00260-TWP-MPB

)

SAM SMITH in his personal capacity, )

CITY OF EVANSVILLE, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants

Sam Smith ("Sergeant Smith") and the City of Evansville ("Evansville") (together, "Defendants")

(Filing No. 48). Plaintiff Charles Brumitt ("Brumitt") initiated this action alleging claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and

under state law for assault, battery, and negligence. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56, the facts are presented in the light most favorable to Brumitt as the non-moving

party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Zerante v. DeLuca, 555

F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009).

At approximately 3:19 a.m. on September 27, 2019, Sergeant Smith, an officer with the

Evansville Police Department, passed by Lyles Sports Bar in Evansville during a routine patrol,

when he noticed an unidentified third-party stagger toward a pickup truck in the parking lot (Filing

No. 51 at 2). Sergeant Smith made a U-turn toward the parking lot, hoping to dissuade the

staggering individual from driving, but by the time he reached the parking lot, the individual was

gone. Sergeant Smith instead saw Brumitt, who was asleep on a utility box behind the bar. Id.

Brumitt was laying on his right side, facing out toward Sergeant Smith and he appeared to be

drunk and/or passed out. At that time, Brumitt was not suspected of any crime, but Sergeant Smith

approached him to check on his welfare and to determine if he had any outstanding warrants.

(Filing No. 49-1 at 6–8.) The encounter between Sergeant Smith and Brumitt, which lasted only

a minute, was captured on Sergeant Smith's body-worn camera.

Sergeant Smith approached Brumitt, shined a flashlight in his face, and asked if he was

okay (Id. at 5; Filing No. 51 at 2). Brumitt, still laying on his side, was awaken and groggily asked

Sergeant Smith who he was and why he was there. Sergeant Smith responded that he was a police

officer and again asked if Brumitt was alright. Brumitt said "no," and Sergeant Smith said "No?

You're not alright?" Brumitt responded by telling Sergeant Smith he could be "passed out

wherever [he] wants." Sergeant Smith said, "I could take you to jail if I'd like," to which Brumitt

said "take me, motherfucker. Take me." Sergeant Smith said back "Take you to jail?" (See

Brumitt's manually filed video, Exhibit B; Filing No. 57 and Filing No. 58). The conversation

lulled for a second or two before the situation escalated.

Sergeant Smith saw what appeared to be a debit card sticking out of Brumitt's pants pocket.

Expecting that the card would have the information he needed to check for outstanding warrants,

Sergeant Smith said "Let's see your ID" and reached for the card. Brumitt then began to sit up and

said "Don't you reach in my butt, damnit. Godamnit don't reach in my butt" (Filing No. 49-1 at

16). Sergeant Smith said "I'll tell you what." Brumitt responded, "Don't do this shit," and then "in

a wild, roundhouse swing," Brumitt's right arm struck Sergeant Smith's face.

The record does not reflect whether Brumitt's hand was open or in a closed fist when he

swung his arm, but it is undisputed that Brumitt's hand made contact with Sergeant Smith's left

cheek and nose (Filing No. 49-1 at 20). The strike startled Sergeant Smith, who had never before

been swung at while on duty (Filing No. 56-1 at 40).

After swinging his arm and striking Sergeant Smith, Brumitt said, "Get the fuck off me,

motherfucker." Sergeant Smith immediately grabbed Brumitt's shirt collar with his left hand and,

with his right fist, struck Brumitt several times in the face (Filing No. 49-1 at 22). Brumitt was

struck four times. (Id.; Filing No. 55 at 9).1 By the time Sergeant Smith finished striking him,

Brumitt was unconscious, and he remained unconscious for the next four minutes while Sergeant

Smith called for medical assistance and handcuffed Brumitt (Brumitt's manually filed video,

Exhibit B; Filing No. 57 and Filing No. 58).

Sergeant Smith did not realize Brumitt was unconscious until after the final strike. While

it is difficult to discern on the video, Brumitt contends the body-worn camera footage shows that

he was in a visibly defensive posture after the first strike, and unconscious after the second strike

(Filing No. 55 at 10).

As a result of Sergeant Smith's use of force, Brumitt suffered a comminuted acute fracture

of his right orbital floor, a broken nose, and lacerations requiring surgery (Filing No. 55 at 11).

Sergeant Smith did not suffer any bruising or other injury to his nose or face, but his right hand

remained swollen for three to four days afterwards (Filing No. 49-1 at 26–27).

On September 27, 2019, the Vanderburgh County Prosecutor's Office filed criminal

charges against Brumitt for Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury to a Public Safety Official, a Level

1 Defendants do not specify whether Sergeant Smith struck Brumitt three or four times, and the body-worn video

footage does not clearly show whether three or four blows were struck. Taking the facts in the light most favorable

to Brumitt, the Court accepts his assertion that he was struck four times.

5 Felony, and Public Intoxication, a Class B Misdemeanor. Brumitt later pled guilty to Public

Intoxication and misdemeanor Battery, Class B and A Misdemeanors, respectively (Filing No. 51

at 4). Brumitt filed this action on November 10, 2020, asserting a Section 1983 claim against

Sergeant Smith and state law claims for Assault, Battery, and Negligence against Evansville

(Filing No. 1).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary

judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hemsworth v.

Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the court reviews "the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted).

"However, inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a

summary judgment motion." Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2007)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "[a] party who bears the burden of proof on

a particular issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific

factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth,

476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted). "The opposing party cannot meet this burden with conclusory

statements or speculation but only with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence."

Sink v. Knox County Hosp., 900 F. Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).

"In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence

to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits

of [the] claim." Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation

marks omitted). "[N]either the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties

nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion

for summary judgment." Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir.

1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Brumitt's

Section 1983 claim should be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, Sergeant Smith's use of force

was objectively reasonable, and Sergeant Smith is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants

further argue that Brumitt's state law claims fail because Sergeant Smith's use of force was justified

under Indiana Code § 35-41-3-3(c) and because Evansville is entitled to immunity under the

Indiana Tort Claims Act.

Brumitt argues his claims are not barred, Sergeant Smith acted unreasonably by using force

that was grossly disproportionate to the threat posed by Brumitt, and Sergeant Smith violated

Brumitt's clearly established rights which precludes an award of qualified immunity. In support

of his arguments, Brumitt designates, in part, two expert reports regarding the use of force and

Brumitt's level of intoxication. On reply, Defendants argue that Brumitt's expert reports are

inadmissible and immaterial, and that Brumitt has failed to create a genuine dispute of material

fact regarding the reasonableness of Sergeant Smith's use of force.

The Court will first address the admissibility of the expert reports before addressing the

merits of Brumitt's Section 1983 claim and state law claims.

A. Admissibility of Expert Reports

Brumitt designates two expert reports—one by Captain Anthony Gregory ("Captain

Gregory") regarding the use of force, and one by C. Dennis Simpson, Ed.D, ("Dr. Simpson") on

Brumitt's level of intoxication (Filing No. 56-4; Filing No. 56-5). Defendants point out that

Captain Gregory's report is unverified, and therefore inadmissible under Rule56(c). They do not

challenge the admissibility of Dr. Simpson's report, but because that report is also unverified, the

Court will discuss the admissibility of both reports.

"Admissibility is a threshold question because a court may consider only admissible

evidence in assessing a motion for summary judgment." Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985

(7th Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Defendants are correct that Brumitt has not submitted an

authenticating affidavit or declaration for his designated expert reports as required by Federal Rule

of Evidence 901. Unauthenticated evidence is inadmissible and may not be considered in

evaluating a motion for summary judgment. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 759 (7th Cir.

2003) (concluding report introduced without authenticating affidavit was inadmissible and could

not be considered on summary judgment); see, e.g., Schmutte v. Resort Condos. Int'l, L.L.C., No.

05-CV-311, 2006 WL 3462656, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 29, 2006) (citing United States v. Kelly, 14

F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994)); Bennett v. Gates, No. 09-cv-00647, 2010 WL 4668367, at *3–4

(S.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2010) (disregarding unauthenticated evidence on summary judgment).

Both of Brumitt's expert reports are therefore inadmissible for purposes of the summary

judgment ruling. Neal v. Indianapolis Fire Dep't, No. 20-cv-02921, 2022 WL 2106143, at *1

(S.D. Ind. June 10, 2022) (declining to consider expert report submitted without authenticating

affidavit); Scott, 346 F.3d at 759 ("[The expert] report was introduced into the record without any

supporting affidavit verifying its authenticity and is therefore inadmissible and cannot be

considered for purposes of summary judgment."); see Est. of Williams v. Ind. State Police, 26 F.

Supp. 3d 824, 838 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (disregarding unauthenticated expert report and rejecting

belated attempt to cure authenticity defect on surreply) (citing Scott, 346 F.3d at 759).

Accordingly, the Court is unable to—and will not—consider either report in ruling on the summary

judgment motion.

B. Section 1983 Claim

Defendants argue Brumitt's Section 1983 claim should be dismissed because it is barred by

Heck v. Humphrey, because Sergeant Smith's use of force was reasonable, and because Sergeant

Smith is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court will address each argument in turn.

1. Heck Bar

Heck v. Humphrey bars a plaintiff from maintaining a Section 1983 action where a

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); see also VanGilder v. Baker, 435 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2006).

"The rule in Heck is intended to prevent collateral attack on a criminal conviction through the

vehicle of a civil suit." McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2006). In applying Heck,

the court must look at the relationship between the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim and the charges

upon which he was convicted. VanGilder, 435 F.3d at 691. The court must consider whether a

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his actual conviction

or sentence, not merely pose a challenge to a potential conviction or charges brought against the

plaintiff. Id. at 691–692. There must be a "clear nexus" between the plaintiff's conviction and the

alleged wrongful government act before the Heck bar applies to a plaintiff's Section 1983 claim.

Id. at 692. "Only a claim that 'necessarily' implies the invalidity of a conviction . . . comes within

the scope of Heck." Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Nelson v. Campbell,

541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004)).

There are three ways by which a claim may be barred by Heck: (1) the lawsuit necessarily

implies the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction, (2) facts alleged in the complaint are inconsistent

with the plaintiff's conviction, or (3) the complaint implies legal justification for the criminal act

upon which the plaintiff was convicted. Defendants argue Brumitt's Section 1983 claim

necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction for misdemeanor battery (Filing No. 51 at 11).

A Section 1983 claim for excessive force where the plaintiff has been convicted of resisting

law enforcement does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff's claim is Heck

barred. A plaintiff may allege that the force used upon him was excessive in relation to his level

of resistance without necessarily challenging his conviction for resisting law enforcement. In

VanGilder v. Baker, 435 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2006), for example, the plaintiff, VanGilder, was taken

to a hospital by law enforcement to have his blood alcohol tested. At the hospital, VanGilder

resisted attempts to draw his blood, so the officer struck VanGilder several times in the face to

gain compliance. VanGilder then kicked the officer in the side of the head, and in response, the

officer punched VanGilder "repeatedly in the face with a closed fist." Id. at 691. VanGilder pled

guilty to resisting law enforcement, and he later brought a Section 1983 suit against the officer.

The district court held that VanGilder's claim was barred by Heck, but the Seventh Circuit reversed,

finding that VanGilder's claim did not collaterally attack his conviction, deny that he resisted the

officer, or challenge the factual basis presented at his plea hearing. Id. at 692. Rather, VanGilder

alleged that he suffered injuries because the officer's response to his resistance was not objectively

reasonable.

The Seventh Circuit explained:

[w]ere we to uphold the application of Heck in this case, it would imply that once

a person resists law enforcement, he has invited the police to inflict any reaction or

retribution they choose, while forfeiting the right to sue for damages. Put another

way, police subduing a suspect could use as much force as they wanted—and be

shielded from accountability under civil law—as long as the prosecutor could get

the plaintiff convicted on a charge of resisting. This would open the door to

undesirable behavior and gut a large share of the protections provided by § 1983.

Id. at 692.

Defendants contend that VanGilder is inapplicable because this case, unlike VanGilder,

implicates Sergeant Smith's right to self-defense under Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (Filing No.

51 at 11–12; Filing No. 66 at 10). Defendants argue that Brumitt's claim necessarily implies that

Sergeant Smith had no right to use force in self-defense, which in turn implies that Sergeant Smith

was not the victim of a battery and, thus, no battery took place (Filing No. 51 at 12; Filing No. 66

at 11).

Defendants' novel argument is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, as Brumitt explains

in his Response, his Section 1983 claim does not imply that Sergeant Smith "was legally barred

from using any force" (Filing No. 55 at 26 (emphasis in original)). It implies only that Sergeant

Smith was barred from using unreasonable force, and neither Sergeant Smith's right to self-defense

nor his official duty to subdue Brumitt allowed him to use unreasonable force. Ind. Code § 35-41-

3-2(c) (describing when "[a] person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person"

(emphasis added)); see Hood v. State, 877 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), transfer denied

891 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 2008) ("The trier of fact is not precluded from finding that a defendant used

unreasonable force simply because the victim was the initial aggressor."). A reasonable jury could

conclude that Sergeant Smith had a right to use reasonable force to defend himself while also

concluding that Sergeant Smith in fact used unreasonable force. See Flerlage v. Village of Oswego,

No. 13-cv-6024, 2017 WL 5903819, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2017) ("Nothing bars presenting an

argument along the lines of: 'The police violated my rights by punching me repeatedly after I

stopped resisting, regardless of whether I swung my fist first.'"); see also Gilbert, 512 F.3d at 901

(7th Cir. 2008) ("One major function of the due process clause is to ensure that a wrongdoer's

punishment comes after a hearing, rather than being meted out on the spot by a public official's

fists or weapons.").

Second, the Court may not evaluate an officer's underlying intent or motivation for using

force to determine whether the force used was reasonable, so any distinction between Sergeant

Smith's motivation in this case and the officer's motivation in VanGilder is immaterial. See

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ("An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth

Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good

intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional."). Regardless of an

officer's justification for using force, the use of unreasonable force violates the Fourth Amendment.

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971)

("[S]tate law may not authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth Amendment . . . .").

Third, under the plain language of Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2(c), the victim of a battery is

not always entitled to use force in self-defense, so any implication that Sergeant Smith was not

entitled to use force in self-defense would not necessarily imply that he was not a victim of battery.

Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2(c) provides that a person may only use force to prevent injury from what

he "reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force." Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2

(emphasis added). The statute does not, for example, allow a battery victim to strike a perpetrator

in retaliation if the victim does not reasonably believe that the perpetrator will imminently use

further force. See cf. Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. 2003) ("When a defendant arms

himself or herself with a weapon before an imminent threat exists in a premeditated strategy to

retaliate for past violence (rather than to protect against the imminent use of unlawful force), a

self-defense instruction is not available."). Therefore, for purposes of applying Heck, even if

Brumitt's claim implied that Sergeant Smith had no right to self-defense because—which Brumitt

does not argue and the Court does not hold2—his claim would not necessarily imply that Sergeant

Smith was not a victim, so Brumitt's conviction for battery would remain unaffected. Contra

(Filing No. 51 at 12).

For all three of these reasons, Brumitt's Section 1983 claim does not imply the invalidity

of his conviction for misdemeanor battery, so it is not barred by Heck.

2. Reasonableness of Use of Force

Defendants next contend that even if Brumitt's Section 1983 claim is not barred by Heck,

they are entitled to summary judgment because the force used by Sergeant Smith was reasonable.

Brumitt asserts six arguments as to why Sergeant Smith's use of force was unreasonable, which

the Court distills down to two overarching arguments: (1) Sergeant Smith used force that was

grossly disproportionate to the threat posed by Brumitt; and (2) Sergeant Smith continued to use

force after Brumitt was unconscious (Filing No. 55 at 15–19). On reply, Defendants contend that

Brumitt's arguments are based on immaterial evidence, including evidence of Sergeant Smith's

martial arts training3 and Brumitt's injuries, and call for an improper evaluation of Sergeant Smith's

actions with "the 20/20 vision of hindsight" (Filing No. 66). The Court finds that a reasonable jury

could conclude that Sergeant Smith used unreasonable force against Brumitt for either or both of

the reasons asserted by Brumitt.

a. Disproportionate Use of Force

Brumitt argues that Sergeant Smith's reaction to being struck was grossly disproportionate

to the threat he posed, as shown by Brumitt's heavy intoxication, the minimal injury he caused

2 The Court has no occasion to decide whether Sergeant Smith reasonably believed Brumitt would imminently use

further unlawful force after striking Sergeant Smith once, as Defendants have not asserted a defense under Indiana

Code § 35-41-3-2. Defendants cite § 35-41-3-2 only in arguing that the statute bars Brumitt's claim under Heck.

3 During his deposition, Sergeant Smith discussed that he is a trained competitive fighter who holds a black belt in

judo, a black belt in Japanese JiuJitsu, a blue belt in Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu, and a black belt in Russian Sambo. (Filing

No. 56-1.)

Sergeant Smith, Sergeant Smith's martial arts training, and the "devastating" injuries Brumitt

suffered. Defendants respond that Sergeant Smith is entitled to "considerable leeway" in

determining the appropriate level of force to use in tense and rapidly evolving situations.

Defendants contend that Brumitt was unpredictable, uncooperative, and dangerous, and that

Sergeant Smith used reasonable force in responding to Brumitt's "wild" swing. Defendants also

contend that neither Sergeant Smith's martial arts training nor Brumitt's injuries are material in

determining the reasonableness of Sergeant Smith's use of force.

Excessive force cases are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective

reasonableness" standard, which "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each

particular case," including (a) the severity of the crime at issue, (b) whether the suspect posed an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (c) whether the suspect was actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 388, 396. While

giving some deference to an officer's perceptions and judgments, the Court's reasonableness

inquiry "must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with

the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97; see Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d

595, 602 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he dispositive question is whether, in light of the facts and

circumstances that confronted the officer . . . [did] the officer behave[ ] in an objectively reasonable

manner.").

When Sergeant Smith first came upon Brumitt, he was asleep and apparently heavily

intoxicated. But despite his intoxication, Sergeant Smith had no reason to believe Brumitt had

committed a crime or was armed4 (Filing No. 49-1 at 6 ("No, I wouldn't have arrested him for

public [intoxication] . . . . "). When Sergeant Smith began asking him questions, Brumitt was

disrespectful and used profanities, but he did not sit up, yell, make threats, or otherwise indicate

he was prone to violence. Brumitt only insisted he could be "passed out" where he liked and after

Sergeant Smith stated he could "take him to jail," Brumitt boldly invited Sergeant Smith to do so.

Brumitt's non-compliance began when Sergeant Smith said "Let's see your ID," and began

reaching toward Brumitt's pocket. Brumitt initially resisted Sergeant Smith's efforts by sitting up

and telling Sergeant Smith not to "reach in [his] butt, dammit." Brumitt then told Sergeant Smith

not to "do this shit" before swinging at him and striking him in the face. When Brumitt struck

Sergeant Smith, he committed at least two offenses—public intoxication, which is a Class B

Misdemeanor, and battery, which ranges from a Class B misdemeanor to a Level 5 Felony under

Indiana law. Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3; Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(e), (g)(5).

In light of these facts and circumstances, the Court must determine whether Sergeant

Smith's particular response was reasonable. Sergeant Smith, a competitive fighter and trained

martial artist, struck Brumitt four times in the face with a closed fist, causing Brumitt to become

unconscious.5 (Filing No. 49-1 at 23–24 ("I like to think that I could have the power of a one punch

knockout and that could take care of it, but I saw a threat and that's what I reacted to. So I'm not

4 Although Sergeant Smith testified he was concerned Brumitt might have had a weapon, that concern was not

reasonable (Filing No. 49-1 at 29). Brumitt was not suspected of any crime when their encounter began. The body-

worn camera footage also shows that Brumitt was not wearing any outwear that could have concealed a weapon.

Neither Brumitt's intoxication nor the fact that he used force against Sergeant Smith, without more, was enough to

create a reasonable belief that Brumitt was armed. See Strand v. Minchuk, 910 F.3d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 2018) (stating

officer had "no reason to believe an offender was armed" after offender "punch[ed] [officer] at least three times in the

face and placing his hands on [officer's] throat").

5 Defendants argue the Court should also consider that after Sergeant Smith realized Brumitt was unconscious, he did

not use "additional force" and "immediately called for an ambulance" (Filing No. 66 at 4). However, Sergeant Smith's

actions following his use of force are not relevant in determining whether the use of force itself was reasonable.

thinking one will take care of it. And like I said, I -- I train in three to four punches . . . . every

time I spar."). The strikes caused two fractures in Brumitt's face and inflicted lacerations requiring

surgery. Sergeant Smith also suffered bruising to his knuckles that lasted several days.

Defendants argue evidence of Brumitt's injuries and Sergeant Smith's martial arts training

are immaterial in evaluating whether Sergeant Smith's use of force was reasonable, but the Court

agrees with Brumitt that this evidence is material in measuring the level of force used by Sergeant

Smith. Closed-fist strikes, unlike taser or firearm deployments, can vary widely in severity. The

extent of Brumitt's injuries is therefore "relevant, but not dispositive," in determining how much

force Sergeant Smith used in administering four closed-first strikes, and whether the strikes were

excessive. Nail v. Gutierrez, No. 06-CV-292, 2008 WL 4545332, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 10, 2008)

(citing Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 690 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that injury is a relevant

factor in making excessive force determination, but "an excessive force claim does not require any

particular degree of injury")). For the same reason, evidence relating to Sergeant Smith's martial

arts training and fighting history is material. Four strikes from a one-hundred-twenty-pound

officer with no fighting experience or related training would presumably inflict less force that four

strikes from Sergeant Smith, a "heavyweight" fighter who trains regularly, fights competitively,

and holds black belts in three fighting styles (Judo, Japanese Jiu-Jitsu, and Russian Sambo) and a

blue belt in a fourth (Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu) (Filing No. 56-1 at 3–5, 9–10, 13–14, 17).

In arguing that Sergeant Smith's use of force was reasonable, Defendants cite two cases

from the Northern District of Indiana involving the use of similar types of force against intoxicated

plaintiffs—Billingsley v. City of Fort Wayne, No. 17-cv-00066, 2018 WL 6697075 (N.D. Ind. Dec.

20, 2018) ("Billingsley"), and Nail v. Gutierrez, No. 06-CV-292, 2008 WL 4545332 (N.D. Ind.

Oct. 10, 2008) ("Nail"). Brumitt argues that Billingsley and Nail are inapplicable because the facts

and circumstances of those cases are distinguishable.

In Billingsley v. City of Fort Wayne, officers received a call that the plaintiff, Billingsley,

had threatened an individual with a knife. 2018 WL 6697075, at *1. When officers arrived, they

saw Billingsley and the individual preparing to fight. One officer searched Billingsley and

recovered a multi-tool with a knife, drugs, and two bottles of alcohol. The officer also concluded

Billingsley was intoxicated based in part on his "loud and slurred speech; unsteady movements;

and a generally hostile demeanor." Id. at *2. Billingsley was arrested but refused to take a

breathalyzer test, so the officers transported him to a hospital for a blood sample. "During the

transport, Billingsley continued to act in a belligerent manner and made multiple threats.

Billingsley was yelling and cursing in the squad car, and at one point, he told [one of the officers]

that he would hide in a bush and shoot [him] the next time he saw [him]." Id.

At the hospital, an officer handcuffed Billingsley's right wrist to the hospital bed rail.

"Billingsley continued to yell and curse from the hospital bed, even after being instructed to stop."

Id. Officers then left the room but later observed Billingsley in the hospital room searching

through his clothing. The arresting officer had been unable to complete a search of Billingsley

before taking him into custody, so the officer was concerned Billingsley might still have access to

a weapon. "Given Billingsley's increasing agitation and the possibility of his having a weapon on

his person," the officer again entered Billingsley's room to secure Billingsley's other wrist to the

bed. When the officer did so, "Billingsley became angrier and repeatedly threatened to kill [the

officer]." Id. at *3. The officer "attempt[ed] to diffuse the situation" by speaking with Billingsley,

but Billingsley did not calm down. Instead, he "suddenly twisted his lower body and kicked with

his right foot at [the officer's] abdomen, threatening to 'kick [his] ass.'" Within a tenth of a second

after the kick, [the officer] delivered two controlled strikes to the side of Billingsley's head to

achieve mental stunning so that Billingsley would become compliant and no longer pose a risk of

harm to himself or others." Id.

The Northern District of Indiana concluded that the officer's two strikes to the side of

Billingsley's head were reasonable under the circumstances. Billingsley insisted that no reasonable

officer "would have felt threatened by the 'slow-motion lethargic attempt at a kick' that he

delivered," but the court disagreed. The court stated the officer's "use of escalating force was

warranted because Billingsley continued to actively resist [the officer] at the time, and despite the

handcuffing, he was clearly not subdued and still posed a threat of harm to the Officers and the

hospital staff." Id. at *7. The court also noted that the officer did not immediately use an enhanced

level of force against Billingsley. "[P]rior to delivering the two strikes to Billingsley's head, [the

officer] . . . was present in the room with Billingsley, interacted verbally with him, and used soft

hand techniques, including light pressure to Billingsley's face and handcuffing his wrists.

Nevertheless, Billingsley continued to resist [the officer], defy his verbal commands, verbally

threaten him, and then physically kick at him." Id.

Defendants argue that the facts of Billingsley are "more plaintiff-friendly than the case at

hand," because the officer there struck a "defenseless and restrained plaintiff" (Filing No. 66 at 8

(emphasis omitted)). But Defendants' discussing of Billingsley focuses solely on the fact that

Billingsley was handcuffed and ignores the remaining facts and circumstances warranting the

Billingsley officer's use of two head strikes. Despite being handcuffed when the officer struck

him, Billingsley continued to actively resist, threaten, and attempt to strike officer. The use of

force in Billingsley is also distinguishable from this case. Whereas the officer in Billingsley

administered two strikes to the side of Billingsley's head "to achieve mental stunning so that

Billingsley would become compliant," Sergeant Smith administered four strikes to Brumitt's face

to knock him unconscious, pursuant to his training as a competitive fighter (Filing No. 49-1 at 29).

The facts of Nail are similar to the facts of Billingsley and likewise distinguishable from

this case. In Nail, two officers arrived at plaintiff Nail's house to investigate a 911 hang-up from

the house. 2008 WL 4545332, at *1. When officers arrived, Nail stated his wife had mistakenly

misdialed 911, but the officers wanted his wife to confirm the story. Nail then went outside.

"Concerned about [the wife's] safety, or that Nail had fled," one of the officers walked outside and

around the house and found Nail in his backyard. The officer questioned Nail, "but Nail refused

to answer and repeatedly asked why Gutierrez was there. Id. at *1. At some point, Nail got up

and said he was going back into the house to get a cigarette. [The officer] told Nail that he was

not going anywhere and pushed him back into his chair." By Nail's own admission, he was "raising

his voice and protesting [the officer's] instructions." Nail also confirmed that he had been drinking

and later admitted that he had struck his wife. Id.at *2. Nail attempted to leave his chair several

more times and each time was pushed back down by the officer. "Fed up with [the] shoving, Nail

suddenly got up and tried to push [the officer] back." Id. However, Nail missed the officer he

intended to push and lunged toward the other. "A scuffle ensued between Nail and the officer,"

during which Nail resisted the attempts to subdue him." One of the officers "applied a stun strike"

to Nail's face because Nail was resisting, but '[w]hen Nail continued to resist the officers, they

administered two bursts of pepper spray to Nail's face. That did not work, so they applied three

strikes to Nail's thigh in order to handcuff him." Id. The Northern District of Indiana determined

the officers' uses of force were reasonable considering that Nail "was drunk, confrontational, and

raised his voice at the officers. The officers were also on notice that Nail had a proclivity for

violence, given that he had hit his wife earlier that evening. And Nail readily admit[ted] that he

lunged toward [one officer] and tried to shove [the other]."

In this case, the threat posed by Brumitt was less severe, and the use of force by Sergeant

Smith was greater, than in Billingsley or Nail. When Sergeant Smith first found Brumitt sleeping,

he was not suspected of any crime, and Sergeant Smith had no reason to believe Brumitt was armed

or had a proclivity toward violence. During his brief conversation with Sergeant Smith, Brumitt

used profanity, but he did not yell at or threaten him, attempt to flee, or refuse any commands.6

Once Sergeant Smith reached for Brumitt's debit card, Brumitt resisted by slowly sitting up, saying

"don't reach in my butt . . . don't do this," and then wildly swinging his arm at Sergeant Smith.

Brumitt's conduct, though belligerent and violent, is distinguishable from Billingsley and Nail,

who displayed violence resulting in dispatch calls, were alert and agitated when officers arrived,

yelled at and threated officers, and continuously and strenuously resisted officers as officers tried

to restrain them. Further, in Billingsley and Nail, the officers used escalating levels of force that

they believed were progressively necessary to gain control over the suspect. Sergeant Smith, in

contrast, did not attempt to arrest Brumitt or use any lesser level of force that might have detained

Brumitt. Instead, he immediately used enough force to ensure that Brumitt would be rendered

unconscious (Filing No. 49-1 at 20–30). Billingsley and Nail do not show that Sergeant Smith's

use of force was proportionate or reasonable.

Considering the facts and circumstances of this particular case, in the light most favorable

to Brumitt, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Sergeant Smith's use of force was

reasonable. Brumitt undoubtedly posed a threat to Sergeant Smith when he swung at him, but

6 The only command Sergeant Smith gave Brumitt was "let's see your ID," but the body-worn camera footage shows

that Sergeant Smith did not give Brumitt time to comply with the command before reaching into Brumitt's pocket.

there was no reason to believe Brumitt was armed, and the threat he posed was further mitigated

by Brumitt's apparent intoxication, drowsiness, and lack of coordination. While some level of

force would have been necessary to subdue and arrest Brumitt, Sergeant Smith's use of four

immediate and powerful strikes to Brumitt's face, which caused unconsciousness, was

disproportionate. See Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir. 2010) ("When

[the officer] first arrived at the scene, he was the only officer on site, and his concern that [plaintiff]

might retrieve a weapon or pose a threat to persons inside the house was clearly reasonable. On

the other hand, once [plaintiff] was on the ground, unarmed, and apparently unable to stand up on

his own, the risk calculus changed. Or so a jury might reasonably conclude. Summary judgment

was therefore inappropriate."); see Ramos v. Drews, No. 14-CV-2556, 2018 WL 5046087 ,at *13

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2018) ("[A] jury could reasonably find that . . . [two plaintiffs] shoved the

officers and [a third plaintiff] took a step toward them, . . . but [the officers] overreacted and used

excessive force when arresting plaintiffs and after they were secured in handcuffs.").

The Court recognizes that officers are often forced to make split-second decisions in tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations, and are therefore given "considerable leeway" in their

assessment of the appropriate use of force. Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706 (7th

Cir. 2013). However, even accounting for these factors, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury

could find that Sergeant Smith acted unreasonably. Sergeant Smith testified that when he was

struck by Brumitt, he "instinctually" acted to "stop the threat" according to his training as a fighter

(Filing No. 56-1 at 53 ("Q: Was there any training that said the appropriate way to punch a suspect,

if you're needing to do that, is to do three or four punches instinctually, sort of in succession, or is

that something that you know because of your years in competitive fighting? A: I would probably

say that comes from my knowledge of competitive fighting."). But the applicable legal standard

"contemplates a reasonable officer, not a reasonable person," and this Court cannot conclude as a

matter of law that a reasonable officer who has been struck by a drowsy, intoxicated, and unarmed

individual would strike that individual in the face until he was unconscious. United States v.

Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original); see Cyrus v. Town of

Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Force is reasonable only when exercised in

proportion to the threat posed, and as the threat changes, so too should the degree of force. Force

also becomes increasingly severe the more often it is used; striking a suspect once is not the same

as striking him ten times." (citations omitted)); Flerlage, 2017 WL 5903819, at *6 ("At this stage

of the proceedings, the record indicates that some of the force that Tyler alleges, even if it occurred

in response to Tyler swinging at [Officer] Melhouse, could be unreasonable. Under Tyler's version

of the facts, he offered no physical resistance to the officers besides running at and swinging at

Melhouse. And the bare fact of resistance does not preclude a finding that an officer used excessive

force; the normal factors for evaluating the use of force still apply. Construing the facts in Tyler's

favor, . . . two officers confronted one teenager who had swung at one of them, but then ceased

resisting. Under those circumstances, the force alleged—tackling and punching—exceeded what

would have been objectively reasonable to subdue Tyler.").

The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Sergeant Smith's use of four closed fist

strikes to Brumitt's face, causing him to become unconscious, was a reasonable use of force.

Because there is a factual dispute on this issue, it should be resolved by the trier of fact and

summary judgment on Brumitt's excessive force claim is denied.

b. Use of Force After Brumitt Was Unconscious

Brumitt also argues that Sergeant Smith acted unreasonably because he continued striking

him even after he was unconscious (Filing No. 55 at 15). Brumitt relies heavily on a slowed,

brightened version of Sergeant Smith's body-worn camera footage to show that Brumitt was non-

resistant after being struck the first time. On reply, Defendants argue that the Court should not

consider the modified footage because it violates the long-standing principle that an officer's

actions must not be judged "with the 20/20 vision of hindsight" (Filing No. 66 at 1 (quoting

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)).

The Court agrees with Defendants regarding the modified footage and will therefore not

consider it on summary judgment. However, the original body-worn camera footage creates a

genuine dispute of material fact regarding the reasonableness of Sergeant Smith's use of force.

Defendants do not address whether, based on the original body-worn camera footage, a reasonable

officer in Sergeant Smith's position would have realized that Brumitt was unconscious before

continuing to strike him. Flerlage, 2017 WL 5903819, at *6 ("Decowski's strongest allegation is

that Melhouse punched him repeatedly after knocking him unconscious. Knowingly using any

force against an unconscious person, as asserted here, is objectively unreasonable."). Although

Defendants designate testimony from Sergeant Smith stating he did not "process" that Brumitt was

unconscious until after administering the fourth and final strike, the Court must evaluate Sergeant

Smith's use of force from the perspective of a reasonable officer in Sergeant Smith's position, not

Sergeant Smith.

The pertinent question therefore becomes whether a reasonable officer would have

perceived that Brumitt was unconscious in between strikes. The Seventh Circuit has held that "an

officer will not be held liable if the circumstances under which the force was used evolved so

rapidly that a reasonable officer would not have had time to recalibrate the reasonable quantum of

force." Abbott, 705 F.3d at 733. But this case is not similar to those cited by the Seventh Circuit

as evolving so rapidly that an officer cannot "recalibrate" his use of force. Id. (citing Berube v.

Conley, 506 F.3d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 2007) (granting qualified immunity to officer who "fired a

fusillade in an emergency situation" at a large man running toward her with a hammer raised in

the air and continued firing until the man was on the ground); and Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d

312, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding officer acted reasonably by responding with deadly force

when a vehicle he had stopped began accelerating toward him as he approached on foot)).

Although Sergeant Smith's encounter with Brumitt escalated quickly, the timeline of events is

relatively straightforward: Brumitt and Sergeant Smith spoke for approximately one minute,

Sergeant Smith reached for Brumitt's pocket, Brumitt sat up swinging an arm and struck Sergeant

Smith, and Sergeant Smith struck him back.

Although Sergeant Smith struck Brumitt in quick succession, enough time elapsed between

the second, third, and fourth strikes to see Brumitt with his arms at his sides and his head tilted to

the side. An officer in Sergeant Smith's position—an arms-length away from Brumitt—would

have been well-positioned to see whether Brumitt had become unconscious, and therefore unable

to resist, in between strikes. See Meyers v. Baltimore County, 713 F.3d 723, 733 (4th Cir. 2013)

("[F]orce justified at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the

justification for the initial force has been eliminated."). A genuine dispute as to whether a

reasonable officer in Sergeant Smith's position would have noticed Brumitt was unconscious and

had time to recalibrate his use of force precludes summary judgment. See Strand v. Minchuk, 910

F.3d 909, 916 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming district court's denial of officer's motion for summary

judgment because "additional fact finding was necessary to determine whether 'the rapidly-

evolving nature of the altercation' justified [the officer's] use of deadly force or whether 'he had

time to recalibrate the degree of force necessary'" in light of plaintiff's statement of surrender);

Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 738 (7th Cir. 2021) ("We assess this question [of whether a

constitutional violation occurred] from the standpoint of a reasonable officer at the scene under

the Graham factors. To appreciate that viewpoint, we consider what a reasonable officer in this

case's circumstances knew and perceived."); Lux v. City of Whitewater, No. 20-cv-1057, 2022 WL

4536935, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 28, 2022) (denying summary judgment on failure to intervene

claim, finding that a jury could review all evidence, including body-worn camera footage and

testimony, and conclude that defendant officer had opportunity to intervene but failed to, despite

officer's testimony that he did not observe other officers use force beyond de minimis contacts).

For this additional reason, summary judgment on Brumitt's Section 1983 claim is denied.

3. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue Sergeant Smith is entitled to qualified immunity on Brumitt's Section

1983 claim. "Qualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78–79 (2017) (cleaned up). "[T]wo central questions must be

addressed in the course of determining whether qualified immunity is available: whether the

plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all, and whether the right at issue was

clearly established at the time and under the circumstances presented." Bianchi v. McQueen, 818

F.3d 309, 319 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Once the defense has been raised, the plaintiff

carries the burden of defeating it. Smith, 10 F.4th at 737.

Defendants raise a qualified immunity defense, arguing that Sergeant Smith's use of force

did not violate any clearly established right. In response, Brumitt focuses on Sergeant Smith's

alleged use of force against Brumitt after he became unconscious and argues Sergeant Smith

violated his clearly established right "to be free from being beaten while unconscious" ('Filing No.

55 at 24). Brumitt argues "[it] has been well established for years that a 'police officer may not

continue to use force against a suspect who is subdued'" (Filing No. 55 at 23). He cites two cases—

Johnson v. Scott, 576 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2009), and Becker v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920, 920 (7th Cir.

2017)—as examples of cases clearly establishing that officers may not use force against subdued

suspects. Brumitt contends that "[i]f the jury believes Brumitt was unconscious when Sgt. Smith

threw punches two, three, and four, then Sgt. Smith violated Brumitt's clearly established

constitutional right to be free from being beaten while unconscious. (Filing No. 55 at 23) (quoting

Johnson v. Scott, 576 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2009)).

Defendants do not dispute that suspects have a clearly established right not to be subjected

to force once subdued, yet they argue that Brumitt has not "come forward with analogous caselaw

demonstrating that Sergeant Smith violated a clearly established right" (Filing No. 66 at 9).

Defendants appear to misunderstand the scope of the right asserted by Brumitt—the right to be

free from force once subdued—and they presume that Brumitt was not, from the perspective of a

reasonable officer, subdued when Sergeant Smith continued to use force.

In distinguishing Becker, for example, Defendants assert that in that case, "the arrestee was

not actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest," whereas here, "the undisputed evidence shows

that Plaintiff struck Sergeant Smith in the face prior to Sergeant Smith using any force" (Filing

No. 66 at 10 (emphasis in original)). But for the reasons discussed above, the critical fact of

whether Brumitt was unconscious, and thus subdued, after Sergeant Smith's second or third strike

remains in dispute. Johnson, 576 F.3d at 660 ("It is well established that a police officer may not

continue to use force against a suspect who is subdued and complying with the officer's orders.

But that principle depends critically on the fact that the suspect was indeed subdued."); Strand,

910 F.3d at 917 ("Factual disputes do not resolve on the force of say so, however. What Officer

Minchuk sees as undisputed—whether Strand continued to pose a threat at the moment Minchuk

deployed deadly force—is actually unresolved and indeed vigorously contested by Strand. . . .

[T]he district court rightly determined, after a close and careful analysis of the record, that

Minchuk was not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law at summary judgment on the

merits of Strand's claim.").

Similarly, in analyzing Johnson, Defendants appear to assume that a reasonable officer in

Sergeant Smith's position would not have perceived that Brumitt was unconscious because "the

Fourth Amendment did not require him to stop and perform a conscious assessment of the situation

on a split second's notice, in the heat of the confrontation" (Filing No. 66 at 10). However, the

question of whether a reasonable officer would have perceived Brumitt as unconscious and had

time to "recalibrate" his use of force remains in dispute, so Sergeant Smith is not entitled to

qualified immunity at this stage. See Strand, 910 F.3d at 916 (affirming district court's denial of

qualified immunity at summary judgment stage in part because of remaining disputes of material

fact regarding whether officer had time to recalibrate degree of force necessary); cf. Johnson, 576

F.3d at 660–61 (affirming district court's holding that officer used reasonable force against suspect

despite apparent surrender once cornered because, in light of suspect's prior attempts to flee and

possible possession of a weapon, officer "had no idea how [suspect] was going to behave" and was

therefore not subdued).

Further, to the extent Defendants argue that Brumitt must identify a case directly on point

to establish his right to be free from force once subdued, they are incorrect. The Supreme Court

has repeatedly stated that courts "do not require a case directly on point" if "existing precedent

[has] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731 (2011). A long history of cases has clearly established that a suspect has a constitutional right

not to be subjected to force once subdued. See, e.g., Abbott, 705 F.3d 706 ("[I]t was well-

established in 2007 that police officers cannot continue to use force once a suspect is subdued….

[T]here is no question that [the suspect] was in fact subdued by the first tasing—she immediately

fell to the ground and convulsed but made no movement after the first tasing ending…."); Frazell

v. Flanigan, 102 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds (affirming jury verdict

in favor of plaintiff and against officer in excessive force case because jury could reasonably

conclude that officer who struck subdued suspect in the back with a baton was objectively

unreasonable force to which qualified immunity did not apply). Brumitt offered Johnson and

Becker as two examples of the many cases that have reiterated that right. He is not required to

find a factually analogous case directly on point to meet his burden.

Genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Brumitt was unconscious and whether a

reasonable officer would have perceived him as unconscious and had time to recalibrate his use of

force preclude summary judgment on Sergeant Smith's qualified immunity argument.

C. Indiana State Law Claim

In addition to his Section 1983 claim, Brumitt asserts state law claims for assault, battery,

and negligence against Evansville. Defendants argue Brumitt's state law claims should be

dismissed for two reasons. First, Sergeant Smith's use of force was justified under Indiana Code

§ 35-41-3-3(c), which permits an officer to use "reasonable force if the officer reasonably believes

that the force is necessary to enforce a criminal law or to effect a lawful arrest." And second,

Evansville is immunized from liability under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, which provides that

governmental entities and their employees are not liable for any loss resulting from the adoption

and enforcement, or failure to adopt or enforce, a law, rule, or regulation, unless the enforcement

"constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment." Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(8).

Brumitt responds that neither Indiana Code § 35-41-3-3(c) nor the Indiana Tort Claims

Act's ("ITCA") immunity provision apply because Sergeant Smith used unreasonable force.

Brumitt argues that Indiana Code § 35-41-3-3(c) only permits the use of "reasonable force" that

an officer "reasonably believes" is needed to effect an arrest, and the parties agree that "Indiana's

excessive force standard effectively parallels the federal standard." (Filing No. 55 at 27.) Brumitt

similarly argues that under Indiana law, the ITCA does not immunize governmental entities from

liability arising from the use of excessive force. (Filing No. 55 at 26); see Gupta v. Melloh, 19

F.4th 990, 1002 (7th Cir. 2021) ("The Indiana Supreme Court has held that because the Indiana

Code limits police officers to using only the force that is reasonable to effectuate an arrest, an

officer's use of excessive or unreasonable force 1s not shielded from liability or subject to immunity

under the Indiana Tort Claims Act." (citing Wilson v. Isaacs, 929 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ind. 2010))).

On reply, Defendants concede both points to Brumitt, stating "that the parties are in

agreement that this Court's conclusion as to the reasonableness of Sergeant Smith's [conduct] under

the 4th Amendment is determinative as to Plaintiffs state law claims" (Filing No. 66 at 12).

Because the Court has already concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Sergeant Smith's

use of force was unreasonable, Brumitt's state law claims survive summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

As explained above, there are numerous material facts in dispute in this case. The Court

does not determine whether the disputed facts are true, but simply determines whether the disputed

facts could lead a jury to find in favor of the non-moving party. For the reasons discussed above,

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 48) is DENIED and this matter shall be

resolved by trial on July 18, 2023 or settlement. The parties are directed to contact the Magistrate

Judge to schedule a settlement conference.

SO ORDERED.

Date: _ 1/25/2023 Qvengs Dite leat

Hon. Tan¥a Walton Pratt, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

27

DISTRIBUTION:

Joseph N. Williams

WILLIAMS & PIATT, LLC

joe@williamspiatt.com

Robert L. Burkart

ZIEMER STAYMAN WEITZEL & SHOULDERS

rburkart@zsws.com

Matthew Stephen Koressel

ZIEMER STAYMAN WEITZEL & SHOULDERS LLP

mkoressel@zsws.com

Keith W. Vonderahe

ZIEMER STAYMAN WEITZEL & SHOULDERS

kvonderahe@zsws.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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