ANANIAS v. ST. VINCENT MEDICAL GROUP, INC. d/b/a ASCENSION MEDICAL GROUP - INDIANA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

DAVINA ANANIAS, )

)

Plaintiff )

) Cause No. 1:22-cv-1723-RLM-MPB

v. )

)

ST. VINCENT MEDICAL GROUP, )

INC., d/b/a ASCENSION MEDICAL )

GROUP, )

)

Defendant

OPINION AND ORDER

Davina Ananias sued her employer, St. Vincent Medical Group, alleging it

discriminated against her based on her religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act. St. Vincent moves to dismiss Ms. Ananias’s amended complaint; Ms.

Ananias moves to file a surreply to St. Vincent’s motion. For the following

reasons, the court denies Ms. Ananias’s motion and grants St. Vincent’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The court accepts the facts in Ms. Ananias’s complaint as true for

purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss. Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173

(7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).

Ms. Ananias is a physician’s assistant. She began working for St. Vincent,

a healthcare system, in 2015. In 2021, St. Vincent implemented a COVID-19

vaccine mandate for its employees, requiring employees to get vaccinated against

the coronavirus by November 12, 2021. If employees didn’t comply by the

deadline, St. Vincent would terminate their employment or place them on

involuntary unpaid leave. St. Vincent permitted employees to apply for medical

and religious exemptions from the vaccine requirement.

Ms. Ananias applied for a religious exemption. St. Vincent denied her

request, explaining that because of her position, exempting her from the

mandate would increase the risks to workplace and patient safety, and so posed

an “undue hardship” to St. Vincent. St. Vincent invited Ms. Ananias to submit

additional information about her accommodation request. She did so, and she

offered to wear personal protective equipment and an N95 face mask while at

work as an alternative to getting the vaccine. St. Vincent again denied Ms.

Ananias’s request for religious exemption, explaining that it had a “strong need

to promote and protect the health and safety of [its] workforce and patients” and

acknowledging her deeply held religious beliefs.

Ms. Ananias received a COVID-19 vaccine after the second denial and

before the November deadline, and so became compliant with St. Vincent’s

vaccine mandate. Her employment continued uninterrupted, and she hasn’t

reported any disciplinary action or changes in position or pay resulting from

these events. Ms. Ananias continues to work for St. Vincent in its Indianapolis

and Carmel, Indiana facilities.

Ms. Ananias filed this suit, alleging St. Vincent discriminated against her

based on her religious beliefs by “forc[ing]” her to get a COVID-19 vaccine. She

seeks both injunctive relief and damages. St. Vincent moves to dismiss the case.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Ms. Ananias’s Motion to File a Surreply

Ms. Ananias moves for leave to file a surreply in opposition to St.

Vincent’s motion to dismiss.

The district’s rules don’t contemplate allowing surreplies to motions to

dismiss. S.D. Ind. L.R. 7-1. The “purpose for having a motion, response and

reply is to give the movant the final opportunity to be heard and to rebut the

non-movant’s response, thereby persuading the court that the movant is

entitled to the relief requested by the motion.” Lawrenceburg Power, LLC v.

Lawrenceburg Mun. Utils., 410 F. Supp. 3d 943, 949 (S.D. Ind. 2019) (quoting

Lady Di’s, Inc. v. Enhanced Servs. Billing, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-0340-SEB-DML,

2010 WL 1258052, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2010)). “New arguments and

evidence may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief. Reply briefs are

for replying, not raising new arguments or arguments that could have been

advanced in the opening brief.” Id. (quoting Reis v. Robbins, No. 4:14-cv-63-

RLY-TAB, 2015 WL 846526, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 26, 2015)). Courts may allow

a party to file a surreply “in limited circumstances to address new arguments

or evidence raised in the reply brief or objections to the admissibility of the

evidence cited in the response.” Id. (citation omitted).

Ms. Ananias asserts she should be able to file a surreply because St.

Vincent “raises for the first[ ]time several cases, including recent Seventh Circuit

precedent, that suggests ‘no harm for employees faced with a choice to accept or

refuse a COVID-19 vaccine.’” [Doc. No. 31-1]. But citing new cases isn’t the same

as raising a new argument or evidence that would warrant permitting a surreply.

See Mayer v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 2:11-cv-147, 2014 WL 1607443, at *3 (N.D.

Ind. Apr. 22, 2014) (“It is commonplace for attorneys to cite different cases in

their reply briefs . . . .”). A review of the parties’ briefs shows that St. Vincent’s

reference to cases specifically involving the COVID-19 pandemic is responsive to

Ms. Ananias’s brief and supports its original arguments about whether she has

alleged any injury. In light of the limited circumstances in which a surreply is

warranted, the court denies Ms. Ananias’s motion to file a surreply. [Doc. No.

31].

B. St. Vincent’s Motion to Dismiss

St. Vincent argues the court should dismiss this case under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or alternatively

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

A federal court must assure itself that it has jurisdiction over the subject

matter of a case—the power to hear and decide it—before it can proceed to take

any action on the merits. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498; Craig v. Ont.

Corp., 543 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2008). Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of

complaints that bring no actionable claim within the subject matter jurisdiction

of the federal courts. In reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must

“accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” and, if necessary, it may “look beyond the

jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been

submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction

exists.” St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 625

(7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th

Cir. 1999)). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating

subject matter jurisdiction by competent proof. Thomas v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442,

446 (1942); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, Ind., 361 F.3d 998, 1001

(7th Cir. 2004). A court must dismiss an action without reaching the merits if

there is no jurisdiction. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549

U.S. 422, 430-431 (2007).

Ms. Ananias alleges St. Vincent violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by (1) failing to engage in the interactive process when it

considered her request for religious accommodation, (2) forcing her to violate her

sincerely held religious beliefs by mandating she get a COVID-19 vaccine, (3)

subjecting her to less favorable terms of employment by denying her religious

accommodation request, and (4) subjecting her to disparate treatment. St.

Vincent says Ms. Ananias lacks Article III standing so her complaint should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to live cases and controversies.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 2009)

(citing Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007)).

“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy

requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992) (citation omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving she has

standing and must show that she: “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly

traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Wadsworth v. Kross, Lieberman &

Stone, Inc., 12 F.4th 665, 667 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)). At the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege

facts demonstrating each element of the standing doctrine. Id. “[A] plaintiff must

demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.” Smith v. Golden

Rule Ins. Co., 526 F. Supp. 3d 374, 391 (S.D. Ind. 2021) (quoting Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)).

To establish injury in fact, the plaintiff must show that “she suffered ‘an

invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and

‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Prosser v. Becerra, 2 F.4th

708, 713 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560).

Certain harms, such as physical or monetary injury, readily qualify as concrete.

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204 (2021). Less tangible harms

ordinarily aren’t concrete for purposes of standing, but Congress can “elevate to

the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were

previously inadequate in law.” Id. at 2205 (citing Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. at

341). When Congress does this by creating a cause of action for a statutory

violation, an alleged violation of the statute meets the concrete-injury

requirement if the injury “has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm ‘traditionally’

recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” Id. at 2204

(citing Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. at 341). There doesn’t need to be an “exact

duplicate in American history and tradition.” Id.

Additionally, “to establish injury in fact when seeking prospective

injunctive relief, a plaintiff must allege a ‘real and immediate’ threat of future

violations of their rights . . . .” Scherr v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1074

(7th Cir. 2013) (citing City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). “For

purposes of standing to seek injunctive relief against future harm, courts

generally assume that litigants ‘will conduct their activities within the law . . . .’”

Simic v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting O’Shea v.

Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,497 (1974)). Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive

relief when the alleged injury is wholly in the past. See Schirmer v. Nagode, 621

F.3d 581, 585-586 (7th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases).

Neither party argues about whether Ms. Ananias suffered a harm akin to

one traditionally recognized in American courts. Rather, St. Vincent says Ms.

Ananias didn’t suffer an injury in fact because she received a COVID-19 vaccine

before the deadline and so didn’t lose her job or suffer any other adverse

employment action. St. Vincent also points to Ms. Ananias’s lack of financial

damages as proof that she didn’t suffer an injury. Ms. Ananias argues in

response that she was harmed by having to choose between getting the vaccine

or following her religious beliefs. She relies primarily on a nonbinding,

unpublished preliminary injunction case to argue that coercion to get vaccinated

is a harm. See Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 21-11159, 2022 WL 486610

(5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022). St. Vincent replies that the standard for showing harm

for a preliminary injunction is different than for a Title VII case and choosing

whether to get a vaccine isn’t an actionable harm.

The right to practice religion is well established and highly litigated in the

United States. One of the vessels for such suits is Title VII, which “prohibit[s] an

employer from intentionally discriminating against an employee based on the

employee’s religion.” Porter v. City of Chi., 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2012)

(citation omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). But simply disliking or disagreeing

with terms of employment because of one’s religious beliefs doesn’t mean an

employee has a cause of action. See Porter v. City of Chi., 700 F.3d at 954 (“[N]ot

everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.

Otherwise, minor and even trivial employment actions that ‘an . . . employee did

not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.’” (quoting Smart v. Ball

State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996))); Klaassen v. Trustees of Ind. Univ.,

7 F. 4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021) (“People who do not want to be vaccinated may

go elsewhere.”); Bridges v. Hous. Methodist Hosp., 543 F. Supp. 3d 525, 528

(S.D. Tex. 2021) (“[Plaintiff] says that she is being forced to be injected with a

vaccine or be fired. This is not coercion. . . . [Plaintiff] can freely choose to accept

or refuse a COVID-19 vaccine; however, if she refuses, she will simply need to

work somewhere else.”). Ms. Ananias’s alleged harm isn’t related to a

traditionally recognized harm, and other courts have declined to find standing

when the plaintiff challenging a vaccine mandate has already chosen whether to

comply with the mandate. See Andre-Rodney v. Hochul, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No.

1:21-cv-1053 (BKS/CFH), 2022 WL 3027094, at *1 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2022)

(plaintiffs who got vaccine and returned to work no longer had standing to

pursue § 1983 action); Klaassen v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 549 F. Supp. 3d 836,

858 (N.D. Ind. 2021) vacated as moot 24 F.4th 638 (7th Cir. 2022) (university

student had standing because she was ineligible for COVID-19 vaccine

exemption and had not yet chosen whether to get vaccine or not attend

university; case vacated and dismissed as moot once she decided not to attend).

Ms. Ananias responds by analogizing her case to Sambrano v. United

Airlines, a preliminary injunction case in which the plaintiffs hadn’t chosen

whether to get vaccinated yet and were actively being pressured to get the

vaccine. St. Vincent correctly points out that the standard for preliminary

injunctions is different than showing an injury in fact for standing purposes.

E.g., Marciano v. de Blasio, 589 F. Supp. 3d 423, 431 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)

(“[E]stablishing that there is a substantial threat of irreparable injury on a

motion for preliminary injunction is a much taller task than showing injury-in-

fact to survive a motion to dismiss.” (quoting Gbalazeh v. City of Dall., 394 F.

Supp. 3d 666, 672 (N.D. Tex. 2019))).

Even so, Ms. Ananias’s argument doesn’t account for a key aspect of

preliminary injunction cases about vaccine mandates: they distinguish plaintiffs

who have already been vaccinated. Sambrano v. United Airlines, 2022 WL

486610, at *9 (“Plaintiffs are . . . challenging the ongoing coercion of being forced

to choose either to contravene their religious convictions or to lose pay

indefinitely. In such cases, when an employee is subjected to ongoing coercion

because of a protected characteristic, the irreparable harm factor of the

preliminary injunction analysis is satisfied.”); Halczenko v. Ascension Health,

Inc., 37 F.4th 1321, 1326 (7th Cir. 2022) (irreparable harm factor not satisfied

when doctor already chose not to comply with vaccine mandate and was fired);

Together Emps. v. Mass Gen. Brigham Inc., 19 F.4th 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2021) (“[A]s

the deadline for being vaccinated has passed, the appellants cannot point to an

‘impossible choice’ as a special factor here; they have already made their

choices.”). Ms. Ananias already made the choice to get vaccinated and so doesn’t

fall into the category of plaintiffs alleging irreparable injury from having to make

the choice. Ms. Ananias hasn’t established that she suffered an injury in fact to

pursue her damages claims.

Nor has Ms. Ananias indicated that there is a “real and immediate” threat

that St. Vincent will violate her or other employees’ rights in the future to

establish an injury in fact for injunctive relief. First, she asks the court to

permanently enjoin St. Vincent from engaging in any policy or practice that

discriminates based on religious belief. Ms. Ananias hasn’t alleged that her

purported harm is ongoing or that there’s any likelihood that St. Vincent’s

employment policies will harm her in the future, and the court won’t infer that

St. Vincent will behave illegally in the future. See Simic v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d

at 738. Ms. Ananias also requests that she be reinstated to her original position

and salary, but nothing in the complaint or in either party’s briefing indicates

that Ms. Ananias suffered any change to her employment status, pay, or benefits,

nor is there any indication that those things will be threatened in the future.

Accordingly, she hasn’t established an injury in fact for her injunctive claims.

St. Vincent also contests whether Ms. Ananias has satisfied the third

element of standing: redressability. To meet this requirement, it must be likely—

not just speculative—that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (citation omitted).

St. Vincent says this lawsuit won’t provide redress to Ms. Ananias:

injunctive relief would have no effect on her because her employment never

stopped or changed; her requests for monetary relief “def[y] common sense”

because she has admitted St. Vincent doesn’t owe her any money. Ms. Ananias

doesn’t address her requested injunctive relief or claims for lost wages, benefits,

back pay, and other compensation, but she says a jury could award her damages

based on St. Vincent’s failure to accommodate her religious belief.

Ms. Ananias’s requests for injunctive relief don’t meet the redressability

requirement. Ms. Ananias doesn’t appear to have changed positions or suffered

any loss in salary, so injunctive relief on those grounds would have no practical

impact or help fix her alleged injury. Nor would issuing a blanket injunction

against St. Vincent to never enact a discriminatory policy again provide any

redress for Ms. Ananias’s qualms with the already-executed vaccine mandate.

As far as damages go, Ms. Ananias requests front pay, back pay, lost

wages, benefits, and other financial loss. Ms. Ananias hasn’t alleged she has

been deprived of any pay or benefits or otherwise suffered any monetary loss

because of St. Vincent’s actions. An award for wages, front pay, back pay,

benefits, and the other compensation Ms. Ananias identifies wouldn’t redress

her alleged harm.

Ms. Ananias also requests compensatory and punitive damages. Had she

alleged an injury in fact, an award of compensatory and punitive damages could

have provided redress for her injury. In Title VII cases, a plaintiff may recover

compensatory and punitive damages for nonpecuniary losses. See Payton v.

Walsh, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1062 (S.D. Ind. 2022) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§1981a(b)(3)) (listing emotional pain, suffering, mental anguish, and other

injuries as compensable nonpecuniary damages). So, even though Ms. Ananias

hasn’t suffered any pecuniary loss, she could have been compensated for

nonpecuniary damage. This doesn’t change that Ms. Ananias hasn’t alleged an

injury in fact and so doesn’t have standing.

Because Ms. Ananias hasn’t established that she has suffered an injury in

fact with respect to any of her claims or that this suit would provide redress with

respect to most of her claims, Ms. Ananias doesn’t have standing. Accordingly,

the court doesn’t have jurisdiction to reach the merits of this case, and the court

grants St. Vincent’s motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 22].

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

(1) DENIES Ms. Ananias’s motion to file a surreply [Doc. No. 31];

(2) GRANTS St. Vincent’s motion to dismiss Ms. Ananias’s amended

complaint, [Doc. No. 22], and DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment

accordingly; and

(3) DENIES AS MOOT Ms. Ananias’s motion for extension of time to file a

response to the motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 26].

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: December 19, 2022

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.

Judge, United States District Court

Distribution to all counsel of record via CM/ECF.