GEFT OUTDOOR LLC v. CITY OF FISHERS, INDIANA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

GEFT OUTDOOR LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:21-cv-03058-JPH-MPB

)

CITY OF FISHERS, INDIANA, )

CITY OF FISHERS BOARD OF ZONING )

APPEALS, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

GEFT OUTDOOR is an advertising company that wants to construct two

digital billboards in Fishers, Indiana, on property that it has leased. But the

billboards don't meet the sign standards in Fishers's Unified Development

Ordinance, and the Fishers Board of Zoning Appeals denied GEFT's requests

for variances. GEFT therefore brought this case, alleging that the sign

standards and variance process violate the First Amendment. It also seeks a

preliminary injunction that would prevent Fishers from enforcing the sign

standards against the two proposed billboards. For the reasons below, that

motion is DENIED. Dkt. [10].

I.

Facts & Background1

GEFT is an outdoor advertiser that buys or leases land to use for signs

that would convey "both commercial and noncommercial speech." Dkt. 1 at 3

(verified complaint). It has leased portions of two properties in Fishers and

plans to put up digital billboards on both. Id. at 3–4. The first billboard, on

131st Street, would be "a 70-foot double-sided, back-to-back billboard with

digital displays on both sides." Id. at 9. The second, on 106th Street, would be

"a 70-foot double-sided, back-to-back billboard with one side having a digital

display and the other with a static display." Id.

Under Fishers's Unified Development Ordinance ("UDO"), GEFT must

apply for and obtain a permit before putting up a sign, as defined by the UDO.

UDO § 6.17.3.A ("It is unlawful for any person to place, alter, or to permit the

placement or alteration of a sign . . . without first obtaining an approved sign

permit application."); dkt. 32-4 at 4. The UDO defines a Sign as:

Any name, identification, description, display, or

illustration which is affixed to, painted on, or is

represented directly or indirectly upon a building,

structure, or piece of land, and which directs attention

to an object, product, place, activity, person, institution,

organization, or business. Religious symbols on places

of worship or structures owned and operated by

religious organizations are not considered a sign unless

accompanied with text. Address numbers are not

considered a sign.

1 By agreement of the parties, there has been no evidentiary hearing. See dkt. 19; dkt.

36. The Court therefore bases these facts on the written record, including the

uncontested allegations and designated deposition testimony.

Dkt. 27 at 4 (quoting UDO art. 12.2).2

The Fishers Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA") denied GEFT's requests for

variances for the proposed billboards. Dkt. 1 at 10–11. GEFT then brought

this action, alleging that (1) Fishers' sign standards use content-based

restrictions on speech in violation of the United States and Indiana

Constitutions, (2) the permitting and variance schemes in Fishers' UDO are

unconstitutional prior restraints on speech under the United States and

Indiana Constitutions, and (3) the BZA's denials of GEFT's variance requests

violate the United States Constitution and exceeded its statutory authority. Id.

at 12–20.3

GEFT also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, arguing that

portions of Fishers' UDO violate the First Amendment because they "contain

impermissible content-based regulations and/or impermissible prior restraints

on speech." Dkt. 11 at 2; see dkt. 10 (limiting GEFT's motion for a preliminary

injunction to its first and second claims). GEFT seeks a preliminary injunction

preventing Fishers from enforcing its UDO with respect to GEFT's two proposed

billboards. Dkt. 10.

2 The current UDO appears to have removed the religious-symbol exclusion, with an

effective date of May 16, 2022. See http://online.encodeplus.com/regs/fishers-

in/doc-viewer.aspx#secid-1.

3 Fishers filed a motion to dismiss GEFT's first and third causes of action, dkt. 25, but

the Court need not resolve that motion in deciding GEFT's motion for a preliminary

injunction.

II.

Applicable Law

Injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is "an exercise

of very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly

demanding it." Cassell v. Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021). To

obtain such extraordinary relief, the party seeking the preliminary injunction

carries the burden of persuasion by a clear showing. See id.; Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).

Determining whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate under Rule

65 involves a two-step inquiry, with a threshold phase and a balancing phase.

Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1044

(7th Cir. 2017). At the threshold phase, the moving party must show that: (1)

without the requested relief, it will suffer irreparable harm during the pendency

of its action; (2) traditional legal remedies would be inadequate; and (3) it has

"a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits." Id. "If the moving party

cannot establish . . . these prerequisites, a court's inquiry is over and the

injunction must be denied." Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971

F.2d 6, 12 (7th Cir. 1992).

If the movant satisfies the threshold requirements, the Court proceeds to

the balancing phase "to determine whether the balance of harm favors the

moving party or whether the harm to other parties or the public sufficiently

outweighs the movant's interests." Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1044. This "involves

a 'sliding scale' approach: the more likely the plaintiff is to win on the merits,

the less the balance of harms needs to weigh in his favor, and vice versa."

Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020).

III.

Analysis

GEFT has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its arguments

that the UDO includes some content-based provisions and that its permitting

and variance schemes are unconstitutional prior restraints. It has not shown,

however, that it is entitled to the broad preliminary injunctive relief that it

seeks—an order declaring the UDO's sign standards "unconstitutional in their

entirety," preventing enforcement of the UDO, and allowing GEFT to put up its

proposed signs. Dkt. 10 at 2; dkt. 11 at 32. That's because the provisions of

the UDO that are likely unconstitutional are severable from the rest of the

UDO, which would still regulate GEFT's proposed billboards.

A. GEFT's Challenge to Content-Based Regulation of Speech

GEFT argues that the UDO violates the First Amendment because it

regulates signs based on content. Dkt. 11 at 2. GEFT contends that two parts

of the UDO are content-based—its definition of "sign," because it excludes

religious symbols, and its section on "Post Signs," because it does not require a

permit for qualifying "for sale" or "for lease" signs. Id. at 23–26. Regarding the

religious-symbol exclusion, Fishers briefly argues that, at least in the

permitting context, it isn't content based because religious symbols are only

excluded if accompanied by text. Dkt. 27 at 20. So, Fishers contends, it's "the

mere physical existence of the text—not its substance or content—that

matters." Id.

The UDO's exclusion of religious symbols from its "sign" definition is

content based because religious symbols convey a message and are treated less

restrictively than other messages. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S.

155, 163 (2015) ("Government regulation of speech is content based if a law

applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or

message displayed."). Fishers's argument glosses over the required

determination whether something is in fact a religious symbol—which is itself

communicative. See American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 139 S. Ct.

2067, 2074–76 (2019) (explaining the messages, both religious and secular,

that can be conveyed with the symbol of the cross).

For example, GEFT could not display certain symbols, such as a

"republican elephant," without first meeting the UDO's sign restrictions. See

dkt. 32 at 2. Yet under the UDO, another group could display a similarly sized

religious symbol free from regulation. See id. That is content-based regulation

because the nature of the symbol—and thus the nature of the message—is the

reason for the unequal treatment. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163 ("The

commonsense meaning of the phrase 'content-based' requires a court to

consider whether a regulation of speech 'on its face' draws distinctions based

on the message . . . . Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious,

defining regulated speech by particular subject matter.").

Regarding the post-sign regulations, Fishers does not contest—for the

purpose of resolving GEFT's motion for a preliminary injunction—that "for sale"

and "for lease" signs are not content neutral. See dkt. 27 at 27–28. The Court

therefore treats the post-sign provisions as content based also. See Reed, 576

U.S. at 164 (explaining that "defining regulated speech by its function or

purpose" is a distinction "drawn based on the message a speaker conveys" and

is therefore content based).

B. GEFT's Challenge to the UDO's Permitting Provisions

Under the UDO, "[i]t is unlawful for any person to place, alter, or to

permit the placement or alteration of a sign . . . without first obtaining an

approved sign permit application." UDO § 6.17.3.A; dkt. 32-4 at 4. GEFT

contends that this requirement is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech

because it gives Fishers "unbridled discretion" to suppress speech before it

occurs. Dkt. 11 at 10–11, 19–21. Fishers responds that its permitting process

is content neutral and limited to applying the UDO's express provisions, so it is

constitutional. Dkt. 27 at 17–20.

Fishers's sign-permit requirement is a prior restraint on speech because

it requires a permit before a sign is put up. See City of Lakewood v. Plain

Dealer Pub'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988) ("[A] licensing statute placing

unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency constitutes

a prior restraint and may result in censorship."). "In general, prior restraints

are highly disfavored and presumed invalid." Stokes v. City of Madison, 930

F.2d 1163, 1169 (7th Cir. 1991). But a prior restraint may be allowed if

"procedural safeguards tightly control the discretion of the administrative

authority and subject it to rapid judicial review." Id. In short, the "settled rule

is that a system of prior restraint avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes

place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a

censorship system." Id. (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420

U.S. 546, 559 (1975)).

The extent of procedural protections that are required depends on

whether the prior restraint is content based. If it is, then the safeguards from

Freedman v. Maryland must generally be provided: "(1) any restraint prior to

judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period during which the

status quo must be maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of that decision

must be available; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to

suppress the speech and must bear the burden of proof once in court."

Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002) (citing Freedman v.

Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)).

Because putting up a "sign"—as defined by the UDO—requires a permit,

and the UDO's "sign" definition is content based due to its religious-symbol

exclusion, Fishers's permitting scheme is not content neutral. While Fishers

argues that its permitting procedures would support a content-neutral

licensing scheme, it does not contend that they can support a content-based

one. Dkt. 27 at 17–20. Nor has Fishers shown that its ordinance provides the

type of "expeditious judicial review" at which it "must bear the burden of proof."

Thomas, 534 U.S. at 321; see FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,

227–30 (1990).

GEFT has therefore shown a likelihood of success on its claim that

Fishers's sign-permitting scheme does not provide the required constitutional

protections.

C. GEFT's Challenge to the UDO's Variance Provisions

GEFT argues that Fishers's variance process is unconstitutional because

it applies "broad, subjective, and amorphous" criteria that invite content-based

discrimination. Dkt. 11 at 12–13. Fishers responds that entities denied

variances can pursue further review in a Board of Zoning Appeals, where

appropriate safeguards would be provided. Dkt. 27 at 22–23.

The UDO allowed4 variances from sign standards based only on certain

determinations:

1. A variance of land use may be approved only upon a

determination that the Findings of Fact

demonstrate:

a. The use will not be injurious to the public health,

safety, morals, and general welfare of the

community.

b. The use and value of the area adjacent to the

property including in the Variance will not be

affected in a substantially adverse manner.

c. The need for the Variance arises from some

condition to the property involved.

d. The strict application of the terms of the UDO will

constitute an unnecessary hardship if applied to

the property for which the Variance is sought.

e. Does not interfere substantially with the

Comprehensive Plan.

4 The current UDO appears to have been modified with specific standards for

variances from the UDO's sign requirements. See http://online.encodeplus.com/

regs/fishers-in/doc-viewer.aspx#secid-1, § 10.2.24.E.6.

UDO § 10.2.24.E.1 (Dkt. 32-5 at 37).

Because the variance scheme is part of the UDO's permitting scheme, it

is a prior restraint, International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, Mich., 974 F.3d

690, 697–98 (6th Cir. 2020), and is therefore "highly disfavored and presumed

invalid," Stokes, 930 F.2d at 1169. To survive, a prior restraint "must contain

narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority."

Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992). "The

reasoning is simple"—if the prior restraint "involves appraisal of facts, the

exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion . . . the danger of

censorship and of abridgement of our precious First Amendment freedoms is

too great to be permitted." Id.

The variance procedure required a determination from findings of fact

and allowed denials based on "multiple vague and undefined criteria" including

"morals," "general welfare," and "unnecessary hardship." International Outdoor,

974 F.3d at 698. Those criteria were vague enough that they "gave a

government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the

content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked

speakers." Id. (quoting Plain Dealer Pub'g Co., 486 U.S. at 759). They were

therefore "an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech." Id.; see GEFT

Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Monroe County, Ind., No. 1:19-cv-1257-JRS-MPB, 2021 WL

5494483 at *12–13 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 23, 2021) (appeal pending) (holding that

Monroe County's essentially identical variance procedure was

unconstitutionally vague because the criteria were "value laden and susceptible

to wide and varying differences of opinion").

GEFT has therefore shown a likelihood of success on its claim that

Fishers's variance scheme is an unconstitutional prior restraint.

D. Severability

For the reasons above, GEFT has shown a likelihood of success on its

claims that certain portions of the UDO are unconstitutional content-based

regulations and prior restraints. GEFT argues that these unconstitutional

UDO provisions cannot be severed, so the UDO's sign regulations must be

stricken "in their entirety." Dkt. 11 at 27–31. Fishers responds that under the

UDO's express severability clause, any problematic parts of the UDO can be

stricken while the rest of the UDO remains in effect. Dkt. 27 at 23–30.

"Severability of a local ordinance is a question of state law." City of

Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988). Under

Indiana law, a statute or ordinance with an unconstitutional provision "is not

necessarily void in its entirety." Paul Steiler Enters., Inc. v. City of Evansville, 2

N.E.3d 1269, 1279 (Ind. 2014). Instead, the "unobjectionable" portions can be

severed and remain in effect if (1) they can be given legal effect and (2) "the

legislature intended the provision[s] to stand" if others fall. Id.

1. Legal Effect of Remaining Provisions

Here, the remainder of the UDO can be given legal effect even if the

challenged portions are severed. Without its religious-symbol exclusion, the

UDO's definition of "sign" would be: "Any name, identification, description,

display, or illustration which is affixed to, painted on, or is represented directly

or indirectly upon a building, structure, or piece of land, and which directs

attention to an object, product, place, activity, person, institution, organization,

or business. . . . Address numbers are not considered a sign." UDO art. 12.2.

That leaves a standard "sign" definition that doesn't make any of the UDO's

other provisions—like the pole sign ban and digital sign ban—unworkable. See

In re City of Mishawaka, 289 N.E.2d 510, 535 (Ind. 1972) ("[T]he deletion leaves

the remainder of the statute in a sensible, complete form, capable of being

executed alike against all similarly situated or affected."). Indeed, it's

unsurprising that the mere removal of an exclusion leaves a workable legal

standard. See Paul Stieler, 2 N.E.3d at 1279 ("Standing along and without its

exemption for riverboat casinos, the [amended smoking ban] could be given

legal effect.").

The same is true of Fishers's permitting scheme. Without it, Fishers

would simply have to enforce its sign standards "on the back end," as it already

does when someone neglects to obtain a permit in advance or puts up a sign

that deviates from its approved permit. Dkt. 32-1 at 13–14 (Vukusich 30(b)(6)

dep. at 42–47); see GEFT Outdoor, 2021 WL 5494483 at *13 ("Instead of taking

place on the front end before a sign is erected, regulation of signs will occur on

the back end after a sign has been erected through an ordinance enforcement

procedure."). This resolves GEFT's content-based challenge to the UDO's post-

sign regulations also, because GEFT argues that whether a permit is required

impermissibly depends on the content of the sign. Dkt. 11 at 25. The

severance of the permitting scheme removes that different treatment, because

then no signs would require permits.

Last, the removal of Fishers's variance scheme would not prevent the

remainder of the UDO from having legal effect. Indeed, the only effect would be

that no variances and no discretion would be permitted—the UDO's standards

could not be relaxed. International Outdoor, 974 F.3d at 699 (holding that the

sign-variance procedures at issue were severable, meaning "that no grant of a

variance [is] possible"); accord GEFT Outdoor, 2021 WL 5494483 at *13 (holding

that Monroe County's unconstitutional variance scheme for sign standards was

severable); Conteers LLC v. City of Akron, No. 5:20-cv-542, 2020 WL 5529656

at *13–14 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2020).

2. Fishers's Intent on Severance

For the intent of the legislative body, Indiana law focuses on severability

provisions, which create a presumption that any "infirm provision . . . is

severable, leaving the remainder intact." City of Hammond v. Herman & Kittle

Props., Inc., 119 N.E.3d 70, 87 (Ind. 2019); see Paul Stieler, 2 N.E.3d at 1279.

Here, the UDO includes a severability provision: "If any provision or the

application of any provision of the UDO is held unconstitutional or invalid by

the courts, the remainder of the UDO or the application of such provision to

other circumstances shall not be affected." UDO § 1.2.4. The resulting

presumption is that Fishers would intend the remainder of the UDO to stay in

effect.

GEFT nevertheless argues that the UDO isn't severable because Fishers

wouldn't intend to have sign standards so different from what it enacted. Dkt.

32 at 2, 16–17. GEFT contends, for example, that if the religious-symbol

exclusion is severable from the definition of "sign," then religious symbols

would be regulated as signs despite the sign definition originally calling for the

opposite. Id. But this argument asks the wrong question because it focuses

on the original standards instead of on "whether [Fishers] intended the

remainder of the [UDO] to stand if the invalid provision" is struck down.

Herman & Kittle Props., 119 N.E.3d at 87 (emphasis added). Besides, Fishers

did address in its original ordinance's severability clause what it intends if "any

provision"—without exception—were struck down. UDO § 1.2.4 (emphasis

added).

GEFT has not overcome the strong presumption of severability created by

the express severability clause, for three reasons. First, there's no evidence

that the UDO would not have been adopted without those provisions. See Paul

Stieler, 2 N.E.3d at 1279. Second, the sign provisions' explicit purposes

include "maintaining the City's aesthetic environment," "guarding against

excessive advertising and the confusing proliferation of signs," and "minimizing

the distraction of excessive and intrusive signs." UDO § 6.17.1. None of those

legitimate purposes could be achieved without sign restrictions. See Midwest

Media Prop., L.L.C. v. Symmes Township, Ohio, 503 F.3d 456, 464 (6th Cir.

2007). Third, the sign standards are comprehensive, demonstrating Fishers's

strong interest in sign regulation generally and the UDO's limitations

specifically. See In re Mishawaka, 289 N.E.2d at 513.

The UDO therefore shows Fishers's intent that its sign standards be

severable.

E. GEFT's Entitlement to Injunctive Relief

Fishers argues that even if GEFT prevails on its constitutional challenges

to certain parts of the UDO, GEFT's proposed billboards are still subject to

regulation under other parts of the UDO that remain intact, including the pole

sign ban (§ 6.17.2.A)5, digital sign ban (§ 6.17.5.I), and maximum area and

height limitations for ground signs (§ 6.17.6.E). Dkt. 27 at 9–10; see dkt. 26.

GEFT contends that the Court should find the entire sign standards

unconstitutional and thus unenforceable because of the content-based

religious symbol exclusion in the UDO's definition of "sign.". Dkt. 32 at 5–8;

see dkt. 11 at 27–28.

As explained above, the religious-symbol exclusion is severable from the

UDO's definition of "sign." And GEFT's proposed billboards do not conform

with other provisions of the UDO that remain intact.6 See dkt. 1; dkt. 11; dkt.

5 Under this section, "[t]he only signs permitted are those stated in [UDO Article 6.17];

all other signs are prohibited unless otherwise stated within the UDO." § 6.17.2.A.

Pole signs are not an allowed sign in the UDO. See § 6.17.6.

6 Moreover, the current version of Fishers's UDO no longer includes the religious-

symbol exclusion from the "sign" definition. See http://online.encodeplus.com/

regs/fishers-in/doc-viewer.aspx#secid-1; https://www.fishers.in.us/DocumentCenter

/View/30426/UDO-Text-Amendment---Ordinance---041822E---Final-Reading. The

parties have not addressed that apparent development, but it's possible that due to it,

"the need for an injunction has disappeared." Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of

Milwaukee, 821 F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir. 2016) (addressing when there is no need for

an injunction in a facial challenge to an ordinance once it has been repealed).

32 at 7. Consider the prohibition on digital signs, UDO § 6.17.5.I, and the

maximum area and height limitations, UDO § 6.17.6.E. These parts of the

UDO—unchallenged by GEFT except through their use of the defined term

"sign"— would still prohibit GEFT's proposed signs. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo,

512 U.S. 43, 48 (1994) ("It is common ground that governments may regulate

the physical characteristics of signs."); Leibundguth Storage & Van Serv., Inc. v.

Vill. of Downers Grove, Ill., 939 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 2019) ("A limit on the

size and presentation of signs is a standard time, place, and manner rule, a

form of aesthetic zoning. The Supreme Court has told us that aesthetic limits

on signs are compatible with the First Amendment.").

Because the challenged provisions are severable, the provisions banning

digital signs and imposing maximum area and height limitations remain

enforceable and would prohibit GEFT's proposed billboards. The only change

would be that they would also apply to religious symbols, which has no bearing

on whether GEFT's proposed signs comply with the UDO. GEFT's signs would

therefore still be regulated "even if" it succeeds on its content-based

challenges." Harp Advertising Ill., Inc. v. Vill. of Chicago Ridge, Ill., 9 F.3d 1290,

1291 (7th Cir. 1993); see Midwest Media, 503 F.3d at 461–62. GEFT therefore

has not shown that it is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief preventing

enforcement of the entire UDO. See Harp Advertising Ill., 9 F.3d at 1292.7

7 Because GEFT is not entitled to the sweeping injunction that it seeks, the Court does

not address—at this stage—whether GEFT lacks standing because any injuries are not

redressable. See Simic v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017)

(addressing standing to seek injunctive relief and explaining that a district court "can

In short, GEFT has shown a likelihood of success on its claims that the

UDO includes some content-based provisions and that its permitting and

variance schemes are unconstitutional prior restraints. But GEFT has not

shown that it is entitled to a broad preliminary injunction that would allow

GEFT to put up its proposed signs subject to no regulation, dkt. 10 at 2; dkt.

11 at 32. See E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 841 (7th Cir. 2013)

("[I]njunctions should prohibit no more than the violation established in the

litigation or similar conduct reasonably related to the violation."). Because the

rest of the UDO remains intact after the unconstitutional provisions have been

severed, GEFT's proposed billboards would still be subject to regulation under

at least the UDO's digital sign ban and maximum area and height limitations.

GEFT is not entitled to the broad preliminary injunctive relief that it

seeks—an order declaring the UDO's sign standards "unconstitutional in their

entirety," preventing enforcement of the UDO, and allowing GEFT to put up its

proposed signs. Dkt. 10 at 2; dkt. 11 at 32. Therefore, GEFT's motion for a

preliminary injunction is DENIED.8

IV.

Conclusion

GEFT's motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. Dkt. [10].

SO ORDERED.

address a motion for a preliminary injunction without making a conclusive decision

about whether it as subject matter jurisdiction").

8 The denial is without prejudice to GEFT renewing its motion for preliminary

injunctive relief, subject to this order, and seeking a narrower preliminary injunction.

Date: 8/11/2022

Sjamu Patrick ltawloe

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

William J. Barkimer

KRIEG DEVAULT LLP

wbarkimer@kdlegal.com

A. Richard M. Blaiklock

LEWIS WAGNER, LLP

rblaiklock@lewiswagner.com

Matthew C. Branic

KRIEG DEVAULT LLP (Carmel)

mbranic@kdlegal.com

Libby Yin Goodknight

KRIEG DEVAULT LLP (Indianapolis)

lgoodknight@kdlegal.com

Mark J. R. Merkle

KRIEG DEVAULT LLP (Indianapolis)

mmerkle@kdlegal.com

18