SHINNEMAN v. INDIANAPOLIS-MARION COUNTY CITY-COUNTY COUNCIL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

TRAVIS SHINNEMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:21-cv-02203-JMS-TAB

)

INDIANAPOLIS-MARION COUNTY CITY- )

COUNTY COUNCIL, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

Order on City Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The plaintiff Travis Shinneman alleges that Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department

(IMPD) Officers Theodore Brink, Joshua Brown, Brian Linares, and Terry Smith violated his

constitutional rights when they either failed to intervene or participated in throwing him headfirst

into a Marion County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) van while he was handcuffed and allowed him to

be transported without a seatbelt or other safety restraints resulting in severe injuries. He also

alleges that the Indianapolis-Marion County City-County Council's (Council) policy requiring

IMPD to use MCSO to transport detainees despite the lack of seatbelts in the transport vehicles

was the moving force behind his injuries. The Council and the four IMPD officers (City

Defendants) have moved for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons below, the motion is

granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

In deciding the motion, the Court accepts as true Mr. Shinneman's account of how he was

treated while in the custody of IMPD and MCSO. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616

(7th Cir. 2011). He alleges that on September 8, 2019, defendants Officers Brink, Brown, Linares,

and Smith arrested him for disorderly conduct and public intoxication because he had been walking

in the street and yelling. Pursuant to policy, the officers requested MCSO to transport

Mr. Shinneman to the Marion County Jail. MCSO Deputy Monday arrived on the scene and

became frustrated with Mr. Shinneman's difficulty entering the back of the van. Deputy Monday

and another unknown officer, presumably one of the four IMPD defendants, tossed a hand-cuffed

Mr. Shinneman headfirst into the back of the van. Deputy Monday transported him without a

seatbelt or other safety restraint. When Mr. Shinneman arrived at the Marion County Jail, he was

assaulted by several deputies and transported by ambulance to Eskenazi Hospital where was

diagnosed as a quadriplegic. Dkt. 63.

II. Legal Standard

The City Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is evaluated under the

same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 646

(7th Cir. 2016), so the Court reviews the pending motion under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A facially plausible claim is one that allows "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court

will "accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true" but will not defer to "legal conclusions

and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim." McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616.

III. Discussion

Mr. Shinneman does not object to the dismissal of the following claims: official-capacity

claims against Officers Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith (dkt. 76 at 13); state law claims against

the Council (id. at 20-21); and state law claims against the four Officers (id. at 20). Mr. Shinneman

asks that the state law claims against the officers be dismissed without prejudice so that he may

move to amend his complaint if he discovers that their actions were outside the scope of their

employment. Id. Because Mr. Shinneman does not object to the dismissal of these claims, the City

Defendants' motion to dismiss them is granted.

This leaves two sets of claims against the City Defendants: Fourth Amendment claims

against the four officers and a Monell policy claim against the Council. Mr. Shinneman's basis for

these claims is that the Council maintained a policy of delegating the transport of detainees to

MCSO despite knowing that MCSO transport vehicles lacked seatbelts or other safety restraints.

He asserts that the Council's policy, and the four officers' adherence to that policy, resulted in him

being transported without a seatbelt and being rendered a quadriplegic.

A. Fourth Amendment Claims Against IMPD Officers

1. Plausible Claim for Relief

Mr. Shinneman claims that defendant Officers Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith violated

his rights when they failed to arrange other transport for him when they realized he was intoxicated

and was going to be transported without a seatbelt in the MCSO van. Dkt. 63 at 22, ¶ 114. He also

alleges that two individuals grabbed him on either side and tossed him headfirst into the van while

he was handcuffed. Id. at 6, ¶ 31. Although he does not know who tossed him into the van, Deputy

Monday was the only non-IMPD officer present, so presumably one of the IMPD officers assisted

him. At the least, the Court can infer from the amended complaint that Mr. Shinneman alleges that

the other officers failed to stop the two individuals from tossing him into the van.

Because Mr. Shinneman was a pretrial detainee who had not yet had a probable cause

hearing, the Court applies the Fourth Amendments' objective unreasonableness standard. Estate of

Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 452 (7th Cir. 2017). An officer who is present and fails to intervene

to prevent other law enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is

liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason to know that other officers were committing a

constitutional violation and he had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm. Yang v. Hardin, 37

F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994).

Mr. Shinneman's allegations that one of the four IMPD officers participated in tossing him

headfirst into the MCSO van while he was handcuffed, and that the remaining officers failed to

intervene, state a viable Fourth Amendment claim. A reasonable jury could conclude that it was

objectively unreasonable to either participate or fail to intervene in this conduct.

It is less clear whether Mr. Shinneman's allegations that the IMPD officers failed to protect

him from being transported without a seatbelt state a viable Fourth Amendment claim. In Dale v.

Agresta, in the context of a qualified immunity defense to an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim regarding failure to seatbelt a convicted prisoner, the Seventh Circuit held that

a convicted inmate did not have a clearly established right to a seatbelt during transport under the

Eighth Amendment. 771 F. App'x 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2019). Because Mr. Shinneman's claims are

governed by the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard, Dale does not foreclose

a Fourth Amendment violation when an officer fails to seatbelt an arrestee. The Court need not

decide whether to extend Dale's reasoning to the Fourth Amendment context, because the

individual officers are protected by qualified immunity as to these claims.

2. Qualified Immunity

"A state official is protected by qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows: (1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at

the time of the challenged conduct." Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). "'If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant

official' is protected by qualified immunity." Id. (quoting Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629 (7th Cir.

2017)). Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). "Because a qualified immunity

defense so closely depends 'on the facts of the case,' a 'complaint is generally not dismissed under

[Rule 12] on qualified immunity grounds.'" Id. at 548 (quoting Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648,

651 (7th Cir. 2001)).

Mr. Shinneman had a clearly established Fourth Amendment right not to be tossed into a

van headfirst while handcuffed. Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1990) ("If the

officers intentionally restrained, jolted, and roughed up Titran without physical provocation from

her, their behavior was unreasonable."); Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). Facts

may be developed during discovery that alter this determination, but at this stage, the IMPD

officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Shinneman's excessive force or failure-to-

protect claims. See Reed, 906 F.3d at 553 ("[A]lthough qualified immunity defenses should be

decided at 'the earliest possible stage in litigation,' Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991), the

determination whether qualified immunity exists for Palmer depends on 'particular facts' that are

not yet in the record.").

On the other hand, an arrestee's right to a seatbelt was not clearly established in September

2019. In Dale, the Seventh Circuit observed: "Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ruled

that transporting an inmate without a seatbelt creates an intolerable risk of harm." 771 F. App'x

at 661. Dale was decided a mere three months before Mr. Shinneman's arrest. Dale involved a

convicted inmate and the more rigorous Eighth Amendment standard. But absent a Fourth

Amendment case to the contrary, a reasonable officer could conclude from Dale that the transport

of an inmate without a seatbelt was not objectively unreasonable. Officers Brink, Brown, Linares,

and Smith are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Shinneman's seatbelt claim.

B. Monell Policy Claim Against the Council

Mr. Shinneman raises a claim against the Council under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on their

implementation of a policy requiring arrestees to be transported by MCSO, knowing MCSO

transport vehicles lacked seatbelts, and also based on the Council's alleged failure to train officers

in how to handle intoxicated arrestees. While municipalities and entities that contract with

municipalities can be held liable under section 1983, they cannot be held liable under a respondeat

superior theory of liability. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978). Rather, to be liable under section 1983, the entity must have caused the deprivation of the

plaintiff's federally secured rights "through its written policies, widespread practices or customs,

and the acts of a final decisionmaker." Levy v. Marion Cty. Sheriff, 940 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir.

2019) (citing Bd. of the Cty. Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997)).

As discussed above, while Dale held that it was not clearly established that convicted

inmates had a right to a seatbelt during transport, the court left the door open to the possibility of

such a right existing and supporting a Monell claim:

The department may be liable under § 1983 if its official policy or custom violates

a plaintiff's constitutional rights. Even if we assumed that the lack of seatbelt

violated Dale's Eighth Amendment rights, Dale has not produced evidence that the

sheriff's department did not provide seatbelts as a matter of policy.

771 F. App'x. at 661 (cleaned up).

Here, Mr. Shinneman claims that the Council maintained a policy of using MCSO for the

transport of arrestees (IMPD General Order 8.1(I)(F), that the Order did not give IMPD officers

discretion to consider transport alternatives, that the Council knew MCSO transport vehicles

lacked seatbelts or other restraints, and that this policy directly led to his injuries. Dkt. 63 at 5, ¶ 26;

14, ¶ 81; 16, ¶91; 18, ¶ 96. These allegations give the Council fair notice and state a plausible

Monell claim.

In contrast, Mr. Shinneman's failure to train claim lacks sufficient factual allegations to

state a plausible claim. "A municipality can be held liable under a theory of failure to train if it has

actual knowledge of a pattern of criminally reckless conduct and there is an obvious need to

provide training to avert harm, even if the prior acts have yet to result in tragedy." Flores v. City

of S. Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Mr. Shinneman alleges only that

the Council failed to train officers on the transport and emergency transport of individuals. Dkt. 63

at 18, ¶¶ 96-97. His response in opposition to the City Defendants' motion suggests that the failure

of the IMPD officers to prevent Mr. Shinneman from being transported without a seatbelt "is a

clear indication that there was a failure to train the officers on the proper recognition and handling

of intoxicated arrestees." Dkt. 76 at 19. Mr. Shinneman does not allege that the Council had actual

knowledge of a pattern of deliberate indifference or criminally reckless conduct related to the

transport of arrestees. And given the discussion in Dale regarding the lack of obvious risk

associated with transporting individuals without a seatbelt, it cannot be inferred from Mr.

Shinneman's allegations that there was an "obvious need to provide training" on transporting

arrestees "to avert harm". Flores, 997 F.3d at 733. Therefore, Mr. Shinneman's failure to train

claim against the Council is dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

In summary, the City Defendants' second motion for judgment on the pleadings, dkt. [72],

is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted to the extent that Mr. Shinneman's

state law claims against the Council and his official capacity and state law claims against Officers

Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith are dismissed. His Fourth Amendment claims against Officers

Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith for not intervening when he was transported without a seatbelt

are dismissed because the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, his failure to train

claim against the Council is dismissed. No partial final judgment shall issue at this time.

The City Defendants’ motion is denied to the extent that the following claims against them

remain:

e Fourth Amendment excessive force and failure to protect claims against Officers

Brink, Brown, Linares, and Smith based on Mr. Shinneman's allegation that two of

the officers present threw him headfirst into the van while he was handcuffed; and

e A Monell policy claim against the Council.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/1/2022

Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge

‘United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

Jennifer H. Culotta

CULOTTA & CULOTTA LLP

jennifer@culottalaw.com

J. Clayton Culotta

CULOTTA & CULOTTA LLP

clay@culottalaw.com

Carol A. Dillon

BLEEKE DILLON CRANDALL, P.C.

carol@bleekedilloncrandall.com

Andrew R. Duncan

RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT, LLP

ard@rkblegalgroup.com

Christopher Andrew Farrington

BLEEKE DILLON CRANDALL ATTORNEYS

drew@bleekedilloncrandall.com

Amy Stewart Johnson

FROST BROWN TODD LLC (Indianapolis)

asjohnson@fbtlaw.com

John F. Kautzman

RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT, LLP

jfk@rkblegalgroup.com

Edward J. Merchant

RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT, LLP

ejm@rkblegalgroup.com

Anthony W. Overholt

FROST BROWN TODD LLC (Indianapolis)

aoverholt@fbtlaw.com

Mathew Rayman

OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL

mathew.rayman2@indy.gov

Adam Scott Willfond

OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL

awillfon@travelers.com