Opinion

JOHNSON v. CLARK COUNTY SHERIFF

Court
District Court, S.D. Indiana
Filed
Jun 27, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.7%

applying Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978) to claim against an Indiana Sheriff's Office

How later courts described this case

  • applying Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978) to claim against an Indiana Sheriff's Office
  • applying objective unreasonableness inquiry to pretrial detainee's medical care claim
  • affirming district court's dismissal of claims against individual defendants in their individual capacities under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because there is no personal liability under these statutes

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

NEW ALBANY DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:21-cv-00194-TWP-DML

)

CLARK COUNTY SHERIFF AND SHERIFF'S )

DEPARTMENT JAIL, )

HEACOCK, )

BEN, )

EMERSON, )

KRAMER, )

)

Defendants. )

Order Screening Complaint, Dismissing Deficient Claims,

and Directing Further Proceedings

Plaintiff Christopher Michael Johnson is an inmate currently incarcerated at Plainfield

Correctional Facility. He initiated this civil rights action alleging violations of the Americans with

Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act, and his constitutional rights based on events that

occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at the Clark County Jail (the "Jail"). Because Mr. Johnson

is a "prisoner" as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), this Court has an obligation under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a) to screen his complaint before service on the defendants.

I. Screening Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion of

the complaint, if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining whether the complaint states

a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). To

survive dismissal,

[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints such as that filed by the plaintiff

are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).

II. The Complaint

Construing Mr. Johnson's complaint liberally, he names five defendants: (1) the Clark

County Sheriff (identified as "Clark County Sheriff and Sheriff's Department Jail")1; (2) Jail

Commander Heacock; (3) Nurse Ben; (4) Doctor Emerson; and (5) Nurse Kramer. All defendants

are sued in both their individual and official capacities. Mr. Johnson seeks monetary damages and

an order requiring the defendants to provide him with all medication that has been prescribed by

his orthopedic specialist. He bases his complaint on allegations about two separate issues, each of

which is discussed below.

A. Mistreatment Based on Disability

Mr. Johnson suffers from a physical impairment and uses a cane to walk. Since he arrived

at the Jail in December 2021, the Sheriff, Jail Commander Heacock, and jail staff have forced him

to be in a cell by himself. Mr. Johnson alleges that this results in discrimination because he cannot

have full access to a telephone or watch television like other inmates. Instead, he is forced to stay

1 The Court does not understand Mr. Johnson to be trying to sue the Jail as an entity separate from

the Sheriff or the Sheriff's Department. If he were bringing such claims, they would be subject to dismissal

because the Jail is not a suable entity.

in a cell by himself "with nothing" because he uses a cane to walk. See dkt. 1 at 2. Mr. Johnson

alleges that these actions violate the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

B. Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care

Since December 3, 2021, Doctor Emerson, Nurse Kramer, and Nurse Ben have refused to

provide Mr. Johnson with Gabapentin, which is a nerve pain medication that his orthopedic

specialist has prescribed to him for the last four years. Mr. Johnson informed Doctor Emerson,

Nurse Kramer, and Nurse Ben about his condition and provided them with documentation showing

that he needs Gabapentin, but they have refused to give him Gabapentin or any nerve pain

medication at all. Nurse Ben told Mr. Johnson that the Sheriff maintains a policy that prohibits

medical staff from giving Mr. Johnson Gabapentin. Because Mr. Johnson has not received

Gabapentin, he has been suffering in pain.

III. Discussion of Claims

Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the complaint certain claims

are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as submitted.

A. Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims

Construing Mr. Johnson's complaint liberally, he alleges that the Sheriff and Jail

Commander Heacock have violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because they have

deprived him of access to Jail programs and benefits (access to the phone and the television)

because of his disability.

To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, "the plaintiff must prove that he is a

qualified individual with a disability, that he was denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity or otherwise subjected to discrimination by such an entity, and that the

denial or discrimination was by reason of his disability." Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592

(7th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). The Rehabilitation Act is "functionally identical." Id. (cleaned up).

Under this standard, Mr. Johnson has adequately stated claims under Title II of the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act against the Sheriff in his official capacity, and those claims shall proceed.

To the extent Mr. Johnson is attempting to bring official-capacity claims against Jail

Commander Heacock under the Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, those claims are

dismissed as duplicative of the claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity.

Finally, to the extent that Mr. Johnson is attempting to bring individual-capacity claims

against the Sheriff or Jail Commander Heacock under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation

Act, those claims also fail because there is no personal liability under those statutes. See Stanek v.

St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming district

court's dismissal of claims against individual defendants in their individual capacities under Title

II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because there is no personal liability under these statutes).

Accordingly, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the Sheriff and Jail Commander

Heacock in their individual capacities are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

B. Medical Care Claims

Mr. Johnson also alleges that he was not provided with adequate medical care. Because

Mr. Johnson was a pretrial detainee while he was housed at the Jail, his claims fall under the

Fourteenth Amendment, and he must plausibly allege that the care he received was objectively

unreasonable. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (applying

objective unreasonableness inquiry to pretrial detainee's medical care claim). Under this standard,

Mr. Johnson has adequately stated claims against the Sheriff, Doctor Emerson, Nurse Ben, and

Nurse Kramer in their individual capacities, and those claims shall proceed.

Mr. Johnson also attempts to sue these defendants in their official capacities. The official-

capacity claim against the Sheriff is actually claim against his office—the Sheriff's Department.

The Sheriff's Department may only be sued when its own actions violate the Constitution. See Levy

v. Marion Cty. Sheriff, 940 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 2019) (applying Monell v. Dep't of Soc.

Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978) to claim against an Indiana Sheriff's

Office). To state such a Monell claim, Mr. Johnson must allege that an action taken by the Sheriff's

Department caused the deprivation of his federally secured rights. The Sheriff's Department "'acts'

through its written policies, widespread practices or customs, and the acts of a final

decisionmaker." Id. (citing Bd. of the Cty. Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997)).

Under this standard, Mr. Johnson has adequately stated a Monell claim against the Sheriff in his

official capacity based on the alleged denial of adequate healthcare, and this claim shall proceed.

To the extent that Mr. Johnson is also attempting to sue Doctor Emerson, Nurse Kramer,

and Nurse Ben in their official capacities, he identifies them as employees of the Jail, so such

claims are dismissed as duplicative of the official-capacity claim against the Sheriff.

C. Summary

In summary, the following claims shall proceed:

• Claims under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act against the Clark

County Sheriff in his official capacity;

• Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Clark County Sheriff, Doctor Emerson,

Nurse Ben, and Nurse Kramer in their individual capacities based on allegations of

inadequate medical care; and

• Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Clark County Sheriff in his official

capacity based on allegations of inadequate medical care.

This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the Court. All other

claims have been dismissed for the reasons stated above. If Mr. Johnson believes that additional

claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court, he shall have through July

25, 2022, in which to identify those claims.

The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect that the defendant currently identified

as "Clark County Sheriff and Sheriff's Department" should be identified as "Clark County Sheriff.”

The clerk is also directed to terminate Jail Commander Heacock as a defendant.

IV. Service of Process

The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process to defendants

Clark County Sheriff, Doctor Emerson, Nurse Ben, and Nurse Kramer in the manner specified by

Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the complaint filed on December 20, 2021, dkt. [1], applicable

forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service

of Summons), and this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 6/27/2022

Date aaah

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JOHNSON

270993

PLAINFIELD - CF

PLAINFIELD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Inmate Mail/Parcels

727 MOON ROAD

PLAINFIELD, IN 46168

Clark County Sheriff

Clark County Jail

501 E. Court Ave.

Jeffersonville, IN 47130

Doctor Emerson

Clark County Jail

501 E. Court Ave.

Jeffersonville, IN 47130

Nurse Ben

Clark County Jail

501 E. Court Ave.

Jeffersonville, IN 47130

Nurse Kramer

Clark County Jail

501 E. Court Ave.

Jeffersonville, IN 47130

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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