RANSOM v. KNIGHT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

MARK RANSOM, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:19-cv-04266-JPH-DLP

)

WENDY KNIGHT, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

At all times relevant to the complaint, Mark Ransom was a prisoner of the

Indiana Department of Correction confined at the Correctional Industrial Facility

(CIF). Mr. Ransom alleges that several staff members at CIF were deliberately

indifferent and negligent regarding his medical needs related to his leg

prosthesis. All defendants have moved for summary judgment. Because no

reasonable jury could find based on the undisputed facts that any defendant

was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, the defendants' motions

for summary judgment, dkts. [102] and [105], are GRANTED as to Mr. Ransom's

deliberate indifference claims which arise under federal law. With all federal

claims resolved, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state law negligence claims.

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Once the moving party has met its

burden, "the burden shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Spierer v. Rossman, 798

F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2015). A disputed fact is material if it might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d

936, 941–42 (7th Cir. 2016). "A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists

'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.'" Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 609–10 (7th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Valenti v. Lawson,

889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the

factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court may

rely only on admissible evidence. Cairel v. Alderen, 821 F.3d 823, 830

(7th Cir. 2016). Inadmissible evidence must be disregarded. Id.

The Court considers assertions in the parties' statements of facts that are

properly supported by citation to admissible evidence. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(e).

To the extent Mr. Ransom has failed to rebut assertions of fact in the motions

for summary judgment, those facts are "admitted without controversy" so long

as support for them exists in the record. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f); see S.D. Ind.

L.R. 56-1(b) (party opposing judgment must file response brief and identify

disputed facts); Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021) (district

court may apply local rules to deem facts unopposed on summary judgment).

Additionally, the Court has no duty to search or consider any part of the record

not specifically cited in the statements of facts. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(h).

II. Undisputed Facts

A. The Parties

Mr. Ransom wears a prosthesis because his right leg is amputated below

the knee. Dkt. 102-2 at 1−2 (Reception Diagnostic Center intake records).

Mr. Ransom was incarcerated at the CIF from June 5 to August 22, 2019.

During that time at CIF, Chris Hufford was the Health Services Administrator

(HSA) and Kate Burdette, Lynette King, and Darlene Shuck were nurses. Nurse

Burdette and Nurse King were each the director of nursing for a period of time

between June 5 and August 22.

Also during this timeframe, Wendy Knight was warden of CIF; Derek

McMullen was the safety hazard manager; Charlie Fox was a major who

supervised custody staff; Robert Stafford was the grievance specialist; and Isaac

Randolph was the grievance manager.

B. Mr. Ransom's Disability and Medical Classifications

Mr. Ransom brought extra prosthetic supplies with him when he entered

the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) in May 2019. Dkt. 102-1 at 36

(Ransom Dep. 87:2−10). He was, however, allowed to keep with him only the

sleeve, liner, and sock that he was wearing at intake. Id. Thereafter, Mr. Ransom

would change his sock daily, his sleeve every three months, and his liner every

six months. Id. at 36 (Ransom Dep. 86:22−87:1).

When Mr. Ransom entered the IDOC, a doctor performed an intake

screening and classified his medical status as "G1," meaning that he has a

"stabilized, permanent or chronic physical or medical condition in which:

frequent monitoring/surveillance is not needed." Id. at 23. The doctor classified

Mr. Ransom's disability status as "A," meaning that he has "No Disability" and

"is capable of performing activities of daily living." Id. at 28.

On June 6, 2019, Mr. Ransom's second day at CIF, Nurse Shuck

performed a transfer intake screening. Supervised by a doctor, she confirmed

that Mr. Ransom had a medical classification of "G1" and a disability

classification of "A." Id. at 7, 19.

C. Mr. Ransom's Bunk Assignment

On June 6, a medical provider issued Mr. Ransom a bottom bunk and

bottom range pass to accommodate his limited mobility. Dkt. 102-3 at 4

(Correctional Industrial Facility intake records). However, Mr. Ransom was not

assigned a top bunk until around June 16. Dkt. 102-1 at 10 (Ransom Dep.

34:14−21). Instead of sleeping on the top bunk, he moved his mattress to the

floor for three or four days and then got permission from an officer to sleep in an

unassigned bottom bunk. Id. at 37 (Ransom Dep. 88:15−89:4).

D. Mr. Ransom's Shower Difficulties

Because Mr. Ransom could not shower with his prosthesis, showering was

difficult for him at CIF. Dkt. 102-1 at 37 (Ransom Dep. 91:10−12). Mr. Ransom

reported his difficulties with showering to Nurse King on June 26. Id. at 31

(Ransom Dep. 67:10−11). He also filed a grievance on July 28 indicating that he

was worried about falling while showering. Id. at 70−71 (Ransom Dep. Exh. C).

Mr. Stafford reviewed the grievance and directed Mr. Ransom to discuss the

issue with Mr. McMullen, the safety hazard manager. Id.

On July 31, Nurse Burdette helped get Mr. Ransom a shower chair.

Id. at 75 (Ransom Dep. Exh. E). But on August 1, Mr. Ransom submitted an

informal grievance to Mr. McMullen saying that he was "having [a] hard time

with [the] shower chair." Id. at 81 (Ransom Dep. Exh. G). Mr. McMullen referred

Mr. Ransom back to Nurse Burdette. Id.

On August 9, Mr. Ransom filed a formal grievance demanding a prison

transfer. Id. at 82. Sometime over the next few days, he was issued crutches.

Id. at 84. Mr. Ransom filed a grievance appeal on August 18—four days before

his transfer to another prison—saying that the crutches were no help. Id. at 83.

E. Mr. Ransom's Prosthetic Supplies

On June 24, Mr. Ransom submitted a healthcare request asking for a visit

to discuss supplies for his prosthesis. Dkt. 102-4 at 1 (medical records). He was

scheduled for a visit with Nurse King. Id.

Two days later, Mr. Ransom met with Nurse Burdette and provided more

details about the supplies he needed: three-ply socks, liners, and barrier cream.

Id. He explained to Nurse Burdette "what could potentially happen if the care

[wasn't] provided for [his] leg." Dkt. 102-1 at 31−32 (Ransom Dep. 67:24−68:2).

The same day, Mr. Ransom met with Nurse King. Mr. Ransom believed that

Nurse King "wasn't aware of what was going on" until he informed her at the

meeting. Id. at 31 (Ransom Dep. 65:10−20). She investigated whether the

supplies could be purchased at retail outlets, but Mr. Ransom told her they

would have to come from a special provider. Id. at 11 (Ransom Dep. 39:9−40:3).

On July 1, Mr. Ransom submitted a healthcare request that provided

contact information for his prosthetics supplier. Dkt. 102-4 at 2.

Mr. Ransom submitted another healthcare request on July 15, stating that

he needed supplies "ASAP." Id. at 3. Nurse King wrote back two days later,

explaining that she had contacted the prosthetics supplier but that the company

would not ship supplies without first establishing who was responsible for

payment—Mr. Ransom's private insurance or the Indiana Department of

Correction. Id.

On July 21, Mr. Ransom submitted two healthcare requests, one seeking

to speak with someone about his prosthetic supplies and another to inform

medical staff that it was the Indiana Department of Correction's obligation to pay

for his prosthetic supplies. Id. at 4−5. Nurse King met with him three days later

to discuss. Id. at 5.

On July 26, Nurse King submitted a request to have Mr. Ransom evaluated

for new prosthetic supplies. Id. at 6, 8−10. The prison medical director requested

pictures of Mr. Ransom's existing liner and socks first. Dkt. 102-4 at 14.

On July 28, Mr. Ransom submitted a grievance about delays getting new

prosthetic supplies. Dkt. 102-1 at 74 (Ransom Dep. Exh. E). He asserted that he

was "limited getting around," "at times unable to walk," and "constantly in pain."

Id. Nurse King wrote Mr. Ransom two days later to explain the steps she had

taken and the process going forward. Dkt. 102-4 at 6.

HSA Hufford and Nurse Burdette met with Mr. Ransom on July 31.

Dkt. 102-1 at 75 (Ransom Dep. Exh. E). HSA Hufford took photographs of

Mr. Ransom's existing supplies. Id. at 40 (Ransom Dep. 100:11−101:9).

By August 2, HSA Hufford had ordered barrier cream and socks for Mr. Ransom.

Id. at 75 (Ransom Dep. Exh. E).

By August 5, Mr. Ransom had been approved for an offsite evaluation for

new supplies. Dkt. 102-4 at 15. On August 15, Mr. Ransom saw the specialist,

who ordered new custom liners, socks, and sleeves. Dkt. 102-5 at 13 (additional

medical records). The specialist also highly recommended that Mr. Ransom

receive unscented liquid hand soap to wash his liners. Id.

On August 18, 2019, Mr. Ransom was seen by Nurse Burdette to have his

supplies cleaned. Id. at 11. Mr. Ransom told her it would take 5 hours for his

supplies to dry. Id. When Nurse Burdette told Mr. Ransom he could not wait in

medical for 5 hours, he became belligerent and started swearing at her. Id.

Nurse Burdette then provided Mr. Ransom a container of liquid antiseptic soap

and directed him to clean his own supplies in his cell. Id.

At some point before mid-August, Mr. Ransom asked for and received

crutches to help him get around. Dkt. 102-1 at 33 (Ransom Dep. 72:21−73:10,

75:19−22).

On August 22, Mr. Ransom was transferred to another IDOC facility. On

September 17, he received new prosthetic supplies from the outside clinic.

Dkt. 102-5 at 14.

Mr. Ransom reports that "towards the end of August" he had sores on his

amputated leg and experienced "a lot of discomfort from not having supplies."

Dkt. 102-1 at 45 (Ransom Dep. 121:8−12). He "eliminated the discomfort by not

moving around, by staying in one spot, in hopes that [he] would get supplies so

[he] could continue to walk." Id. (Ransom Dep. 121:20−122:2).

III. Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment creates a right to adequate medical care for incarcerated persons.

Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2021);

see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103−04 (1976). "To prove a violation of that

right, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant actually knew of a serious health

need and acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's suffering." Howell,

987 F.3d at 653.

The defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because

Mr. Ransom was not suffering from a serious medical need. They may be correct

that an amputated limb, without more, does not qualify as a serious medical

need. See Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006) (where plaintiff's

amputation had healed and he used a prosthesis, it was "not obvious that his

condition constituted a 'serious medical need' in the context of Eighth

Amendment"). But based on the facts presented in this case, a reasonable jury

could find that Mr. Ransom's condition, coupled with the lack of new supplies,

caused him sores and discomfort toward the end of his time at Correctional

Industrial Facility. Dkt. 102-1 at 45 (Ransom Dep. 121:8−12). And even "[a] few

days' delay in addressing a painful but readily treatable condition can support a

claim of deliberate indifference." Bentz v. Ghosh, 718 F. App'x 413, 417 (7th Cir.

2017); see Howell, 987 F.3d at 653 ("Denying or delaying appropriate treatment

to an incarcerated person suffering from avoidable pain can violate the Eighth

Amendment."). For purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that Mr. Ransom

can show that he had a serious health need and turns to the question of

deliberate indifference.

A. Nurse Shuck

Mr. Ransom's allegation against Nurse Shuck is based on her having

classified him as having "No Disability" in early June. Dkt. 102-1 at 30

(Ransom Dep. 61:3−62:3).

The only alternative disability classifications are vision impairment ("B"),

mobility impairment ("C"), and hearing loss ("D"). See dkt. 102-3 at 19.

Classifications "B" and "D" clearly do not apply, leaving "C" as the only plausible

alternative. No reasonable jury could find that Nurse Shuck was deliberately

indifferent for concluding that Mr. Ransom was "capable of performing activities

of daily living" and did not suffer from an "impairment that substantially limit[ed]

[his] gross motor movement (e.g., paraplegia, stroke with hemiplegia)." Id. This

is especially true because Nurse Shuck assigned Mr. Ransom a "G1" medical

status classification, thereby documenting Mr. Ransom's "stabilized, permanent

or chronic physical or medical condition." Id. at 7. Moreover, Mr. Ransom has

not designated evidence from which a jury could find that Nurse Shuck, having

only seen Mr. Ransom once shortly after he arrived at CIF, acted with deliberate

indifference to his suffering. Indeed, Mr. Ransom has not designated evidence

that he experienced any suffering related to his amputated leg until late July

2019. See dkt. 102-1 at 74 (Ransom Dep. Exh. E).

Nurse Shuck is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Ransom's

Eighth Amendment claim.

B. HSA Hufford, Nurse Burdette, and Nurse King

Mr. Ransom argues that HSA Hufford, Nurse Burdette, and Nurse King

were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition when they failed to

promptly obtain extra prosthetic supplies. Dkt. 110 at 2−3. But the undisputed

evidence shows that each of these defendants was responsive to Mr. Ransom and

took reasonable steps to try to get Mr. Ransom's supplies and, once they were

aware of it, to mitigate his pain.

Nurse King and Nurse Burdette learned about Mr. Ransom's need for

supplies between June 24 and June 26, 2019. Dkt. 102-4 at 1. Nurse King

immediately researched retail options, but Mr. Ransom explained that there were

no such options. Dkt. 102-1 at 11 (Ransom Dep. 39:9−40:3). Mr. Ransom gave

her the contact information for his prosthetics supplier on July 1, and Nurse

King contacted the supplier sometime before July 17—the timing is unclear from

the record—but ran into issues with payment. Dkt. 102-4 at 2−3. She then

submitted a request on July 26 to have Mr. Ransom evaluated for new supplies

at an outside clinic, but the medical director wanted more evidence before

approving the request. Id. at 14. Nurse Burdette and HSA Hufford met with

Mr. Ransom on July 31, and HSA Hufford promptly ordered barrier cream and

socks. Dkt. 102-1 at 75 (Ransom Dep. Exh. E). Someone resubmitted the request

for an offsite evaluation, and Mr. Ransom was sent to the outside clinic on

August 15. Dkt. 102-4 at 15; dkt. 102-5 at 13. Nurse Burdette followed the

outside specialist's recommendation and gave Mr. Ransom unscented liquid

hand soap to wash his liners. Dkt. 102-5 at 11, 13.

To be sure, there was a considerable passage of time from when Nurse

King and Nurse Burdette first learned about Mr. Ransom's need for supplies (on

or about June 26, 2019) until he was approved for an offsite evaluation (on or

about August 5, 2019). But there's no designated evidence showing that Nurse

King, Nurse Burdette, or HSA Hufford were aware that the lack of supplies was

causing Mr. Ransom pain until on or after July 28, 2019. See dkt. 102-1 at 74

(Ransom Dep. Exh. E). By then, Nurse King had already put in a request to have

Mr. Ransom evaluated at an offsite clinic. Dkt. 102-4 at 8−10 (request made

July 26, 2019). And when the prison medical director required more evidence

before approving the request, Nurse Burdette and HSA Hufford promptly met

with Mr. Ransom to take pictures of his supplies and re-submitted the request.

Dkt. 102-1 at 75 (Ransom Dep. Exh. E).

In short, no reasonable jury could find that any of these defendants "acted

with deliberate indifference to [Mr. Ransom's] suffering." Howell, 987 F.3d at

653. They took reasonable, albeit at times unfruitful, steps to help get

Mr. Ransom appropriate prosthetic supplies. And even if one could conclude that

one or more of these defendants were negligent in responding to Mr. Ransom's

needs and procuring the supplies he needed, that's not enough for a jury to find

in his favor. King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) ("Negligence—

even gross negligence—is insufficient to meet [deliberate indifference] standard .

. .."). HSA Hufford, Nurse Burdette, and Nurse King are therefore entitled to

summary judgment on Mr. Ransom's Eighth Amendment claims.

C. Warden Knight, Mr. McMullen, Major Fox, Mr. Randolph, and

Mr. Stafford

Mr. Ransom argues that Warden Knight, Mr. McMullen, Major Fox, and

Mr. Stafford knew about his various difficulties and did nothing about them:

• Warden Knight knew that Mr. Ransom was "unable to stand in the

shower, [had] problems walking up and down stairs, and [had] other

serious medical needs."

• Mr. McMullen knew about "Mr. Ransom being unable to stand . . .

in the shower, his inability to be in a top bunk, and his difficulty

with stairs."

• Major Fox knew about "the actions taken by Indiana Department of

Correction staff."

• "Mr. Stafford was aware of the serious medical needs of

Mr. Ransom."

Dkt. 111 at 2−3 (response to motion for summary judgment).

But the evidence does not support Mr. Ransom's arguments. First, there

is no admissible evidence about Warden Knight's knowledge. Mr. Ransom

testified that his mother told him that she had called Warden Knight and

discussed Mr. Ransom's medical needs. Dkt. 102-1 at 43 (Ransom Dep.

114:10−115:5). Mr. Ransom's testimony about his mother's conversation with

Warden Knight is inadmissible hearsay, and Mr. Ransom does not present a

declaration or affidavit from his mother. Therefore, there is no admissible,

designated evidence of any such conversation having taken place.

There is evidence that Mr. McMullen and Major Fox knew that Mr. Ransom

was having trouble taking showers. But they either tried to help Mr. Ransom or

referred him to medical staff who tried to help. See dkt. 102-1 at 34

(Ransom Dep. 76:4−6); id. at 81−84 (Ransom Dep. Exh. G). And Mr. Ransom

himself testified that he was able to shower, even though it was difficult. Id. at 37

(Ransom Dep. 91:10−12) ("I'm not saying I didn't take a shower there. I'm saying

it was so difficult for me to take a shower there.").

There is also evidence that Mr. Stafford and Mr. Randolph received and

reviewed grievances in August about Mr. Ransom's complaints. But the

undisputed evidence would not allow a jury to find that either Mr. Stafford or

Mr. Randolph ignored Mr. Ransom's condition. Instead, they reviewed his

grievances and reasonably relied upon medical personnel to attend to Mr.

Ransom's medical needs. See dkt. 102-1 at 81−84 (Ransom Dep. Exh. G); see

Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010−11 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming grant of

summary judgment for grievance counselor who "took [the plaintiff's] medical

complaints seriously and reasonably relied upon the doctors' recommendations

in handling [the plaintiff's] condition").

Warden Knight, Mr. McMullen, Major Fox, Mr. Randolph, and Mr. Stafford

are all entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Ransom's Eighth Amendment

claims.

IV. State Law Negligence Claims

"When federal claims drop out of the case, leaving only state-law claims,

the district court has broad discretion to decide whether to keep the case or

relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims." RWJ Mgmt. Co.,

Inc. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2012). And when, as in

this case, "the federal claims are dismissed before trial, there is a presumption

that the court will relinquish jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims."

Dietchweiler by Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir. 2016).

The Seventh Circuit has identified circumstances when the presumption should

be set aside. RWJ Mgmt. Co., 672 F.3d at 480 (when "the statute of limitations

has run on the pendant claim," when "substantial judicial resources have

already been committed," or "when it is absolutely clear how the pendent claims

can be decided"). But none of those apply here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)

(limitation period tolled for claims over which district court exercised

supplemental jurisdiction); Ind. Code § 34-11-8-1 (allowing plaintiff to continue

action in state court). The Court therefore applies the presumption and

relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Ransom's state law claims.

Those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

V. Conclusion

The defendants’ motions for summary judgment, dkts. [102] and [105], are

GRANTED as to all of Mr. Ransom's Eighth Amendment claims. The Court

relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Ransom's state law claims, so

those claims are dismissed without prejudice. Final judgment shall now enter.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 2/10/2022 S| arn Pat nicl \bawlove

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

4 Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

MARK RANSOM

12291 Saint Augustine St.

Leopold, IN 47551

Bryan Findley

CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP

bfindley@cassiday.com

Heather Terese Gilbert

CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP

hgilbert@cassiday.com

Nancy Kay Goldburg

INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL

nancy.goldburg@atg.in.gov

Adrienne Nicole Pope

INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL

adrienne.pope@atg.in.gov

Marilyn A. Young

CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP

myoung@cassiday.com