TAYLOR v. MALDONADO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

EZEKIEL I. TAYLOR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:20-cv-00952-SEB-MPB

)

MALDONADO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff Ezekiel Taylor alleges that, as an inmate at Marion County Jail, he was beaten and

placed in unconstitutional conditions of confinement in retaliation for requesting grievance forms.

The defendants move for partial summary judgment on claims against certain defendants. For the

following reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied

in part.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party

must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions,

documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing

that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the

adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).

The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable factfinder could return

a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court

views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable

inferences in that party's favor. Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018).

II. MR. TAYLOR'S COMPLAINT

Because the defendants seek summary judgment on only some claims, it is helpful for the

Court to first summarize the complaint and screening order. Mr. Taylor alleged that after he

requested a grievance in the Marion County Jail, the defendants removed him from a hallway at

Taser point and

deliberately took plaintiff out of camera view, where he was assaulted, kicked,

punched, elbowed, slammed, deprived of food, water, toilet, and clothing, bedding,

sleep, and humiliated for up to 24 hours before being threatened, falsely accused of

being suicidal, stripped naked and placed into a suicide cell before being released

to the general public.

Dkt. 2 at 1−2. The Court screened Mr. Taylor's complaint and identified First Amendment

retaliation claims and—depending on his status as a pretrial detainee or convicted offender—

Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment excessive force and conditions-of-confinement claims against

the individual defendants. Dkt. 13 at 2−3.

The defendants do not seek summary judgment on excessive force claims against defendant

Buchanan or conditions-of-confinement claims against defendants Foxworthy and Jabkiewicz.

They seek summary judgment on all remaining claims.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court takes judicial notice of the chronological case summary ("CCS") in Indiana case

number 49G10-1704-CM-014710, available at mycase.in.gov, and derives the following

background facts about the case from that CCS. Mr. Taylor was arrested for trespass on

April 21, 2017. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced on April 24, 2017, to a term of 365 days in

county jail with all but five days suspended. On July 18, 2017, Mr. Taylor failed to appear for a

compliance hearing, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

On April 8, 2019, Mr. Taylor was transferred to Marion County Jail from Pendleton

Correctional Facility (where he had completed serving a sentence on an unrelated matter) to attend

a hearing on the failure to appear warrant.1 Dkt. 93-1 at 3 (Taylor Depo. at 11:13−23).2 On April

12, he woke up and was fed breakfast before his hearing. Id. at 4 (14:9−13). At the hearing, the

trial court gave him credit for time served and ordered his release from jail as soon as possible. Id.

at 4 (16:4−6).

Mr. Taylor returned to the jail and was sent to his dorm in unit 4T. Id. at 4 (16:12−15).

Mr. Taylor asked about release procedures, and Deputy Maldonado informed Mr. Taylor that it

could take up to 72 hours to release him. Id. at 4 (16:16−22). Upon learning this, Mr. Taylor

requested a grievance. Id. at 4 (16:23−24). Deputy Maldonado told Mr. Taylor that he would need

to get a grievance form from the mailman, who had already been by that day. Id. at 4−5 (16:24−25;

17:1). Mr. Taylor became upset because he believed he had the right to file a grievance, so he

"stood [his] ground" and refused to return to the dorm until he received a grievance form. Id. at 5

(18:15−22). Mr. Taylor yelled at Deputy Maldonado because it was loud in the corridor. Id. at 5

(19:7−9). He didn't use an aggressive tone and made no physical or verbal threats. Id. at 5 (18:25;

19:1). Deputy Maldonado ordered Mr. Taylor to return to his dorm. Id. at 5 (19:7−17). When

Mr. Taylor refused, Deputy Maldonado drew his Taser. Dkt. 93-1 at 5 (20:1−16). Mr. Taylor

1 The defendants erroneously state that the following events occurred in April 2018 rather than April 2019.

2 The PDF of Mr. Taylor's deposition has four pages of deposition per page. For ease of reference, the Court

cites first to the page of the PDF and in parentheses to the page and lines of the deposition.

removed his shirt, went down on his knees, and moved down to the ground to let Deputy

Maldonado handcuff him. Id. at 6 (22:22−25−23:1−6).

Jail deputies have the authority to remove inmates from a corridor for refusing to return to

the dorm. Dkt. 93-2 at ¶ 7. Deputy Maldonado attested that he removed Mr. Taylor from the

corridor due to his refusal to return to the dorm, not because he requested a grievance. Dkt. 93-2

at ¶¶ 7−8.

Deputy Maldonado and other officers escorted Mr. Taylor down the corridor past an

elevator with a camera to an elevator without a camera. Dkt. 93-1 at 6 (23:21−23; 24:5−7).

Mr. Taylor described the trip to the elevator as rough—at times being lifted off the ground—but

he suffered no injuries from the walk. Id. at 6−7 (24:15−17; 27:19−22). When Mr. Taylor got off

the elevator, Sergeant Buchanan, a member of the Correctional Emergency Response Team

("CERT"), was waiting. Id. at 8 (29:8−15). Deputy Maldonado handed Mr. Taylor to Sergeant

Buchanan and did not see Mr. Taylor again during his shift. Dkt. 93-2 at ¶ 8; dkt. 93-1 at 9

(36:11−20).

Sergeant Buchanan and another unknown CERT officer took Mr. Taylor to holding cell 2B.

Dkt. 93-1 at 9 (35:22−25−36:1−3). There, they threw him into a wall and began kicking and

punching him and applying painful pressure points on him. Id. at 10−12 (37−46). They verbally

demeaned him, saying the assault would not end until he said "uncle" and admitted that he had no

rights. Id. at 12 (45:8−25−46:1−6). After the assault, the officers left Mr. Taylor in the cell with

his handcuffs on. Id. at 12 (46:11−13).

Mr. Taylor was in cell 2B for several hours with no bed, bedding, or toilet. Id. at 12

(48:22−23); 13 (49:1−2); 16 (64:4−12). At some point, his handcuffs were removed. Id. at 12

(46:10−16). Mr. Taylor was allowed out of the cell once to use the bathroom but urinated on the

floor several times due to the lack of access to a bathroom. Id. at 13 (49:3−5; 52:1−2). Mr. Taylor

did not receive lunch or dinner. Id. at 13 (50−51). Deputy Jabkiewicz gave meals to other inmates

but refused to give Mr. Taylor dinner because he was scheduled to go home. Id. at 13 (51:6−10).

Two other inmates were in cell 2B with Mr. Taylor and "faced worse physical abuse" than he did.

Id. at 16 (62:14−16). Mr. Taylor asked for grievances because he wanted to alert someone to the

abuse. Id. at 16 (62:7−10). The other inmates—who did not complain or try to assert their rights—

received food, clothing, and bedding. Id. at 16 (62:23−25; 63:1−22).

Deputy Foxworthy arrived at his assigned floor around 10:00 p.m. and was alerted that

Mr. Taylor was aggressive and unhappy because he believed he should have been released.

Id. at 12 (48:14−20). Mr. Taylor, frustrated with the lack of food and bathroom access, decided to

tie a sheet to the bars of his cell to attract attention. Id. at 13 (51:18−25; 52:1−2). Deputy

Foxworthy recalled that Mr. Taylor also tied the sheet around his neck, and he was concerned that

Mr. Taylor was trying to commit suicide. Dkt. 93-3 at ¶ 5. At that point, Deputy Thomas pointed

his Taser at Mr. Taylor, and Deputy Jabkiewicz and Deputy Foxworthy entered the cell and

stripped Mr. Taylor of all of his clothing. Id. at 13 (52:14−18). Mr. Taylor did not recall having

the chance to remove the clothing himself, but he did not resist. Id. at 13−14 (52:21−23; 53:7−17).

Mr. Taylor remained in cell 2B for an unclear length of time before being transferred naked to a

separate holding cell and being provided a suicide smock. Id. at 14 (53:24−25; 54:1−5). Sergeant

Green saw Mr. Taylor as the deputies escorted him naked, but he did not intervene to stop the

deputies. Id. at 14 (54:10−18). Mr. Taylor believed he was removed from cell 2B and sent to

suicide watch because he was asking for food, bedding, and grievances. Id. at 16 (62:5−10).

Deputy Foxworthy attested that he followed jail procedures after observing Mr. Taylor

with the sheet. Dkt. 93-3 at ¶¶ 4−6. According to those procedures, once an inmate is determined

to be suicidal, (1) he is removed from the current area; (2) anything that is considered potentially

harmful is taken away; (3) he is escorted to a separate holding cell where he "change[s] into a

suicide smock and gown"; and (4) once medically cleared, he is assigned a segregation cell. Id. at

¶ 6. Deputy Foxworth's incident report does not mention Mr. Taylor being stripped and escorted

naked from one cell to another. Dkt. 93-4.

Mr. Taylor was taken out of the holding cell and reprocessed, and then taken to a suicide

cell by Deputy Foxworthy and Deputy Jabkiewicz. Dkt. 93-1 at 14 (56:5−20). The toilet in the cell

didn't work, and there was feces in the sink. Id. at 20 (80:5−8). The cell had urine and feces on the

toilet seat, food and crumbs on the floor, and blood and mucus on the wall. Id. at 21 (85:6−10).

Mr. Taylor was not provided breakfast. Id. at 15 (58:16−17). At one point, Deputy Jabkiewicz told

Mr. Taylor that he saw pictures of Mr. Taylor's son and brother on Facebook, and then bragged

about his military experience and the firearms he owned. Id. at 18 (69:10−70: 10). Deputy

Jabkiewicz also verbally berated him. Id. at 18 (70:14−20). Mr. Taylor felt intimidated by Deputy

Jabkiewicz's statements. Id. at 18 (70:2−10). At some point, Mr. Taylor dozed off and was released

later that day around 3:00 or 4:00 in the afternoon. Id. at 15 (58:24−25).

Shortly after his release, Mr. Taylor stabbed someone. Id. at 18 (69:17−21). He attributes

the stabbing to the sleep deprivation and trauma he experienced at the jail. Id. Mr. Taylor had sore

muscles and a limp as a result of the beating in cell 2B, and continues to suffer from "constant

paranoia" and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 17−18 (68:24−25; 72:14−17).

IV. DISCUSSION

Mr. Taylor alleges that the defendants used force against him and placed him in

unconstitutional conditions in retaliation for his requesting grievances. The Court addresses the

claims for which the defendants seek summary judgment and clarifies the scope of the remaining

claims.

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Mr. Taylor must establish three elements to prove a First Amendment retaliation claim.

"First, he must show he engaged in protected First Amendment activity. Second, he must show an

adverse action was taken against him. Third, he must show his protected conduct was at least a

motivating factor of the adverse action." Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2020).

"Furthermore, "[c]onduct that does not independently violate the Constitution can form the basis

for a retaliation claim, if that conduct is done with an improper, retaliatory motive.'" Id. (quoting

Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005)).

Retaliatory animus "can . . . be demonstrated by suspicious timing alone only when the . . .

action follows on the close heels of protected expressions." Daza v. Indiana, 941 F.3d 303, 309

(7th Cir. 2019). "The burden then shifts to the defendants to show that they would have taken the

action despite the bad motive." May v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2013). In other

words, the defendants can rebut Mr. Taylor's prima facie case of retaliation "by showing that [their]

conduct was not a necessary condition of the harm – the harm would have occurred anyway."

Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011). If a defendant can establish a non-retaliatory

motive for the allegedly retaliatory action, Mr. Taylor must "produce evidence upon which a

rational finder of fact could infer that these explanations were lies." Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d

711, 717 (7th Cir. 2006).

i. Deputy Maldonado

Deputy Maldonado concedes for purposes of this motion that Mr. Taylor engaged in a

protected activity by requesting a grievance form and suffered an adverse action when he was

transferred to a holding cell. Dkt. 94 at 6, n. 3. Thus, only the third element is at issue.

Deputy Maldonado attested that he did not base any of his actions in retaliation against

Mr. Taylor. Dkt. 93-2 at ¶ 8. Rather, he moved Mr. Taylor from the corridor to a holding cell

because Mr. Taylor refused to return to the dorm. Id. at ¶ 8. Mr. Taylor admits that he refused to

return to the dorm and that his actions were unruly. Dkt. 93-1 at 5 (18:18−25; 19:20−23). However,

Mr. Taylor also alleges that Deputy Maldonado intentionally escorted Mr. Taylor past an elevator

with cameras to an elevator without cameras. Id. at 6 (23:21−23; 24:5−7). From there, Deputy

Maldonado handed Mr. Taylor to Deputy Buchanan and another CERT team member, who took

Mr. Taylor to a cell and assaulted him. Id. at 19 (74:16−23) ("[A]ll I did was ask for a grievance,

and I was removed from the 4T corridor and taken to 2B holding and assaulted."). A jury could

infer that Deputy Maldonado deliberately placed Mr. Taylor in harm's way in retaliation for

requesting a grievance. In other words, while removal from the corridor may have occurred without

a request for a grievance, a transfer to a holding cell where he was assaulted was not "a necessary

condition of the harm." Greene, 660 F.3d at 980. Accordingly, there are questions of fact that

preclude judgment in Deputy Maldonado's favor on the First Amendment retaliation claim.

ii. Deputies Foxworthy and Jabkiewicz

Mr. Taylor alleges that while he was in holding cell 2B, he was placed on suicide watch

after asking Deputies Foxworthy and Jabkiewicz for grievances. There is no dispute that Mr. Taylor

was not moved to a separate holding cell and prepared for suicide segregation until he tied a sheet

around the bars of the cell. Dkt. 93-1 at 13 (51:18−21); dkt. 93-3 at ¶¶ 4−5. Placing Mr. Taylor on

suicide watch was consistent with jail policy. Id. at ¶ 6. However, a jury could find that the manner

in which he was placed on suicide watch—stripped of his clothing and forced to remain in the cell

naked with other inmates—was motivated by retaliatory animus. Further, Mr. Taylor alleged that

he was refused food and bedding because he requested grievances while two inmates who did not

complain did receive food and bedding. Accordingly, there are questions of fact that preclude

judgment in Deputies Foxworthy and Jabkiewicz's favor on the First Amendment retaliation claim.

iii. Sergeants Green and Buchanan

There is no evidence that Mr. Taylor engaged in any protected speech when he encountered

Sergeants Green and Buchanan, or that his protected conduct was a motivating factor in their

actions. Summary judgment is therefore granted for Sergeants Green and Buchanan on the

retaliation claims against them.

iv. Qualified Immunity

The defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment

retaliation claims. "Qualified immunity is a doctrine that protects government officials from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d

696, 701 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Once a defendant raises qualified immunity as a defense,

the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it by showing "two elements: first, that the facts show a

violation of a constitutional right, and second, that the constitutional right was clearly established

at the time of the alleged violation." Id. (cleaned up). "'If either inquiry is answered in the negative,

the defendant official' is protected by qualified immunity." Koh v. Ustich, 933 F.3d 836, 844 (7th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original)). The

Court can consider the elements in either order. Id.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Taylor, a reasonable jury could

conclude that Deputy Maldonado, Deputy Foxworthy, and Deputy Jabkiewicz retaliated against

Mr. Taylor because he requested grievances. Thus, moving to the second element, Mr. Taylor

Harrison must "show either a reasonably analogous case that has both articulated the right at issue

and applied it to a factual circumstance similar to the one at hand or that the violation was so

obvious that a reasonable person necessarily would have recognized it as a violation of the law."

Leiser, 933 F.3d at 701 (quoting Howell v. Smith, 853 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 2017)). He need not

find "a case on all fours with the facts here," but he must point to "some settled authority that

would have shown a reasonable officer in [the defendant's] position that her alleged actions

violated the Constitution." Id. at 702 (cleaned up). The Court must look at the "specific context of

the case" to determine "whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established."

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

It's clearly established that inmates "are entitled to utilize available grievance procedures

without threat of recrimination." Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005); see also

Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 276 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). "[A] transfer decision made with a

retaliatory motive could be a violation of the prisoner's First Amendment right even if the transfer

itself did not independently violate the Constitution." Holleman, 951 F.3d at 881 (citing Babcock,

102 F.3d at 275). Here, Deputy Maldonado moved Mr. Taylor from a corridor in a general

population dorm to a holding cell where two CERT officers allegedly beat him. This is similar to

other Seventh Circuit cases in which the court held that placing an inmate in a more dangerous

situation (e.g. a transfer to a maximum-security facility from a minimum-security facility)

constituted an adverse action. Id. (citing cases). Thus, there is settled authority that Deputy

Maldonado's actions violated Mr. Taylor's rights. With respect to Deputies Foxworthy and

Jabkiewicz's conduct, there is settled authority holding that correctional officers may not conduct

humiliating strip searches in retaliation for protected conduct. Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631,

634 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, they were on notice that leaving Mr. Taylor naked in a cell and escorting

him naked through the hallway was prohibited conduct if it was intended to humiliate him.

Accordingly, defendants Deputy Maldonado, Deputy Foxworthy, and Deputy Jabkiewicz are not

entitled to qualified immunity.

In summary, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to

Mr. Taylor's First Amendment retaliation claims against Sergeants Green and Buchanan and

denied as to his claims against Deputy Maldonado, Deputy Foxworthy, and Deputy Jabkiewicz.

B. Excessive Force Claims

In the Court's screening order, the Court said Mr. Taylor's excessive force and conditions-

of-confinement claims would proceed under the Eighth Amendment if he was a convicted prisoner

or the Fourteenth Amendment if he was a pretrial detainee. As it turns out, Mr. Taylor does not fit

in either category. Although he was convicted of trespass, he had been ordered released by the trial

court, his sentence satisfied.

The defendants suggest that the Fourth Amendment applies, citing Lopez v. City of

Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2006), which explained that "the Fourth Amendment governs

the period of confinement between arrest without a warrant and the preliminary hearing at which

a determination of probable cause is made, while due process regulates the period of confinement

after the initial determination of probable cause." (quoting Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797

(7th Cir. 1992)). Mr. Taylor's situation is different: he had already been convicted of trespass. But

the point is well taken that because Mr. Taylor had been ordered released when these events

occurred, the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard likely does not apply. That is

because a person who is not incarcerated pursuant to a conviction (which in most civil rights cases

is a pretrial detainee) "possesses a constitutional right 'to be free from punishment.'" Williamson

v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979));

see also Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2019) ("Pretrial detainees are in a

different position, because their detention is unrelated to punishment.").

The standard under the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment is the same:

whether the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable given the totality of the

circumstances. See Lopez, 464 F.3d at 719; Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 823 (holding that the objective

inquiry applicable to pretrial detainees applies to all conditions-of-confinement claims, not just

those involving excessive force). Because Mr. Taylor was not in the jail as a punishment but rather

because additional time was needed to process him for release, the Court finds that the Fourteenth

Amendment objective inquiry applies to his excessive force and conditions-of-confinement

claims.

Whether a correctional officer was objectively reasonable in his use of force depends on

the facts and circumstances of each case. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015).

"A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,"

and must take into account concerns about institutional security. Id. Some factors the Court may

consider when assessing the reasonableness of force are:

the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;

the extent of the plaintiff's injury; and effort made by the officer to temper or to

limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat

reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.

Id.

i. Sergeant Green

Mr. Taylor testified that Sergeant Green used no force against him. Dkt. 93-1 at 14

(54:14−15). Any excessive force claim against him is dismissed.

ii. Deputy Maldonado

Mr. Taylor was supposed to be released from custody, but upon his return to the jail,

Deputy Maldonado informed him it could take up to three days to "process" him. Mr. Taylor

became upset—reasonably so—and requested a grievance. Mr. Taylor acknowledged that he

yelled because it was noisy in the jail, but he testified that he never threatened anyone. Dkt. 93-1

at 5 (19:1−9). Deputy Maldonado drew his Taser and ordered Mr. Taylor to the ground where he

was handcuffed. Id. at 5 (4−16). Deputy Maldonado then aggressively walked him down the

corridor to the elevator before he was handed over to Sergeant Buchanan. Dkt. 93-1 at 6

(23:21−23). Mr. Taylor states he never threatened or resisted anyone during the escort. Id. at 6

(24:19−20). Thus, one could conclude that any force was unreasonable under the circumstances.

See Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding it was clearly established that

police officers may not "shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens without any

provocation" or "use excessively tight handcuffs and violently yank the arms of arrestees who were

not resisting arrest" or posing security threat) (internal quotations omitted)).

Deputy Maldonado argues he is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The Court

agrees. Mr. Taylor points to no authority, and the Court has located none, suggesting that an

"aggressive walk" with no injury violates his right to be free from excessive force. In Day v.

Wooten, 947 F.3d 453, 461 (7th Cir. 2020), the Seventh Circuit discussed qualified immunity in

the context of the right for an arrestee to be "free from excessively tight handcuffs." The Court

observed that for an officer to be liable, he must be aware that the handcuffs were causing the

arrestee pain. Id. at 462. Here, Mr. Taylor was not injured by the escort, and there is no evidence

that he advised Deputy Maldonado of any physical discomfort during the escort. Absent a

complaint of pain, "there was nothing that would have alerted [Deputy Maldonado] to the fact that

a constitutional violation was looming." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, Deputy

Maldonado is entitled to qualified immunity, and the excessive force against him fails.

iii. Deputies Foxworthy and Jabkiewicz

With respect to Deputies Foxworthy and Jabkiewicz, Mr. Taylor alleges only that they

physically removed his clothing after he tied the bedsheet around the bars in his cell. Id. at 13

(52:7−10). They did not kick or punch him. Id. at 14 (55:1−3). They removed his clothing pursuant

to jail policy regarding potentially suicidal inmates. Dkt. 93-3 at ¶ 6. Because Mr. Taylor was

taking direct action that any reasonable officer would construe as a sincere effort to hurt himself,

the officers' decision to remove his clothing immediately to prevent further harm was reasonable.

Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 399−400. Therefore, any excessive force claim against Foxworthy and

Jabkiewicz fails. But this is not the end of the road for Mr. Taylor's claim with respect to having

his clothing removed and being forced to remain in the cell and then walk down a hallway nude,

as the Court will discuss next.

C. Conditions of Confinement

Incarcerated people are entitled to "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities"

including adequate food, water, sanitation, bedding, and other basic necessities. Hardeman,

933 F.3d at 820 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) and citing Gray v. Hardy,

826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016) and Woods v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 1990)).

Further, "continued exposure to human excrement" can violate an inmate's rights, both due to

"the health concerns emphasized in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), and the more general

standards of dignity embodied in the Eighth Amendment[.]" Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 821

(cleaned up).

The defendants seek summary judgment for any conditions-of-confinement claims against

defendants Maldonado, Buchanan, and Green based on their lack of involvement with escorting

Mr. Taylor to and housing him in the filthy suicide cell.

It isn't clear why the defendants frame Mr. Taylor's conditions-of-confinement claims as

only pertaining to his time in the suicide cell. Recall that Mr. Taylor was housed in several cells

during the relevant events. Mr. Taylor started in unit 4T (and makes no complaints about the jail

conditions there). After Deputy Maldonado escorted Mr. Taylor to the elevator, Sergeant

Buchanan took him to holding cell 2B, where Sergeant Buchanan and another CERT officer

allegedly beat Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor was in holding cell 2B from the early afternoon on April 12

to early morning on April 13. In cell 2B, Mr. Taylor was handcuffed for an unspecified amount of

time after the beating, allowed to use the bathroom only once, deprived of food and bedding, and

stripped naked. Once stripped of his clothing, Mr. Taylor remained in the cell naked (in front of

other inmates) for an unclear length of time and then was escorted naked to another cell. He was

taken to holding cell 1 and given a suicide smock, and then was escorted to the suicide cell. The

suicide cell lacked a functioning toilet and was soiled with excrement, food, crumbs, blood, and

mucus.

"[E]xposing a person's naked body involuntarily is a severe invasion of personal privacy."

Colbruno v. Kessler, 928 F.3d 1155, 1161−63 (10th Cir. 2019) (applying the Fourteenth

Amendment objective inquiry standard to claim involving officers who walked a pretrial detainee

nude through public hallways despite easy access to clothing). Thus, compelling Mr. Taylor to be

naked for a prolonged period in front of others could rise to "calculated harassment unrelated to

prison needs" with the intent to humiliate Mr. Taylor. Richards v. Wexford, 2021 WL 4892160,

at *3 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2021) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) and citing

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing strip searches in the Eighth

Amendment context)).

Thus, far from being limited to the time he was in the suicide cell, Mr. Taylor's conditions-

of-confinement claims also include the complained of conditions in 2B and his naked escort to

holding cell 1. The question is whether Defendants Maldonado, Green, or Buchanan were

personally responsible for these conditions. "Individual liability under § 1983 … requires personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation." Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649,

657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). For a supervisor to be liable for the conduct of

his subordinates he must "know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn

a blind eye for fear of what [he] might see." Morfin v. City of E. Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1001

(7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)).

i. Deputy Maldonado and Sergeant Buchanan

It is undisputed that Deputy Maldonado had no interaction with Mr. Taylor after he passed

Mr. Taylor off to Sergeant Buchanan in the elevator. He was not present for the beating in 2B or

any of the events that followed. Similarly, the allegations against Sergeant Buchanan are limited

to the alleged beating itself (a claim for which he does not seek summary judgment). In other

words, Sergeant Buchanan had no role in distributing food or bedding, taking away Mr. Taylor's

clothing, or ensuring that the cells were clean and in working order. Accordingly, summary

judgment is granted as to conditions-of-confinement claims against defendants Maldonado and

Buchanan.

ii. Sergeant Green

Mr. Taylor alleges that Sergeant Green turned a blind eye to the constitutional violations

of his subordinates. Dkt. 100 at ¶ 5. He alleges that Deputy Foxworthy and Deputy Jabkiewicz

physically and verbally abused him in Sergeant Green's presence, and Sergeant Green failed to act.

Dkt. 93-1 at 8−9 (32:25−33:6) and 14 (54:7−18). Thus, there is a material dispute of fact as to

whether Sergeant Green turned a blind eye to the conditions of Mr. Taylor's confinement.

Sergeant Green argues he is entitled to qualified immunity, stating, "Since there is no

evidence that would allow a jury to hold [him] personally liable for any decision that allegedly

subjected Taylor to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, … Green [is] entitled to qualified

immunity on Taylor's conditions of confinement claims." Dkt. 94 at 13−14. The Court finds this

wholly underdeveloped and conclusory argument waived. See Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674

(7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991))

("[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent

authority, are waived . . . ."). And regardless, the right to be free of the conditions of which

Mr. Taylor complained was clearly established. See Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820, and Mays, 575

F.3d at 649.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment for conditions-of-confinement claims

against Sergeant Green is denied.

V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

In summary, the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [93], is granted as to First

Amendment retaliation claims against Sergeants Green and Buchanan and denied as to retaliation

claims against Deputies Maldonado, Fox, and Jabkiewicz; granted as to excessive force claims

against Sergeant Green, Deputy Maldonado, Deputy Foxworthy, and Deputy Jabkiewicz; granted

as to conditions-of-confinement claims against Deputy Maldonado and Sergeant Buchanan, and

denied as to conditions-of-confinement claims against Sergeant Green.

The claims proceeding are:

e First Amendment retaliation claims against Deputy Maldonado, Deputy

Foxworthy, and Deputy Jabkiewicz;

e Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims against Sergeant Buchanan;

e Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims against Deputy

Foxworthy, Deputy Jabkiewicz, and Sergeant Green. This includes all allegations

related to Mr. Taylor's conditions-of-confinement from his placement in cell 2B

until his release.

Mr. Taylor's motion to appoint counsel, dkt. [106], is granted. The Court will attempt to

recruit counsel to represent Mr. Taylor at settlement and, if necessary, trial. Mr. Taylor's motion

for pretrial conference, dkt. [119], motion to set deadline, dkt. [121], and motion for status

conference, dkt. [125], are granted to the extent that the Court will schedule a status conference

once counsel has been appointed. Mr. Taylor's motion to correct error, dkt. [120], is granted to

the extent that the Court acknowledges that Mr. Taylor wrote "charges" not "changes" in one of

his previous motions.

The exhibit at docket 93-1, Mr. Taylor's deposition, is currently under seal despite there

being no request to seal it. The clerk is directed to unseal docket [93-1].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 11/30/2021 Pub Bous Biker

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE

United States District Court

8 Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

EZEKIEL I. TAYLOR

150465

MIAMI – CF

MIAMI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Electronic Service Participant – Court Only

Mathew Rayman

OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL

mathew.rayman2@indy.gov

Andrew J. Upchurch

OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL

andrew.upchurch@indy.gov