“Qualified immunity is an individual defense available to each individual defendant in his individual capacity.”
How later courts described this case
- “Qualified immunity is an individual defense available to each individual defendant in his individual capacity.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
SCOTT STROTHER, )
BETHANY STROTHER, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. 1:20-cv-00063-SEB-MJD
)
STEVEN SCOTT, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY GROUNDS
This cause is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[Dkt. 53], filed on December 18, 2020. Plaintiffs Scott and Bethany Strother have
brought this action against Defendant Detective Steven Scott pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth,1 and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs
further seek redress under this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction for state law claims
including false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. For the reasons
explicated below, we GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Factual Background
This action arises from an encounter between Detective Scott and Mr. Strother on
December 13, 2018. Detective Scott is employed by the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
1 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint [Dkt. 32] alleges a violation of the Fifth Amendment, but the
Fifth Amendment is not discussed in any of the subsequent briefing. We therefore find that this
claim has been abandoned.
Department (“IMPD”) and was assisting fellow IMPD detective Marc Klonne with
undercover surveillance in the 3800 block of Meridee Drive in Indianapolis to locate a
homicide suspect on the day in question. Scott Dep. at 7. Mr. Strother, a United States
Army veteran, resides in the 3800 block of Meridee Drive with his wife Bethany, also a
plaintiff, and their three children. Strother Dep. at 11. The encounter that took place
between Detective Scott and Mr. Strother occurred when Mr. Strother followed Detective
Scott’s SUV on Meridee Drive, which has no outlet, because Mr. Strother believed that
Detective Scott’s SUV was acting suspiciously. Amended Compl. ¶ 16; Dkt. 60 at 3.
Once Detective Scott’s SUV turned around, Mr. Strother turned his vehicle at an angle in
the road in hopes of identifying the driver and obtaining a license plate number.
Amended Compl. at ¶ 19.
Mr. Strother asked Detective Scott about his presence in the neighborhood three
times while standing outside of and behind his vehicle. Dkt. 60 at 3. During the
encounter, Mr. Strother was armed with a handgun that he carries inside of his pants.
Detective Scott told Mr. Strother repeatedly to move out of the way but did not show any
type of identification in the form of a badge or credentials. However, Detective Scott
verbally identified himself as a police officer and flashed his concealed red and blue
lights in response to Mr. Strother’s inquiries. See, e.g., Amended Compl. at 3–4; Dkt. 60
at 3–4. Mr. Strother testified that he eventually left his cover behind his vehicle and
moved towards Detective Scott. Strother Dep. at 26–27. When Detective Scott told him
to get out of the way and go back to his car, Mr. Strother responded that he “wasn’t going
anywhere.” Id. at 27.
Mr. Strother was not satisfied with Detective Scott’s self-identification as a police
officer until another officer, Detective Klonne, arrived and confirmed that Detective Scott
was indeed a police officer. See Dkt. 60 at 3–4. Based on how Mr. Strother angled his
vehicle in the street as well as his overall actions toward Detective Scott, Detective Scott
perceived that Mr. Strother was likely armed and believed that Mr. Strother was
interfering with his ability to do his job as a police officer and detective. Dkt. 54-10 at 2.
Detective Scott detained Mr. Strother in handcuffs, informed him that he was being
arrested for criminal confinement, and placed Mr. Strother in the back of his vehicle.
Strother Dep. at 32. When Detective Scott learned that Mr. Strother’s children were home
alone, he decided to release him. Id. at 33.
The day after the incident, Detective Scott emailed his case report to one of the
deputy prosecutors to see if any charges could be filed against Mr. Strother. Dkt. 54-1.
He also submitted his probable cause affidavit, photos, and other documents to a
paralegal in the screening department. Dkt. 54-3 at 1; Scott Dep. at 22. After the Marion
County Prosecutor’s Office filed the probable cause affidavit, Marion Superior Court
found probable cause to exist based on the case report filed and issued a warrant for Mr.
Strother’s arrest. Dkt. 54-17 at 4. Based on the arrest warrant, deputies from the Marion
County Sheriff’s Office searched the Strothers’ home for Mr. Strother on December 18,
2018. Id. at 4. Detective Scott did not participate in, request, or authorize the search.
Scott Dep. at 30. He was unaware that anything occurred with his probable cause
affidavit until a supervisor informed of the arrest warrant on the day it was executed. Id.
At the time of the search, Mr. Strother was in Kentucky for work. Strother Dep. at
43. Mr. Strother subsequently retained a criminal defense attorney and turned himself in
on December 20, 2018, where he was taken directly to his initial hearing and released on
his own recognizance immediately after. Id. at 43–47. The criminal charges were
dismissed about a year after they were filed. Id. at 47–48.
Although the Strothers argue a “plethora” of disputed material facts preclude
summary judgment, [Dkt. 60 at 8], Defendant Scott accepts the Strothers’ version of
disputed facts for summary judgment purposes. Dkt. 61 at 6.2 We will not repeat and
recite the entire factual background of this encounter because the facts, even when taken
in the light most favorable to Mr. Strother, entitle Detective Scott to judgment as a matter
of law on the grounds of qualified immunity.
Discussion
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes of material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A court must grant a motion for
summary judgment if it appears that no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the
nonmovant on the basis of the designated admissible evidence. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). We neither weigh the evidence nor evaluate
2 In his reply brief, Detective Scott states that the “factual disputes the Strothers identify are
either immaterial or nonexistent. But if the Court determines a dispute to be genuine, Det. Scott
takes the Strothers’ version of it for summary judgment purposes.” Dkt. 61 at 6.
the credibility of witnesses, id. at 255, but view the facts and the reasonable inferences
flowing from them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McConnell v. McKillip,
573 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
II. Analysis
In this litigation, Plaintiffs allege various violations of their rights guaranteed
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Although not entirely clear from Plaintiffs' complaint and summary judgment briefing,
we understand Plaintiffs to allege claims for false arrest, unlawful search, and the
falsification of a probable cause warrant under the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment due process and malicious prosecution claims. Plaintiffs also allege state
law false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims. For the reasons
detailed below, none of these claims survive summary judgment.
Defendant has asserted the defense of qualified immunity on all of the Strothers’
federal claims against him. Dkt. 55 at 30–31; see Estate of Williams by Rose v. Cline, 902
F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Qualified immunity is an individual defense available to
each individual defendant in his individual capacity.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages
liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825
(2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When evaluating whether
qualified immunity applies, courts must “consider two questions: (1) whether the facts,
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a constitutional
right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation.” Allin v. City of Springfield, 845 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, qualified immunity is appropriate “when the
law, as applied to the facts, would have left objectively reasonable officials in a state of
uncertainty.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 2018). In other words, a
government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless it can be said that “every
reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] [a] right.”
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” Id. at 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Detective Scott argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on all Plaintiffs'
federal claims because, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
they can show no constitutional violation. Specifically, Detective Scott asserts that: (1)
there can be no claim based on false arrest because on the night in question he had
probable cause (or, at the very least arguable probable cause, which is all that is required
for qualified immunity purposes) to reasonably believe that Mr. Strother had committed
any number of offenses, including criminal confinement, obstruction of traffic, and
resisting law enforcement; (2) he cannot be held liable for any unlawful search claim
because he did not initiate nor was he even present for any search of Plaintiffs' residence
and thus cannot be held liable under § 1983 because he did not participate directly in the
alleged constitutional violation; (3) Plaintiffs can bring no claim based on a falsified
probable cause affidavit because there is no evidence that he knowingly included any
false or misleading information in the probable cause warrant; and (4) case law is clear
that an alleged false arrest cannot support a due process claim; and (5) there can be no
malicious prosecution claim when, as here, probable cause existed.
These arguments are well taken and supported by the case law cited by Detective
Scott. Once a defendant raises a qualified-immunity defense, it becomes the plaintiff’s
burden to defeat it. Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2013). It is well-settled in
the Seventh Circuit that the party opposing summary judgment waives any argument that
he does not raise in his brief in opposition to it. See, e.g., Laborers Int’l Union v. Caruso,
197 F.3d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 2003) (arguments not presented to the district court in
response to a summary-judgment motion are waived); see also C & N Corp. v. Kane, 756
F.3d 1024, 1026 (7th Cir. 2014).
The Strothers have failed to respond to or acknowledge Detective Scott’s qualified
immunity defense as to all federal claims brought against him. To defeat Detective
Scott’s qualified-immunity defense, the Strothers needed to show—for each federal claim
asserted—that (1) Detective Scott violated their constitutional rights; and (2) the right
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Archer v. Chisholm, 870
F.3d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 2017). “A failure to show either is fatal for the plaintiff’s case,
and [the court] may begin (and possibly end) with either inquiry.” Id. (citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). The words “qualified immunity” are absent from
the Strothers’ brief and the words “clearly established” are mentioned only once in
passing for the principle that evidence fabrication—when it leads to a deprivation of
liberty—violates clearly established law. Dkt. 60 at 19. The Strothers have therefore
waived any argument that Detective Scott is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Because Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the present case cannot move
forward on any of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, see Archer, 870 F.3d at 613, and we decline
to extend supplemental jurisdiction to the Plaintiffs’ state law claims.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt.
53] is GRANTED. Final judgment shall issue accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/30/2021 Tha Buus Bik
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
Martin Austin Brown
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT,
LLP
mab@rkblegalgroup.com
Andrew R. Duncan
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT,
LLP
ard@rkblegalgroup.com
Tara Lynn Gerber
City of Indianapolis
tara.gerber@indy.gov
John F. Kautzman
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT,
LLP
jfk@rkblegalgroup.com
Terrance Lamont Kinnard
KINNARD & SCOTT
tkinnard@kinnardlaw.net
Edward J. Merchant
RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT,
LLP
ejm@rkblegalgroup.com
Adam Scott Willfond
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
adam.willfond@indy.gov