JOLLEY v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

WILLIAM B. JOLLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:20-cv-03216-JMS-MJD

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and )

MARCIA FUDGE, Secretary of the Department of )

Housing and Urban Development, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff William B. Jolley is a veteran of the United States Air Force and was

formerly employed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). He brings

this action against the United States of America and Marcia Fudge, Secretary of HUD, alleging

discrimination and challenging the constitutionality of the Uniformed Services Employment and

Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA") and of the administrative procedures for bringing claims

under USERRA and other federal employment discrimination statutes. [Filing No. 1.] The United

States and Ms. Fudge (collectively, "the Government") have filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking

dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6)

for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. [Filing No. 17.] In addition to opposing the Government's Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Jolley

has filed a Motion for Sanctions, arguing that the Government violated Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11 by arguing that venue is improper in this Court. [Filing No. 30.] These motions are

both ripe for the Court's decision.

I.

STANDARD APPLICABLE TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS

At the outset, the Court notes that the Government seeks to dismiss this case in its entirety

based on improper venue, and seeks dismissal of certain claims based on lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. [See Filing No. 18.] For the reasons discussed below, the

Court concludes that the venue issue is dispositive here and requires that this matter be transferred

to another Court. Accordingly, the Court need not address the Government's arguments

concerning subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, and need not outline the standards

applicable to those arguments. See In re LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 576-57 (7th Cir. 2008)

(explaining that a court may transfer a case to a different venue without first considering the issue

of subject matter jurisdiction).

Rule 12(b)(3) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for improper venue. Deb v.

SIRVA, Inc., 832 F.3d 800, 809 (7th Cir. 2016). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(3), the Court must accept the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true, unless those

allegations are contradicted by the evidence submitted by the defendant. Id. "Rule 12(b)(3) is a

somewhat unique context of dismissal in that a court may look beyond the mere allegations of a

complaint, and need not view the allegations of the complaint as the exclusive basis for its

decision." Id. " Where one party makes a bald claim of venue and the other party contradicts it, a

district court may look beyond the pleadings to determine whether the chosen venue is

appropriate." Id. at 809-10.

II.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

According to Mr. Jolley, he brings this action "for the amelioration of employment

conditions for Veterans, older workers[,] and disabled workers in the federal civil service." [Filing

No. 1 at 7.] Mr. Jolley's filings indicate that he currently resides in Brunswick, Georgia, and has

done so since he commenced this action. [See, e.g., Filing No. 1 at 12; Filing No. 30 at 2.]

Mr. Jolley alleges that he was employed with HUD from 1963-1972 and from 2004-2010.

[Filing No. 1 at 7.] In 2003 or 2004, he filed a lawsuit against HUD alleging age discrimination

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and he settled the case in 2004 in

exchange for a position in HUD's Jacksonville, Florida office at the GS-15 grade and $60,000.00.

[Filing No. 1 at 7-8.] Mr. Jolley alleges that he was employed in that role from 2004 to 2007, but

"was frequently faced with covert animosity." [Filing No. 1 at 8.] According to Mr. Jolley, in

2007 he successfully litigated a claim for "[u]ncooperative and disparaging treatment" under

USERRA, before the Merits Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"). [Filing No. 1 at 8.]

Mr. Jolley alleges that in 2007 or early 2008, HUD began a "reorganization" process in

contravention of the statutory requirements established in 42 U.S.C. § 3535(p). [Filing No. 1 at

8.] As a part of that process, HUD directed Mr. Jolley to accept the position of Field Office

Director in Boise, Idaho, or be fired. [Filing No. 1 at 8.] HUD did not give Mr. Jolley the option

of accepting a comparable position closer to his home and family. [Filing No. 1 at 8.] After Mr.

Jolley accepted the position in Boise, he "sought a swap" with another director who was located

in Springfield, Illinois, but HUD would not approve the swap. [Filing No. 1 at 9.] However, when

1 Pursuant to the standard of review detailed above, the allegations contained in Mr. Jolley's

Complaint are accepted as true for purposes of this Order. To the extent that such allegations are

contradicted by the Government's evidence, or the Government has provided additional facts, those

matters will be discussed further below.

Mr. Jolley later left his position in Boise,2 the director from Springfield was transferred to the

Boise position. [Filing No. 1 at 9.] Mr. Jolley alleges that he has "served HUD successfully,

politely and professionally in every position that he has held." [Filing No. 1 at 9.]

In Count I of his Complaint, Mr. Jolley alleges that in 2018, he applied for the position of

GS-15 Field Office Director at the HUD Field Office in Boise, Idaho. [Filing No. 1 at 2-3.] He

was not selected for the position, and believes that was due to his hearing disability, his "advanced

age," the fact that he had previously successfully litigated a USERRA claim before the MSPB, or

some combination of those factors. [Filing No. 1 at 3.] Mr. Jolley alleges that he previously held

a GS-15 Director position and was successful in that role "despite deafness and advanced age."

[Filing No. 1 at 3.] He believes that, in order to avoid hiring him for a new GS-15 Director position,

HUD reorganized its field office and downgraded the available position to a GS-14 level, without

complying with federal law concerning field office reorganization. [Filing No. 1 at 3.] According

to Mr. Jolley, "[n]either HUD nor [the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")]

has resolved the issue at stake despite [his] patience going through various administrative

procedures." [Filing No. 1 at 3.]

With respect to Count I, Mr. Jolley asks the Court to find that by failing to hire him, HUD

violated 42 U.S.C. § 3535(p), which establishes requirements for the reorganization of HUD field

offices, and "violated employment selection laws" including USERRA, the ADEA, and the

Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). [Filing No. 1 at 5.] He further asks that the Court

direct HUD "to immediately place [him] in the GS-15, step 10 position as the Boise Field Office

Director with all back-pay and benefits to which he is entitled." [Filing No. 1 at 5.]

2 It is unclear from the Complaint exactly when or why Mr. Jolley left the Boise position.

In Count II of the Complaint, Mr. Jolley alleges that two of his USERRA cases that were

heard by the MSPB were reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and remanded

to the MSPB, but the MSPB has ignored them, "even when the MSPB had adequate board

members to render action on the remand." [Filing No. 1 at 4.] He asks the Court "to decide the

remanded USERRA issue" pursuant to this Court's authority granted by the Declaratory Judgment

Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and order that he be placed in the Boise Field Office Director

position with all back-pay benefits. [Filing No. 1 at 6.]

In Count III of the Complaint, Mr. Jolley alleges that USERRA, specifically 38 U.S.C.

§ 4324, is unconstitutional because it treats veterans employed by federal agencies less favorably

than veterans employed by states or private entities. [Filing No. 1 at 4.] Mr. Jolley alleges that

USERRA requires federally employed veterans to pursue relief before the MSPB, "which has

administrative judges not constitutionally qualified" under the criteria established in Lucia v.

S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). [Filing No. 1 at 4.] He asks the Court to declare § 4323

unconstitutional and order that all appeals by federally employed veterans be treated pursuant to

the procedures established in § 4324 for veterans employed by states or private entities. [Filing

No. 1 at 6.]

In Count IV of the Complaint, Mr. Jolley alleges that the administrative judges serving on

the MSPB and the EEOC are not constitutionally qualified pursuant to the Lucia decision. [Filing

No. 1 at 4-5.] He asks the Court to "decide that the administrative judges" must be qualified under

the criteria established in Lucia and order that "decisions previously made by constitutionally

unqualified administrative judges" after June 21, 2018 be "tried with qualified judges." [Filing

No. 1 at 6.]

In Count V of the Complaint, Mr. Jolley alleges that all "[d]ecisions involving issues

related to the USERRA, ADEA and the ADA laws should have the protection of qualified judges."

[Filing No. 1 at 5.] He asks the Court for an injunction requiring the MSPB and the EEOC to "use

constitutionally qualified judges" or district court judges to decide cases involving USERRA, the

ADEA, or the ADA. [Filing No. 1 at 7.]

Regarding venue, Mr. Jolley alleges the following:

A substantial part of the events or omissions (the EEOC case) giving rise to the

claim arises in the EEOC case in Indianapolis, In. The EEOC assigned the case of

Disability and Age discrimination relative to the HUD Boise, Idaho office to be

tried in Indianapolis by EEOC administrative judge Davidson Momah. Judge

Momah is not qualified to decide the matter according to the decision of the U.S.

Supreme Court in Lucia v. SEC.

[Filing No. 1 at 1 (emphasis omitted).]

On June 21, 2021, Mr. Jolley filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking

judgment in his favor on Count I. [Filing No. 15.] Just over a week later, the Government filed

its Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 17], as well as a Motion to Stay Briefing on Plaintiff's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 19]. The Court granted the Motion to Stay Briefing

and ordered that a briefing schedule on Mr. Jolley's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would

be set following a ruling on the Government's Motion to Dismiss. [Filing No. 20.]

Mr. Jolley then filed a second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking judgment in

his favor on Count II. [Filing No. 21.] The Government again moved to stay summary judgment

briefing pending a ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 25], and the Court granted the

motion, ordering that a briefing schedule on the second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

would be set following a ruling on the Government's Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 28].

Thereafter, the Government's Motion to Dismiss became ripe. [See Filing No. 26 (Mr.

Jolley's Response); Filing No. 29 (the Government's Reply).] Then Mr. Jolley filed a Motion for

Sanctions, asserting that the Government violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 by arguing

in its Motion to Dismiss that venue is improper in this Court. [Filing No. 30.] The Motion for

Sanctions is also ripe for the Court's decision.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

The Government argues that this case should be dismissed because venue is not proper in

the Southern District of Indiana. [Filing No. 18 at 3-6.] Specifically, the Government contends

that Mr. Jolley asserts that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B), but does not allege in

the Complaint that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his claims occurred

in this District. [Filing No. 18 at 4-6.] Instead, the Government argues, this suit principally

involves Mr. Jolley's application for a job in Idaho, which he applied for while living in Georgia,

and after he was not selected, he pursued relief through the EEOC and MSPB in Washington, D.C.

[Filing No. 18 at 5.] Accordingly, the Government contends, "none of the events having actual

significance to this case occurred in Indiana." [Filing No. 18 at 5.] The Government acknowledges

that Mr. Jolley's EEOC claim was presented to an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") in

Indianapolis, but maintains that is insufficient to render venue proper here because: (1) the ALJ

himself was puzzled as to why Mr. Jolley was pursuing relief in Indianapolis, and issued an order

directing Mr. Jolley to show cause why the case was not being heard in a different EEOC office;

(2) Mr. Jolley did not enter an appearance in the Indianapolis administrative proceeding or actively

litigate that case, and the case ultimately was not heard there; and (3) the case was assigned to an

ALJ in Indianapolis as a result of Mr. Jolley requesting a hearing, not due to any action taken by

the Government. [Filing No. 18 at 6.]

In the alternative, the Government argues that this case should be transferred to a proper

venue if not dismissed. [Filing No. 18 at 7-8.] The Government offers the U.S. District Court for

the District of Idaho, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the U.S. District

Court for the Southern District of Georgia as potential venues, and argues that any of those districts

would provide closer access to witnesses and documents, and constitute the places where the

events giving rise to this suit occurred. [Filing No. 18 at 7.] The Government also contends that

any of those other venues would be preferable to this Court in light of national statistics showing

greater docket congestion in this District. [Filing No. 18 at 7.]

Mr. Jolley responds that venue is proper in this Court because his EEOC case was assigned

to an ALJ in Indianapolis and "was pursued in Indianapolis." [Filing No. 27 at 1.] Mr. Jolley

asserts that he is "surprised" that the Government "was not made aware that most of the action

with respect to [Mr. Jolley's] HUD employment was handled on the desk of, and personally by,

Michael Lawyer, Director of Human Resource Management for the HUD Office of Field Policy

and Management (FPM); and that Michael Lawyer's office is in Indianapolis, Indiana." [Filing

No. 27 at 1-2.] According to Mr. Jolley, Mr. Lawyer was personally involved in denying Mr.

Jolley the job he applied for and would be a key witness in this lawsuit. [Filing No. 27 at 2.] Mr.

Jolley asserts that nothing related to this case happened in Idaho, because all of the events

concerning his application for the Boise position "happened in the office of Mr. Lawyer." [Filing

No. 27 at 4 n.1.] Mr. Jolley argues that Mr. Lawyer's presence in Indiana and the fact that his case

was before an ALJ in Indiana are sufficient to render venue proper in this Court. [Filing No. 27 at

2.] Mr. Jolley does not specifically respond to the Government's arguments that venue would be

proper in the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Southern District of Georgia. [See

Filing No. 27.]

In reply, the Government argues that Mr. Jolley's "theory about Mr. Lawyer's supposed

role with respect to the position in Boise does not appear anywhere in the complaint." [Filing No.

29 at 2-3.] Even if the Court were to look past this omission, the Government argues, venue is still

improper in this District. [Filing No. 29 at 3.] The Government asserts that the Court has the

power, pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), to transfer this case to

another venue in the interests of convenience and fairness. [Filing No. 29 at 34.] The Government

maintains that Georgia, Idaho, and Washington, D.C. have closer connections to this lawsuit than

Indiana. [Filing No. 29 at 4.] According to the Government, "this lawsuit is not just about Mr.

Jolley's application to Boise in 2018," and his inclusion of other claims concerning the Federal

Circuit remanding his case to the MSPB—both of which are located in Washington, D.C.—further

weighs against litigating this case in Indiana. [Filing No. 29 at 4.]

1. Whether Venue is Proper in this Court

The federal venue statue provides that a civil action against the United States or any officer

or employee of the United States acting in her official capacity may be brought in "any judicial

district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of

the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action." 28

U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). It is undisputed that neither Ms. Fudge nor Mr. Jolley reside in the Southern

District of Indiana and that no real property is involved in this action, so venue is only proper in

this District if "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to" Mr. Jolley's claims

occurred here.

"The test of determining whether a 'substantial part' of the events or omissions giving rise

to a claim occurred in a particular district is more of a qualitative, rather than quantitative inquiry."

Estate of Moore v. Dixon, 460 F. Supp. 2d 931, 936 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (interpreting identical

language in § 1391(a)(2) and citing Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 432-33

(2d Cir. 2005)). "The court must look to the entire sequence of events underlying the claim, rather

than a single action which may have triggered the claim," and must focus on the activities of the

defendant, not the plaintiff. Estate of Moore, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (citing Uffner v. La Reunion

Francaise, S.A., 244 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2001); PKWare, Inc. v. Meade, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1015

(E.D. Wis. 2000)). A majority of the events giving rise to the claim need not have taken place in

a particular district for venue to be proper, so long as a substantial portion of the events occurred

there. Estate of Moore, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (citation omitted). "Finally, in order for events to

be deemed 'substantial' under the statute, they must have a 'close nexus' to the alleged claim." Id.

(citing Daniel, 428 F.3d at 433).

Mr. Jolley argues that venue is proper in this District for two reasons: (1) Mr. Lawyer was

present here when he made decisions about Mr. Jolley's employment application; and (2) an ALJ

located here was assigned to the EEOC case. Turning first to Mr. Lawyer, the Government

submitted a declaration along with its response to Mr. Jolley's Motion for Sanctions, in which Mr.

Lawyer explains that he lived and worked in Washington, D.C. during all times relevant to this

lawsuit. [Filing No. 31-1 at 1 ("From 2010 to 2019, I resided in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan

area and worked at HUD's office in Washington, D.C.").] Setting aside the fact that the Complaint

contains no allegations about Mr. Lawyer's alleged involvement in this case,3 even if the Court

3 Appended to the end of the Complaint is a section titled "Content of Motion to EEOC Hearings

Unit," which contains one sentence stating, "Mr. Lawyer should be referred to the Department of

Justice for an FBI investigation leading to possible criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1917 for

his part in the charade." [Filing No. 1 at 11.] However, Mr. Lawyer's first name is not provided,

and there is no specific information indicating who he is or what role he allegedly played in "the

charade."

accepts Mr. Jolley's assertions that Mr. Lawyer was involved in rejecting his job application or

reorganizing the HUD field office in Boise, Mr. Lawyer would have done those things from his

office in Washington, D.C., not while he was in Indiana. Furthermore, although Mr. Lawyer

relocated to "Central Indiana" in April 2019, [Filing No. 31-1 at 1], his current presence in Indiana

has nothing to do with the events giving rise to this lawsuit and is insufficient to render venue

proper in this Court.

Mr. Jolley's reliance on an Indianapolis ALJ's handling of his EEOC case is similarly

misplaced. As an initial matter, nothing in the EEOC case records submitted by the Government

or by Mr. Jolley indicate why an Indianapolis-based ALJ was assigned to the EEOC case to begin

with. On his EEOC complaint, in response to the question "Where do you believe the

discrimination occurred," Mr. Jolley answered "HUD Office of Field Policy & Management."

[Filing No. 17-2 at 2.] He listed an address in Washington, D.C. for that office. [Filing No. 17-2

at 3.] The ALJ also expressed confusion regarding why the case was before him, as he ordered

Mr. Jolley to show cause why the case should proceed in Indianapolis, rather than the EEOC field

office in Seattle, Washington—the nearest field office to Boise—or Washington, D.C.—the

nearest field office to HUD's Washington, D.C. headquarters. [Filing No. 17-4 at 3.] It does not

appear that Mr. Jolley ever responded to that order to show cause, and his EEOC case was

ultimately dismissed without adjudication after he notified the ALJ that he had filed the instant

lawsuit in this Court and otherwise failed to comply with the procedures for litigating the EEOC

case. [Filing No. 17-5 at 2-3.]

The brief pendency of Mr. Jolley's discrimination claim before an ALJ in Indianapolis did

not give rise to the instant lawsuit. To be sure, Mr. Jolley's EEOC complaint alleged age and

disability discrimination, [Filing No. 17-2 at 2], which are also at issue in this lawsuit. However,

the alleged discriminatory acts (i.e., the denial of Mr. Jolley's application for employment and

allegedly improper restructuring of the Boise field office) had already occurred before his EEOC

case reached Indianapolis. And while Mr. Jolley asserts that EEOC ALJs are not constitutionally

adequate, the ALJ in Indianapolis dismissed the case and did not reach a substantive decision that

Mr. Jolley can challenge as unconstitutional. Mr. Jolley's other claims concern USERRA, and the

way his USERRA claims were handled by the MSPB, which are wholly separate from the issues

raised in his EEOC case and have nothing to do with any actions taken by the Indianapolis ALJ.

In sum, the Court concludes that Mr. Jolley has not demonstrated that "a substantial part of

the events or omissions giving rise to" his claims occurred in this District. Accordingly, venue is

not proper in this Court. The Court therefore must consider whether this case should be dismissed

or transferred to an appropriate venue.

2. Whether this Case Should be Dismissed or Transferred

When a case is filed in an improper venue, the district court "shall dismiss, or if it be in the

interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been

brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). "The interests of justice may require transfer rather than dismissal

if the plaintiff mistakenly filed suit in the wrong district and the statute of limitations has since

run." Farmer v. Levenson, 79 F. App'x 918, 922 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,

369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962); Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1986)). Courts in this

Circuit have also observed that "[t]ransfer is ordinarily in the interest of justice because dismissal

of an action that could be brought elsewhere is 'time consuming' and may be 'justice-defeating.'"

Spherion Corp. v. Cincinnati Fin. Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059-60 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing

Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 467); see also Hangxiao Che v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, 2021 WL

3129418, at *4 (S.D. Ill. July 23, 2021) ("Generally, courts prefer transferring a case to a

jurisdiction where venue is proper as opposed to dismissing it. Transfer avoids the 'time-

consuming and justice-defeating technicalities' required to refile a case in a proper venue.").

The Court finds that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this case, rather than dismiss

it. Notably, the Government does not offer a basis for dismissal—apart from improper venue—

for the discrimination claim raised in Count I of Mr. Jolley's Complaint. [See Filing No. 18.]

Accordingly, even if the Court were to address the other matters raised in the Government's

motion, at least one of Mr. Jolley's claims would remain for adjudication and could be pursued in

a proper venue. And although the Court lacks the information needed to determine whether a

statute of limitations issue might arise if this case is dismissed, at minimum, dismissing a case that

could be pursued elsewhere is inefficient. See Spherion Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60. The

Court will next consider where this case should be transferred.

3. Other Potential Venues

Mr. Jolley does not dispute the Government's arguments that venue would be proper in the

District of Columbia or the Southern District of Georgia. [See Filing No. 27.] The Court agrees

that venue would be proper in Georgia because Mr. Jolley resides there. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(e)(1)(C). Venue would also be proper in the District of Columbia because: (1) a substantial

portion of the events giving rise to the claims occurred there; and (2) Ms. Fudge is deemed a

resident of the District of Columbia for venue purposes. Specifically, according to Mr. Jolley, the

alleged discriminatory actions that resulted in his failure to be selected for employment occurred

in Mr. Lawyer's office in Washington, D.C., as did the MSPB's review of his USERRA claim.

Furthermore, because Ms. Fudge performs her official duties in Washington, D.C., she is a resident

of that district for purposes of venue. See Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. F.T.C., 580 F.2d 264,

266-27, 266 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The residence of a federal officer has always been determined

by the place where [she] performs [her] official duties."). Based on these considerations, coupled

with the fact that Mr. Jolley's filing of the instant action shows that he has no qualms about

litigating outside of where he resides, the Court concludes that it is in the interests of justice to

transfer this case to the District Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the Government's

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART to the extent that it seeks to transfer this case to

another venue. The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.

B. Motion for Sanctions

Although the Court has determined that this case should be litigated in the District of

Columbia, because Mr. Jolley's Motion for Sanctions is ripe and concerns conduct that occurred

before this Court, the Court finds it appropriate to adjudicate the motion.

Mr. Jolley seeks sanctions against the Government, pursuant to Rule 11, arguing that the

Government "intentionally diminished" the fact that Indianapolis is an appropriate venue for this

lawsuit by failing to disclose to the Court that Mr. Lawyer is located in Indiana. [Filing No. 30 at

1-2.] Mr. Jolley contends that prior to filing its Motion to Dismiss, the Government "well knew"

that Mr. Lawyer was located in Indianapolis and that Mr. Lawyer "is the individual most involved

with the current matters of Mr. Jolley's employment attempts with Defendant HUD." [Filing No.

30 at 2.]

The Government responds that sanctions are not appropriate because: (1) Mr. Jolley did

not include in his Complaint any allegations about Mr. Lawyer or his involvement in the alleged

discrimination, and therefore the Government could not have addressed that issue in its Motion to

Dismiss; (2) Mr. Jolley's assertion that Mr. Lawyer was located in Indiana during the relevant time

is inaccurate; and (3) venue is improper in this District and this case should be litigated in another

court. [Filing No. 31.]

Based on the discussion of venue above, Mr. Jolley's Motion for Sanctions is clearly

without merit. Not only is his belief about Mr. Lawyer's location inaccurate, but he provided no

information in his Complaint that would have alerted the Government to Mr. Jolley's position that

Mr. Lawyer was significantly involved in the events giving rise to this lawsuit or permitted the

Government to appropriately address that matter in its Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, Mr.

Jolley's Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Jolley's Motion for Sanctions, [30], is DENIED. The

Government's Motion to Dismiss, [17], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as

follows:

e The motion is GRANTED to the extent that the Government seeks to transfer this case

to another venue; and

e The motion is DENIED in all other respects.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), the Clerk is DIRECTED to TRANSFER this case to the

District Court for the District of Columbia. Mr. Jolley's pending Motions for Partial Summary

Judgment, [15; 21], shall remain pending for disposition by the District Court for the District of

Columbia. However, the Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE the pending motions on this

Court's docket.

Date: 10/14/2021 = one Mpa! CS:

(Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

15

Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record

Distribution via U.S. Mail to:

William B. Jolley

73 Bartram Trail

Brunswick, GA 31523