Opinion

MITAN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE

Court
District Court, S.D. Indiana
Filed
Sep 16, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.7%

"We thus are unconvinced that any of the Court's prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated."

How later courts described this case

  • "We thus are unconvinced that any of the Court's prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated."
  • addressing a false arrest claim
  • officer's qualified immunity defense was "[f]urther bolster[ed]" by the fact that she consulted with district attorney before conducting arrest
  • stating that by opening a door and stepping back to allow police entry, a defendant can consent to the police entry into his home

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

KEITH J. MITAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:11-cv-01260-SEB-TAB

)

GEORGE P. CLARK, in his individual )

capacity, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 62]

filed by Defendant on February 26, 2021, and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment

[Dkt. 67], filed by Plaintiff on April 15, 2021. Plaintiff Keith J. Mitan has brought this

action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Defendant George P. Clark, a Postal Inspector for the

United States Postal Inspection Service, alleging that Inspector Clark conducted an

unlawful seizure of Mr. Mitan's personal property in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

For the reasons detailed below, we GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

and DENY Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Keith J. Mitan ("Mr. Mitan"), a resident of Michigan, was a practicing

attorney there until 2009, when his bar license was suspended. Pl. Dep. at 25–26. The

instant lawsuit arises from the seizure of certain documents belonging to Mr. Mitan from

a residence located at 3230 North Reba Court, Bloomington, Indiana, ("the Property") in

connection with a criminal investigation involving Mr. Mitan's brother, Kenneth Mitan

("Kenneth"). Defendant George P. Clark was the United States Postal Inspection Service

Agent assigned to that criminal investigation.

I. Plaintiff's Use of the Property

In March 2001, Mitan Estates, Inc. purchased the Property from the Richard E.

Deckard Family Limited Partnership #206 (the "Deckard Partnership"). According to

Mr. Mitan, Kenneth "signed the original purchase agreement … on behalf of Mitan

Estates, Inc. [MEI]," but it is not clear what position, if any, Kenneth held with MEI at

the time of the purchase. Mr. Mitan has never been an officer or director of MEI and is

unaware of the purposes behind the corporation's purchase of the Property, but

"speculate[s]" that it was purchased "[a]s an investment." Pl. Dep. at 8–9, 11.

According to Mr. Mitan, he had permission to "keep his personal property inside

the house" located on the Property, and at various times between 2001 and 2009, he

brought "documents [he] wasn't using anymore" to store in the house, some of which

were projected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 14, 29–31. Mr. Mitan never

resided in the house on the Property or ever even spent the night there as "[t]here was no

bed in the house." Id. 15, 16. Rather, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, Mr. Mitan

resided in Farmington Hills, Michigan, and used the Property only to store items

"[b]ecause [he] didn't have space in Michigan" to put them. Id. at 7, 14. Mr. Mitan's

brother, Kenneth, lived "primarily in California" during the relevant time period and Mr.

Mitan is unaware whether Kenneth ever used the house on the Property as his residence.

Id. at 11–13, 16–17.

II. Subpoena Issued for Documents Related to the Property and to

Individuals Including Plaintiff

In 2008, the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania opened a criminal investigation involving Plaintiff's brother, Kenneth

Mitan. In connection with that investigation, on October 8, 2008, Assistant United States

Attorney ("AUSA") Scott Cullen issued a grand jury subpoena to "Deckard Homes and

Apartments," demanding production of "[a]ll records related to the property at 3230

North Reba Court, Bloomington, IN 47403, and to individuals named Kenneth Mitan,

Keith Mitan, Teresa Mitan, and Frank Mitan, including but not limited to, lease

agreements, purchase agreements, correspondence, methods of payment, and, notices of

default and/or eviction, dating from January 1, 2005 to the present."1 Dkt. 62-4; Clark

Decl. ¶ 6. That subpoena also provided, in lieu of appearance before the grand jury, the

requested documents could be turned over to the government by mailing them to the

United States Postal Inspection Service as "615 CHESTNUT STREET, SUITE 700,

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106, ATTN: George Clark, United States Postal Inspector."

Dkt. 62-4. The subpoena further provided that it would "remain in effect until [the

Deckard Partnership] w[as] granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on

behalf of the court." Id.

1 Frank and Teresa Mitan are the parents of Kenneth and Keith Mitan.

The Deckard Partnership complied with the subpoena, providing the requested

materials in 2008. In December 2008, a federal grand jury in the U.S. District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging Kenneth Mitan,

Frank Mitan, and other defendants with various counts of mail and wire fraud and related

offenses. Dkt. 62-5.

III. Foreclosure on the Property and State Court Order Awarding Legal Title

to the Real Estate and Personal Property Therein

In January 2009, the Deckard Partnership commenced a foreclosure action on the

Property. Dkt. 62-6. On September 10, 2009, after a contested hearing at which both

sides were represented by counsel, the Monroe Circuit Court entered a judgment in favor

of the Deckard Partnership, awarding to the Deckard Partnership "legal and equitable title

to the real estate [at 3230 Reba Court] and personal property therein." Id. at 1–2.

By letter dated September 30, 2009, AUSA Cullen notified the U.S. District Court

in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that the week prior, on September 24, 2009, a

representative of the Deckard Partnership had contacted the government to inform it of

the foreclosure action and the Monroe Circuit Court's September 10, 2009 Order

awarding the Deckard Partnership possession of the real property and all personal

property therein. When agents of the Deckard Partnership entered the home, they

discovered the house "littered with thousands and thousands of disorganized documents."

Dkt. 62-7. AUSA Cullen stated in the September 30 letter that the government

anticipated that it would "have the documents on October 2, 2009 and [would] make

them available for the defendants shortly thereafter." Id.

Kenneth Mitan's criminal trial was scheduled to begin only a few days later, in

early October 2009. The U.S. Attorney's Office believed it had an "obligation" to obtain

the records stored at the Property and instructed Inspector Clark to travel to Indiana to

collect them. Inspector Clark understood that, in doing so, he was "acting at the direction

of the United States Attorney's Office." Clark Dep. at 15–16, 19. Before traveling to the

Property, Inspector Clark consulted with the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding whether a

search warrant was required to remove materials from 3230 Reba Court and was advised

that no search warrant was necessary. It was Inspector Clark's understanding that, as of

that time, the Deckard Partnership was the owner of both the real and personal property

contained in the residence on the Property and that the Deckard Partnership wanted the

government to retrieve the materials inside the house. Id. at 10, 12, 14, 15–16; Clark

Decl. ¶ 10.

IV. Seizure of Documents from the Property

Early on the morning of October 1, 2008, Inspector Clark and an FBI agent flew

from Philadelphia to Indianapolis, where they rented a U-Haul and drove to

Bloomington, Indiana. When they arrived at the Property, Inspector Clark observed

employees of the Deckard Partnership clearing out the residence. Clark Dep. at 4–5;

Clark Decl. ¶¶ 11–12. Inspector Clark informed Deckard Partnership employee, Ranatta

Raper, of their arrival, and Ms. Raper instructed other Deckard Partnership employees to

load the "boxes and bags of stuff" into the U-Haul. Clark Dep. at 5; Clark Decl. ¶¶ 13–

14. According to Inspector Clark, he "couldn't open the door of the truck fast enough for

[the Deckard Partnership employees] to get the stuff out of the house." Clark Dep. at 11.

Inspector Clark testified that the Deckard Partnership employees "were expecting us.

They loaded the truck up with records … almost faster than I could blink. They wanted

to get rid of that stuff." Id. at 37.

As the materials were loaded into the U-Haul, Inspector Clark compiled a rough

inventory of the documents they had collected using a sheet of carbon paper on Postal

Service Form 8164 ("PS Form 8164"), titled "Search Warrant Inventory." See Dkt. 62-9.

Inspector Clark crossed out the words "search warrant" on the form to clarify that he was

not executing a search warrant. Id.; Clark Dep. at 38. According to Inspector Clark, he

"did nothing to suggest [he] had a search warrant,"2 utilizing the PS Form 8164 for the

inventory only because it was printed on carbon paper and he wanted to leave a copy with

Ms. Raper as a receipt but did not have access to a copy machine. Clark Dep. at 37–38.

The inventory identified the "[i]tems taken from the Deckard Homes" as follows: 98

cardboard boxes of documents; five plastic crates of documents; six plastic garbage bags

of documents; one wire basket of documents; and various other items such as computers,

luggage, and videotapes. Dkt. 62-9. Ms. Raper's initials appear at the bottom of the

inventory sheet. Id.

2 Mr. Mitan contends that whether Inspector Clark led Deckard Partnership employees to believe

that he had a search warrant for the materials seized from the Property is a disputed fact.

However, he fails to cite to any admissible evidence in support of that contention, citing instead

merely to an attorney argument written in a prior brief filed in this case in which the attorney

assumed, for purposes of the argument, that Inspector Clark had shown Ms. Raper a search

warrant. The only evidence adduced in the record before us regarding a search warrant is

Inspector Clark's sworn testimony that he did not have one and never represented to anyone that

he did. There is no contrary testimony from Ms. Raper or any other Deckard Partnership

employee.

Inspector Clark and the FBI agent were at the Property for approximately one hour

on October 1, 2009 before beginning the drive in the U-Haul with the seized materials

back to Philadelphia, where they arrived at approximately 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. on the

morning of October 2, 2009. Clark Dep. at 4–5, 6; Clark Decl. ¶ 15. In Philadelphia, the

collected materials were transferred to and stored in a government facility for potential

use in the criminal proceedings against Kenneth Mitan. Clark Dep. at 16; Clark Decl.

¶ 15.

Mr. Mitan was not physically present at the Property on October 1, 2009, and thus

did not personally witness the removal of the materials from 3230 Reba Court. Pl. Dep.

at 7. The items on the inventory sheet that Mr. Mitan claims constitute his personal

property include several boxes and plastic containers of documents, his briefcase, and an

"old hard drive" that had been removed from a computer. Id. at 20.

V. Reversal of State Court Order and Return of Plaintiff's Personal

Property

In December 2009, approximately two months after Inspector Clark's visit to the

Property, Kenneth Mitan filed a notice of appeal with the Indiana Court of Appeals,

challenging the Monroe Circuit Court's order awarding title of the property at 3230 Reba

Court to the Deckard Partnership. Dkt. 62-10. A year later, on November 4, 2010, the

Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the Monroe Circuit Court's order in part but reversed

as to the "award of all personal property" in the house and "remand[ed] with instructions

to award to the Partnership only that personal property specified by the contract as being

included in the sale." Mitan v. Richard E. Deckard Family Ltd. P'ship #206, 936 N.E.2d

873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (unpublished).

Kenneth Mitan was eventually convicted at the criminal trial, and, sadly, died in

2015 while incarcerated. In March 2015, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the

government to return Plaintiff's personal property that had been seized from 3230 Reba

Court, which the government returned to Plaintiff in May 2015, following Kenneth's

death.

VI. The Instant Litigation

On September 16, 2011, Mr. Mitan filed this lawsuit in our court against the

United States Postal Inspection Service and Inspector Clark, individually, and in his

official capacity as United States Postal Inspector, alleging that the search of the Property

and seizure of his personal property violated his Fourth Amendment rights. On

November 9, 2012, we transferred the case to the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania regarding it as related to the criminal case against Mr.

Mitan's brother, United States v. Kenneth Mitan, No. 2:08-cr-0760-MMB-1 (E.D. Pa.).

See Dkt. 46. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania initially dismissed the lawsuit and

denied Mr. Mitan's request for leave to amend his complaint. Mr. Mitan appealed that

order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the dismissal was proper but

that the district court had erred in denying Mr. Mitan leave to amend his complaint,

remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings. See Mitan v. United

States Postal Inspection Servs., 656 Fed. App'x 610 (3d Cir. 2016).

On remand, Mr. Mitan filed his second amended complaint, this time naming only

Inspector Clark in his individual capacity as a defendant. Specifically, Mr. Mitan alleges

that Inspector Clark violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures by "seizing [Mr. Mitan's personal property] without a warrant."

Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Inspector Clark moved for summary judgment in the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania, but the district court concluded that summary judgment was

premature and denied the motion without prejudice to refiling once discovery was

complete. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Mitan filed a motion to transfer the case back to this

Court, arguing that the personal property at issue in this lawsuit had been returned to him

in Michigan and the litigation therefore no longer had a connection to the Eastern District

of Pennsylvania. On March 20, 2020, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred

this case back to this district.

Following a period of discovery upon transfer, Inspector Clark moved for

summary judgment on February 26, 2021. Mr. Mitan filed his cross-motion for summary

judgment on April 15, 2021. Those motions are now fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

Legal Analysis

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes of material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A court must grant a motion for

summary judgment if it appears that no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the

nonmovant on the basis of the designated admissible evidence. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). We neither weigh the evidence nor evaluate

the credibility of witnesses, id. at 255, but view the facts and the reasonable inferences

flowing from them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McConnell v. McKillip,

573 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (S.D. Ind. 2008).

Courts often confront cross-motions for summary judgment because Rules 56(a)

and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow both plaintiffs and defendants to

move for such relief. "In such situations, courts must consider each party's motion

individually to determine if that party has satisfied the summary judgment standard."

Kohl v. Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am., 183 F.R.D. 475 (D.Md. 1998). Thus, in

determining whether genuine and material factual disputes exist in this case, the Court

has considered the parties' respective memoranda and the exhibits attached thereto, and

has construed all facts and drawn all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most

favorable to the respective non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).

II. Discussion

The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Amendment "protects two

types of expectations, one involving 'searches,' the other 'seizures.'" Soldal v. Cook Cnty.,

Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 63 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113

(1984)). "A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to

consider reasonable is infringed." Soldal, 506 U.S. at 63 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at

113). "A 'seizure of property occurs where there is some meaningful interference with an

individual's possessory interests in that property." Soldal, 506 U.S. at 63 (quoting

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113). An individual is permitted to bring a Fourth Amendment

claim based on a search or seizure only of his own "person[], house[], papers, and

effects." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

Here, Mr. Mitan asserts that his right to be protected from unreasonable seizures

was infringed when Inspector Clark seized his personal property from 3230 Reba Court

without a warrant. Inspector Clark rejoins that he is entitled to summary judgment on

Mr. Mitan's claims because Mr. Mitan did not actually suffer a violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights, given that, at the time of the seizure of the materials at issue in this

litigation, the Deckard Partnership had a state court judgment making the Partnership, not

Mr. Mitan, the owner of the personal property, and, in any event, Mr. Mitan had no

reasonable expectation of privacy in the location from which the materials were seized.3

3 Inspector Clark argues that Mr. Mitan's Fourth Amendment claim fails because he had no

reasonable expectation of privacy in 3230 Reba Court. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88

(1998) ("[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must

demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his

expectation is reasonable, i.e., one that has a 'source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by

reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized

and permitted by society.") (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–144 & n.12 (1978)).

Given that Mr. Mitan lived in a different state, approximately 350 miles from the Property, and

neither owned, resided, nor had ever stayed as an overnight guest at the Property, and was not

present on the day of the search, we agree with Defendant that Mr. Mitan had no reasonable

expectation of privacy in the Property. See, e.g., McFadden v. Pryor, No. 12 C 4110, 2015 WL

3932100, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2015) (holding that the plaintiff lacked Fourth Amendment

protections in mother's home where he did not own the property, was not in possession of it, did

not reside there, and was not physically present at the time of the search). However, while Mr.

Mitan's lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 3230 Reba Court precludes him from

challenging the search of the Property, his complaint alleges only a violation of his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure of his personal property. The fact that he

Inspector Clark also contends that, even if the Court were to find that Mr. Mitan had a

possessory interest in the seized materials and the seizure violated the Fourth

Amendment, he is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity

grounds because a reasonable government official in his position could have believed that

the Deckard Partnership was the owner of the seized property and had voluntarily

consented to the seizure; thus, his conduct did not violate clearly established law.

After a full and careful consideration of the parties' arguments, we find, for the

reasons detailed below, that even assuming genuine issues of material fact exist as to

whether Mr. Mitan held a possessory interest in the materials that Inspector Clark seized

from 3230 Reba Court and whether the Deckard Partnership had authority to consent to

the seizure,4 Inspector Clark is entitled to qualified immunity because, when assessed in

light of the particular facts of this case, a reasonable officer in his position could have

did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 3230 Reba Court it is not determinative of his

Fourth Amendment claim based on the alleged unreasonable seizure because the Fourth

Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of property even where there are no privacy

or liberty interests at stake. See Soldal, 506 U.S. at 65 ("We thus are unconvinced that any of the

Court's prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable

seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated."). It is well-established that

"seizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within

the meaning of the Amendment has taken place." Id. at 68.

4 As the Third Circuit recognized in affirming the dismissal of Mr. Mitan's initial complaint, "[a]

state court judgment awarding ownership of Mitan's personal property to the Partnership would

ordinarily preclude a finding that Mitan retained a possessory interest, but it is not clear in this

case that the judgment was meant to, or even could, bind Mitan or his personal property housed

at the [Property]," given that the state court judgment names only Mr. Mitan's brother, Kenneth,

as a defendant and Inspector Clark has not advanced any argument as to why the judgment

would have bound Mr. Mitan or his property. Mitan v. United States Postal Inspection Serv.,

656 Fed. App'x 610, 615–616 (3d Cir. 2016). However, even if Mr. Mitan retained a possessory

interest in the materials seized from the Property at the time of the seizure, for the reasons

detailed below, it does not affect our conclusion that Inspector Clark is entitled to qualified

immunity.

believed the seizure was constitutional. Accordingly, we turn directly to the qualified

immunity analysis.

"Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability

unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established

at the time of the challenged conduct." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). When evaluating whether qualified immunity

applies, courts must "consider two questions: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2)

whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation." Allin v. City of Springfield, 845 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal

citation and quotation omitted). Thus, qualified immunity is appropriate "when the law,

as applied to the facts, would have left objectively reasonable officials in a state of

uncertainty." Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 2018). In other words, a

government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless it can be said that "every

reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] [a] right."

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam). "[E]xisting precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (quotation marks and

citation omitted). Because we are able in this case to "rather quickly and easily decide

that there was no violation of clearly established law," we turn immediately to the second

prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 239

(2009).

As of October 1, 2008, the date on which Inspector Clark seized the materials at

issue, it was clearly established that, while "the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits

searches and seizures performed without a warrant, there is an exception when someone

with actual or apparent authority consents to the search or seizure." United States v.

Aghedo, 159 F.3d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1998). The presence of consent "must be judged

against an objective standard," meaning whether "the facts available to the officer at the

moment [would] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting

party had authority over the premises." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990)

(quotation marks an citation omitted). Consent must be voluntary, Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973), and can be manifested through actions as well as

words. United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that by opening

a door and stepping back to allow police entry, a defendant can consent to the police

entry into his home). In a § 1983 case such as this, once the defendant presents evidence

that the plaintiff consented to the search or seizure, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

establish the lack of consent. Valance v. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1279 (7th Cir. 1997).

Here, at the time Inspector Clark seized the materials at issue in this litigation

from 3230 Reba Court, he was acting "at the direction of the United States Attorney's

Office," with the understanding based on the Monroe Circuit Court judgment that the

Deckard Partnership, not Mr. Mitan, legally owned all personal property housed at that

location. Mr. Mitan argues that the state court judgment was invalid, but even if that is

true, as the Third Circuit previously recognized in this case, the judgment's "existence

made it objectively reasonable for Clark to believe that the Partnership had authority to

consent to the entry and seizure." Mitan, 656 Fed. App'x at 614. This conclusion is

buttressed by the fact that, before traveling to Indiana to retrieve the materials from the

Property, Inspector Clark consulted with the United States Attorney's Office in

Pennsylvania regarding whether the government needed to obtain a warrant before taking

possession of the materials and was advised that no warrant was required because the

Deckard Partnership was consenting to the seizure. The Seventh Circuit has observed

that consulting with prosecutors regarding the legal requirements for taking possession

"goes a long way toward solidifying [a] qualified immunity defense." Fleming v.

Livingston Cnty., Ill., 674 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2012) (addressing a false arrest claim);

accord Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 554 (2012) (officer's consultation with

deputy district attorney "provides further support for the conclusion that an officer could

reasonably have believed that the scope for the warrant was supported by probable

cause"); Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 251 (7th Cir. 2015) (officer's qualified

immunity defense was "[f]urther bolster[ed]" by the fact that she consulted with district

attorney before conducting arrest).

There is also ample other evidence in the record establishing that a reasonable

government official in Inspector Clark's position could have believed that the Deckard

Partnership voluntarily consented to the seizure. Inspector Clark testified that, prior to

his arrival at the Property, employees of the Deckard Partnership had emailed the U.S.

Attorney's Office and "offered" the seized items to the government, indicating that the

materials would be destroyed if not retrieved by the government. Clark Dep. at 10.

Then, upon Inspector Clark's arrival at the Property, Ms. Raper, an employee of the

Deckard Partnership who was present at that location, gave "tons of oral consent" to the

seizure and initialed an inventory sheet titled "Items taken from Deckard Homes" which

Inspector Clark understood was to "memorializ[e]" that the Partnership was "giving [the

government] this property." Id. at 11. The Partnership's consent was also manifested

through the employees' actions of loading bags and boxes of documents into Inspector

Clark's U-Haul truck "almost faster than [he] could blink." Id. at 37. According to

Inspector Clark, he "couldn't open the door of the truck fast enough for them to get the

stuff out of the house." Id. at 11.

Mr. Mitan rejoins that Inspector Clark's testimony regarding the Deckard

Partnership's having voluntarily consented to the seizure is inadmissible hearsay and that

there is contrary evidence in the record establishing that Inspector Clark coerced the

Partnership's consent, either by falsely implying he had a search warrant or by

"improperly utiliz[ing] a grand jury subpoena in lieu of a search warrant." Dkt. 68 at 10.

For the following reasons, we are not persuaded by these arguments.

We can dispatch quickly with Mr. Mitan's hearsay argument. Hearsay is an out of

court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). A

statement is "a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the

person intended it as an assertion." Fed. R. Evid. 801(a). However, when an out-of-court

statement's significance "lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to

the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay …. The effect is to

exclude from hearsay the entire category of 'verbal acts' and 'verbal parts of an act,' in

which the statement itself affects the legal rights of the parties or is a circumstance

bearing on conduct affecting their rights." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), Advisory Committee's

Note to Subdivision (c).

The Seventh Circuit has found that the "utterance of consent to [] search"

constitutes a "verbal act[], and as such [is] not inadmissible hearsay" because "[l]ike the

classic examples of verbal acts, offer and acceptance, … statements that grant or

withhold permission to the authorities to conduct a search carry legal significance

independent of the assertive content of the words used." United States v. Moreno, 233

F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, Inspector Clark's

testimony that the Partnership gave consent to seize the materials at issue in this litigation

is admissible because the expression of consent is not hearsay, but a verbal act.

Nor is Mr. Mitan's claim that Inspector Clark coerced the Deckard Partnership into

giving consent, either by falsely implying that he had a search warrant or by improperly

using a grand jury subpoena, supported by the evidence. The only evidence Mr. Mitan

cites in support of the claim that Inspector Clark implied to the Deckard Partnership

employees that he had a search warrant covering the seized property is a section of a brief

in support of a motion to dismiss filed earlier in this litigation by the attorney

representing Ms. Raper and Richard Deckard, both of whom were previously named as

defendants in this case, in which the attorney assumed that because Inspector Clark used

a Search Warrant Inventory form to memorialize the materials that were seized, there

must also have been a search warrant "to which the Search Warrant Inventory would

have been attached." Dkt. 20 at 5. However, argument and statements from an attorney,

unsupported by affidavits or deposition testimony, "are not evidence," even on summary

judgment. Mitze v. Colvin, 782 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2015); see also In re Morris Paint

& Varnish Co., 773 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Arguments and factual assertions

made by counsel in a brief, unsupported by affidavits, cannot be given any weight.");

Thames v. St. Vincent Stress Ctr., No. 1:09-cv-1041-SEB-TAB, 2010 WL 5124733, at *7

(S.D. Ind. Dec. 9, 2010) (observing that statement by opposing party's attorney in

briefing "is not evidence" for purposes of summary judgment). Beyond the attorney's

inadmissible assumption that there had to have been a search warrant, there is no

evidence to substantiate Mr. Mitan's claim that Inspector Clark falsely represented to Ms.

Raper or any other employee of the Deckard Partnership that he was executing a search

warrant. Indeed, Inspector Clark has testified specifically to the contrary.

Thus, to recap, the only admissible evidence in the record regarding this issue is

Inspector Clark's uncontroverted testimony that he never represented or implied that he

was executing a search warrant and that he used the search warrant inventory form only

because the form was printed on carbon paper which enabled him to provide Ms. Raper

with a copy of the list of items seized. Inspector Clark further testified that he took steps

to affirmatively demonstrate he was not executing a search warrant, including crossing

out the words "search warrant" in the title of the inventory form. Accordingly, there is no

admissible evidence to support Mr. Mitan's claim that Inspector Clark implied, much less

falsely represented, to any employee of the Deckard Partnership that he was executing a

search warrant; rather, the undisputed evidence establishes the contrary.

Mr. Mitan's alternative argument that Inspector Clark improperly used a grand jury

subpoena to coerce the Deckard Partnership's employees into consenting to the seizure is

likewise unfounded. The only evidence Mr. Mitan cites in support of this claim is that

Inspector Clark testified at one point during his deposition that he understood that the

Deckard Partnership was complying with the December 18, 2008 grand jury subpoena

issued against Mr. Mitan's brother when it agreed to turn over documents to the

government. Clark Dep. at 39. Inspector Clark clarified upon further questioning,

however, that he understood that a grand jury subpoena had at one point been issued, but

that he had "no reason one way or the other" to know whether the seized items were

being turned over pursuant to that subpoena because the Partnership had dealt exclusively

with the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding the subpoena. Id. at 47. Inspector Clark

testified that he had no memory of speaking with Ms. Raper about whether she was

turning over the documents pursuant to a subpoena and that he knew only that the

Deckard Partnership had contacted the United States Attorney's Office to say that the

government should come to retrieve whatever documents it wanted from 3230 Reba

Court because, to the Partnership, the documents were "garbage," and it otherwise

planned to dispose of the materials. Id. at 46. When considered as a whole, this

testimony in no way supports Mr. Mitan's claim that Inspector Clark "improperly

utilized" the grand jury subpoena in seizing the materials from the Property.

For these reasons and on these grounds, we hold that Inspector Clark is entitled to

summary judgment based on qualified immunity in defense of Mr. Mitan's claim that the

October 1, 2019 seizure of the personal property at issue violated his Fourth Amendment

rights. To the extent that Mr. Mitan contends that the government's continued

withholding of the materials after the Monroe Circuit Court's order was overturned as to

the Deckard Partnership's ownership interest in the personal property housed at 3230

Reba Court constitutes a separate violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, that claim

also does not survive summary judgment. It is well-established in the Seventh Circuit

that "continued retention of unlawfully seized property is not a separate Fourth

Amendment wrong." Gonazlez v. Vill. of W. Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 660 (7th Cir.

2012) (citing Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, Mr.

Mitan has presented no case law or other authority to contradict the Third Circuit's

conclusion based on its prior consideration of this issue that "it was not clearly

established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the continued retention of the property

after the state appeals court partially reversed the [Marion Circuit Court's] judgment."

Mitan, 656 Fed. App'x at 614. Inspector Clark is therefore entitled to summary judgment

on any Fourth Amendment claim related to the government's continued retention of the

seized materials following the partial reversal of the Marion Circuit Court's order.°

II. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 62] is

GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 67] is DENIED.

Final judgment shall be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/16/2021 Fuh Gaus Barker

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

> We note also that there is no evidence that Inspector Clark was personally involved in the

decision to hold the materials from 3230 Reba Court for use in the criminal proceedings against

Kenneth Mitan until 2015, when those proceedings conclusively ended upon his death, which

buttresses our conclusion that there is no basis to impose personal liability on Inspector Clark

based on the government's decision.

21

Distribution:

KEITH J. MITAN

PO Box 251597

West Bloomfield, MI 48325-1597

Holly M. Harvey

BUNGER & ROBERTSON

hmharvey@lawbr.com

Thomas E. Kieper

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (Indianapolis)

tom.kieper@usdoj.gov

Jackson Taylor Kirklin

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (Indianapolis)

taylor.kirklin@usdoj.gov

John W. Richards

BUNGER & ROBERTSON

jwr@lawbr.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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