Opinion

MWANGANGI v. NIELSEN

Court: District Court, S.D. Indiana
Filed: May 3, 2021
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 21.6%

"[A] municipality cannot be liable under Monell when there is no underlying constitutional violation by a municipal employee."

How later courts described this case

"[A] municipality cannot be liable under Monell when there is no underlying constitutional violation by a municipal employee."
concluding that "because [the plaintiff] failed to delineate his negligence claim in his district court brief in opposition to summary judgment or in his brief to this [Court of Appeals], his negligence claim is deemed abandoned"
"It is of course a plaintiff's sole decision as to how he will shape his lawsuit."
stating that "the district court has the discretion to decide whether to enter judgment on a portion of the case under Rule 54(b)" in appropriate circumstances

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

DAUDI M. MWANGANGI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 1:19-cv-04105-JMS-MJD

)

TAYLOR NIELSEN, BLAYNE ROOT, FRANK )

NOLAND, BEN PHELPS, TREY HENDRIX, and )

CITY OF LEBANON, INDIANA, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Daudi Mwangangi filed this civil rights action against the City of Lebanon,

Indiana (the "City") and City Police Officers Taylor Nielsen, Frank Noland, and Trey Hendrix,

and City Police Sergeant Ben Phelps (collectively, "the City Defendants"), as well as

Whitestown, Indiana Police Officer Blayne Root, alleging multiple claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and Indiana tort law. The claims stem from an incident in which Mr. Mwangangi, who

works as a roadside assistance provider, responded to a call to assist a stranded motorist at a gas

station in Lebanon, Indiana. Shortly after Mr. Mwangangi finished helping the motorist, seven

police officers arrived and then detained, searched, handcuffed, arrested, and jailed him for

impersonating a law enforcement officer, a charge that was ultimately dismissed. Mr.

Mwangangi filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 74], the City Defendants

filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 86], and Officer Root filed a Cross-

Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 82]. After the summary judgment motions were

fully briefed, the Court granted each in part and denied each in part. [Filing No. 107.] Mr.

Mwangangi then filed a Motion to Reconsider Portions of its Summary Judgment Ruling

("Motion to Reconsider"). [Filing No. 108.] Officer Root filed a Notice of Appeal, [Filing No.

110], as did Officers Nielsen, Noland, and Hendrix and Sergeant Phelps (collectively, "the City

Officers"), [Filing No. 112]. Mr. Mwangangi then filed a Motion to Certify Elements of the

Court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for Interlocutory Appeal

("Motion to Certify") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), [Filing No. 119]. Thereafter, Officer

Root filed his Partial Motion to Stay Proceedings ("Motion to Stay"), [Filing No. 120], which the

City Defendants joined, [Filing No. 125]. The City Defendants then filed their own Motion to

Stay District Court Proceedings Pending Appeal and to Vacate the June 7, 2021 Trial Setting

("Second Motion to Stay"), [Filing No. 131]. The Motion to Reconsider, Motion to Certify,

Motion to Stay, and Second Motion to Stay are now ripe for the Court's decision.

BACKGROUND

The parties' respective versions of the events underlying this lawsuit are lengthy and

complex, have been addressed in the previous Order addressing the parties' summary judgment

motions ("the Summary Judgment Order"), [Filing No. 107], and need not be fully recounted

here. Instead, the Court will discuss the factual background and procedural history of this case

only to the extent necessary to resolve the pending motions.

Mr. Mwangangi's Amended Complaint, [Filing No. 38], asserts numerous claims against

Defendants. However, the Amended Complaint is not organized into numbered counts and does

not specify the particular Defendant or Defendants against whom each claim is asserted. [See

Filing No. 38.] Instead, the Amended Complaint outlines the relevant facts and then contains a

section titled "Legal Claims" which reads in its entirety as follows:

185. Defendants' acts and omissions constitute unreasonable searches and seizures

in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

186. The [City of] Lebanon's and/or Boone County's[1] policies, procedures,

directives and protocols (both formal and informal), discussed herein violate

the Fourth Amendment and have resulted in damage to Plaintiff and a whole

class of similarly situated citizens. The aforementioned Constitutional

violations and related injuries to Plaintiff and individual's (sic) similarly

situated, will continue unless appropriate Court Orders are issued to stop the

Defendants' unconstitutional policies and procedures.

187. The acts and omissions of the Defendants identified herein constitute false

arrest, false imprisonment, battery and negligence under Indiana law.

188. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the above civil torts and

violations of the United States Constitution.

[Filing No. 38 at 30.]

As relevant here, Mr. Mwangangi alleged that "Defendants unreasonably seized and/or

searched Mr. Mwangangi's blood and personal property." [Filing No. 38 at 10.] He alleged that,

after he was arrested, "[t]he Defendant police officers searched [his] Vehicle, inventorying the

items within." [Filing No. 38 at 24.] The Amended Complaint says nothing else about the

search of the vehicle. However, Mr. Mwangangi alleges that his cell phone, computer tablet, and

"other property" were unreasonably seized, retained for an unreasonably long time, and damaged

as a result of Defendants' negligence. [Filing No. 38 at 26-27.]

Mr. Mwangangi subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Paragraph 185 of the

Amended Complaint to Include Claims for Excessive Force and Failures to Intervene ("Motion

to Amend"). [Filing No. 49.] In that motion, Mr. Mwangangi requested permission to amend

Paragraph 185 to read: "Defendants' acts and omissions constitute unreasonable searches and

seizures, excessive force and failures to intervene in violation of the U.S. Constitution." [Filing

No. 49 at 6.] Magistrate Judge Dinsmore denied the Motion to Amend as unnecessary,

1 Defendants Boone County, Indiana and Westley Garst were named in the Amended Complaint

but later dismissed from this action with prejudice upon their and Mr. Mwangangi's joint motion.

[Filing No. 98.]

concluding that complaints need not specifically set out legal theories, and no harm would result

to Defendants if Mr. Mwangangi pursued excessive force and failure to intervene theories based

on the facts already pled, because discovery was ongoing and neither the statements of claims

and defenses nor dispositive motions were yet due. [Filing No. 55 at 1-2.]

Thereafter, as directed by the Case Management Plan, [Filing No. 26 at 6], Mr.

Mwangangi submitted his Statement of Claims, [Filing No. 73], in advance of summary

judgment. In relevant part, the Statement of Claims states as follows:

b. This lawsuit seeks redress against the Defendant Officers for violation of

Plaintiff's civil rights based upon their individual and collective actions/inactions

representing Unreasonable Search and Seizure, Excessive Force and Failure to

Intervene. Lt. Phelps also bears civil rights liability under a separate legal theory

as a supervisor, for approving, assisting, condoning and/or purposely ignoring the

violation of Plaintiff's civil rights.

* * *

d. This lawsuit seeks redress against the Defendant City of Lebanon, Indiana

because of its policies, practices, protocols and customs (both formal and

informal) relating to the use of Vehicle Inventories as a pretext to perform

unconstitutional investigatory searches of vehicles without obtaining a warrant.

Whether it is the actual policies, including but not limited to Standard Operating

Guideline 31 (Exhibit 49 to Lt. Phelp[s]'s Deposition), or the manner in which

those policies are customarily applied by the Lebanon Police, the policies and

customs lend themselves to unconstitutional pretext searches, masquerading as a

Vehicle Inventory. These unconstitutional Lebanon Police Department customs,

specifically employed in this case, resulted in violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights.

Moreover, without redress sought in this case (whether by Court Order, Judgment,

damages and/or punitive damages) civil rights violations, of the sort suffered by

plaintiff, will continue to harm citizens living in the Lebanon Indiana area and

those visiting that area. In this case, the Defendant Officers involved in the

unreasonable search of Plaintiff's vehicle were Lt. Phelps, Officer Nielsen, Officer

Root and Officer Hendrix. While Dep. Garst was present for the search and

provided some passing assistance, his liability relative to the search does not stem

from participating in the unconstitutional vehicle search, but through his failure to

intervene.

e. This lawsuit seeks redress for civil rights violations relating to the unreasonable

search and seizure of plaintiff's personal property, including some damage to that

property. The property at issue is Plaintiff's computer tablet, his cell phone and his

Vehicle (which was damaged).

[Filing No. 73 at 5-7.]

Mr. Mwangangi subsequently filed his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [Filing

No. 74.] In the motion, Mr. Mwangangi listed the claims and issues upon which he sought

summary judgment. [Filing No. 74 at 2-4.] At the end of that list, Mr. Mwangangi included the

following:

4. Finally, it is noted that the outcome of the above Requests for Partial Summary

Judgment, the evidence/arguments presented in support of this Motion and the

evidence/arguments presented by parties opposing this Motion will likely also

resolve other claims Plaintiff has raised in this case. Claims resolved or impacted

by the Court's review of evidence and/or ruling on the above matters include:

* * *

e. Plaintiffs' claims against Lt. Phelps, Officer Nielsen, Officer Root,

Officer Hendrix and Dep. Garst relative to the warrantless search of

Plaintiff's Vehicle, which plaintiff maintains was identified as an

Inventory as a pretext to justify a warrantless search. (The claim against

Dep. Garst as to this unreasonable search issue relates to failure to

intervene).

[Filing No. 74 at 4-5.]

In the "Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute" in his opening brief, Mr. Mwangangi

asserted: "After/as Officer Noland took Mr. Mr. Mwangangi away to jail, his Vehicle was

searched by Officers Root, Nielsen, Hendrix and Phelps, without obtaining a warrant. Deputy

Garst did not intervene. Defendants contend this search was an inventory of the Vehicle's

contents." [Filing No. 77 at 18 (footnotes omitted).]

Officer Root filed a response to Mr. Mwangangi's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

in which he asserted in his "Material Facts Not in Dispute" that "[a]fter Plaintiff was taken to

[Officer] Noland's vehicle for transport to jail, [Officer] Root assisted the other officers on the

scene in performing an inventory search of the Subject Vehicle." [Filing No. 79 at 5 (citations

omitted).] The response did not otherwise address the search of Mr. Mwangangi's vehicle. [See

Filing No. 79.] Officer Root also filed a separate Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, in

which he sought judgment on all of the claims asserted against him. [Filing No. 82.] In his brief

in support of the cross-motion, he included an identical assertion that "[a]fter Plaintiff was taken

to [Officer] Noland's vehicle for transport to jail, [Officer] Root assisted the other officers on the

scene in performing an inventory search of the Subject Vehicle." [Filing No. 83 at 5 (citations

omitted).] The brief in support of the cross-motion did not otherwise address the vehicle search.

[See Filing No. 83.]

The City Defendants filed their own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking

summary judgment on all claims against the City Defendants. [See Filing No. 86.] In their

"Undisputed Material Facts," the City Defendants asserted that, after Mr. Mwangangi was

arrested, "[a]n inventory of the vehicle took place," and then "[t]he vehicle was towed by the

wrecker service." [Filing No. 87 at 9 (citations omitted).] The City Defendants argued in

relevant part that Mr. Mwangangi had not come forward with evidence to sustain any claim

under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against the City regarding its alleged

policy of performing unconstitutional vehicle searches under the guise of valid inventory

searches and therefore summary judgment on that claim was warranted. [Filing No. 87 at 30-

31.] The City's brief did not address any potential claims against individual officers relating to

the vehicle search. [See Filing No. 87.]

In his consolidated response to Defendants' summary judgment motions and reply in

support of his own motion, Mr. Mwangangi disputed Defendants' contention that an inventory

search of the vehicle took place. [Filing No. 91 at 14.] He argued that the search was never

intended to create an inventory of the vehicle's contents, vastly exceeded the scope of an

inventory search, was used as a pretext to search for evidence without a warrant, and failed to

comply with the City's guidelines for conducting an inventory search. [Filing No. 91 at 14.] He

asserted that "[t]he city inventory policy both as written and in how it was commonly executed

by supervising officers in the field, made civil rights violations like the one suffered by Plaintiff

highly predictable, if not inevitable." [Filing No. 91 at 14.] Mr. Mwangangi argued that there

were questions of fact that precluded summary judgment on the Monell claim against the City

concerning inventory searches. [Filing No. 91 at 31-33.] Mr. Mwangangi did not specifically

address any potential claims against individual officers concerning the inventory search. [See

Filing No. 91.]

In their reply brief, the City Defendants asserted that "Plaintiff is free to disagree, but the

undisputed material facts demonstrate . . . that a vehicle inventory took place." [Filing No. 99 at

2.] Regarding the Monell claim, the City Defendants argued that Mr. Mwangangi did not

identify any express policy, widespread practice or custom, or final policymaker who allegedly

caused a constitutional deprivation, nor did he come forward with evidence of any express policy

or any series of constitutional violations relating to inventory searches. [Filing No. 99 at 14.]

In his surreply, Mr. Mwangangi argues that he "has long identified Lebanon's written

inventory policy," which as written and as applied "all but guaranteed such constitutional

violations" because it provides almost no limit to the discretion of the officers in the field and

"specifically allows activity the Indiana Supreme Court has identified as 'indicia of pretext which

raise a question about whether it was conducted in good faith.'" [Filing No. 103 at 3 (quoting

Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 436 (Ind. 1993)).]

In the recitation of the facts in the Summary Judgment Order, the Court noted that, after

Mr. Mwangangi was arrested, "[t]he remaining officers at the scene completed an inventory

search of Mr. Mwangangi's Crown Victoria and had the vehicle towed." [Filing No. 107 at 19

(citations omitted).] In the "Procedural History" section, the Court attempted to define the

claims raised by Mr. Mwangangi, writing:

The Amended Complaint is not a model of clarity, lacking numbered counts

asserted against clearly identified defendants. However, reading the Amended

Complaint together with Mr. Mwangangi's Statement of Claims and Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, he appears to assert the following claims, which can

be organized into three categories. First, Mr. Mwangangi asserts numerous

Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against [Officers Nielsen,

Noland, Hendrix, and Root and Sergeant Phelps, (collectively, "the Individual

Defendants")], claiming that: (a) no reasonable suspicion existed to seize Mr.

Mwangangi at the Lebanon Speedway at the time Officer Nielsen initiated her

red-and-blue lights; (b) even if there were a reasonable suspicion, certain aspects

of the seizure, including ordering Mr. Mwangangi out of his car, surrounding Mr.

Mwangangi with numerous police vehicles, the pat downs, and the use of

handcuffs rendered the seizure unreasonable; (c) no probable cause existed to

arrest Mr. Mwangangi; (d) the officers used excessive force; and (e) certain

officers failed to intervene to prevent Mr. Mwangangi's constitutional rights from

being violated. Second, Mr. Mwangangi asserts claims against the City under

Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), relating to its policies

concerning handcuffing and vehicle inventory searches. Third, Mr. Mwangangi

asserts state-law tort claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, battery,

negligence in relation to the handling of his personal property, and negligent

training and supervision against the City Defendants.

[Filing No. 107 at 20-21 (internal citations omitted).]

The Court did not discern any individual claims against the Individual Defendants

concerning the inventory search of the vehicle, and therefore did not address those claims in the

Summary Judgment Order. [See generally Filing No. 107.] The Court granted summary

judgment in favor of the City on Mr. Mwangangi's Monell claim relating to inventory searches,

concluding that "Mr. Mwangangi has not specified how the City itself violated the Fourth

Amendment with respect to its policy or practices regarding inventory searches," and noting that

"[f]rom Mr. Mwangangi's meager briefing, the Court cannot discern exactly what practice,

beyond a generalized 'inventory search,' is the subject of Mr. Mwangangi's complaint." [Filing

No. 107 at 72.]

Regarding Mr. Mwangangi's other claims, the Court granted summary judgment in favor

of Mr. Mwangangi on the following issues: (1) Officer Root's liability for the first pat-down,

which constituted an unreasonable search; (2) Officer Root's, Officer Noland's, and Officer

Nielsen's liability for handcuffing Mr. Mwangangi, which was unreasonable and converted the

initial stop into an arrest without probable cause; (3) Officer Noland's liability for the second pat-

down without probable cause or reasonable suspicion; and (4) Officer Root's, Officer Noland's,

Officer Nielsen's, and Sergeant Phelps' liability for arresting Mr. Mwangangi without probable

cause. [Filing No. 107 at 79-80.] In granting summary judgment on each of these issues, the

Court concluded that the Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for patting

down, handcuffing, or arresting Mr. Mwangangi. [Filing No. 107 at 61.]

In addition, as relevant here, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City

Defendants on Mr. Mwangangi's claim for negligence in the handling of his personal property.

[Filing No. 107 at 77-78.] Specifically, the Court concluded that the City Defendants were

immune from liability on that claim under the law enforcement provision of the Indiana Tort

Claims Act ("ITCA"), Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8)(A), and, in any event, Mr. Mwangangi had not

identified any evidence supporting the claim. [Filing No. 107 at 77-78.] The Court also granted

summary judgment in favor of the City Defendants as to the claim for negligent training and

supervision, concluding that the claim was barred by the discretionary function immunity

provision of the ITCA, Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7). [Filing No. 107 at 78-79.]

After the Summary Judgment Order was issued, Mr. Mwangangi filed his Motion to

Reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. [Filing No. 108.] Officer Root then

filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the Summary Judgment Order to the extent that it denied him

qualified immunity and determined that probable cause did not exist to arrest Mr. Mwangangi.

[Filing No. 110.] The City Officers filed their own Notice Appeal, also appealing the Summary

Judgment Order to the extent that it denied them qualified immunity and concluded that there

was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Mwangangi. [Filing No. 112.]2 Mr. Mwangangi then filed

his Motion to Certify. [Filing No. 119.] Officer Root then filed his Motion to Stay, which the

City Defendants joined, [Filing No. 125], requesting that "all proceedings in the District Court be

stayed pending completion of the appeal with the exception of Plaintiff's [Motion to Certify]."

[Filing No. 120.] The Second Motion to Stay, filed by the City Defendants, asks the Court to

rule on the Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Certify, then stay all pretrial and trial deadlines

and vacate the final pretrial conference currently scheduled for May 13, 2021 and the trial

currently scheduled for June 7, 2021. [Filing No. 131 at 8.] The Motion to Reconsider, Motion

to Certify, Motion to Stay, and Second Motion to Stay are now ripe for the Court's decision, and

each will be addressed in turn.

II.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

A. Standard of Review

Relief under Rule 59(e)3 is an "extraordinary remed[y] reserved for the exceptional case."

Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 442 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582,

584 (7th Cir. 2008)). "To prevail on a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59, the movant

must present either newly discovered evidence or establish a manifest error of law or fact." Oto

v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). "A 'manifest error'

2 The Court of Appeals consolidated the two appeals for briefing and disposition. [See Filing

No. 2 in Seventh Circuit Case No. 21-1576.]

3 Defendants assert that "it is unclear what Federal Rule of Civil Procedure the Plaintiff is

moving under," [Filing No. 122 at 1], although Mr. Mwangangi explicitly states in the Motion to

Reconsider that he is proceeding under Rule 59, [Filing No. 108 at 1]. Accordingly, the Court

will apply the Rule 59 standards.

is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the 'wholesale disregard,

misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.'" Id. (citation omitted). A Rule

59(e) motion "does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it

certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and

should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment." United States v. Resnick,

594 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees,

233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)). Nor may a party use Rule 59(e) to "rehash previously

rejected arguments." Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Oto, 224

F.3d at 606) (internal quotation omitted).

B. Discussion

Mr. Mwangangi asserts that the Court made two errors in its Summary Judgment Order:

(1) failing to recognize that the individual capacity § 1983 claims against Officers Nielsen, Root,

and Hendrix and Sergeant Phelps (collectively, "the Defendant Officers") concerning their

allegedly unlawful search of the vehicle remain to be resolved at trial; and (2) granting summary

judgment in favor of the City on the Monell claim concerning the allegedly unlawful inventory

search policy. [Filing No. 108 at 1-2.] The Court will address each of these issues in turn.

1. Individual § 1983 Claims Against the Defendant Officers

Regarding the individual claims, Mr. Mwangangi contends that "[t]hroughout this

litigation, and without regard to the validity of the arrest, [he] has rejected Defendants'

contention that the vehicle search, conducted at the scene of the arrest, was a valid vehicle

inventory or ever intended to be an inventory." [Filing No. 108 at 2.] He points out that the

individual unlawful search claims were not addressed in the Summary Judgment Order because

neither he nor any Defendants sought summary judgment on these claims, and accordingly he

"asks the Court to confirm [the] procedural reality" that "[t]hese claims remain part of this case."

[Filing No. 108 at 4.] Specifically, Mr. Mwangangi asserts that these claims were preserved in

his Statement of Claims, which states that the alleged inventory search was a "pretext to perform

unconstitutional investigatory searches of vehicles without obtaining a warrant" and specifies

that "the Defendant Officers involved in the unreasonable search of Plaintiff's vehicle were

[Sergeant] Phelps, Officer Nielsen, Officer Root and Officer Hendrix." [Filing No. 108 at 4

(quoting Filing No. 73 at 6).] He also argues that the claims were referenced in his Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, in which he stated that the issues remaining for determination that

might be impacted by the Court's ruling included the claims against the Defendant Officers

"relative to the warrantless search of Plaintiff's Vehicle, which plaintiff maintains was identified

as an Inventory as a pretext to justify a warrantless search." [Filing No. 108 at 4 (quoting Filing

No. 74 at 5).] Mr. Mwangangi further argues that the Court's factual conclusion that Defendants

conducted an inventory search of his vehicle is erroneous, disregards Defendants' burden of

proof on that issue, does not interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, ignores disputes of material fact, and accepts Defendants' conclusory assertions as

controlling. [Filing No. 108 at 5-14.] He outlines specific evidence that he believes shows that a

dispute of material fact exists as to whether the search of his vehicle was a permissible inventory

search. [Filing No. 108 at 6-13.] Accordingly, Mr. Mwangangi argues, "as a matter of law, it is

inappropriate, at this stage of the litigation, for the Court to hold/find that an inventory took place

or that the search fell under the protection of an Inventory exception" to the warrant requirement.

[Filing No. 108 at 14.] Mr. Mwangangi argues that the individual unlawful search claims were

not rendered moot by the Summary Judgment Order because, even though he can recover search-

related damages on his false arrest claim, a jury might value damages differently if he can also

demonstrate that the search was independently unlawful. [Filing No. 108 at 3.] Mr. Mwangangi

also argues that the independent search claim may be relevant to the issue of punitive damages.

[Filing No. 108 at 3-4.]

In response, Defendants4 assert that motions for reconsideration may only be granted to

correct manifest errors of law or fact, consider newly discovered evidence, or address

intervening changes in controlling law, and none of these circumstances are present here. [Filing

No. 122 at 4-5; Filing No. 122 at 8.] They argue that the Court correctly identified all of the

claims at issue in this lawsuit by considering Mr. Mwangangi's Amended Complaint, Statement

of Claims, and summary judgment briefing, and Mr. Mwangangi's "lack of clarity in assigning

and labeling claims to individual defendants does not qualify as a basis to add those claims after

cross motions for summary judgment have been ruled upon." [Filing No. 122 at 5-6 (citing

Filing No. 107 at 20-21).] According to Defendants, Mr. Mwangangi's summary judgment

response brief contains no arguments regarding the individual capacity vehicle search claims

outside of the limited discussion of the Monell inventory claim. [Filing No. 122 at 6.] They

assert that the Amended Complaint does not reference any improper vehicle search by the

Defendant Officers, and his current characterization of the search as an improper inventory is

belied by his allegation in the Amended Complaint, which states that "[t]he Defendant police

officers searched the Vehicle, inventorying the items within." [Filing No. 122 at 6-7 (quoting

Filing No. 38 at 24).] Defendants argue that "[t]o the extent that Plaintiff wishes to reexamine

whether there was an inventory search or imply that this Court was incorrect by calling it an

'Inventory,' he is bound by his own judicial admission regarding [the] same." [Filing No. 122 at

7.] They contend that the individual claims were not included in the Statement of Claims or the

4 The City Defendants responded to Mr. Mwangangi's motion, [Filing No. 122], and Officer

Root joined the City Defendants' Response, [Filing No. 124].

summary judgment briefing, but "[e]ven assuming the Plaintiff addressed the Fourth Amendment

individual capacity vehicle search claims in his response to summary judgment, it was too late in

the day to bring them up" because a party cannot amend his complaint by raising arguments in

his brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. [Filing No. 122 at 6-7.]

In reply, Mr. Mwangangi acknowledges that he has not identified a new fact or change in

the law, but maintains that "the record, arguments, caselaw, summary judgment standards and

procedural realities of the case, as previously/originally presented, contradict the vehicle search

discussion in the [Summary Judgment] Order," and "justice and the application of law require

[that] the Court correct that error." [Filing No. 123 at 2.] He asserts the individual search claims

are not new and that Defendants' "argument misses the legal reality that, here, the individual

Fourth Amendment violations of the Individual Defendants function as a prerequisite for the

Monell Inventory Claims." [Filing No. 123 at 2-3 (emphasis in original).] Accordingly, he

argues, it is "inconceivable" that there would be a Monell claim related to the vehicle search

without separate individual claims against the officers who conducted the search. [Filing No.

123 at 3.] Mr. Mwangangi reiterates that he highlighted these individual claims in his Statement

of Claims, his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and his summary judgment briefing.

[Filing No. 123 at 3-4.] He argues that Defendants chose not to address those claims in their

summary judgment briefing, did not include any facts related to the alleged inventory search, and

failed to meet their burden to show that the search satisfied the inventory exception to the

warrant requirement. [Filing No. 123 at 4-5.] Because questions of fact precluded the Court

from deciding whether the search of the vehicle was a valid inventory search, Mr. Mwangangi

argues, the Court should clarify that the individual search claims were not resolved by the

Summary Judgment Order and remain to be addressed at trial. [Filing No. 123 at 5.] In a

footnote, Mr. Mwangangi asserts that his allegation in the Amended Complaint that Defendants

searched his vehicle and inventoried the items inside is not binding because, "[a]s discovery

began to reveal additional Fourth Amendment claims, Plaintiff, in an abundance of caution,

initially tried to amend the Complaint to reflect additional Fourth Amendment violations

clarified and uncovered during the discovery process," but the Court denied the Motion to

Amend and in doing so "made it clear that such updated amendments to the Complaint to include

newly revealed Fourth Amendment claims were not required or appropriate." [Filing No. 123 at

5 n.1 (citing Filing No. 55).] Mr. Mwangangi states that he "relied on the Court's direction and

specifically identified the Vehicle Search claims revealed during discovery and discussed in

depositions in both the Statement of Claims and the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment."

[Filing No. 123 at 5 n.1 (citations omitted).]

Mr. Mwangangi essentially argues that the Court erred in failing to recognize his

individual unlawful search claims against the Defendant Officers. This can only be true,

however, if Mr. Mwangangi asserted those claims in his Amended Complaint and preserved

them throughout the remainder of this litigation. Turning first to the Amended Complaint, the

only reference Mr. Mwangangi made to a search of the vehicle is the factual allegation that "[t]he

Defendant police officers searched the Vehicle, inventorying the items within." [Filing No. 38 at

24.] No other factual allegations were made regarding the search or inventory of the vehicle,

such as that it was pretextual, that no actual inventory of the items found within the vehicle was

created or documented, that the officers did not comply with the City's inventory policy, or

whether the City even has a policy concerning inventory searches. Indeed, the single allegation

implies that Defendants conducted a valid inventory search. It is true that the Amended

Complaint frequently mentions unconstitutional searches or seizures, but these references do not

specifically relate to a search of a vehicle and could reasonably be interpreted as addressing any

one of many events that Mr. Mwangangi alleges violated the Fourth Amendment, including the

initial traffic stop, the pat-downs, the drawing of his blood, or the seizure of his personal

property.

Mr. Mwangangi's reliance on Magistrate Judge Dinsmore's denial of the Motion to

Amend misses the mark. Mr. Mwangangi did not attempt to amend the Amended Complaint to

include specific claims directed at the Defendant Officers concerning a search of the vehicle. He

attempted to add the words "excessive force and failures to intervene" to one paragraph of the

Amended Complaint, which Magistrate Judge Dinsmore correctly determined was unnecessary

given that the Amended Complaint already contained the factual allegations underlying Mr.

Mwangangi's excessive force and failure to intervene theories. [Filing No. 55 at 1-2.]

Magistrate Judge Dinsmore referenced caselaw establishing that "[e]ven where a plaintiff

initially asserts particular theories of recovery, unless the change unfairly harms the defendant

[he] is allowed to switch course and pursue other avenues of relief as litigation progresses."

[Filing No. 55 at 2 (quoting Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir.

2018)).] It was true at that time—before liability discovery closed, statements of claims and

defenses were filed, or dispositive motions were due—that the addition of the excessive force

and failure to intervene theories was not harmful to Defendants. [See Filing No. 55 at 2.] But

that is no longer true at this late stage in the litigation.

Looking past the lack of clarity provided in the Amended Complaint, Mr. Mwangangi's

failure to include individual claims against the Defendant Officers in his Statement of Claims is

fatal to those claims. "Federal courts possess certain 'inherent powers,' not conferred by rule or

statute, 'to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of

cases.'" Jackson v. Regions Bank ("Jackson II"), 838 F. App'x 195, 198 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017)). "District

courts often exercise this authority by ordering parties to submit a specific list of claims and

theories (superseding all prior assertions) to clarify the issues as trial approaches." Jackson II,

838 F. App'x at 198 (affirming district court's finding that a plaintiff had abandoned a claim by

failing to include it in the Statement of Claims).

It is true that Mr. Mwangangi stated in his Statement of Claims that "[i]n this case, the

Defendant Officers involved in the unreasonable search of Plaintiff's vehicle were [Sergeant]

Phelps, Officer Nielsen, Officer Root and Officer Hendrix." [Filing No. 73 at 6.] But that

factual assertion does not sufficiently convey that Mr. Mwangangi intended to assert individual

claims against each of those officers, especially given the context in which that assertion was

made. The first sentence of the paragraph states: "This lawsuit seeks redress against the

Defendant City of Lebanon, Indiana because of its policies, practices, protocols and customs

(both formal and informal) relating to the use of Vehicle Inventories as a pretext to perform

unconstitutional investigatory searches of vehicles without obtaining a warrant." [Filing No. 73

at 6 (emphasis added).] As to other claims in the Statement of Claims, Mr. Mwangangi uses

similar language to make clear that he is in fact asserting claims against the Defendant Officers.

[See Filing No. 73 at 7 ("This lawsuit seeks redress against the Defendant Officers, the City of

Lebanon, Indiana, and Boone County Indiana, relating to state law claims . . . .").] No such

language was used in reference to potential unlawful search claims against the Defendant

Officers. Accordingly, while Mr. Mwangangi clearly asserted a claim against the City relating to

the vehicle search, and clearly asserted other claims against the Defendant Officers, he did not

clearly state claims against the Defendant Officers related to the search of his vehicle. In other

words, his allegation that the Defendant Officers were involved in the search of his vehicle

provides details as to the basis of the Monell claim against the City, but does not, when read in

context, allege additional separate claims against each of the officers.

"This Court has consistently held that failure to assert a claim in a Statement of Claims

results in abandonment of that claim." Jackson v. Regions Bank ("Jackson I"), 2020 WL

4430588, at *4 (S.D. Ind. July 31, 2020), aff'd, 838 F. App'x 195 (7th Cir. 2021) (collecting

cases). This Court has also observed that:

[T]he Statement of Claims requirement serve[s] several important purposes,

including clarifying and focusing the issues for summary judgment and for trial,

avoiding wasted time and resources on issues that will not be pursued, ensuring

that the claims that are going forward can be addressed and disposed of in the

most efficient manner possible, and aiding parties in developing their litigation

strategies and preparing for trial. In order to carry out these purposes and give

meaning to the Statement of Claims requirement, the Court must enforce it.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Mr. Mwangangi did not assert individual claims related to the search of the vehicle

against the Defendant Officers in his Statement of Claims. His argument that it is

"inconceivable" that he would assert a Monell claim against the City concerning the vehicle

search without asserting individual claims against the Defendant Officers relating to the search is

neither helpful nor dispositive. It is true that establishing an underlying constitutional violation

is generally required to prove a Monell claim. See, e.g., Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630

F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[A] municipality cannot be liable under Monell when there is no

underlying constitutional violation by a municipal employee."). But it does not follow that every

plaintiff asserting a Monell claim is automatically and simultaneously asserting claims against

the individual municipal employees who participated in the alleged constitutional violation.

Many plaintiffs may elect to do so, and it may make logical sense for them to do so, but neither

of those realities demonstrate that Mr. Mwangangi did in fact assert individual capacity claims,

and neither of those realities justify the Court inferring individual claims where the Plaintiff did

not specifically assert them. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 577 U.S. 308, 311 (2016)

(recognizing that plaintiffs are "masters of their complaint"); Pilcher v. Swalec, 540 F. Supp.

1373, 1374 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("It is of course a plaintiff's sole decision as to how he will shape his

lawsuit."). The Case Management Plan required "the party with the burden of proof [to] file a

statement of the claims or defenses it intends to prove at trial, stating specifically the legal

theories upon which the claims or defenses are based," [Filing No. 26 at 6 (emphasis added)],

and Mr. Mwangangi failed to specifically state his individual claims against the Defendant

Officers, regardless of his belief that those claims were implied by or related to the Monell claim

against the City. See Jackson I, 2020 WL 4430588, at *4 ("The Court rejects the argument that a

claim concerning [an alternative theory of liability] was 'inherently included' in the Statement of

Claims [listing another specific legal theory based on the same statute], but even if the Court

were to accept that premise, a claim that is 'inherently included' is not 'specifically' stated, and

therefore does not meet the requirements established by the [Case Management Plan].").

The Court acknowledges that Mr. Mwangangi listed the individual search claims in the

list of remaining claims contained in his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 74 at

5]. As a result, it would have been helpful if Defendants had addressed this issue in their

summary judgment briefing, and it would have been in the interest of clarity for the Court to

have addressed this issue in the Summary Judgment Order. It also would have been more

accurate for the Court to specify in its recitation of the facts that Mr. Mwangangi disputes

whether the search of the vehicle was a valid inventory search. [See Filing No. 77 at 18 (Mr.

Mwangangi stating that "Defendants contend this search was an inventory of the Vehicle's

contents." (emphasis added)).] These omissions, however, do not change the result. Any

potential claims against the Defendant Officers concerning the search of the vehicle—to the

extent they ever existed—were abandoned when Mr. Mwangangi filed his Statement of Claims.

See Jackson I, 2020 WL 4430588, at *5 ("The contents of the Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment are immaterial to the abandonment issue, because the claim was abandoned before the

motion was filed, and the abandonment was not a consequence of the way the issues were

framed or briefed in the motion.") (emphasis in original). And, as discussed further below, the

Monell claim against the City was correctly disposed of on grounds not related to the factual

issue of whether a valid inventory search took place.

For all of these reasons, Mr. Mwangangi's Motion to Reconsider is GRANTED IN

PART for the very limited purpose of clarifying that the factual issue of whether the vehicle

search was a valid inventory search is disputed, and the Court has made no factual finding as to

that issue. However, the Court concludes that no claims against the Defendant Officers related

to the search of the vehicle remain pending for resolution at trial, and to the extent Mr.

Mwangangi seeks confirmation that those claims remain, his Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

2. Monell Claim Relating to Inventory Searches

Mr. Mwangangi argues that the Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City

on the Monell claim relating to inventory searches "misses important evidence presented in the

record as well as arguments presented in Plaintiff's summary judgment briefing." [Filing No.

108 at 14.] He asserts that his briefing contained documented evidence that the City's inventory

search policy, either as written or as applied, is constitutionally deficient and the Court erred in

concluding that he had not properly developed his arguments as to this issue. [Filing No. 108 at

14-18.] Mr. Mwangangi also argues that the City's inventory policy allows activity that the

Indiana Supreme Court has identified as indicia of pretext. [Filing No. 108 at 15-18 (citing Fair,

627 N.E.2d at 436).]

In response, Defendants assert that Mr. Mwangangi's "request for the Court to reconsider

the Monell inventory claim is nothing more than a re-hashing of the same losing argument he

made at the summary judgment stage," which is not a ground for reconsideration. [Filing No.

122 at 9.] They assert that the Court was correct in concluding that Mr. Mwangangi waived this

issue by failing to adequately develop his argument and come forward with evidence as

necessary to meet his burden to survive summary judgment. [Filing No. 122 at 9-10.]

In reply, Mr. Mwangangi argues that the caselaw and evidence he presented in support of

his Monell claims "was never actually considered by the Court," and the Court's conclusion that

the issue had been waived is erroneous. [Filing No. 123 at 5-6.] He maintains that he presented

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that factual disputes exist as to whether the City's inventory

search policy, as written or as applied, is constitutionally deficient and leads to vehicle searches

that violate the Fourth Amendment. [Filing No. 123 at 7.] He asks the Court to reverse its ruling

on this issue. [Filing No. 123 at 7-8.]

Mr. Mwangangi has not identified any manifest error of fact or law in the Court's

conclusion that he waived his Monell claim by failing to adequately develop his argument

concerning what specifically is unconstitutional about the City's handling of inventory searches.

Because the City Defendants sought summary judgment on this claim, Mr. Mwangangi was

required to address this claim in his response and demonstrate that summary judgment was not

appropriate. The section in his response brief concerning this issue is approximately two pages

in length and addresses both the Monell claim related to inventory searches and his separate

Monell claim related to the use of handcuffs. [Filing No. 91 at 31-33.] In that section, Mr.

Mwangangi makes several conclusory assertions, including that: (1) "the policies associated with

Vehicle searches both as written and as practiced lead to violations of Plaintiff's civil rights in

the form of an unreasonable search"; (2) "the record establishes actual or constructive notice that

obvious omissions in [the City's] training and supervision program caused Defendants to violate

Plaintiff's constitutional rights"; (3) "the written policies for vehicle searches and related

training/supervision in vehicle searches (common in many interactions with the public) was so

flawed or constitutionally problematic that it was almost guaranteed to result in civil rights

abuses"; and (4) "[q]uestions of fact preclude Summary Judgment as to these issues." [Filing

No. 91 at 31-32.] Mr. Mwangangi also cites to record evidence in support of these contentions,

including the inventory policy and the deposition of Sergeant Phelps, but he does not explain

what that evidence shows or the relevance of that evidence to his Monell claim. Notably, Mr.

Mwangangi seems to implicitly acknowledge the inadequacy of his response brief in his Motion

to Reconsider, where he generally cites to his surreply brief—not to his response brief—in

support of his contentions that he previously presented arguments and evidence relevant to his

Monell claim concerning vehicle searches. [See Filing No. 108 at 15-17 (citing Filing No. 103

and discussing the arguments contained therein).] Claims not properly developed in response to

summary judgment are waived. See Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003)

(concluding that "because [the plaintiff] failed to delineate his negligence claim in his district

court brief in opposition to summary judgment or in his brief to this [Court of Appeals], his

negligence claim is deemed abandoned").

Although Mr. Mwangangi disagrees with the Court's ruling, he has not identified a

sufficient reason for the Court to reconsider. Accordingly, the Motion to Reconsider is DENIED

to the extent that it seeks reversal of the Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City

on Mr. Mwangangi's Monell claim related to vehicle inventory searches.

III.

MOTION TO CERTIFY

A. Standard of Review

At the outset, the Court notes that Mr. Mwangangi seeks certification of certain issues

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which allows a party to petition for leave to file an interlocutory

appeal of a nonfinal order. [See Filing No. 119.] However, the Court in its discretion concludes

that the proper vehicle for assessing Mr. Mwangangi's request for permission to appeal these

issues is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See Horwitz v. Alloy Auto. Co., 957 F.2d 1431,

1433 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that "the district court has the discretion to decide whether to enter

judgment on a portion of the case under Rule 54(b)" in appropriate circumstances). In relevant

part, Rule 54(b) provides:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief--whether as a claim,

counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when multiple parties are

involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but

fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is

no just reason for delay.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

As a policy matter, Congress has determined that appeals should generally wait until

litigation in the trial court has completely finished with respect to all parties and all claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 1291. Rule 54(b) creates a narrow exception to that rule. "Rule 54(b) is not

intended to provide an option to the district court to certify issues for interlocutory appeal.

Rather, Rule 54(b) allows appeal without delay of claims that are truly separate and distinct from

those that remain pending in the district court, where 'separate' means having minimal factual

overlap." Lottie v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 408 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The

Seventh Circuit has explained:

The test for separate claims under the rule is whether the claim that is contended

to be separate so overlaps the claim or claims that have been retained for trial that

if the latter were to give rise to a separate appeal at the end of the case the court

would have to go over the same ground that it had covered in the first appeal.

Id. (quoting Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1162 (7th Cir.

1997)). The power to enter a judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) is "largely discretionary," and in

exercising it the Court must consider "judicial administrative interests as well as the equities

involved, and giv[e] due weight to the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals." Reifer

v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 265 (1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

B. Discussion

Mr. Mwangangi seeks to appeal the grant of summary judgment as to three claims: (1) his

Monell claim against the City concerning inventory searches; (2) his state law negligent training

and supervision claim against the City Defendants; and (3) his state law negligent handling of

personal property claim against the City Defendants. [Filing No. 119 at 2.]

The City Defendants responded to Mr. Mwangangi's Motion to Certify, [Filing No. 127],

and Officer Root joined the response, [Filing No. 128]. However, Defendants provide no

meaningful substantive objection to Mr. Mwangangi's request to appeal,5 and acknowledge that

5 It appears that Defendants may have intended to oppose Mr. Mwangangi's request to appeal the

grant of summary judgment as to the Monell claim, as they state in their response that they

"renew, defer to, and adopt . . . their arguments asserted in their Response in Opposition to the

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration [DE 122] with respect to the Fourth Amendment

individual search claims and Monell inventory search claim against the City of Lebanon, as these

arguments apply with equal force to the arguments raised and referred to by Plaintiff in Section

II of the Motion to Certify" and they "continue their request that the relief sought in the

Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Section II of the instant Motion to Certify be denied."

[Filing No. 127 at 2.] However, Mr. Mwangangi does not request any relief in Section II of his

Motion to Certify, and instead clarifies in that section that he does not seek to certify for appeal

they "take this position in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency in avoiding multiple

appeals and with the intent of addressing these issues in a combined and unified matter." [Filing

No. 127 at 2.]

In reply, Mr. Mwangangi states that "a substantive reply is not called for" because

"Defendants have added nothing new to any arguments relevant to Plaintiff's Contingent Motion

to Certify this Court's Inventory-Monell ruling" and do not object to certification of the rulings

concerning state law immunity for the negligent training and supervision and negligent handling

of property claims. [Filing No. 129 at 1.] Mr. Mwangangi "merely restates that he reserves all

rights and arguments relevant to the unreasonable warrantless Vehicle Search claims pending

against Defendants Phelps, Nielsen, Root and Hendrix." [Filing No. 129 at 1.]

This action involves multiple parties and multiple claims for relief. The three claims that

Mr. Mwangangi seeks to pursue on appeal were fully disposed of in the Summary Judgment

Order and summary judgment was granted in favor of the City or the City Defendants on each of

the claims. These claims are sufficiently separate from the rest of the lawsuit to render

appropriate a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). The Monell claim was disposed of on the

ground that it was waived, while the state law claims were disposed of based on the application

of immunity under the ITCA. The claims and issues that remain pending for resolution at trial—

the individual search claims against the Defendant Officers, as he believes that the Court has not

issued any final order as to those claims. [Filing No. 119 at 3.] Mr. Mwangangi's request to

appeal the grant of summary judgment on the Monell claim is discussed in Section IV(A) of the

Motion to Certify, [Filing No. 119 at 4-8], and Defendants do not specify whether they object to

the relief requested in that section, [see Filing No. 127]. Regardless, Defendants' attempt to

incorporate their previous arguments concerning the Monell claim is unhelpful, as those

arguments related to the Motion to Reconsider and do not address whether an appeal is proper.

Furthermore, Defendants "make no objections or arguments in response as to Plaintiff's request

to certify" the grant of summary judgment on the negligent handling of personal property and

negligent supervision and training claims. [Filing No. 127 at 2.] Defendants' arguments, taken

together, amount to no meaningful objection to Mr. Mwangangi's requested relief or to an appeal

of any of the issues addressed in the Motion to Certify.

a § 1983 failure-to-intervene/supervisory liability claim against the Individual Defendants; a

Monell claim relating to the City's handcuffing practices; state law claims for false arrest, false

imprisonment, and battery; as well as damages valuations for the claims on which Mr.

Mwangangi was granted summary judgment—will not involve waiver or state law immunity

principles. As such, any appeal that is potentially taken following a trial of the remaining claims

would not involve the same issues that would be involved in a present appeal of the Monell

inventory search claim and the state law claim for negligent training and supervision and

negligent handling of property. See Lottie, 408 F.3d at 939.

In addition, the Court finds that there is no just reason for delay. The Court is mindful of

the historic federal policy of avoiding piecemeal appeals. See Reifer, 507 U.S. at 265. However,

the circumstances of this case are unique in that, regardless of how the Court decides the Rule

54(b) issue, there is already a potential for piecemeal appeals. Defendants are presently entitled

to an appeal concerning the qualified immunity determinations and are pursuing that appeal.

Whether Defendants are successful or not, the case will return to this Court for a trial addressing

at least the remaining claims unaffected by the qualified immunity determinations. If Mr.

Mwangangi were forced to wait until after that trial to appeal the Court's rulings concerning his

waiver of the Monell inventory search claim and the ITCA immunity provisions applicable to his

state law claims, it is possible that the Court of Appeals could then reverse this Court's rulings,

which would require yet another trial to adjudicate his Monell and state law negligence claims.

If, on the other hand, the Court enters final judgment on the Monell and state law negligence

claims now, in the event that the Court of Appeals reverses this Court's rulings on those claims,

those claims could be resolved in the same trial as the other remaining claims after the qualified

immunity issue is decided on appeal, which would eliminate the need for a second trial.

Accordingly, the interests of judicial efficiency weigh heavily in favor of entering a partial final

judgment under Rule 54(b).

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that its grant of summary judgment on Mr.

Mwangangi's inventory search Monell claim, the state law claim for negligent training and

supervision, and the state law claim for negligent handling of property constitute final judgments

under Rule 54(b) and there is no just reason for delaying an appeal of those judgments. A partial

final judgment shall issue accordingly. Mr. Mwangangi's Motion to Certify is GRANTED to

the extent that he is permitted to take an appeal of these issues pursuant to Rule 54(b).

IV.

MOTION TO STAY AND SECOND MOTION TO STAY

In the Motion to Stay, Defendants6 request "that all proceedings in the District Court be

stayed pending completion of the appeal with the exception of Plaintiff's [Motion to Certify]."

[Filing No. 120 at 3.] Defendants assert that the interest of judicial economy will be served by a

stay that will permit them to litigate the qualified immunity issue on appeal. [Filing No. 120 at

2-3.]

Mr. Mwangangi does not object to staying this case pending resolution of Defendants'

appeal, provided that the Motion to Reconsider and the Motion to Certify are resolved prior to

the Court issuing any stay. [Filing No. 126 at 1.]

In the Second Motion to Stay, the City Defendants again ask the Court to stay this action

pending resolution of the appeal and to vacate the currently scheduled final pretrial conference

and trial. [Filing No. 131 at 8.]

6 Officer Root filed his Motion to Stay, [Filing No. 120], which the City Defendants joined,

[Filing No. 125].

In response to the Second Motion to Stay, Mr. Mwangangi agrees with the City

Defendants' request to vacate the final pretrial and trial dates, but argues that "a blanket stay

without . . . establishing a future plan may cause unneeded delay in the final resolution of [his]

civil rights claims." [Filing No. 132 at 1.] He states that he "is uncertain if a stay is the

appropriate procedural mechanism needed in these circumstances" and requests that the Court

order the parties to prepare and submit a revised Case Management Plan, including new trial

dates and related deadlines. [Filing No. 132 at 2.]7

"[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to

control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for

counsel, and for litigants." Texas Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. E.P.A., 410 F.3d

964, 980 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). However, a

stay "requires a good justification." Rogers v. Desiderio, 58 F.3d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1995).

A stay of this matter is appropriate pending the resolution of the current appeal. It is in

the interests of judicial administration and efficiency to allow the Court of Appeals to resolve the

qualified immunity question and the other issues discussed above before moving forward in this

litigation, and that constitutes "good justification" for staying this proceeding. The Court

acknowledges Mr. Mwangangi's desire to reset the trial and reestablish the associated deadlines,

but that is not practicable given that the Court cannot predict with any substantial degree of

certainty when the current appeal will be completed or how the results of that appeal will impact

7 Mr. Mwangangi also asserts, as he has repeatedly done elsewhere in his briefing, that "he has

reserved all rights and arguments (including the right to file future Motions) relevant to the

individual Vehicle Search claims pending against Defendants Phelps, Nielsen, Root and

Hendrix." [Filing No. 132 at 1-2.] As this Order makes clear above, those claims, to the extent

they were ever asserted, have been abandoned and are no longer at issue in this lawsuit. Mr.

Mwangangi's repeated attempt to reserve his rights with respect to those claims do not operate to

revive those claims and are therefore of no consequence.

the issues to be resolved in this Court. Accordingly, the Motion to Stay and the Second Motion

to Stay are GRANTED. This action is hereby STAYED, and the Clerk is DIRECTED to

ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE this case, pending resolution of the appellate proceedings.

All currently pending deadlines are TERMINATED, and all scheduled court proceedings are

VACATED, including the final pretrial conference scheduled for May 13, 2021 and the jury trial

scheduled to begin on June 7, 2021. The trial and other deadlines will be reset at the earliest

mutual convenience once the appeal has been resolved. At least once every 120 days from the

date of this Order, the parties are directed to file a joint report advising the Court of the status of

the appeal. Further, any party may file a motion to reopen this case and to lift the stay within

fourteen days after the Seventh Circuit issues a decision.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court makes the following rulings:

1. Mr. Mwangangi's Motion to Reconsider Portions of its Summary Judgment Ruling,

[108], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

a. The motion is GRANTED for the very limited purpose of clarifying that the

factual issue of whether the vehicle search was a valid inventory search is

disputed;

b. The Motion is DENIED to the extent that Mr. Mwangangi seeks confirmation

that individual claims against the Defendant Officers concerning the inventory

search of the vehicle remain pending, and the Court finds that any such

claims, to the extent they were asserted in the first place, have been

abandoned; and

c. The Motion is DENIED to the extent that it seeks reversal of the Court's grant

of summary judgment in favor of the City on Mr. Mwangangi's Monell claim