HURT v. VANTLIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

EVANSVILLE DIVISION

WILLIAM HURT, DEADRA HURT, and ANDREA )

HEATH, )

Plaintiffs, )

) 3:14-cv-00092-JMS-MPB

vs. )

)

JEFF VANTLIN, JACK SPENCER, WILLIAM )

ARBAUGH, JASON PAGETT, MATTHEW WISE, )

and ZACHARY JONES, )

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiffs William Hurt, Deadra Hurt, and Andrea Heath1 initiated this action in June 2014,

and allege that they were wrongfully targeted, arrested, and prosecuted for the death of their uncle,

Marcus Golike, whose body was found in the Ohio River in June 2012. On December 13, 2019,

the Court issued an Order on the parties' various Motions in Limine. [Filing No. 448.] In the

Order, the Court found – among other things – that the state court judge's finding that probable

cause existed for Plaintiffs' arrests is inadmissible at the trial. [Filing No. 448 at 4-5.] Defendants

Matthew Wise and Zachary Jones (the "KSP Defendants") then filed a Motion to Reconsider and

in the Alternative, Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal and to Stay Pending

Resolution of Proceedings, [Filing No. 450], and, similarly, Defendants Jeff Vantlin, Jack Spencer,

William Arbaugh, and Jason Pagett (the "EPD Defendants") filed a Motion to Reconsider the

Court's Order on Motions in Limine, Dated December 13, 2019 or, Alternatively, to Certify for

Interlocutory Appeal, [Filing No. 451]. On February 6, 2020, the Court issued an Order denying

Defendants' requests for an interlocutory appeal, and setting the requests for reconsideration for

1 The Court will refer individually to Plaintiffs by their first names only throughout this Order.

oral argument at a February 20, 2020 hearing. [Filing No. 457.] The parties presented oral

argument on the requests for reconsideration on February 20, 2020 and, subsequently, submitted

supplemental materials pursuant to the Court's Order. [Filing No. 460; Filing No. 461; Filing No.

462; Filing No. 463.] The portions of Defendants' motions that request reconsideration are now

ripe for the Court's decision.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Affording relief through granting a motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 59(e) is an "extraordinary remed[y] reserved for the exceptional case." Foster v. DeLuca,

545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008). Rule 59 motions are for the limited purpose of "correct[ing]

manifest errors of law or fact or…present[ing] newly discovered evidence." Rothwell Cotton Co.

v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation and quotation omitted). "A

'manifest error' is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the 'wholesale

disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.'" Oto v. Metropolitan Life

Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sedtrak v. Callahan, 987 F. Supp. 1063, 1069

(N.D. Ill. 1997)).

II.

BACKGROUND

In their Motion in Limine, the EPD Defendants moved to exclude any reference, evidence,

or testimony of "[a]ny contradiction to the underlying criminal court judge's determination

that…[p]robable cause existed for each Plaintiff's arrest, at the time of their respective arrests."

[Filing No. 397 at 2.] Plaintiffs responded that the state court judge's determination regarding

probable cause is not entitled to preclusive effect, so is inadmissible. [Filing No. 426 at 27-29.]

In its December 13, 2019 Order, the Court stated:

The finding of probable cause is especially intertwined with Plaintiffs' claims for

wrongful pretrial detention and false arrest. The Seventh Circuit has held that an

arrest "is constitutional if the arresting officers (1) have probable cause to arrest the

person sought and (2) reasonably believe that the person arrested is the person

sought." Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation and

quotation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has also held, however, that when a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to probable cause "is more accurately characterized

as a challenge to the integrity of the evidence than to its sufficiency," collateral

estoppel does not bar the § 1983 claim. Schertz v. Waupaca Cty., 875 F.2d 578,

581 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 670 (7th Cir. 2002).

Because the state court judge's finding of probable cause has no preclusive effect

in this case, the Court finds that it is not relevant to the issues in this case and that

its risk of prejudicial effect substantially outweighs any probative value. Betts v.

City of Chicago, Ill., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (granting motion

in limine to preclude evidence of state court judge's finding that probable cause did

not exist); Hillard v. City of Chicago, 2010 WL 1664941, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2010)

("Some courts have found it appropriate to advise the jury of the disposition of a

plaintiff's criminal charge in a false arrest case to prevent the jury from assuming

the plaintiff was found guilty. Notifying the jury of the 'no probable cause' finding

is unnecessary to meet this purpose…. There is no need to delve into the specifics

of the state court disposition…. [I]ntroduction of the 'no probable cause' finding

risks a substantial prejudicial effect, as the jury may equate the state court's finding

with a determination as to the propriety of the defendant officers' actions. [Plaintiff]

insists the court can address this concern with a limiting instruction. However, the

tenuous relevance of this evidence does not outweigh the risk that it will confuse

and mislead the jury").

The Court finds that evidence that the state court judge found that probable cause

existed for Plaintiffs' arrests is inadmissible at the trial in this case.

[Filing No. 448 at 4-5.]

III.

DISCUSSION

In support of their motion, the KSP Defendants argue that the probable cause finding is

relevant and that "judges and prosecutors each arrived at their own respective, independent

conclusion that probable cause existed for [Plaintiffs'] arrests…." [Filing No. 450 at 4.] The KSP

Defendants assert that the lack of probable cause is an essential element of Plaintiffs' false arrest,

pretrial detention, and conspiracy claims. [Filing No. 450 at 6.] They also argue that the probable

cause finding is probative of the conspiracy claim because it shows that "these Defendants had no

reason to think that a constitutional violation had occurred." [Filing No. 450 at 7.]

In support of their motion, the EPD Defendants argue that the Court should reconsider its

ruling because the state court judge's determination of probable cause is relevant to Plaintiffs' false

arrest claim, as prima facie evidence that probable cause existed, which may be rebutted by

Plaintiff's evidence at trial. [Filing No. 451 at 3-4.] The EPD Defendants contend that the evidence

described in the probable cause affidavits "did not include any of the evidence that Plaintiffs now

claim was fabricated," and that "[b]y excluding such evidence, the Court's Order only allows the

'rebuttal' evidence to such presumption, including Defendants' actions during the interrogations,

Mr. Golike's mental health history…, and [the] allegedly fabricated report." [Filing No. 451 at 5.]

The EPD Defendants also argue that the probable cause determinations by the state court judge,

the screening prosecutor, and the trial prosecutor are all relevant to William and Deadra's § 1983

claim for failure to intervene in their unlawful detention and to the issue of punitive damages.

[Filing No. 451 at 5.] As to the failure to intervene claim, the EPD Defendants argue that all

information known to them – including that a state court judge had found there was probable cause

to arrest Plaintiffs – should be presented to the jury in order for them to determine whether the

EPD Defendants knew a constitutional violation was committed when William and Deadra were

being detained. [Filing No. 451 at 6.] They argue that they "must be able to present evidence that

once William and Deadra's criminal charges were filed by the screening prosecutor and probable

cause was found by the criminal court judge, [they] had no control over William and Deadra's

detainment." [Filing No. 451 at 7.] As to the issue of punitive damages, the EPD Defendants

argue that "each EPD Defendant's state of mind is vitally important, including whether each EPD

Defendant acted reasonably, in whether the jury may assess punitive damages," and their

knowledge of the prosecutor's and criminal court judge's determinations of probable cause is

evidence of the EPD Defendants' state of mind as well. [Filing No. 451 at 8-9.]

In response, Plaintiffs argue that "[o]fficers who commit constitutional violations are not

permitted to try to avoid liability by pointing to the decisions of judges or prosecutors." [Filing

No. 453 at 4.] They contend that the EPD Defendants' argument that evidence of the probable

cause rulings shows why they did not try to stop Plaintiffs' detention is contrary to that principle.

[Filing No. 453 at 6-7.] Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish cases relied upon by the EPD Defendants,

and argue that the probable cause decisions by the state court judge or prosecutors have no

probative value. [Filing No. 453 at 7-10.] They also assert that the introduction of the prosecutors'

or state court judge's legal conclusions is unfairly prejudicial, and could confuse the jury. [Filing

No. 453 at 10-11.] Plaintiffs note that the probable cause found to exist by the prosecutors and the

state court judge was probable cause to prosecute, not probable cause to arrest in the first place.

[Filing No. 453 at 11.] They argue that "[i]ntroduction of the probable cause opinions of the

prosecutor or judge as somehow blessing or affirming Defendants' actions would be misleading

and confusing for jurors." [Filing No. 453 at 12.] Plaintiffs rely upon an affidavit from the

charging prosecutor, wherein he states that he made the decision to initiate criminal charges against

William and Deadra, and decline criminal charges against Andrea, based solely on the police

reports provided by the Evansville Police Department. [Filing No. 435 at 12.] Plaintiffs assert

that "Defendants have it backward when they claim they were relying on [the prosecutor's]

determinations. Defendants weren't relying on [the prosecutor]; he was relying on their police

reports…." [Filing No. 453 at 12.]

The EPD Defendants argue in their reply that Plaintiffs do not dispute that evidence of

what each EPD Defendant knew is relevant to the knowledge element of William and Deadra's

failure to intervene claim for the post-arrest and pre-trial detainment. [Filing No. 454 at 3-4.]

They argue that Plaintiffs do not address their argument that the prosecutors' and the state court

judge's determinations of probable cause are relevant to the issue of punitive damages, and reiterate

their argument that they are entitled to present evidence of the state court judge's probable cause

determinations as a prima facie showing that probable cause existed for Plaintiffs' arrests. [Filing

No. 454 at 5-7.] The EPD Defendants state that they do not intend to introduce evidence of the

state court judge's probable cause determination through expert testimony, and that "the court can

instruct the jury that those determinations are not controlling on the issue of liability." [Filing No.

454 at 7.]

The KSP Defendants did not file a reply.

As the Court found in its December 13, 2019 Order, the state court judge's finding of

probable cause has no preclusive effect in this case. [Filing No. 448 at 4.] The EPD Defendants

do not appear to dispute that ruling, arguing instead that the probable cause finding should be

admissible because: (1) they are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that probable cause existed,

which Plaintiffs may rebut at trial; and (2) the probable cause finding is relevant to William and

Deadra's § 1983 claims for failure to intervene in their unlawful detention, and to the issue of

punitive damages. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Rebuttable Presumption Argument

First, as to Plaintiffs' false arrest claim, the EPD Defendants argue that they are entitled to

a rebuttable presumption that probable cause existed for Plaintiffs' arrests, and that Plaintiffs can

present contradictory evidence at trial. But the cases they cite for this proposition are significantly

distinguishable in that they did not involve, and none discuss, the propriety of providing the

underlying probable cause finding to a jury. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th

Cir. 2019) (noting that while a finding of probable cause is normally entitled to a presumption of

validity, the presumption may give way upon a showing that probable cause was unlawfully

procured, but not discussing whether a jury should be informed of the probable cause decision);

Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010) (Fourth Amendment claim related to whether

exculpatory facts were omitted from warrant application was resolved on summary judgment, and

court did not consider whether probable cause finding was admissible in jury trial); Bennett v.

Antinnucci, 2018 WL 6067197, at *5 (N.D. Ind. 2018) (denying motion to dismiss Fourth

Amendment claim brought by former Postal Service employee against special agent of the Postal

Service who completed probable cause affidavit which led to charges against plaintiff; court did

not discuss admissibility of probable cause determination in jury trial); Ankh El v. Shelton, 2017

WL 1106088, at *5 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (plaintiff presented no evidence that probable cause was

obtained through false testimony, fraud, or other improper actions, so failed to rebut prima facie

evidence of probable cause on summary judgment).

Indeed, a central issue in this case is about eroding the "presumption" of probable cause.

The Court relied upon two decisions that – unlike any of the cases cited by the EPD Defendants –

discussed whether a jury should be provided with evidence of the underlying probable cause

finding. While it is true that both cases involved an underlying finding of no probable cause, the

Court finds this to be a distinction without a difference. In both cases, the courts reasoned that

informing a jury of the finding of no probable cause would be prejudicial. See Betts v. City of

Chicago, Ill., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (excluding finding of no probable cause

because, among other reasons, it was more prejudicial than probative); Hillard v. City of Chicago,

2010 WL 1664941, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ("[I]ntroduction of the 'no probable cause' finding risks

a substantial prejudicial effect, as the jury may equate the state court's finding with a determination

as to the propriety of the defendant officers' actions"). The same reasoning holds true for a finding

that probable cause existed. Upon learning that a state court judge (or a prosecutor) found that

probable cause existed, a jury may believe that they must make the same finding. Given that the

probable cause finding has no preclusive effect, the risk of prejudice far outweighs any probative

value.

B. Relevancy Argument

As to Plaintiffs' failure to intervene claim, Defendants set forth a theme of being entitled

to present the probable cause finding because they somehow relied on that finding in determining

how to act toward Plaintiffs. But a central issue in this case is whether the basis for the probable

cause finding – allegedly coerced confessions and fabricated evidence – was improper. To allow

the EPD Defendants to rely on the probable cause finding would require circular reasoning: they

would be relying on the very finding that Plaintiffs claim was based on information they should

have known was false. It would also go against Seventh Circuit precedent holding that when a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to probable cause "is more accurately characterized as a

challenge to the integrity of the evidence than to its sufficiency," the probable cause finding has

no preclusive effect. Schertz, 875 F.2d at 581.

Further, to the extent that Defendants seek to rely on the prosecutor's determination that

there was probable cause to move forward with the prosecutions of William and Deadra in order

to justify their actions, the Court finds significant the Declaration of Malcolm Gwinn. Mr. Gwinn

was the Deputy Prosecutor who made the decision to initiate criminal charges against William and

Deadra, and to decline to initiate charges against Andrea. He states that he "did not do any

independent investigation when making those decisions" and "relied solely on the police reports

that [he] was provided by the Evansville Police Department concerning its investigation into Mr.

Golike's death." [Filing No. 453-1.] The notion that Defendants based their actions on Mr.

Gwinn's charging decisions appears to be misplaced.

Finally, a close examination of Plaintiffs' claims and the alleged acts upon which they

intend to rely shows that the probable cause determination by the state court judge is likely not

relevant. At the February 20, 2020 hearing, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file a Report setting

forth: "(1) for their wrongful pretrial detention claim, the specific unconstitutional acts that were

committed and by which Defendants; (2) for their failure to intervene in constitutional violations

claim, the specific unconstitutional acts for which each Defendant failed to intervene; and (3) for

their conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights claim, the specific unconstitutional acts each

Defendant conspired to commit." [Filing No. 460 at 1-2.] Plaintiffs did so, [Filing No. 463], and

their Report provides important context when considering whether the state court judge's probable

cause determination is relevant.

The Report shows that the evidence upon which Plaintiffs will rely falls squarely within

one of three categories:

• Evidence of events that occurred before the probable cause determination,

including that:

o Detectives Vantlin, Wise, and Jones allegedly used impermissible,

coercive interrogation tactics during Plaintiffs' interrogations in

order to procure false confessions, [Filing No. 463 at 1];

o Detectives Vantlin, Wise, and Jones allegedly "mutually agreed" to

arrest William and Deadra, despite lacking probable cause to do so,

[Filing No. 463 at 1];

o Detectives Vantlin, Wise, and Jones allegedly manufactured facts to

obtain probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs, [Filing No. 463 at 1];

o Detectives Vantlin, Wise, and Jones allegedly failed to intervene to

stop one another from participating in the coercive interrogations of

Plaintiffs, [Filing No. 463 at 3]; and

o Detectives Vantlin, Wise, and Jones allegedly failed to intervene to

stop one another from feeding facts to Plaintiffs during their

interrogations, [Filing No. 463 at 3];

• Evidence fabricated or action taken by the very Defendants involved in the

interrogations leading to the allegedly coerced confessions, including that:

o after William was in custody Detective Vantlin allegedly fabricated

or fed facts to William and incorporated the facts into police reports

knowing the reports would be used to continue the prosecution and

detention of Plaintiffs, [Filing No. 463 at 2];

o Detective Vantlin allegedly fabricated statements and a false

identification of Plaintiffs that he attributed to a Kangaroo Express

convenience store clerk in an effort to continue the prosecution and

detention of William and Deadra, [Filing No. 463 at 2];

o Detectives Wise and Jones allegedly failed to intervene to stop

Detective Vantlin's ongoing investigation of William and Deadra

while William and Deadra were detained, [Filing No. 463 at 3];

o Detective Vantlin allegedly failed to intervene to prevent Detective

Spencer's fabrication of an inculpatory statement, [Filing No. 463

at 3]; and

o Detective Vantlin allegedly failed to intervene to stop Detectives

Arbaugh and Pagett from fabricating a false statement, [Filing No.

463 at 3]; and

• Evidence of overt acts by Defendants whose reliance on the probable cause

determination would not justify those acts in any event, including that:

o Detective Spencer allegedly fabricated an inculpatory statement,

which he attributed to William in an effort to continue the

prosecution and detention of William and Deadra, [Filing No. 463

at 2];

o Detectives Arbaugh and Pagett allegedly created a police report

containing a fabricated and inculpatory statement attributed to

William in an effort to continue the prosecution and detention of

William, [Filing No. 463 at 2];

o Detective Arbaugh allegedly failed to intervene to stop Detective

Pagett from fabricating a false statement, [Filing No. 463 at 3]; and

o Detective Pagett allegedly failed to intervene to stop Detective

Arbaugh from fabricating a false statement, [Filing No. 463 at 3].

These categories of evidence indicate that the state court's finding of probable cause will

likely not be relevant to Defendants' liability. First, events that took place before the probable

cause determination could not have been affected by that determination, making the probable cause

determination irrelevant. For example, it would not make sense for Detective Wise to rely on the

probable cause determination to justify his actions during his interrogation of Deadra, which took

place before the probable cause determination. Second, the Defendants involved in the

interrogations that led to the probable cause determination cannot use that determination to

challenge or explain allegations that they fabricated evidence. For example, the probable cause

determination is unrelated to the Kangaroo Express convenience store clerk's statements (and

Detective Vantlin's inclusion of those statements in a police report). Finally, a defendant who did

not participate in the interrogations but allegedly fabricated evidence cannot rely on the probable

cause determination to justify his actions. For example, the probable cause determination would

not justify Detectives Pagett and Arbaugh's alleged fabrication of a report saying that William had

told them he had to "pay for what he did." Put simply, after reviewing the evidence Plaintiffs list

in connection with their pretrial detention, failure to intervene, and conspiracy claims, the Court

reaffirms its decision that the probable cause determination is not admissible at this time.2

2 At first glance it may appear that the probable cause determination could be relevant to the failure

to intervene and conspiracy claims. For example, Detective Arbaugh could argue that, knowing

that the state court judge had already found that probable cause existed, he decided not to try to

stop Detective Pagett from fabricating William's statement that he had to "pay for what he did."

However, given Plaintiffs' allegations that all of the Defendants fabricated evidence or coerced

confessions at one time or another, it does not seem plausible that they determined not to intervene

in each other's wrongdoing because the state court judge had found that probable cause existed.

Defendants also argue that the probable cause determination is relevant to the issue of

punitive damages. Based on the above, the Court is not convinced that this is the case, because

the actions of Defendants on which Plaintiffs intend to rely to establish liability do not appear to

be the type that would be justified by the probable cause finding. However, if the Court determines

that the probable cause finding is relevant to the issue of punitive damages, such evidence can be

presented to the jury only after a finding of liability, and in a separate damages phase of the trial.

The potential relevancy of the probable cause finding to the issue of punitive damages does not

warrant reconsideration at this juncture.3

In sum, Defendants have not shown that the Court committed a "manifest error of law,"

nor have they submitted new evidence that would warrant reconsideration of the Court's ruling on

the admissibility of the state court judge's finding of probable cause for Plaintiffs' arrests. The

KSP Defendants' Motion to Reconsider and in the Alternative, Motion to Certify Order for

Interlocutory Appeal and to Stay Pending Resolution of Proceedings, [Filing No. 450], and the

EPD Defendants' Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order on Motions in Limine Dated December

13, 2019 or, Alternatively, to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal, [Filing No. 451], are both DENIED

to the extent that they seek reconsideration of the Court's December 13, 2019 decision.

3 The Court notes that at the February 20, 2020 hearing on the pending motions, the Court ordered

the KSP Defendants and the EPD Defendants to file a Report "listing cases that hold that evidence

of the state court judge's probable cause finding is admissible at trial for the wrongful pretrial

detention, failure to intervene in constitutional violations, and conspiracy to deprive constitutional

rights claims." [Filing No. 460 at 2.] The KSP Defendants and the EPD Defendants filed their

Reports, and the Court has reviewed the cases they submitted and has determined that none

advance the KSP Defendants' and the EPD Defendants' arguments for reconsideration. Nearly all

of the cases cited in the Reports involved the review of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

and many of the cases related to the preclusive effect of a probable cause finding or whether the

defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. None addressed whether a jury should hear evidence

related to a state court judge's probable cause determination in a civil rights case. [See cases listed

in Filing No. 461 and Filing No. 462.]

The Court's denial of Defendants' motions comes with a significant caveat: Specifically,

that motions in limine are preliminary in nature, and that the Court's ruling as to the admissibility

of the probable cause determination could change as trial progresses. As the Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals has explained, "a ruling [in limine] is subject to change when the case unfolds,

particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was [expected]. Indeed, even if nothing

unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion,

to alter a previous in limine ruling." United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1989)

(citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984)); see also Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753,

758 n.3 (2000) ("in limine rulings are not binding on the trial judge, and the judge may always

change [her] mind during the course of a trial"). The parties should be mindful that the Court's

ruling may change, depending on how the evidence plays out at trial, and that relief from the

Court's Order in Limine must be sought outside the presence of the jury.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES The KSP Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider

and in the Alternative, Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal and to Stay Pending

Resolution of Proceedings, [450], and the EPD Defendants' Motion to Reconsider the Court's

Order on Motions in Limine Dated December 13, 2019 or, Alternatively, to Certify for

Interlocutory Appeal, [451], to the extent that they seek reconsideration of the Court's December

13, 2019 decision.

Date: 7/23/2020 ~ Lane Monat Sta

(Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record

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