dismissal with prejudice is proper "if it is clear that any amendment would be futile"
How later courts described this case
- dismissal with prejudice is proper "if it is clear that any amendment would be futile"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
LONNIE D. BAKER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 4:19-cv-00238-JMS-DML
)
AISIN HOLDINGS OF AMERICA, INC., AISIN USA )
MFG., INC., and NATHAN LANG, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Lonnie Baker was employed by Defendant Aisin USA Mfg., Inc. ("Aisin")
when he applied for and received leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
("FMLA"). Subsequently, Mr. Baker was terminated after being in jail for three days during a
period in which he alleges he had been approved for FMLA leave. Mr. Baker initiated this lawsuit,
alleging interference and retaliation claims against Aisin and Defendant Nathan Lang, Mr. Baker's
supervisor at Aisin, under the FMLA. [Filing No. 1.] Aisin and Mr. Lang have filed a Motion to
Dismiss, which is now ripe for the Court's ruling. [Filing No. 24.]
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim that does not state a right to
relief. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide the defendant with
"fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In reviewing
the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all
permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Active Disposal Inc. v. City of Darien, 635
F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint
"contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The
Court will not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations as sufficient to state a claim for
relief. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). Factual allegations
must plausibly state an entitlement to relief "to a degree that rises above the speculative level."
Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This plausibility determination is "a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense." Id.
II.
BACKGROUND
The following are the factual allegations set forth in the Third Amended Complaint – the
operative complaint in this case – which the Court must accept as true at this time.
A. Mr. Baker's FMLA Leave
Mr. Baker began working at Aisin in February 2015 as a Set-Up Resisting Welder
Operator. [Filing No. 19 at 4.] Around July 5, 2016, Mr. Baker sought treatment for symptoms
of anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder that impaired his daily functioning. [Filing No. 19 at
4.] Mr. Baker continued working at Aisin and in September 2016 he applied for and received up
to 12 weeks of continuous FMLA medical leave – from mid-September through mid-December
2016. [Filing No. 19 at 4-5.] Mr. Baker attended doctor's appointments on September 23, 2016,
October 5, 2016, and October 28, 2016. [Filing No. 19 at 4-5.] After his final appointment, Mr.
Baker received by mail a medical certification update request from Aisin dated October 25, 2016,
which was to be completed by November 14, 2016. [Filing No. 19 at 6.] This was the only medical
certification or recertification request Mr. Baker received. [Filing No. 19 at 6.]
Mr. Baker at all times tried to communicate with Mr. Lang by email or telephone regarding
FMLA issues, but was never able to reach him. [Filing No. 19 at 6.] When these efforts were
unsuccessful, Mr. Baker went to Aisin's Human Resources Department to speak directly with Mr.
Lang. [Filing No. 19 at 6.] Mr. Baker always provided Mr. Lang with a doctor's note for "coverage
and protections," to be sure he had documentation for his leave. [Filing No. 19 at 6.] In late
October or early November 2016, Mr. Baker met with Mr. Lang and provided a doctor's note
supporting his FMLA leave through November 7, 2016 for "major anxiety and depression." [Filing
No. 19 at 6.] The note stated that Mr. Baker could return to work without any additional
certifications. [Filing No. 19 at 6.] Mr. Baker notified Mr. Lang verbally, in person, that he
intended to return to work on November 8, 2016, barring any complications from his health
condition, but that if he was unable to do so, he would be out for the remainder of his FMLA leave
until mid-December 2016. [Filing No. 19 at 7.] Mr. Baker was concerned that he would be a
safety risk at work due to recent increases in his medication, which can take 6-8 weeks to improve
symptoms. [Filing 19 at 16.] Mr. Baker's doctor agreed to refer Mr. Baker to a mental health
specialist if he was unable to return to work on November 8, 2016, as planned. [Filing No. 19 at
6-7.] Mr. Baker's doctor filled out the initial medical certification, which Mr. Lang could access
either directly or through Aisin's FMLA task contractor. [Filing No. 19 at 7.] No additional
recertification request was sent to clarify any doubts about Mr. Baker's medical status. [Filing No.
19 at 7.]
B. Mr. Baker's Arrest and Termination
On November 5, 2016, Mr. Baker was "falsely arrested" on charges that were eventually
dismissed. [Filing No. 19 at 8.] Mr. Baker remained in custody from November 8 to November
10, 2016, which included the day he was scheduled to possibly return from FMLA medical leave.
[Filing No. 19 at 8.] Mr. Baker's girlfriend notified Mr. Lang on those days that he would not be
at work, and would need to take the rest of his FMLA leave due to his ongoing mental health
condition. [Filing No. 19 at 7.] Mr. Baker's girlfriend also explained to Mr. Lang why Mr. Baker
did not call Mr. Lang himself. [Filing No. 19 at 7-8.] Mr. Lang told Mr. Baker's girlfriend that
Mr. Baker "would still have his job," and "to keep [Mr. Lang] posted." [Filing No. 19 at 8.] A
few days later, Mr. Baker was terminated for voluntary job abandonment by letter dated November
10, 2016, which Mr. Baker received on November 14, 2016. [Filing No. 19 at 7-8.]
C. Mr. Baker's Efforts to Get His Job Back
Mr. Baker contacted Mr. Lang in December 2016, desperate to regain his job so that he
could pay his mortgage. [Filing No. 19 at 8.] Mr. Lang refused to rehire him, but advised him
that he could reapply in 180 days. [Filing No. 19 at 8.] In late May or early June 2017, Mr. Baker
met with Mr. Lang, who again refused to rehire Mr. Baker because he had "failed to keep in contact
[with Mr. Lang] on FMLA and go through the employment agencies…." [Filing No. 19 at 8.].
Mr. Lang told Mr. Baker that he would consider rehiring him in 90 days. [Filing No. 19 at 8.]
Aisin never rehired Mr. Baker and, in early July 2018, Mr. Baker lost his home valued at $110,000
due to foreclosure. [Filing No. 19 at 9.]
D. Mr. Baker's Difficulties Obtaining FMLA Documents
Prior to initiating this lawsuit against Aisin and Mr. Lang, in April and October of 2018,
Mr. Baker requested some documents by phone and email from Aisin's "third-party administrator"
for FMLA matters. [Filing No. 19 at 18.] In early April 2018, Mr. Baker filed an informal
complaint with Aisin's administration claiming that he was wrongfully terminated, but the
complaint was "to no avail." [Filing No. 19 at 18.] In July and August of 2018, Mr. Baker
exchanged several emails and a few letters with Aisin's counsel regarding the FMLA and his belief
that he was wrongfully terminated, also "to no avail." [Filing No. 19 at 18.]
E. Mr. Baker's Lawsuit
Mr. Baker initiated this litigation in November 2019, [Filing No. 1], and filed the operative
Third Amended Complaint on March 6, 2020, [Filing No. 19]. He alleges that Aisin and Mr. Lang:
(1) interfered with his FMLA leave by firing him for absences attributable to his serious medical
condition and preventing him from using his five weeks of remaining FMLA leave (Count 1); (2)
retaliated and/or discriminated against him for taking FMLA leave by firing him under the pretext
of his arrest and denying him the opportunity to update his medical certification (Count 2); (3)
interfered with his FMLA leave or retaliated against him by disciplining and terminating him for
requesting leave when he gave adequate notice for the entitlement, denying him the opportunity to
provide recertification prior to his termination, and terminating him when he was unable to
personally call in to report absences on November 8-10, 2016 even though the circumstances
justified non-compliance with routine employer policies (Count 3); (4) willfully interfered with
his FMLA leave and discriminated or retaliated against him for using FMLA leave by failing to
rehire him (Count 4); and (5) willfully interfered and discriminated or retaliated against him by
denying him access to FMLA documents, medical records, and employee/employer policy
handbooks; destroying, delaying, or limiting material evidence in violation of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 26 and 37; and denying access to the courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments (Count 5).1
1 Mr. Baker's Third Amended Complaint is twenty-one pages and is repetitive and, oftentimes,
rambling. The Court has done its best to parse out Mr. Baker's claims, and the facts that he alleges
support those claims. To the extent Mr. Baker intended to raise other theories or claims not
identified by the Court, the Court finds those theories or claims waived for failure to clearly
articulate them.
F. Discovery Issues
After initiating this lawsuit, Mr. Baker discovered that Aisin and Mr. Lang informed Aisin's
"contractor for [FMLA] task matters" to deny Mr. Baker access to FMLA documents, medical
records, and doctors' notes in their possession. [Filing No. 19 at 17.] Mr. Baker has requested and
been denied any and all FMLA documents and any other material employee and employer policy
handbooks to adequately litigate his claims. [Filing No. 19 at 17.]
Mr. Baker has also attempted to request "all FMLA material" from Aisin's third-party
administrator for FMLA matters, and received an email from a supervisor named Tammy Seemann
stating that Aisin has informed the administrator not to release any FMLA documents or medical
documents to Mr. Baker. [Filing No. 19 at 18.] Ms. Seemann advised Mr. Baker that he would
have to go through Aisin to receive any FMLA documentation that he seeks. [Filing No. 19 at 18.]
In February 2020, Mr. Baker received a February 6, 2020 letter from Aisin Human
Resources Benefits Coordinator Tammy Hall stating that Aisin would not release any documents
to former employees absent a subpoena or court order. [Filing No. 19 at 18.] Mr. Baker alleges
that Aisin and Mr. Lang have "interfered and [have] prejudiced [his] request for all documents to
properly litigate his claims and inspect for any evidence, including any possible fraud on the court
and destroying any and all documents for [him]." [Filing No. 19 at 18 (emphasis omitted).]
III.
DISCUSSION
The Court addresses each of Mr. Baker's claims, and the arguments set forth by Aisin and
Mr. Lang in support of their Motion to Dismiss, in turn below.
A. Interference Under the FMLA (Count 1)
Aisin and Mr. Lang argue that Mr. Baker's absences for time in jail starting November 8,
2016 were unrelated to his health condition and did not qualify for FMLA protection. [Filing No.
25 at 6-8.] They assert that Mr. Baker is not entitled to FMLA leave for time spent in jail when he
was otherwise capable of performing the functions of his position. [Filing No. 25 at 6-8.] Aisin
and Mr. Lang argue that Mr. Baker does not claim that his incarceration had anything to do with
his serious health condition, or that his condition would have prevented him from working on
November 8, 2016 if he had not been "falsely arrested" and detained. [Filing No. 25 at 7-8.] Aisin
and Mr. Lang contend that being in jail was the true reason for Mr. Baker's work absence, which
does not qualify for FMLA protection. [Filing No. 25 at 7.] Aisin and Mr. Lang argue that because
Mr. Baker was not entitled to FMLA leave for the time he spent in jail because it was not related
to his ongoing health condition, they could not have interfered with FMLA rights to which Mr.
Baker was not entitled. [Filing No. 25 at 8.]
Mr. Baker did not respond to the Motion to Dismiss.
The FMLA entitles eligible employees suffering from a qualifying illness to as much as
twelve weeks unpaid leave in a twelve-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D). Under the
FMLA, it is "unlawful for [an] employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny" an employee's
"exercise of or … attempt to exercise [] any right provided under" the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
To prove an FMLA interference claim, Mr. Baker must establish that: "(1) he was eligible for
the FMLA's protections, (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA, (3) he was entitled to take
leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his
employer denied [or interfered with]… FMLA benefits to which he was entitled." Preddie v.
Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cracco v. Vitran
Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 635-36 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, there is no dispute that Mr. Baker was an eligible employee and that Aisin was
covered by the FMLA. At issue is whether Mr. Baker has adequately alleged that he was entitled
to FMLA leave while he was in jail, that he gave sufficient notice, and that Aisin and Mr. Lang
interfered with his rights under the FMLA. [See Filing No. 19 at 12-13; Filing No. 25 at 7.]
Regarding entitlement to FMLA benefits, Aisin and Mr. Lang argue that Mr. Baker was
not entitled to FMLA benefits because he was in jail and that Mr. Baker's "own allegations
demonstrate his absences had nothing to do with his underlying serious health condition." [Filing
No. 25 at 7.] However, Mr. Baker alleges that Aisin approved his FMLA leave through mid-
December 2016, and that he was going to try to return to work on November 8, 2016, but that there
was a chance he would not be able to as he had switched medications and was concerned he would
be a safety risk due to the medication. [Filing No. 19 at 6.] Mr. Baker also alleges that Aisin did
not request any further certifications from him for FMLA leave through mid-December 2016. Mr.
Baker's presence in jail from November 8 through November 10, 2016 does not necessarily render
him ineligible for FMLA benefits, so long as he was entitled to FMLA leave during that period in
the first instance. See, e.g., Gurley v. Ameriwood Indus., 232 F. Supp.2d 969, 975-76 (E.D. Mo.
2002) ("[Defendant] argues that the two days [plaintiff] spent in jail cannot be counted as FMLA
leave…. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. If, in fact, [plaintiff] had a 'serious medical
condition' on the two days in question, the fact that she was arrested on outstanding warrants and
incarcerated for those two days would not negate her entitlement to FMLA leave"). While Aisin
and Mr. Lang may ultimately be able to defeat this claim by showing that Mr. Baker did not use
his FMLA leave for its intended purpose, Scruggs v. Carrier Corp., 688 F.3d 821, 825 (7th Cir.
2012), the Court can only consider Mr. Baker's allegations at the dismissal stage and must take
those allegations as true. The Court finds that Mr. Baker has adequately alleged that he was
entitled to FMLA benefits through mid-December 2016.2
With regard to notice, Mr. Baker alleges that he notified Mr. Lang verbally, in person, that
he intended to return to work on November 8, 2016, barring any complications from his health
condition, but that if he was unable to do so he would be out the remainder of his FMLA leave
until mid-December 2016. [Filing No. 19 at 7.] Mr. Baker alleges that his girlfriend notified Mr.
Lang on November 8, 9, and 10, 2016 that Mr. Baker would not be at work and would be taking
the rest of his FMLA leave due to his ongoing medical condition, [Filing No. 19 at 7], and Mr.
Lang told Mr. Baker's girlfriend that he "would still have his job" and "to keep [him] posted."
[Filing No. 19 at 8]. The Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to allege that Mr. Baker
gave Aisin and Mr. Lang sufficient notice that he intended to take FMLA leave until mid-
December 2016.3
Finally, Mr. Baker adequately alleges that Aisin and Mr. Lang denied him FMLA benefits
to which he was entitled by terminating his employment with Aisin. [Filing No. 19 at 12-13.]
2 Aisin and Mr. Lang assert that Mr. Baker does not allege that "his serious health condition would
have otherwise prevented him from working on November 8, 2016, if he had not been detained."
[Filing No. 25 at 8.] But Mr. Baker does allege that he was concerned he would be a safety risk
due to the new medication he was taking, and that he had informed Aisin and Mr. Lang that this
might prevent him from returning to work on November 8, 2016. [Filing No. 19 at 7.] This is
sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage to allege that he was entitled to FMLA leave on that date.
3 Additionally, even if Mr. Baker's notice was not sufficient, compliance with Aisin's notice policy
may have been excused given that Mr. Baker was in jail. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d) ("An
employer may require an employee to comply with the employer's usual and customary notice and
procedural requirements for requesting leave, absent unusual circumstances"); Flores v. Murphy
Co., 2014 WL 584553, at *6 (D. Or. 2014) (plaintiff who was in jail during FMLA leave submitted
sufficient evidence to show that he was not obligated to comply with employer's notice policy
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d), due to the "unusual circumstance" of being incarcerated).
In sum, the Court must take Mr. Baker's allegations as true at the motion to dismiss stage,
and it finds that Mr. Baker has adequately alleged an FMLA interference claim in Count 1 related
to his inability to take his remaining five weeks of FMLA leave due to his termination. Aisin and
Mr. Lang's Motion to Dismiss Count 1 is DENIED.
B. Retaliation and Discrimination Under the FMLA (Count 2)
In support of their Motion to Dismiss, Aisin and Mr. Lang argue that Mr. Baker was not
entitled to FMLA benefits to cover unauthorized absences resulting from his incarceration and,
because he "could never have received FMLA leave for the period he was in jail," his request for
FMLA leave was not protected activity. [Filing No. 25 at 8-9.]
The FMLA prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees for exercising or attempting to exercise FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2),(b).
Unlike an interference claim, a claim of retaliation requires a showing of discriminatory or
retaliatory intent. See Kauffman v. Federal Express Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2005);
Goezler v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis., 604 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 2010). In asserting a retaliation
claim under the FMLA, a plaintiff may proceed under the direct or indirect methods of proof.
Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 823-24 (7th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff can state a
claim under the direct method by alleging that: (1) he exercised or attempted to exercise rights
protetected by the FMLA; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal
link between the protected activity and rights protected by the FMLA. Ames v. Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir 2011). Under the indirect method, a plaintiff can state a
claim for FMLA retaliation by alleging that he was treated less favorably than other similarly
situated employees who did not take FMLA leave, even though he was performing his job in a
satisfactory manner. Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2006).
Taking Mr. Baker's allegations in the Third Amended Complaint as true, as it must at the
motion to dismiss stage, the Court finds that Mr. Baker has sufficiently alleged an FMLA
retaliation/discrimination claim. As discussed above in connection with his FMLA interference
claim, Mr. Baker has adequately alleged that he was entitled to take FMLA leave and was
attempting to exercise that right. He has also adequately alleged that Aisin took an adverse
employment action against him by terminating him. Finally, he alleges that his attempt to take
FMLA leave, or his exercise of that leave before his arrest, was the cause of his termination.
Aisin's and Mr. Lang's Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the Third Amended Complaint is DENIED.
C. Willful Interference and/or Retaliation: Employer's Call-in Policy (Count 3)
As to Mr. Baker's third claim, Aisin and Mr. Lang argue that it is duplicative of his first
and second claims and that, in any event, it fails as a matter of law. [Filing No. 25 at 10-12.] Aisin
and Mr. Lang reiterate their argument that Mr. Baker cannot establish an entitlement to FMLA
benefits because incarceration unrelated to a health condition does not qualify for FMLA leave.
[Filing No. 25 at 11.] They argue that, because Mr. Baker cannot plausibly use FMLA benefits to
excuse absences incurred solely as a result of his legal troubles, they did not have to provide Mr.
Baker with an opportunity to submit an updated FMLA certification to receive the balance of his
leave. [Filing No. 25 at 11.] Regarding notice, Aisin and Mr. Lang argue that Mr. Baker's claim
of unusual circumstances preventing his adherence to Aisin's call-in policies duplicates arguments
in Counts 1 and 2 and does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Filing No. 25 at
10-12.]
The Court finds that Count 3 is duplicative of Mr. Baker's FMLA interference and
retaliation/discrimination claims. While Mr. Baker points to allegations regarding the notice he
gave for his FMLA leave, whether he was given an opportunity to provide a recertification, and
whether he was able to comply with Aisin's call-in policy while he was in jail, these are really just
additional allegations to support the claims he asserts in Counts 1 and 2. For example, Mr. Baker's
allegation that Aisin never asked for a recertification may be relevant to whether he was entitled
to FMLA leave until mid-December 2016 in the first place. Similarly, his allegations that he had
provided Mr. Lang with notice of the possibility that he would take FMLA leave through mid-
December 2016 and that he was unable to comply with Aisin's call-in policy are simply additional
allegations that support his interference and retaliation/discrimination claims asserted in Counts 1
and 2. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Aisin's and Mr. Lang's Motion to Dismiss as to Count 3
because it is duplicative of Counts 1 and 2, but notes that Mr. Baker may rely on the allegations
he sets forth in Count 3 in support of Counts 1 and 2.
D. Willful Interference and/or Retaliation: Refusal to Rehire (Count 4)
In support of their Motion to Dismiss, Aisin and Mr. Lang set forth the same arguments
that they asserted in connection with Count 2. They argue that Mr. Baker attempted to use his
FMLA benefits to cover unauthorized absences resulting from his incarceration, that he failed to
exercise rights protected by the FMLA, and that he is not entitled to FMLA leave for time spent in
jail. [Filing No. 25 at 8-10.]
As with Mr. Baker's duplicative third claim for FMLA interference, Mr. Baker again sets
forth a duplicative claim in Count 4. Specifically, he alleges in Count 4 that Aisin and Mr. Lang
retaliated against him or discriminated against him for exercising his rights under the FMLA by
failing to rehire him after his termination. Aisin's failure to rehire him is yet another allegation
that he contends supports his FMLA retaliation/discrimination claim, and need not be set forth as
a separate claim. The Court GRANTS Aisin's and Mr. Lang's Motion to Dismiss Count 4 as
duplicative of Count 2, but Count 2 for FMLA retaliation/discrimination is deemed to include Mr.
Baker's allegations surrounding Aisin's decision not to rehire him.
E. FMLA Interference and Retaliation: Inability to Obtain Documents (Count 5)
Finally, Aisin and Mr. Lang argue that Mr. Baker fails to state a cognizable claim in Count
5 because the FMLA does not provide an avenue for relief for obtaining documents to prosecute
Mr. Baker's lawsuit. [Filing No. 25 at 12.] Aisin and Mr. Lang argue that relief for obtaining
discovery documents is not a viable cause of action under the FMLA and should be dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Filing No. 25 at 12.] Aisin and Mr. Lang
argue that although Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 34 and 37 provide avenues for obtaining
documents, Mr. Baker cannot plausibly allege a violation of the FMLA due to discovery abuses
because discovery has not yet commenced. [Filing No. 25 at 12.]
It is not clear whether Mr. Baker is alleging that Aisin thwarted his attempts to obtain
documents before the lawsuit, which interfered with his ability to exercise his rights under the
FMLA and constituted retaliation or discrimination under the FMLA, or whether Aisin refused to
provide him with documents after he filed this lawsuit, which is interfering with his ability to
pursue his claims and constitutes retaliation or discrimination. In the interest of thoroughness, the
Court assumes that Mr. Baker intends to allege both.
First, to the extent Mr. Baker is alleging that Aisin prevented him from obtaining
documents that he needed in order to exercise his rights under the FMLA before he filed the
lawsuit, the Court finds that this is an allegation on which he can rely in support of his FMLA
interference and retaliation/discrimination claims.
Second, if Mr. Baker is alleging that Aisin withheld documents after Mr. Baker filed the
lawsuit, he is essentially seeking relief for the violation of procedural rules governing discovery.
There is no cause of action for violating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, if Mr. Baker
believes that Aisin has violated procedural rules by failing to produce documents, he may file a
Motion to Compel.
The Court GRANTS Aisin's and Mr. Lang's Motion to Dismiss Count 5. To the extent
that Mr. Baker is complaining regarding Aisin thwarting his attempts to obtain documents
necessary for him to exercise his rights under the FMLA, Mr. Baker's claim is duplicative of his
earlier claims and he may use his allegations to support those claims. To the extent that Mr. Baker
is seeking redress for discovery violations committed by Aisin after this lawsuit was initiated, Mr.
Baker may file a Motion to Compel.4
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
• DENIES IN PART the Motion to Dismiss filed by Aisin and Mr. Lang, [24],
to the extent that it finds that Mr. Baker has set forth allegations sufficient to
support his FMLA interference claim (Count 1) and his FMLA
retaliation/discrimination claim (Count 2);
• GRANTS IN PART the Motion to Dismiss filed by Aisin and Mr. Lang, [24],
to the extent that it finds that Counts 3 and 4 are duplicative of Counts 1 and 2,
4 Aisin Holdings of America, Inc. is also named as a Defendant in this case. The Court noted in a
previous Order that "[i]n recent filings, the defendants state that defendant Aisin USA
Manufacturing, Inc. has been 'misidentified' as both 'Aisin Holdings of America, Inc. and Aisin
USA Manufacturing, Inc.' If the defendants seek to eliminate Aisin Holdings of America, Inc.
from this case, they must file an appropriately supported motion seeking that relief." [Filing No.
18 at 1.] Aisin and Mr. Lang acknowledge the Court's direction in their brief in support of their
Motion to Dismiss, and state that "Defendants will file an appropriately supported motion if they
seek to eliminate any putative party to this lawsuit." [Filing No. 25 at 1.] Now that the Court has
ruled on Aisin's and Mr. Lang's Motion to Dismiss, the time to correct the docket has come.
Technically, all the claims Mr. Baker sets forth in the Third Amended Complaint remain pending
against Aisin Holdings of America, Inc., since that entity did not file a Motion to Dismiss. The
Court ORDERS Aisin to file any motion seeking to correct the docket, with appropriate support,
by July 24, 2020.
and Count 5 is either duplicative or fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Counts 3, 4, and 5 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;> and
e ORDERS Aisin to file any motion seeking to correct the docket, with
appropriate support, by July 24, 2020.
No partial final judgment shall issue.
Although Counts 1 and 2 will proceed, Mr. Baker is cautioned that the presumption that
his allegations are true ends at the motion to dismiss stage of this litigation. In order to succeed
on his claims, it will be Mr. Baker's burden to provide evidence supporting each element of those
claims. The Court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss should not be interpreted as an indication that
Mr. Baker's claims will ultimately succeed — that will depend on the evidence that the parties
present. To that end, the Court requests that the Magistrate Judge confer with the parties regarding
the possibility of resolving Mr. Baker's remaining claims prior to trial or establish a case
management plan to promote the orderly administration of the case.
Date: 7/7/2020 -
Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge
‘United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution via ECF only to all counsel of record
Distribution via United States Mail to:
Lonnie D. Baker
325 South Park Street
Seymour, Indiana 47274
> Because Counts 3 and 4 are dismissed as duplicative, and Count 5 is dismissed since it is either
duplicative or improperly seeks relief for an alleged discovery violation, the Court finds that Mr.
Baker cannot amend those claims to remedy those issues. Accordingly, dismissal with prejudice
is appropriate. Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013) (dismissal with prejudice is
proper "if it is clear that any amendment would be futile").
15