HOOK v. NORVELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

AMANDA HOOK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:19-cv-00049-TWP-DML

)

NICOLE NORVELL, DEBBIE SAMPSON )

KELLY SCHMELZLE, CHRISTINE )

FEATHERSTONE and CATHY HODGE, )

)

Defendant. )

ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Defendants Nicole Norvell (“Norvell”), Debbie Sampson

(“Sampson”), Kelly Schmelzle (“Schmelzle”), Christine Featherstone (“Featherstone”) and Cathy

Hodge (“Hodge”) (collectively, “Defendants”) (Filing No. 14). The Defendants are each

employees of the State of Indiana. Plaintiff Amanda Hook (“Hook”) initiated this action against

the Defendants after she nearly lost her child daycare licenses based on Defendants' false claims

that Hook violated a stay away agreement concerning Hook's husband who is criminally charged

with four counts of child molestation. Hook is seeking relief for Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ancillary state tort claims. For the reasons

discussed below, the Defendants’ Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required when reviewing a

motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the Complaint and draws all

inferences in favor of Hook as the non-moving party. See Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d

632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).

Hook is the owner and operator of Hook’s Child Daycare, an unincorporated entity which

operates three separate childcare facilities in the Madison, Indiana area. Each facility is required

to have a separate operating license. The Defendants are each employees of the State of Indiana.

Norvell is the Director of the Family and Social Services Administration ("FSSA"), in Indiana;

Sampson is the Manager of FSSA; Schmelzle is a Licensing Consultant with FSSA; Featherstone

is a case worker with FSSA; and Hodge works for the Indiana Department of Child Services.

In January 2017, Hook’s husband, Joseph Hook, was under investigation for child

molestation. In order to keep operating her licensed childcare facilities, Hook was required to sign

a Consent Agreement (the “Agreement”) with the State of Indiana. The Agreement, signed on

January 24, 2017, stated in relevant part, that: “Joseph Hook II (JD) will not be allowed in any

of the child care homes during child care hours.” (Filing No. 1 at 3-4) (emphasis in original).

No other restrictions were imposed.

In March 2017, Joseph Hook was criminally charged with four counts of child molestation

in Jefferson County Circuit Court, State v. Joseph D. Hook, 39C01-1703-F1-00234.1 Following

Joseph Hook's arrest, Schmelzle, Sampson and unknown staff at FSSA have systematically worked

to disrupt with the goal of shutting down Hook's businesses. (Filing No. 1 at 4.)

In May 2017, Norvell notified Hook that FSSA was seeking to revoke the licenses at her

three childcare locations. The alleged basis of the revocation was:

On 1/224/17 you signed an agreement with the Office of Early Childhood & Out

of School Learning that your spouse would not be allowed in the child care homes.

According to the principal of a local elementary school, on 3/13/17 and 3/14/17,

your spouse, representing himself as part of the child care, picked up a child from

kindergarten and transported him to a house around the corner from one of the child

cares. According to child care staff, the child would then have to walk alone to the

home, which is located on a busy highway.

1 The case, State of Indiana vs. Joseph D. Hook, remains pending; however, the case is no longer in Jefferson County

Superior Court. A special judge was appointed and the case is now pending in Jennings County Circuit Court, Jennings

County, Indiana. The case number now is 40C01-1906-CB-000036. https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase.

(Filing No. 1 at 4.) A notice dated June 12, 2017 informed Hook that retroactively, she would no

longer be eligible to receive CCDF2 voucher payments from the State. Id. On June 13, 2017,

Hook filed an appeal of FSSA’s decision to seek revocation of her licenses. Thereafter, from

August to September 2017, the Defendants, who are employees and agents of FSSA, and the

Indiana Department of Child Services, pursued an agenda to find or create a basis to revoke Hook's

childcare licenses to operate her facilities. Id. at 5. Specifically,

1. Norvell initiated the proceedings to revoke Hook's childcare license which incorporated

the false charge of violating the Agreement. (Filing No. 1 at 9 ¶ 51.)

2. Schmelzle prepared the allegation which formed the basis of the revocation. The entire

statement had been fabricated and was untrue. In August 2017, Hook discovered that

Schmelzle posted on the FSSA website, which is accessible to anyone looking for childcare

services, that Hook's daycare licenses had been revoked when they had not been revoked.

Schmelzle made multiple visits to Hook’s childcare facilities and made demands which

were either outside of her discretion or which were inconsistently and arbitrarily imposed

upon Hook and not imposed against other childcare providers.

3. Sampson (along with Schmelzle) told parents of Hook’s Child Daycare students that

Joseph Hook is guilty and confessed to the charges pending against him. As a result of

those statements parents have withdrawn their children from Hook’s Child Daycare

causing financial harm to the business. Sampson and Schmelzle also told parents of Hook’s

Child Daycare students that the business was closing and that they needed to make other

childcare arrangements.

4. Featherstone told a parent of children who attend Hook’s childcare facilities that Joseph

Hook was a child molester and that her children were not safe around him. Featherstone

told a parent to find alternate daycare.

5. Hodge interviewed multiple parents and children who were students at Hook’s Child

Daycare and told them that they had to remove their children from the facility. As a result

of Hodge’s statements a number of parents withdrew their children from Hook’s daycare

facility.

2 The Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) is a federal program that helps low-income families obtain child

care so that they may work, attend training or continue their education. The purpose of CCDF is to increase the

availability, affordability and quality of child care. https://www.in.gov/fssa/carefinder/3900.htm

On November 8, 2017, a hearing was held before the administrative law judge to determine

the issue regarding the revocation of Hook’s childcare home licenses. On or about January 4,

2018, after briefing and hearing of the facts and issues, the administrative law judge issued orders

in all three licensing actions stating that she did not sustain the revocation of Hook’s childcare

home licenses. In other words, FSSA was unsuccessful at the agency level and the administrative

law judge found in favor of Hook and against revocation of her licenses. Following the

administrative law judge's ruling, the Defendants continued to work individually and in concert to

fabricate alleged violations in an effort to revoke Hook's childcare licenses. (Filing No. 1 at 8-12.)

On March 15, 2019, Hook filed the instant Complaint seeking relief for Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ancillary state tort claims.

Hook does not challenge the administrative process whereby she saw success; rather, she argues

that the actions by the Defendants "individually and collectively," during and since the

administrative process "have stigmatized" her and deprived her of a liberty interest because it has

“become impossible for her to operate in her chosen profession… operate[ing] an in home child

daycare service.” (Filing No. 1 at 9 ¶ 50.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint

that has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When

deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all factual allegations

in the complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 633.

However, courts “are not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions or unsupported conclusions

of fact.” Hickey v. O’Bannon, 287 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2002).

The complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United

States Supreme Court explained that the complaint must allege facts that are “enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, mere “labels,” “conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the

elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Id.; see also Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581

F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2009) (“it is not enough to give a threadbare recitation of the elements of

a claim without factual support”). The allegations must “give the defendant fair notice of what the

. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Stated differently,

the complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

III. DISCUSSION

Hook makes the following claims in her Complaint: Causes of Action I through V:

Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by each individual Defendant; Causes of Action VI through X3:

Tortuous Interference with Business; Causes of Action XI through XV: Negligence by the

individual Defendants; and Cause of Action XVI: Declaratory Relief. (Filing No. 1, p. 9-16.) The

Defendants argue that Hook has failed to state a due process claim against them in Causes of

Action I-V and Cause of Action XVI of the Complaint, and that dismissal is appropriate on the

3 Plaintiff mistakenly mis-numbered her causes of action. Cause of action VI-X are listed as Tortious Interference

with Business, and Cause of Action VI is also listed as Negligence by Norvell. The Court has corrected the counts

so that they are addressed sequentially in this entry.

state law claims because Defendants are entitled to immunity. The Court will first address the

federal claims before turning to the state law claims.

A. Fourteenth Amendment Federal Claims (Causes of Action I-V and Cause of Action

XVI)

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause “forbids a state to deprive any

person of ‘life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d

493, 503 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). “Procedural due process claims

require a two-step analysis. The first step requires us to determine whether the plaintiff has been

deprived of a protected interest; the second requires a determination of what process is due.”

Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 673 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Strasburger v. Board of Educ.,

Hardin County Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 143 F.3d 351, 358 (7th Cir. 1998)). )). The general

test for determining what process is due and when is stated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319

(1976). Mathews identified three factors to be balanced: first, the private interest at stake; second,

the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and

third, the government’s countervailing interests. Id. Thus, the key question that the Court must

ask is “whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the

State; [and] whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally

sufficient.” Id. at 503. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).

Hook does not challenge the administrative process which she successfully defended

against the license revocation; rather, she argues that the actions by the individual Defendants

during and since the administrative process deprived her of a liberty interest. Specifically, Hook's

alleges "[a]ll of the Defendants are sate actors whose actions, individually and collectively have

stigmatized Mrs. Hook whereby it has become impossible for her to operate in her chosen

profession resulting in the loss of her liberty interest to operate an in home child daycare service."

(Filing No. 1 at 9 ¶50.)

The Defendants argue that Hook has asserted a legal conclusion of “impossibility,” but she

has not pled allegations that have shown the actions of the individual Defendants have created an

absolute bar to her continued operation of Hook's Child Daycare. They point out that Hook's

Complaint does not allege that she has closed down her daycare. Instead, Hook's assertions that

Norvell, Sampson and Schmelzle "continue to engage in conduct to interfere with her businesses"

show that Hook is still maintaining the operation of her businesses. (Filing No. 1 at 12-15, ¶¶ 73,

80, 87.) Because Hook's licenses were never revoked and her daycare centers remain open, the

Defendants argue Hook's allegations that "it has become impossible for her to operate her chosen

profession" do not give rise to a liberty interest in pursuing her chosen profession. See Lawson v.

Sheriff of Tippecanoe Co., Indiana, 725 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984) (employee’s liberty

interest may be infringed when stated reasons for termination “make him all but unemployable in

the future”); Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 670 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating, “the employee must

show that, because the charges have been made, it is unlikely that anyone will hire him for a

comparable job in the future.”).

In support of their position, Defendants cite to Hunt v. Indiana Fam. & Soc. Services

Admin. 2007 WL 2349626, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 1, 2007) (J. Tinder). In Hunt, the state received

information that Hunt had injured a child in her care and the state sought not only to revoke Hunt's

childcare licensure but caused criminal charges to be filed against Hunt. Id. at *3-4. An

administrative law judge rescinded the licensure revocation, and Hunt prevailed on the criminal

charges. Id. at *1. The court ultimately held,

A total loss of business would preclude employment in her chosen field. But her

loss was not total. The defendants' investigation of the abuse allegation and the

subsequent proceedings did not make it impossible for her business to remain open,

and thus any damage to her reputation by the state did not trigger a liberty or

property interest.

Id. at *10. Stated otherwise, “[m]erely showing some impairment to employment is not sufficient

to trigger the constitutional requirements of due process.” Id. (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.

226, 234 (1991).

Defendants also argue the actions alleged to have been committed by the individual

Defendants in the Complaint fail to state a cognizable liberty interest for purposes of the Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process. Defendants assert that here, while the actions of the individuals may

have impaired Hook's ability to operate her day care businesses, the Complaint list no actions that

have resulted in a constitutional deprivation. It is well-established that a plaintiff can only bring

a § 1983 against those individuals personally responsible for the Constitutional deprivation.

Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, “[c]ounties and other

governmental entities may not be held liable for the unconstitutional acts under a respondeat

superior theory.” Gee v. Sharp, WL 899655, at *10 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007)). Accordingly,

“a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant through the official’s own

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft at 676. For these reasons, Defendants

argue Causes of Action I-V and Cause of Action XI must be dismissed.

In Response, Hook points out that her Complaint clearly articulates as to each individual

Defendant their personal actions which resulted in their being named in this action. She argues

that while the Hunt court found that Hunt’s loss was not total, it did not say that was the only

criteria. Hook distinguishes the facts in her Complaint from those in Hunt, noting that the state

defendants in Hunt ended their actionable harm with the favorable hearing outcome. (Filing No.

16 at 9.) In her Complaint, Hook alleges that the Defendants continue to fabricate violations and

continue their campaign to put her out of business. (Filing No. 1 at 2-12.) Hook contends this is

a due process violation. She argues she has been forced to close one of her facilities, another has

a single student on a periodic basis and the third is not full. Thus, Hook contends her losses are

not the result of merely being stigmatized by Defendants' comments about her and her husband,

but rather, two blatant and direct acts of the Defendants.

Hook has a protected property interest in her daycare licenses. A protected property interest

arises when there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefit. DeSalle v. Wright, 969 F.2d

273, 277 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, Hook's state licenses entitled her to operate her daycare businesses.

See, e.g., Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1395 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that private adoption

agency had a property interest in the renewal of its license). However, in her Complaint, Hook

proceeds only under the theory that she was deprived of a liberty interest. Individuals also have a

liberty interest in being able to pursue an occupation. See Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 669

(7th Cir. 2001). The state’s revocation of her licenses would have foreclosed Hook's chosen field.

However, Hook's licenses were not revoked and she has not stated cognizable claim that

she was deprived of the process that she was due. The Complaint does not allege that her businesses

were closed either before or after her success at the administrative hearing. Instead, the Complaint

states that Hook was "stigmatized" by the Defendants' statements that her husband was a child

molester. Defendants' statements and warnings that parents should find another childcare facility

is insufficient to establish a deprivation of liberty. Beishel v. Stone Bank School Dist., 362 F.3d

430, 439 (7th Cir. 2004) (defamatory statements by a government official, without more, does not

constitute a deprivation of liberty).

In her response, Hook argues that she has been forced to close one of her facilities, another

has a single student on a periodic basis, and the third is not full. She contends these losses are not

the result of being stigmatized by Defendants' comments about her and her husband, but rather,

two blatant and direct acts by the Defendants. (Filing No. 16 at 9-10.) She states that the

Defendants refuse to refer Hook's Child Daycare as an eligible daycare facility, and they have told

and continue to tell parents that they must find alternative childcare or face retribution as to their

own parental rights. Id. She further argues she was treated differently than other child care owners

in violation of equal protections under the law. Id. at 11. However, none of the allegations

regarding closure of her facilities is contained in the Complaint, and there is no equal protection

claim in the Complaint.

As pled, the Complaint does not state a claim which shows the individual Defendants

infringed on any constitutionally protected property or liberty interests of Hook. “A person has no

cognizable liberty interest in his reputation; consequently, allegations which merely damage one’s

reputation do not implicate a liberty interest.” Id. “[I]t is only the ‘alteration of a legal status,’

such as governmental deprivation of a right previously held, ‘which, combined with the injury

resulting from the defamation, justif[ies] the invocation of procedural safeguards.” Dupuy v.

Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 503 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976)).

As pointed out by the Defendants in their Reply, by her own admission Hook admits to maintaining

operation of her chosen profession, (Filing No. 1 at 9, ¶¶ 73, 80, 87), and in her Response she

admits that only after the filing of her Complaint that she “close[d] one of her locations” (Filing

No. 16 at 1, n.1), and she continues to operate two facilities. Id. at 5. A due process claim exists

only if the fabricated evidence is used to cause an infringement of the plaintiff's liberty interest.

Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F. 3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We have consistently held that a

police officer who manufactures false evidence against a criminal defendant violated due process

if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant of her liberty in some way.”) (emphasis

added).

Although a property interest was at stake in the revocation proceedings, Hook received all

the procedural protections required under the Constitution during her administrative hearing.

Because her Complaint fails to state a claim for loss of liberty interest, Hook's § 1983 claims

arising from a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, are dismissed.

In a footnote, the Defendants explain Hook's Fifth Amendment due process claim in Cause

of Action XVI of the Complaint (Filing No. 1 at 16), fails because the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment applies to actions of the United States while the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States. See O'Brien v. City of Frankfort, 2018 WL 4620265,

at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2018) (“) (citing Dusenbery v. U.S. 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002)). Hook

does not dispute the Defendants persuasive argument. Accordingly, because Hook’s Complaint

asserts claims against actions performed by state employees and not federal employees, she does

not have a Fifth Amendment claim and her Fifth Amendment claim is dismissed.

B. State Law Tort Claims (Causes of Action VI-XV)

Indiana Code § 34-13-3-5(b) states, “a lawsuit alleging that an employee acted within the

scope of the employee’s employment bars an action by the claimant against the employee

personally.” The Indiana Supreme Court defines ‘scope of employment’ as “conduct of the same

general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized”. Celebration Fireworks,

Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 453 (Ind.2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) Agency § 229

(1958)). “Even tortious acts may fall within the scope of employment.” Id.

With respect to the state law tort claims of Tortious Interference with Business (Causes of

Action VI-X) and Negligence (Causes of Action XI-XV), the Defendants argue that they are

entitled to immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. Defendants point out that these claims

are asserted against five employees of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration and

Department of Child Services. (Filing No. 1 at 3, ¶¶ 7-11.) While Hook's subsequent allegations

may imply illegal or tortious behavior (on the part of all defendants), the Defendants are entitled

to immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act as they were alleged to have been acting in their

respective roles for their respective state agencies “so situated at the time of the acts.” See Bowens

v. City of Indianapolis, 1:13-CV-00072-DML-SE, 2014 WL 4680662, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 19,

2014) (dismissal of claims of assault, battery, etc. against police officer under ITCA).

Defendants argue that although Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c), provides an exception to the

rules, Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c), Hook's bare assertions of “tortious interference” and negligence

are nothing more than a legal conclusions/conclusory statements insufficient to meet the standard

under subsection (c) that requires “a reasonable factual basis supporting the allegations.” Ind.

Code § 34-13-3-5(c). As pled in the Complaint, Defendants assert they are entitled to immunity

afforded to state employees by the Indiana Tort Claims Act.

In her response, Hook does not directly address the Defendants' immunity argument.

Instead, she explains that she "reasonably believes that discovery will show that the Defendants’

wrongful conduct was not authorized or incidental to conduct that was authorized". (Filing No.

16 at 11.) Defendants argue the “wholesale failure to respond to an opposing argument results in

waiver.” Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads, Inc. v. Foxx, 14 F.Supp.3d. 1217, 1230 (S.D. Ind.

2014).

Having dismissed the federal claims, the Court need not address whether Hook has waived

the immunity argument, because the Court elects to proceed in the alternative and will not exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, “a district court ‘may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ over state-law claims if the court ‘has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” John C. & Maureen G. Osborne Revocable Fam.

Tr. v. Town of Long Beach, Indiana, 2018 WL 1471903, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2018) (citing

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). The Seventh Circuit has stated consistently that “the usual practice is to

dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been

dismissed prior to trial.” Groce v. Eli Lilly, 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999); see Al’s Serv. Ctr.

v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).

Exceptions to the general rule exist: “(1) when the statute of limitations has run on the

pendent claim, precluding the filing of a separate suit in state court; (2) substantial judicial

resources have already been committed, so that sending the case to another court will cause a

substantial duplication of effort; or (3) when it is absolutely clear how the pendent claims can be

decided.” Davis v. Cook Cnty., 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Wright v. Associated

Ins. Companies Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The usual practice shall be followed. Substantial judicial resources have not been expended

on these claims and it is not clear how the pendent claims will be decided. The pendent state law

claims should be decided in state court because the outcome will be based on the interpretation of

Indiana law. These claims shall be dismissed without prejudice so that they can be resolved in

state court.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Hook’s Complaint (Filing

No. 14) is GRANTED. The federal claims in Causes of Action I-V and Cause of Action XVI are

dismissed with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.* Hook's state law claims in Causes of

Action VI-XV are dismissed without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 5/26/2020 Cin Ladin peph

TANYA WALTON PRATT, JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

DISTRIBUTION:

J. Clayton Culotta

CULOTTA & CULOTTA LLP

clay @culottalaw.com

Bryan Findley

INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE

bryan.findley @ atg.in.gov

* The Court notes that Hook has not requested, alternatively, leave to file an amended complaint. If Hook's daycare

businesses have continued to operate, it is unlikely she would be able to allege facts giving rise to a valid due process

claim. It appears an amended complaint would be futile, therefore this dismissal is with prejudice.

14