Opinion

SHIRLEY v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE

Court
District Court, S.D. Indiana
Filed
May 4, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.6%

noting that courts should not “easily declare[]” employees acting outside the scope of employment because then “claimants would more often find themselves limited to recovery against the private assets of employees rather than those of governments.”

How later courts described this case

  • noting that courts should not “easily declare[]” employees acting outside the scope of employment because then “claimants would more often find themselves limited to recovery against the private assets of employees rather than those of governments.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

KORTEZ SHIRLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:19-cv-01032-JPH-TAB

)

MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, )

JOHN LAYTON Former Marion County Sheriff, )

DEENIK Corporal, )

)

Defendants. )

ENTRY ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS

This action is before the Court on the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Dkt. 31.

I. Standard of Review

“To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 900 F.3d 388, 397 (7th Cir.

2018) (internal quotation omitted). “When assessing the facial plausibility of a claim, we draw all

reasonable inferences and facts in favor of the non-movant, but need not accept as true any legal

assertions.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

II. Allegations

In plaintiff Kortez Shirley’s third amended complaint, he names three defendants: 1)

Marion County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO); 2) former Marion County Sheriff John Layton; and 3)

Corporal (Cpl.) Deenik. Dkt. 29.

Mr. Shirley alleges that beginning in April 2017, he was detained at Marion County Jail

(the Jail). Dkt. 29 at 2-3. On May 4, 2017, Mr. Shirley went to the main entrance to cell block 4V

and 4W to receive his prescribed daily medication. Id. at 3. After taking the medication, he turned

to Cpl. Deenik and opened his mouth to show that he had swallowed it. Id. Mr. Shirley then began

walking back to his cell, but Cpl. Deenik asked him to turn around and open his mouth. Id. Mr.

Shirley alleges that Cpl. Deenik approached him, grabbed his jaw/face, and pushed his head into

the wall causing him pain and discomfort. Id. Then, Cpl. Deenik allegedly said, “if you want to act

like a monkey, I’m going to treat you like a monkey.” Id. He further alleges that the other

defendants were aware that Cpl. Deenik has a propensity towards violence, aggression, excessive

force, and mistreatment of minorities and inmates. Id at 4.

Mr. Shirley further alleges that after he filed his grievances, Jail employees began

repeatedly retaliating against him, such as by deliberately knocking his personal items, including

his toothbrush and other hygienic products, on the floor of his cell, stomping on his food, throwing

his mattress on the floor, and waking him in the middle of the night and strip searching him. Id. at

3. Jail employees allegedly refer to their batons as “n***** beaters.” Id. at 4. Jail supervisors are

aware of the terminology “n***** beaters” in connection to the beating of African American

inmates, and fail to correct it. Id. at 5. The terminology of “n***** beaters” is used in front of

inmates to embarrass, harass, intimidate, and discriminate against African American inmates.

Id. If a white inmate behaves erratically they are asked to be taken into “suicide watch”, but if

an inmate who is a minority behaves the same way, Jail guards immediately call for additional

guards to help put the inmate into submission, often by the use of physical force. Id. Defendants

were allegedly aware of such inappropriate conduct and did nothing to rectify it, further

perpetuating the unconstitutional actions, climate, and policy, and failing to correct, train and

discipline on such matters as necessary to correct the situation. Id.

Mr. Shirley brings claims of: 1) battery against MCSO and Sheriff Layton; 2) due process,

excessive force, and policies of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment against

MCSO and Sheriff Layton in their official capacities and against Cpl. Deenik in his individual

capacity; 3) Monell policy claims of excessive force, racial discrimination, and retaliation against

MCSO and Sheriff Layton in their official capacities and against Cpl. Deenik in his individual and

official capacities. Dkt. 29.

III. Discussion

Battery Claim vs Sheriff Layton

The defendants first argue that the battery claim against Sheriff Layton fails to state a viable

claim under Indiana law. Mr. Shirley contends that throughout this litigation the parties have

disputed who was the proper governmental entity defendant, but he does not explain how Sheriff

Layton could be liable for battery. The third amended complaint does not allege any basis under

the Indiana Tort Claim Act (ITCA) for finding liability against Sheriff Layton. See Ind. Code Ann.

§ 34-13-3-5(c) (“A lawsuit filed against an employee personally must allege that an act or omission

of the employee that causes a loss is: (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee's

employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the employee

personally.”).

Cpl. Deenik is the individual who allegedly grabbed Mr. Shirley and pushed his head

against a wall. Any claim against Cpl. Deenik for battery would be barred by the ITCA. “A lawsuit

alleging that an employee acted within the scope of the employee's employment bars an action by

the claimant against the employee personally.” Ind. Code Ann. § 34-13-3-5(b). See Celebration

Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ind. 2000) (noting that courts should not “easily

declare[]” employees acting outside the scope of employment because then “claimants would more

often find themselves limited to recovery against the private assets of employees rather than those

of governments.”). The only proper defendant for a battery claim is Cpl. Deenik’s employer, the

MCSO. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the battery claim against Sheriff

Layton.

Remaining Claims vs Sheriff Layton

Next, the defendants correctly argue that the official capacity claims against Sheriff Layton

should be dismissed because they are duplicative of Monell claims against the MCSO. “Because a

suit against a government office and the officeholder are identical, the two defendants—the Sheriff

and his office—are redundant on this claim.” Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 843–44 (7th Cir.

2013) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978)). The third amended

complaint asserts no individual capacity claims against Sheriff Layton. Accordingly, the motion

for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to all official capacity claims against former Sheriff

Layton because they are duplicative.

Monell Claim vs Cpl. Deenik

Mr. Shirley seeks to bring a Monell claim against Cpl. Deenik in his individual and official

capacities. A Monell claim cannot be brought against an individual in his individual capacity. See

Johnson v. Dykstra, No. 3-17-CV-00071-PPS-MGG, 2019 WL 2270356, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 24,

2019) (“Johnson has also brought ‘Monell’ claims against Neal and Payne in their individual

capacity. But this is an oxymoron. A party simply may not assert a Monell claim against prison

officers in their individual capacities. Recall that under section 1983, only municipalities may be

held liable for constitutional violations caused by their official policy including unwritten

customs.”). In addition, any plausible claim against Cpl. Deenik in his official capacity would be

redundant of a Monell claim brought against the MCSO. The motion for judgment on the pleadings

is therefore granted as to any Monell or policy claim brought against Cpl. Deenik in his individual

and official capacities.

Qualified Immunity

Next, Cpl. Deenik argues that all individual capacity claims against him should be

dismissed because he is entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity may be appropriate

at the pleading stage where the plaintiff asserts the violation of a broad constitutional right that

had not been articulated at the time the violation is alleged to have occurred.” Hardeman v. Curran,

933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation omitted). Cpl. Deenik, however, is not

asserting (and cannot plausibly assert) that the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass

excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees.

“[T]he plaintiff is not required initially to plead factual allegations that anticipate and

overcome a defense of qualified immunity.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The Court finds that

the dismissal of any claims on the basis of qualified immunity is not warranted without evidentiary

support. “Because a qualified immunity defense so closely depends on the facts of the case, a

complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds.” Id.

(internal quotation omitted). The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to any claims

brought against Cpl. Deenik based on qualified immunity.

Excessive Force vs Cpl. Deenik

Finally, the defendants argue that the force used was not excessive and therefore, the due

process claim against Cpl. Deenik must be dismissed. This claim warrants little discussion because

sufficient facts are alleged to state a claim of excessive force. The Court cannot find without

evidence that the force used to grab Mr. Shirley by the jaw and push his head into the wall causing

great pain was not excessive. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to the

excessive force claim brought against Cpl. Deenik.

IV. Conclusion

In sum, the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, dkt. [31], is granted in part

and denied in part. The following claims are dismissed: 1) all claims against Sheriff Layton,

and 2) any policy claim brought against Cpl. Deenik in his individual and official capacities.

The claims remaining in this action ar:e 1) battery against the MCSO; 2) Fourteenth

Amendment due process claims (encompassing excessive force and racial discrimination (equal

protection)) against Cpl. Deenik in his individual capacity; and 3) Monell policy claims under the

Fourteenth Amendment against the MCSO in its official capacity.

The clerk is requested to terminate all defendants on the docket other than the Marion

County Sheriffs Office and Corporal Deenik.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 5/4/2020

Slam ruck lbanlove

Distribution: James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Andrea Lynn Ciobanu Southern District of Indiana

CIOBANU LAW, PC

aciobanu @ciobanulaw.com

Tara Lynn Gerber

City of Indianapolis

tara.gerber @indy.gov

Adam Scott Willfond

OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL

adam.willfond @indy.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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