noting that courts should not “easily declare[]” employees acting outside the scope of employment because then “claimants would more often find themselves limited to recovery against the private assets of employees rather than those of governments.”
How later courts described this case
- noting that courts should not “easily declare[]” employees acting outside the scope of employment because then “claimants would more often find themselves limited to recovery against the private assets of employees rather than those of governments.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
KORTEZ SHIRLEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:19-cv-01032-JPH-TAB
)
MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, )
JOHN LAYTON Former Marion County Sheriff, )
DEENIK Corporal, )
)
Defendants. )
ENTRY ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS
This action is before the Court on the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Dkt. 31.
I. Standard of Review
“To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 900 F.3d 388, 397 (7th Cir.
2018) (internal quotation omitted). “When assessing the facial plausibility of a claim, we draw all
reasonable inferences and facts in favor of the non-movant, but need not accept as true any legal
assertions.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
II. Allegations
In plaintiff Kortez Shirley’s third amended complaint, he names three defendants: 1)
Marion County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO); 2) former Marion County Sheriff John Layton; and 3)
Corporal (Cpl.) Deenik. Dkt. 29.
Mr. Shirley alleges that beginning in April 2017, he was detained at Marion County Jail
(the Jail). Dkt. 29 at 2-3. On May 4, 2017, Mr. Shirley went to the main entrance to cell block 4V
and 4W to receive his prescribed daily medication. Id. at 3. After taking the medication, he turned
to Cpl. Deenik and opened his mouth to show that he had swallowed it. Id. Mr. Shirley then began
walking back to his cell, but Cpl. Deenik asked him to turn around and open his mouth. Id. Mr.
Shirley alleges that Cpl. Deenik approached him, grabbed his jaw/face, and pushed his head into
the wall causing him pain and discomfort. Id. Then, Cpl. Deenik allegedly said, “if you want to act
like a monkey, I’m going to treat you like a monkey.” Id. He further alleges that the other
defendants were aware that Cpl. Deenik has a propensity towards violence, aggression, excessive
force, and mistreatment of minorities and inmates. Id at 4.
Mr. Shirley further alleges that after he filed his grievances, Jail employees began
repeatedly retaliating against him, such as by deliberately knocking his personal items, including
his toothbrush and other hygienic products, on the floor of his cell, stomping on his food, throwing
his mattress on the floor, and waking him in the middle of the night and strip searching him. Id. at
3. Jail employees allegedly refer to their batons as “n***** beaters.” Id. at 4. Jail supervisors are
aware of the terminology “n***** beaters” in connection to the beating of African American
inmates, and fail to correct it. Id. at 5. The terminology of “n***** beaters” is used in front of
inmates to embarrass, harass, intimidate, and discriminate against African American inmates.
Id. If a white inmate behaves erratically they are asked to be taken into “suicide watch”, but if
an inmate who is a minority behaves the same way, Jail guards immediately call for additional
guards to help put the inmate into submission, often by the use of physical force. Id. Defendants
were allegedly aware of such inappropriate conduct and did nothing to rectify it, further
perpetuating the unconstitutional actions, climate, and policy, and failing to correct, train and
discipline on such matters as necessary to correct the situation. Id.
Mr. Shirley brings claims of: 1) battery against MCSO and Sheriff Layton; 2) due process,
excessive force, and policies of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment against
MCSO and Sheriff Layton in their official capacities and against Cpl. Deenik in his individual
capacity; 3) Monell policy claims of excessive force, racial discrimination, and retaliation against
MCSO and Sheriff Layton in their official capacities and against Cpl. Deenik in his individual and
official capacities. Dkt. 29.
III. Discussion
Battery Claim vs Sheriff Layton
The defendants first argue that the battery claim against Sheriff Layton fails to state a viable
claim under Indiana law. Mr. Shirley contends that throughout this litigation the parties have
disputed who was the proper governmental entity defendant, but he does not explain how Sheriff
Layton could be liable for battery. The third amended complaint does not allege any basis under
the Indiana Tort Claim Act (ITCA) for finding liability against Sheriff Layton. See Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-13-3-5(c) (“A lawsuit filed against an employee personally must allege that an act or omission
of the employee that causes a loss is: (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee's
employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the employee
personally.”).
Cpl. Deenik is the individual who allegedly grabbed Mr. Shirley and pushed his head
against a wall. Any claim against Cpl. Deenik for battery would be barred by the ITCA. “A lawsuit
alleging that an employee acted within the scope of the employee's employment bars an action by
the claimant against the employee personally.” Ind. Code Ann. § 34-13-3-5(b). See Celebration
Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ind. 2000) (noting that courts should not “easily
declare[]” employees acting outside the scope of employment because then “claimants would more
often find themselves limited to recovery against the private assets of employees rather than those
of governments.”). The only proper defendant for a battery claim is Cpl. Deenik’s employer, the
MCSO. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the battery claim against Sheriff
Layton.
Remaining Claims vs Sheriff Layton
Next, the defendants correctly argue that the official capacity claims against Sheriff Layton
should be dismissed because they are duplicative of Monell claims against the MCSO. “Because a
suit against a government office and the officeholder are identical, the two defendants—the Sheriff
and his office—are redundant on this claim.” Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 843–44 (7th Cir.
2013) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978)). The third amended
complaint asserts no individual capacity claims against Sheriff Layton. Accordingly, the motion
for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to all official capacity claims against former Sheriff
Layton because they are duplicative.
Monell Claim vs Cpl. Deenik
Mr. Shirley seeks to bring a Monell claim against Cpl. Deenik in his individual and official
capacities. A Monell claim cannot be brought against an individual in his individual capacity. See
Johnson v. Dykstra, No. 3-17-CV-00071-PPS-MGG, 2019 WL 2270356, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 24,
2019) (“Johnson has also brought ‘Monell’ claims against Neal and Payne in their individual
capacity. But this is an oxymoron. A party simply may not assert a Monell claim against prison
officers in their individual capacities. Recall that under section 1983, only municipalities may be
held liable for constitutional violations caused by their official policy including unwritten
customs.”). In addition, any plausible claim against Cpl. Deenik in his official capacity would be
redundant of a Monell claim brought against the MCSO. The motion for judgment on the pleadings
is therefore granted as to any Monell or policy claim brought against Cpl. Deenik in his individual
and official capacities.
Qualified Immunity
Next, Cpl. Deenik argues that all individual capacity claims against him should be
dismissed because he is entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity may be appropriate
at the pleading stage where the plaintiff asserts the violation of a broad constitutional right that
had not been articulated at the time the violation is alleged to have occurred.” Hardeman v. Curran,
933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation omitted). Cpl. Deenik, however, is not
asserting (and cannot plausibly assert) that the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass
excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees.
“[T]he plaintiff is not required initially to plead factual allegations that anticipate and
overcome a defense of qualified immunity.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The Court finds that
the dismissal of any claims on the basis of qualified immunity is not warranted without evidentiary
support. “Because a qualified immunity defense so closely depends on the facts of the case, a
complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds.” Id.
(internal quotation omitted). The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to any claims
brought against Cpl. Deenik based on qualified immunity.
Excessive Force vs Cpl. Deenik
Finally, the defendants argue that the force used was not excessive and therefore, the due
process claim against Cpl. Deenik must be dismissed. This claim warrants little discussion because
sufficient facts are alleged to state a claim of excessive force. The Court cannot find without
evidence that the force used to grab Mr. Shirley by the jaw and push his head into the wall causing
great pain was not excessive. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to the
excessive force claim brought against Cpl. Deenik.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, dkt. [31], is granted in part
and denied in part. The following claims are dismissed: 1) all claims against Sheriff Layton,
and 2) any policy claim brought against Cpl. Deenik in his individual and official capacities.
The claims remaining in this action ar:e 1) battery against the MCSO; 2) Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims (encompassing excessive force and racial discrimination (equal
protection)) against Cpl. Deenik in his individual capacity; and 3) Monell policy claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment against the MCSO in its official capacity.
The clerk is requested to terminate all defendants on the docket other than the Marion
County Sheriffs Office and Corporal Deenik.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 5/4/2020
Slam ruck lbanlove
Distribution: James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Andrea Lynn Ciobanu Southern District of Indiana
CIOBANU LAW, PC
aciobanu @ciobanulaw.com
Tara Lynn Gerber
City of Indianapolis
tara.gerber @indy.gov
Adam Scott Willfond
OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL
adam.willfond @indy.gov