Opinion

BALLHEIMER v. BATTS

Court
District Court, S.D. Indiana
Filed
Mar 20, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.6%

“This case falls into the ‘obvious’ category. A reasonable law enforcement officer should have known that ordering Plaintiff to submit to a medical catheterization, against his will and without the issuance of a search warrant . . . was an unreasonable search.”

How later courts described this case

  • “This case falls into the ‘obvious’ category. A reasonable law enforcement officer should have known that ordering Plaintiff to submit to a medical catheterization, against his will and without the issuance of a search warrant . . . was an unreasonable search.”
  • officers who committed Fourth Amendment violation by unlawfully catheterizing prisoner were entitled to qualified immunity
  • holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was operating her vehicle while intoxicated merely because she was found passed in the parked, running vehicle
  • “An arrest without probable cause is a violation of a constitutional right, whereas an arrest without arguable probable cause is a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

JEFFREY C. BALLHEIMER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:17-cv-01393-SEB-DLP

)

RYAN BATTS #525, )

MATTHEW BURKS #562, )

BLAYNE ROOT #524, )

TOWN OF WHITESTOWN, INDIANA )

acting through its Metropolitan Police Dept. )

and its Chief of Police, )

DENNIS R. ANDERSON Chief of Police, in )

his official capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Jeffrey Ballheimer (“Ballheimer”) has sued Defendants the Town of

Whitestown, Indiana (“the Town”); Ryan Batts, Matthew Burks, and Blayne Root, three

officers of the Town’s police department (together, “the Officers”); and Dennis

Anderson, chief of the Town’s police department, for violations of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state-law

torts and state constitutional violations.

The matter is now before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment. For the reasons detailed below, we deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and deny in part and grant in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.

Background

I. Facts

The following facts are not genuinely disputed unless so noted. On the evening of

July 7, 2016, the Officers were dispatched to respond to a report of an unconscious

person in the parking lot of a local gas station and truck stop near the interstate which

passes by outside the Town. At the gas station, the Officers found Ballheimer asleep in

the driver’s seat of his car. The car was properly parked in a designated parking spot and

was not obstructing traffic. The engine was running but not in gear. Ballheimer had an

open laptop computer on his lap; an extinguished cigarette butt and cold cigarette ashes

were visible; the driver’s side window was partly open.

After a few unsuccessful attempts to rouse Ballheimer, Officer King eventually

awakened him, who responded at first with angry, vulgar language before composing

himself. Medics called by the Officers arrived soon thereafter at the scene. Ballheimer’s

eyes were observed to be bloodshot and glassy, his speech was slurred, and he appeared

“confused and lethargic,” Compl. ¶ 8, though just how confused and lethargic is disputed.

Ballheimer said that he had been on his way home and pulled over at the gas station

because he felt very tired.

Root checked Ballheimer’s pulse and asked him whether he had any medical

problems, which Ballheimer denied having. The medics nonetheless examined

Ballheimer in their ambulances. Because Ballheimer did not wish to be examined or

treated by the medics, he signed a medical release form as soon as the medics permitted

him to do so. Ballheimer then exited the ambulance. The Officers observed Ballheimer

staggering as he walked both from his car to the ambulance and back again, so unsteady

was he on his feet. These observations prompted them to immediately pull him aside and

to conduct field sobriety testing.

Officer Burks reportedly had never previously performed an impaired driver

investigation or a field sobriety test. Officer Burks nonetheless was able to determine that

Ballheimer had failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn test, and the

one-legged-stand test. Ballheimer was also breathalyzed but that test detected no alcohol

on his breath. The Officers have testified that they smelled neither alcohol nor marijuana

on or around Ballheimer. Though Officer Batts was certified to perform “drug

recognition expert” tests, he did not perform such a test on Ballheimer.

The Officers advised Ballheimer of Indiana’s implied-consent law. Though the

precise words included in that advisement are not in the record, the following example

based on the same statute was proffered as typical:

I have probable cause to believe that you have operated a vehicle while

intoxicated. I must now offer you the opportunity to submit to a chemical test and

inform you that your refusal to submit to a chemical test will result in a suspension

of your driving privileges for one year. Will you now take a chemical test?

Abney v. State, 811 N.E.2d 415, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). See Ind. Code §§ 9-30-6-1

through 2. Eventually Officers Batts and Burks transported Ballheimer in their police car

to a nearby hospital for assistance in performing the chemical testing.

At the hospital, Ballheimer refused to consent to blood and urine screens until he

was reminded that refusal would result in his driver’s license being suspended.

Ballheimer then signed a consent form and a hospital technician drew his blood. A urine

sample was requested, and it is undisputed that he refused to provide a sample. Whether

that failure to consent was the result of Ballheimer’s refusal to submit, as the Officers

say, or of his inability to produce a specimen, as he says. Ballheimer initially consented

to be catheterized but revoked that consent when the procedure was explained to him.

There followed a substantial period of time during which Ballheimer “attempted”

to provide a urine sample. As noted, the parties dispute whether those attempts were each

a sham or the result of a genuine physical inability to produce a sample. Ballheimer

eventually collapsed in the hospital bathroom and became unresponsive to Batts’s

demands for a “yes or no” answer to the question of whether he would consent to be

catheterized. Batts and Burks lifted Ballheimer into a chair. When he failed to stand up

from his seated position in the chair—whether because he was unable to do so or refused

to do so—he was informed that he was under arrest, was handcuffed, and placed in a

wheelchair. Batts wheeled Ballheimer back outside to the police car in which they had

arrived. In Defendants’ words, “Upon arriving at [Burks’s] police car, [Ballheimer] did

not get into the car as instructed, so [Batts] struck [Ballheimer] in his right thigh with his

right knee and [Ballheimer] fell into the seat . . . .” Defs.’ Br. Supp. 8.

According to Ballheimer,

I remember the officer coming around and sitting in the car and looking at me and

saying, now we’re going to charge you with resisting arrest, so you can’t bond out

until Monday. And then he shot me the most, like, messed up smile I’ve ever seen

in my life. And, like, at that point, I was legitimately, like, terrified. So I—that’s

when I tried to get out of the situation by telling them—it somehow got translated

into my needing medical help.

Ballheimer Dep. (Dkt. 30 Ex. 4) 110:15–24.

In the meantime, Officer Burks had begun drafting a search warrant application to

secure a court order compelling production of Ballheimer’s urine. Among other things,

Officer Burks’s affidavit in support of the application stated that Ballheimer “had refused

[to take a chemical test] by not responding.” Dkt. 33 Ex. 2, at 2. Ballheimer contends that

this was a lie, since Officer Burks himself had observed Ballheimer consent to a blood

draw and repeatedly attempt to provide a urine sample. The affidavit further stated that

Burks was requesting “a search warrant to be issued to obtain and remove blood or other

body fluid sample(s)” from Ballheimer, omitting the fact that the Officers had already

obtained a blood sample from him. Id. Ballheimer maintains that this omission was

intentional and misleading. Officer Batts read and approved Officer Burks’s false and

misleading affidavit before it was filed. The warrant was issued by the court within an

hour following its submission and authorized the officers “to obtain and remove blood or

other body fluid sample(s)” from Ballheimer and “to use reasonable force to obtain such

sample(s).” Dkt. 33 Ex. 1, at 1.

Batts drove Ballheimer back to the hospital where Ballheimer was administered

fluids intravenously for dehydration, and perhaps received a medication as well, causing

him to feel “substantially better.” Ballheimer Dep. (Dkt. 30 Ex. 5) 123:12. Ballheimer

was then allowed one “last chance” to urinate voluntarily, though he did not. Id. at 127:4.

After I couldn’t pee, they gave me a few minutes, and then they pretty much said,

okay, well, you need to get cathetered now because you have to. And so instead of

just arguing with them, I just complied, and I got up on the table, so they wouldn’t

force me because they’ve proven that they were going to do whatever they want.

They’re going to get it however they want to. And that’s when the nurse told me to

pull down my pants, and then she grabbed my penis and started pushing it in, and

it was the worst pain I have ever felt in my life. And she keeps yelling at me, you

can’t move. It’s kind of hard not to move when I’m feeling like I’m going to vomit

the whole time.

Id. at 128:4–17.

Following the successful extraction of the urine, Ballheimer was transported to the

county jail, where he wound up remaining for two weeks. The chemical tests revealed the

presence of amphetamines, methamphetamine, benzodiazepines, and MDMA in

Ballheimer’s system. Ballheimer later admitted to having taken methamphetamine and

Xanax on July 6, 2016, the day before his arrest, but he denied taking any drugs on July

7, 2016. Following his two weeks of detention, Ballheimer was released on bond to a

rehabilitation facility, where he remained for the ensuing five months.

Ballheimer’s driver’s license was suspended for one year by the Indiana Bureau of

Motor Vehicles, but that suspension appears to have been vacated sometime thereafter.

On September 27, 2017, on a petition for judicial review, the state court judge ( the same

judge who had issued the warrant on July 7, 2016) ruled that “probable cause did not

exist to believe [Ballheimer] had operated his vehicle in an impaired condition [on July 7,

2016,] and there was no authority to offer [Ballheimer] implied consent.” Dkt. 33 Ex. 4,

at 5. The State of Indiana public records reveal that the pending criminal charges for

operating a vehicle while intoxicated, operating a vehicle with a controlled substance or

its metabolite in the body, public intoxication, and resisting law enforcement were

dismissed shortly after the judge entered his ruling. See also Dkt. 33 Ex. 6, at 1 (order of

dismissal). No conviction resulted from this arrest and no other criminal charges were

preferred in connection with the July 7, 2016, incident.

II. Procedural Background

Ballheimer filed this lawsuit against the officers and the Town on May 2, 2017.

On May 2, 2018, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants

sought judgment on Ballheimer’s claims in their entirety; Ballheimer’s motion sought

judgment only with regard to liability on Defendants’ claims. We previously granted in

part and denied in part Defendants’ motion, and denied Ballheimer’s, issuing the

following findings:

• Both motions were denied without prejudice to refiling for failure to present a

decidable issue as to the following: the lawfulness of Defendants’ seizure or

seizures and the Town’s alleged Monell liability. We invited renewed motions on

these issues “provided they are supported with cogent, coherent briefs addressing

the points raised” in our ruling.

• Both motions were denied with prejudice to refiling because of the presence of a

genuine dispute of material fact as to the issue of whether Defendants deliberately

or recklessly provided the court issuing the warrant with false, material

information.1

1 Although we denied with prejudice both parties’ motions on this issue, the Officers nonetheless

ask us to review this decision in light of recent Seventh Circuit precedent clarifying that “the

materiality of omitted facts, unlike the materiality of false statements, is properly part of the

qualified-immunity analysis.” Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 654 (7th Cir. 2019). But

Ballheimer contends that the Officers in applying for the warrant, did not simply omit the fact

that Ballheimer had previously submitted a blood sample, they falsely informed the court that

Ballheimer had refused to submit to chemical tests. This disputed issue, therefore, is not merely

an omission, it is also a misrepresentation.

• Defendants’ motion was granted with respect to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

false arrest claim, Fourteenth Amendment claim, and all state-late claims.

The parties accepted our invitation to refile their motions. On July 17, 2019,

Defendants filed their supplemental motion for summary judgment; Plaintiff filed his

cross-motion on September 5, 2019. Defendants seek summary judgment on all

remaining claims against them; Plaintiff seeks summary judgment only on liability.

To recap: Plaintiff has three remaining Fourth Amendment claims: (1) his

allegedly unlawful detention in the gas station parking lot; (2) the false justification for

the search of his bodily fluids, and (3) the excessive manner in which that search was

conducted, viz. by forced catherization. Also pending is Plaintiff’s Monell claim against

the Town. For the first time, Plaintiff also challenges the probable cause for his being

placed in custody after he failed the field sobriety tests.

Analysis

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes of material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A court must grant a motion for

summary judgment if it appears that no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the

nonmovant on the basis of the designated admissible evidence. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). We neither weigh the evidence nor evaluate

the credibility of witnesses, id. at 255, but view the facts and the reasonable inferences

flowing from them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McConnell v. McKillip,

573 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (S.D. Ind. 2008).

Courts often confront cross motions for summary judgment because Rules 56(a)

and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow both plaintiffs and defendants to

move for such relief. In such situations, courts must consider each party’s motion

individually to determine if that party has satisfied the summary judgment standard. Kohl

v. Ass’n. of Trial Lawyers of Am., 183 F.R.D. 475 (D. Md. 1998). Here, the Court has

considered the parties’ respective memoranda and the exhibits attached thereto and has

construed all facts and drawn all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most

favorable to the respective nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 574.

We note at the outset that, regrettably, the parties’ renewed motions suffer from

some of the same deficiencies as their earlier attempts to secure summary judgment. We

previously critiqued the parties for “treat[ing] their briefs in opposition to summary

judgment in favor of the other party largely identically to their briefs in support of

summary judgment in their own favor,” rather than satisfying the relevant summary

judgment burdens imposed on them as movants. [Dkt. 78, at 8]. At various points in their

renewed motions, both sides continue to ignore their respective burdens. As we

previously admonished the parties, the court is entitled to require “strict compliance”

with Rule 56’s summary judgment requirements. That said, we have been able to tolerate

these procedural shortcomings on our way to fashioning the decisions that follow.

II. Discussion

A. Section 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person” who “subjects, or

causes to be subjected” another to the deprivation of federal rights under color of state

law.

Defendant Chief of Police Anderson is sued here in his official capacity, which

“represents ‘only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer

is an agent’”—in this case, the Town. McConnell v. McKillip, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1090,

1097 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (McKinney, J.) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Accordingly, we treat Ballheimer’s claims against Anderson as

being against the Town.

We begin our analysis with Ballheimer’s claims against the Officers before we

proceed to address his claims against Anderson and the Town.

B. Fourth Amendment Claims Against the Officers

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness under all the

circumstances, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), limned by balancing

the public and private interests at stake in a given state intrusion into personal privacy.

United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985).

In analyzing Fourth Amendment seizures, police-citizen interactions are divided

into three types. United States v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506, 1508 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing

United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1982)). Applying this framework,

progressively deeper intrusions into a citizen’s privacy interests require progressively

weightier justifications. See id. Consensual encounters over which police exercise no

control and which are therefore not Fourth Amendment seizures at all require no

particularized suspicion to justify them. Id. Investigatory stops, or Terry stops, which are

limited to brief, nonintrusive detentions, require reasonable suspicion of criminality

supported by specific, articulable facts. Id. Full arrests subjecting an arrestee to a litany of

intrusions, see Utah v. Streiff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting),

require probable cause to believe the person is committing or has committed a crime.

Johnson, 910 F.2d at 1508.

It is critical, therefore, to undertake a careful and accurate preliminary

characterization of each police-citizen encounter in order to define the quantum of

suspicion necessary to justify the police conduct engaged in at any given moment. United

States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir. 1995). Nonseizures may, of course, ripen into

seizures, see Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2013), and

Terry stops may ripen into arrests, see Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 524–25 (7th Cir.

2014), so long as the seizure is supported by a sufficient quantum of suspicion. To test

the sufficiency of suspicion, we must view “the facts and circumstances within [a police

officer’s] knowledge” “at the moment the decision [to seize] was made,” disregarding

later acquired information, Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953–54 (7th Cir. 1999). It is

similarly important to determine the timeline of events during which a particular

encounter occurs and to which the appropriate characterization attaches.

Determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion normally are mixed

questions of fact and law, but when the facts are undisputed, the ultimate resolution of

whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed becomes a question of law.

United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d 750, 754, 2010 WL 3155876 (7th Cir. 2010).

1. Defendants’ Detention of Ballheimer in the Gas Station Parking Lot

Ballheimer does not argue that any Fourth Amendment violations were committed

by the Officers during the time period in which they were conducting the “welfare

check,” up to and including Ballheimer’s exit from the ambulance. His first Fourth

Amendment claim is that the Officer’s lacked the necessary suspicion to detain him and

conduct the field sobriety tests once the medics permitted him to leave the gas station

parking lot.

The parties agree that this detention constituted a Terry stop for purposes of our

determining the “quantum of suspicion” necessary for the police action. For the Officers’

actions to have been lawful under the Fourth Amendment, they must have had reasonable

suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that Ballheimer was engaging in

some unlawful activity. Matz, 769 F.3d at 522. “[A]lthough reasonable suspicion is a less

demanding standard than probable cause, such a stop requires at least a minimal level of

objective justification and the officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted). Ultimately, the reasonable suspicion determination is based on “commonsense

judgments and inferences about human behavior.” United States v. Maclin, 313 Fed.

Appx. 886, 889, 2009 WL 605944, at *2 (7th Cir. 2009). When making a reasonable

suspicion determination, we must examine the totality of the circumstances. United States

v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).

For Ballheimer to prevail on this claim, he must establish that the Officers had “no

objective justification for the stop,” merely “unparticularized suspicion.” See Matz v.

Klotka, 769 F.3d at 522. For the Officers to prevail, they must have had “specific and

articulable facts” supporting their reasonable belief that Ballheimer operated his vehicle

while intoxicated. There is an abundance of relevant case law to guide the court in

making this determination, but surprisingly, neither party cites to any controlling

authority or analogous caselaw beyond a few citations articulating boilerplate principles.

Defendants, in fact, cite to no legal authorities; Ballheimer cites cases that are plainly

distinguishable.2

Nevertheless, having conducted our own careful review of applicable case law in

light of the parties’ contentions, we conclude that, based on the totality of the

circumstances, the evidence establishes that the Officers reasonably suspected that

2 See Mordacq v. State, 585 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that there was insufficient

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was operating her vehicle while

intoxicated merely because she was found passed in the parked, running vehicle). Contrary to

Ballheimer’s argument, the Mordacq court did not hold that “merely sitting asleep in a properly

parked vehicle with the engine running is not evidence of impaired operation.” Instead, it held

that this evidence alone was not sufficient to “prove a violation” of impaired operation.

Ballheimer’s invocation of Clark v. State, 611 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) is similarly

problematic. An appellate court holding that there were insufficient facts to sustain a conviction

does not transmute into an articulation of the reasonable suspicion standard. Ballheimer also

misapplies Indiana Code § 9-30-6-2, which requires chemical tests to be administered within

three hours of a suspect’s allegedly impaired operation of the vehicle. Ballheimer does not

explain how this statute is relevant to our determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed

at the time of the Terry stop.

Ballheimer had operated his vehicle while under the influence of an illegal substance.3

Accordingly, they did not commit a Fourth Amendment violation by detaining

Ballheimer for the purposes of conducting an investigatory stop.

The undisputed facts adduced here establish that Ballheimer was found

unconscious sitting in the driver’s side of his vehicle while the engine was running; that

Ballheimer told the Officers after they managed to rouse him that he was “on his way

home” and had stopped at the truck stop because he “was really tired.” The Officers

noted that Ballheimer’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot; that his speech was slurred; that

he responded to their inquiries in the negative when asked if he had any underlying

medical conditions; and that Ballheimer stumbled when attempting to walk. These

specific, articulable facts were noted by the Officers at the time they detained Ballheimer.

Considered as a whole, they sufficiently establish an objective justification for their belief

that Ballheimer may have been operating his vehicle while under the influence of a

controlled substance.4

3 Ind. Code. § 9-30-5-2 provides that operation of a vehicle while intoxicated is a criminal

offense. “Intoxication” may be caused by either alcohol or a controlled substance. Ind. Code. §

9-13-2-86. Indiana Code Section 9-13-2-118 defines an operator of a vehicle as “a person, other

than a chauffeur or a public passenger chauffeur, who: (1) drives or is in actual physical control

of a motor vehicle upon a highway; or (2) is exercising control over or steering a motor vehicle

being towed by a motor vehicle.”

4 See Minett v. Overwachter, 2020 WL 224342 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 15, 2020) (officers articulated

specific facts from which a reasonable officer could infer that an individual had operated a

vehicle while intoxicated where the individual was found sitting near a parked vehicle that only

he appeared to be associated with and smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech and trouble

keeping his balance); United States v. Lee, 2018 WL 10075927, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2018)

(officers had reasonable suspicion that individual was under the influence of an intoxicant or

controlled substance when he was found asleep and not easily awakened in a parked, running car

with a child in the backseat). See also Smith v. Ball State Univ., 2001 WL 1339006, at *4 (S.D.

Ind. Oct. 29, 2001), aff'd, 295 F.3d 763, 2002 WL 1456715 (7th Cir. 2002) (officers need not

Accordingly, we hold that the Officers had reasonable suspicion to detain

Ballheimer at the car to conduct a brief investigatory stop and the field sobriety tests.5

2. Ballheimer’s Arrest

Ballheimer’s failed the field sobriety tests, prompting Officers Batts and Burks to

transport him in their police car to a nearby hospital to permit chemical testing to be

performed. He was subsequently formally arrested. As we ruled in our prior summary

judgment order, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity for Ballheimer’s

allegations that they lacked probable cause to arrest him.6 Ballheimer now claims,

however, that prior to his formal arrest, the officers placed him in police custody without

possessing the requisite quantum of suspicion. The parties appear to agree that by placing

Ballheimer in police custody and transporting him to the hospital, the investigatory stop

was no longer brief or nonintrusive, and had ripened into an arrest requiring probable

cause. See Matz, 769 at 524–25. Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706, 719–20 (7th Cir.

2013). “Probable cause exists if at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances

within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of

reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has

detect the odor of alcohol or locate paraphernalia to have reasonable suspicion that individual

may have been drunk or on drugs)

5 Ballheimer does not challenge the promptness or intrusiveness of this investigatory stop, nor

does he challenge the administration of the breathalyzer test.

6 Our previous summary judgment ruling addressed qualified immunity for the Officers for their

seizure of Ballheimer following his failed sobriety tests. Because the Officers have not asserted

this defense, however, and because the parties’ first round of briefing did not specifically address

whether the Officers unlawfully seized Ballheimer when they transported him to the hospital, we

will now address the parties’ theories on this question.

committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Ramos v. City of Chicago,

716 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted).

The Officers maintain that Ballheimer’s failed sobriety tests provided them with

probable cause to arrest him, and that, if probable cause did not exist, they are entitled to

qualified immunity. We need not determine whether the Officers had probable cause to

arrest Ballheimer in order to conclude that here they are shield by qualified immunity. In

this context, qualified immunity protects officers who have “arguable probable cause” to

arrest. In other words, it shields those officers who reasonably but mistakenly believe

probable cause existed. Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1008, 2013 WL 3481359

(7th Cir. 2013) (“An arrest without probable cause is a violation of a constitutional right,

whereas an arrest without arguable probable cause is a violation of a clearly established

constitutional right.”).

Ballheimer’s failed sobriety tests heightened the Officers’ reasonable suspicions,

thereby creating arguable probable cause, they say. Arguable probable cause exists when

“a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances as the officer in question could

have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in light of well-established law.”

Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F. 3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 1998). According to the Officers, at

the time they seized Ballheimer, there was no law clearly establishing that officers, armed

with reasonable suspicion that a suspect has operated a vehicle while under the influence

of an illegal substance, do not have probable cause to arrest that suspect if he fails the

field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the Officers argue, they are entitled to the protections of

qualified immunity.

Once this defense has been raised by the Officers, it becomes Ballheimer’s burden

to overcome it. Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2012). In our prior

discussion of Ballheimer’s claim that the Officers did not have probable cause to arrest

him at the hospital, we concluded that the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity,

but that determination was based on Ballheimer’s failure to carry this burden. We ruled

that Ballheimer had simply had “nothing at all to say on qualified immunity for the

Fourth Amendment false arrest claim.” Based on our current review of Ballheimer’s

renewed briefs, though he attempts a response to this defense, we conclude that he has

nothing of value to say with regard to qualified immunity on his Fourth Amendment false

arrest claim. He has provided nothing beyond the mere recitation of boilerplate principles

regarding qualified immunity standards, without any explanation as to how those

principles apply to his case. From there, he states that he “incorporates herein his

foregoing arguments on the lack of reasonable suspicion and probable cause,” repeating

that it is “clearly established” that police officers are barred from conducting field

sobriety tests or from taking individuals into custody “when they have no knowledge of

whether [they] had operated a vehicle within the past three hours.” Such shallow

advocacy does not carry the day or satisfy Plaintiff’s legal burden.

In an effort to salvage his claim, Ballheimer again misapplies the holding of

Mordacq v. State, 585 N.E.2D 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).7 There, the court held that the

state had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal defendant had operated a

7 Ballheimer’s invocation of Nichols v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1210, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) and

Clark v. State, 611 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) fails for the same reason.

vehicle while intoxicated when it offered little to no evidence that she had driven her

vehicle within three hours of the chemical testing that revealed a high level of alcohol in

her system. Whether the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant

(who was discovered passed out and reeking of alcohol in the driver’s side of her running

vehicle) was not disputed in Mordacq. This holding, which focused on the burden of

proof in a criminal proceeding, does not impose on police officers an obligation to

determine when a suspect last operated a vehicle as a condition precedent of probable

cause to arrest the person. Ballheimer’s continued reliance on this case does not serve to

strengthen his arguments. Probable cause plainly does not require “an actual showing” of

criminal activity. United States v. Navarro, 90 F.3d 1245, 1253 (7th Cir. 1996). By

ignoring this legal principle, Ballheimer has again failed to rebut the Officer’s qualified

immunity defense.

Thus, we conclude that Ballheimer, having failed to sustain his burden in

overcoming the Officer’s assertion of qualified immunity, entitles the Officers to the

protections of qualified immunity from Ballheimer’s Fourth Amendment false arrest

claim against them.

3. Plaintiff’s Unlawful Search Claim

Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable,

subject to a few well delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357

(1967). The warrant requirement applies with full force “‘where [surgical] intrusions into

the human body are concerned[,]’” Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985) (quoting

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)), including, more specifically, in

blood draws, where there is “a compelled physical intrusion beneath [a person’s] skin and

into his veins to obtain a sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal

investigation.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013). In terms of legal

distinctions, there is no justifiable distinction between a compelled physical intrusion

beneath a person’s skin and the insertion of a catheter into the urethra to obtain a sample

of his urine as evidence for a criminal investigation.

In our prior summary judgment ruling, we included several findings and

conclusions with respect to the Officer’s search:

• The “exigent circumstances” exception to warrant requirement was inapplicable,

and therefore the officers required a warrant for the catherization.

• If the warrant was valid, the Officers did not act outside the scope of authorization

by taking Ballheimer’s urine in addition to his blood. We also noted that, had the

Officers raised a qualified immunity defense (they had not), nothing in the warrant

would have so unambiguously excluded the possibility of taking both blood and

urine samples as to disentitle the Officers from relying on that construction of their

own authorization.

• Based on the parties’ submission, we could not determine with sufficient

reliability whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause. Nor could

we determine whether the Officers unreasonably executed the warrant, viz. the

forced catherization.

We invited renewed motions on the issues of whether the warrant was based on

probable cause and whether the Officers unreasonably executed the warrant. Neither

party has elected to revisit the issue of probable cause, and thus our remaining inquiry

focuses on the reasonableness of the forced catherization. Because Ballheimer “assumes”

that probable cause existed for the warrant, so shall we.8 We therefore turn to a

discussion of whether the Officers were unreasonable when they executed the warrant.

The Officers assert that their actions to require that Ballheimer submit to the

catheterization performed by the hospital nurse was reasonable. Alternatively, they argue

they are shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The constitutionality of invasive

medical procedures conducted under court order for the purposes of criminal

investigation is determined under the “Schmerber balancing test.” Winston, 470 U.S. at

763. See, e.g., United States v. Husband, 226 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2000); Elliott, 686

F. Supp. 2d at 859. In our prior summary judgment ruling, we admonished the parties for

failing to cite to or apply Schmerber or Winston in framing their arguments regarding the

constitutionality of a forced catheterization. Now, only Ballheimer has managed to

proffer an analysis that includes a discussion of all three Schmerber factors. The Officers

acknowledge the existence of these factors, but include only the third factor in their

8 Ballheimer states that the Court mandated that the parties presume, in the event they submitted

renewed summary judgment motions, that the warrant was not falsely procured and was based on

probable cause. Ballheimer has misinterpreted our directive from the earlier ruling, wherein we

stated that the parties could submit additional briefing on the question of whether probable cause

existed to obtain the warrant, although we barred further submissions with respect to whether the

warrant was falsely procured. These are two distinct inquiries that Ballheimer has improperly

continued to conflate. Moreover, we advised Ballheimer that “any future efforts [] to hold the

Officers liable for conduct under a warrant issued without probable cause would have to

overcome the hurdle of showing that the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause to

render official belief in its existence unreasonable.” Ballheimer has now had two opportunities to

apply the appropriate standard on this issue and has failed both times to do so. Accordingly, we

deem this argument waived for the purposes of this entry.

analysis. Of greater concern, however, is the fact that they never responded to

Ballheimer’s arguments regarding these factors.

The Schmerber balancing test analyzes the reasonableness of a medical procedure

pursuant to the following factors: (1) “the extent to which the procedure may threaten the

safety or health of the individual”; (2) “the extent of intrusion upon the individual’s

dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity”; and (3) “the community's

interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence.” Husband, 226 F.3d at

631 (quoting Winston, 470 U.S. at 763.). We address each of these factors in turn below.

The first Schmerber factor, the extent to which the procedure may threaten the

safety or health of the individual, prompted Ballheimer to proffer the report of his expert

witness, Dr. Steven Smith, in arguing that an in-and-out catheterization should only be

performed “when the appropriate medical indications for doing so exist.” Additionally,

before a catheterization is performed, medical history should be obtained from the

individual, and the risk of potential complications of that procedure should be discussed

with the individual. Following the completion of the catheterization, a health care

provider should evaluate the individual for any immediate complications and should

advise the individual about signs and symptoms of potentially delayed complications.

None of these protections were undertaken in Ballheimer’s case. He was not

examined by a doctor nor was his medical history taken. The risks of the procedure were

never communicated to him and no discussion followed the procedure advising him of

delayed complications. However, Dr. Smith opines that the insertion of a catheter is not

an unusual or particularly dangerous procedure. Notwithstanding this fact, because

Ballheimer had already produced a blood sample, he argues that the forced

catheterization unnecessarily threatened his health. The Officers offer no rebuttal; thus

we find that this factor weighs in Ballheimer’s favor.

Next we consider the extent to which the procedure represented an intrusion upon

Ballheimer’s dignitary interests. Ballheimer states that the loss of personal dignity

associated with “putting a catheter into a man’s penis and then into his bladder,” cannot

be justified “in the name of efficacy and locality” “when a blood draw is more accurate

and reliable.” The Officers again do not respond to these averments, presumably

conceding that one’s dignitary interests are clearly intruded upon when his pants are

pulled down, exposing his genitalia, and he is then subject to the painful insertion of a

catheter into his penis. We thus conclude that the use of the catheter constituted a

significant invasion of Ballheimer’s personal privacy and bodily integrity. Elliott v.

Sheriff of Rush Cty., Ind., 686 F. Supp. 2d 840, 859, 2010 WL 679065 (S.D. Ind. 2010).

Finally, we weigh “against these individual interests … the community’s interest

in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence.” Winston, 470 U.S. at 762. The

Officers’ arguments center on the importance of their being able to obtain urine samples

as part of their investigation and prosecution of individuals who are driving while

impaired. According to the Officers, while blood testing is an effective toxicology tool to

confirm the presence of alcohol, urine testing more efficaciously confirms the presence of

other substances in a person’s body. The ability to test urine thus serves the public’s

interest in ensuring that drivers impaired by substances other than alcohol are

appropriately penalized and deterred from future offenses. Additionally, because Indiana

law provides only a three-hour window from the point in time when the individual

operated a vehicle and the administration of chemical testing of the suspect’s fluid,

officers seeking to have this test performed are faced with a time exigency. As the

Officers explain, “If catheterization is off the table, all a suspect will have to do in

situations like the present case [is] wait three hours and they would be in the clear.”

Ballheimer responds, again relying on his expert, that analysis of blood is “more reliable,

accurate, and scientifically valid method of determining both impairment and intoxication

due to . . . the use of a controlled substance or the excessive consumption of [alcohol.]”

The Officers do not challenge the opinions of Ballheimer’s expert, nor do they cite

any reason for requiring the urine sample in addition to Ballheimer’s already furnished

blood sample. They argue “efficiency,” but do not specifically argue that they were in

need of expeditious toxicology results. More critical to our analysis is the fact that they

have failed to explain the reason they required earlier confirmation of the substances

Ballheimer may have ingested than they would have obtained from the blood sample. The

Indiana’s three-hour rule merely requires that a chemical screening be administered

within three hours; it does not mandate that toxicology results be retrieved within three

hours. Here, because Ballheimer’s blood had already been drawn by the time the

catherization was administered, we cannot conclude that the public interest factor,

properly weighed, redounds in favor of the Officers, particularly when they have offered

no arguments to rebut Ballheimer’s claim that his guilt or innocence could have been as

readily determined by virtue of his blood sample.

Our analysis of the Schmerber factors has included a review of the few decisions

of those courts who have also addressed the reasonableness of forced catheterizations,

although we note that our research has disclosed no decision involving the precise

question presented to us here. We summarize those holdings below.

Lockard v. City of Lawrenceburg is the most closely analogous case to

Ballheimer’s within our Circuit.9 In Lockard, police officers received a warrant

“authorizing and ordering” them to obtain blood and urine samples from the plaintiff by

all “necessary and proper means.” The police officers directed the forced catheterization

of the plaintiff after plaintiff had provided his blood sample “but was either unwilling or

unable to provide a urine sample.” The officers felt that, because the warrant ordered the

retrieval of both specimens, that they were obligated to obtain the urine sample. Lockard

v. City of Lawrenceburg, Ind., 815 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1037-38, 2011 WL 3902796 (S.D.

Ind. 2011).

The Lockard court distinguished the facts of that case from those of Elliot v. Rush,

686 F. Supp. 2d 840 (S.D. Ind. 2010). In Elliot, police officers obtained a warrant

authorizing them to obtain professional medical assistance to obtain “a blood or urine

sample” from the plaintiff and to use “reasonable force to do so.” The officers then

obtained blood and urine from the plaintiff, utilizing a forced catheterization for the latter

following the plaintiff’s failed attempts to urinate. The Elliot court focused on the scope

of the warrant in finding the officers had acted unconstitutionally when they seized both

9 Even looking beyond our Circuit, we were unable to locate a case comparable to ours.

urine and blood from the plaintiff.10 The Lockard court concurred in the Elliot analysis,

relying on the fact that the warrant in its case authorized blood “and” urine, as opposed to

blood “or” urine in the Elliot case.

The Lockard court nevertheless refrained from deciding whether the Officers’

actions were constitutional, concluding instead that qualified immunity for the officers’

conduct applied and was dispositive of the case. Noting what it described as the

“diverging patchwork of well-reasoned cases,” the Court concluded that the officers had

not violated a “clearly established” right. It further held that the issue was not so obvious

that a reasonable officer would know that a forced catheterization would violate the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Lacking clear precedent from other courts, the Schmerber factors alone must

guide our analysis. We hold that each of these factors favors Ballheimer. Ballheimer’s

already furnished blood sample at the time of the forced catherization would have

satisfied the public interest thus avoiding any compromise to his health or unnecessary

intrusions on his dignity. The Officers provide no justification for their need to procure

Ballheimer’s urine in addition to his already acquired blood sample, nor have they

mustered any arguments to address the potential harms to his physical or personal well-

10 In our prior summary judgment ruling, we distinguished our case from the Elliot case based on

the issue of “scope.” As we explained: “Elliott held that police officers exceeded the scope of a

warrant authorizing them to obtain ‘a sample of Plaintiff’s blood or urine . . . by requiring

Plaintiff to give a urine sample after Plaintiff had already provided a blood sample.’ There,

however, both blood and urine samples were taken pursuant to the warrant. Here, by contrast, the

blood sample had already been taken by consent at the time the warrant issued. Even if the

warrant’s ‘or’ was exclusive, the Officers complied with it by taking only Ballheimer’s urine

sample under its auspices.” [Dkt. 78, at 20-21] (internal citations omitted).

being. The Officers were constitutionally authorized to use “reasonable force” to seize

Ballheimer’s bodily fluids, but they stop short of justifying the forced catheterization as

reasonable under these circumstances.

We caution, however, that this determination is limited to the specific

circumstances of this case. Evidence of a need for an immediate urinalysis or the

deficiencies inherent in a blood sample might change the analysis and the conclusion we

have reached here. We do not speculate regarding other potential variations on the facts

before us. Our ruling applies only here on the evidence presented by the parties to this

litigation.

That said, we also conclude that the individual officers who have been sued here

for this constitutional violation are entitled to qualified immunity.11 As previously noted,

qualified immunity shields public officials exercising their discretionary powers and sued

in their personal capacities—as the Officers here—from the burdens of litigation under

Section 1983 unless their conduct violated “a clearly established . . . constitutional right

of which a reasonable person would have known at the time.” Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d

854, 860 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

The qualified immunity analysis poses two questions: (1) whether a defendant

violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the

11 This determination hinges on the assumption that the warrant authorizing the Officers to obtain

Ballheimer’s urine was properly obtained from the state court judge who issued it. If the warrant

was not properly procured, the Officers cannot find protection under qualified immunity for

violating Ballheimer’s clearly established right against a warrantless, intrusive medical search.

Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 754.

time of the violation. Id. (citing McComas v. Brickley, 673 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir.

2012)). These questions may be addressed in either order. Id. (citing McComas, 673 F.3d

at 725). “If a defendant asserts that she is entitled to qualified immunity, the plaintiff

bears the burden of defeating the immunity claim.” Archer v. Chisholm, 191 F. Supp. 3d

932, 943 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (citing Betker, 692 F.3d at 860). The doctrine of qualified

immunity, as applied here, means that the Officers can only be held liable only if, at the

time of the catherization, Ballheimer had a clearly established right not be subjected to

forced catheterization despite a warrant so authorizing.12

The phrase “clearly established” cannot be defined at a high level of generality.

City of Escondido, Cal. V. Emmons, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 500, 503. (2019). As the

Supreme Court has explained, “Specificity is especially important in the Fourth

Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an

officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the situation the

officer confronts.” Id. (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152, 200 L. Ed. 2d

449 (2018)). Thus, the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to “identify a case

where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Fourth

Amendment.” Escondido, Cal. V. Emmons, 139 S.Ct. at 503 (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 138

S. Ct. 577, 590, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018)).

Like the Lockard court, we recognize the “diverging patchwork” of precedent on

the subject of forced catheterizations. Lockard, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. (collecting

12 As the Lockard court confirmed, a catheterization is the only means by which Officers can

obtain urine from an unwilling or incapable suspect. Lockard, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.

cases). See Levine v. Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684 (8th Cir.2008) (Fourth Amendment rights of

prisoner were violated when he was catheterized as a part of random drug screening),

Sparks v. Stutler, 71 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir.1995) (forced catheterization without warrant

violated prisoner’s Fourth Amendment rights); Elliott, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (“This case

falls into the ‘obvious’ category. A reasonable law enforcement officer should have

known that ordering Plaintiff to submit to a medical catheterization, against his will and

without the issuance of a search warrant . . . was an unreasonable search.”) Indeed, there

is a dearth of case law evaluating whether police officers act unconstitutionally when

they direct a forced catherization pursuant to a warrant. Thus. we are unable to locate a

“closely analogous case” that would have placed these Officers on notice of their

unconstitutional conduct.

While Ballheimer repeatedly asserts that Elliot establishes that a forced

catheterization violates a clearly established constitutional right, this reading

misconstrues that decision, as we explained in our previous summary judgment ruling.

The holding in Elliot was premised on the fact that the Officers acted beyond the scope of

a valid warrant. Here, our analysis includes the fact that the Officers acted within the

parameters of presumptively valid warrant. As we have held, in forcing the

catheterization of Ballheimer, the Officers acted unreasonably and therefore

unconstitutionally, but qualified immunity saves them from liability because it “gives

ample room” for their mistaken judgments. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, (1991).

We add this note as well to our discussion: the absence of a closely analogous

case is not necessarily fatal to Ballheimer’s claim if he were able to show that the

violation of his rights was so obvious that a reasonable state actor would have understood

that his actions violated the Constitution. Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654–55 (7th

Cir. 2001); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000). (Analogous

case law is not always required because “in the most extreme cases, an analogous case

might never arise because the existence of the right was so clear . . . that no one thought it

worthwhile to litigate the issue.”). Ballheimer argues that “the lack of case law directly

on point supports the proposition that state actors are not conducting forced

catheterizations because it is obvious that such actions are unreasonable.”

Ballheimer’s argument has its appeal, but we do not agree that the

unconstitutionality of the Officers’ conduct was so obvious as to place the lawfulness of

their actions “beyond debate,” placing them beyond the protections of qualified

immunity. Escondido, 139 S.Ct. at 503. Despite the shortage of case law directly on point

with respect to the constitutionality of the Officer’s actions, there is no shortage of case

law granting police officers qualified immunity for utilizing forced catheterizations to

secure evidence of this kind. See Levine v. Roebuck, 550 F.3d at 684 (officers who

committed Fourth Amendment violation by unlawfully catheterizing prisoner were

entitled to qualified immunity); Sparks v. Stutler, 71 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir.1995);

(same); Ellis v. Cotten, 2008 WL 4182359 (N.D.Tex. Sept. 9, 2008) (“Even if Defendant

violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, he would still be immune from suit”

because taking blood and urine samples are “proper method[s] of seizing evidence for a

person suspected of committing an intoxication offense.”) This issue takes law

enforcement officers no less than courts into “nebulous territory.” Thus, the officers

cannot fairly be held liable for their “bad guesses in gray areas.” Lockard, 815 F. Supp.

2d at 1051.

C. Municipal Liability

Although as we have determined the Officers are shielded from liability for their

unconstitutional conduct, the Town may still be subject to Monell liability. Eilenfeldt v.

United C.U.S.D. #304 Bd. of Educ., 169 F. Supp. 3d 867, 876 (C.D. Ill. 2016). Plaintiff so

claims. The Town resists.

We begin by noting the barebones-ness of Ballheimer’s argument on the question

of Monell liability. His primary assertion with respect to his Monell claim is that

summary judgment should not be granted for the Town. This plainly falls short of

establishing a basis for holding as a matter of law that he should prevail on this claim.

We therefor turn our attention only to the issue of whether the Town is entitled to

summary judgment on the claims against it based on Monell.

It is well-settled that § 1983 does not allow “for a local government to be sued . . .

for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.

of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist.

No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2001). To successfully maintain a § 1983 action

against a local government, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an

unconstitutional policy. “Locating a ‘policy’ ensures that a municipality is held liable

only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative

body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.”

Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). Such a

policy can take one of three forms: “(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a

constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by

written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute

a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that constitutional injury was

caused by a person with final policy-making authority.” Rasche v. Vill. of Beecher, 336

F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003).

Ballheimer alleges the existence of a widespread custom within the Town of

unconstitutionally utilizing forced catheterizations to obtain urine samples from suspects.

No “bright-line” rule defines a widespread custom or practice, but a plaintiff generally

“must introduce evidence that acquiescence on the part of the policymakers was and

amounted to a policy decision.” Dixon v. Cty. of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016);

Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). “There is no

clear consensus as to how frequently such conduct must occur to impose Monell liability,

except that it must be more than one instance or even three.” Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303

(internal citations omitted); see also Rodriguez v. Milwaukee Cty., 756 F. App’x 641, 643

(7th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (Mar. 25, 2019).

The Town argues that the evidence establishes that no such custom or practice

existed. While Officer Batts testified that he directed the use of forced catheterizations,

executed pursuant to warrants authorizing reasonable force to obtain urine, on “several

occasions,”13 there is no evidence that Chief Anderson was aware of the technique

13 Officer Batts could not confirm the number of occasions.

employed before Officer Batts. In fact, Chief Anderson unequivocally testified that he

was not aware. Officer Batts testified to the opposite effect, but both he clarified that

Chief Anderson would only become aware of the forced catheterizations (absent an

explicit conversation on the subject, which both Chief Anderson and Officer Batts deny

occurring) by reading the corresponding matter’s incident report. However, Chief

Anderson does not always read incident reports, and he denies doing so in any case where

a forced catheterization may have been used. Chief Anderson maintains that he had no

knowledge that officers may be utilizing this practice.

According to the Town, this evidence establishes that any forced catheterizations

were “isolated” occurrences. We disagree that this evidence forecloses finding that a

widespread custom or practice existed. Officer Batts testified that he has utilized forced

catheterizations in similar circumstances on “several” occasions. We are without even a

ballpark estimate as to what “several” means. Three? Ten? Fifty? Without even slight

quantification as to how often the unconstitutional conduct occurred, we cannot conclude

that the violations occurred on fewer than the minimally required “one or three instances”

as discussed in the case law is necessary to establish a widespread custom. Additionally,

the Town has not presented any evidence as to whether other officers were partaking in

this conduct. Officer Batts’s testimony that he “did not know” if his fellow officers

utilized this technique does not establish as an evidentiary matter that it was not an

ongoing practice, as the Town apparently believes.

The Town next argues that Ballheimer cannot prevail because Chief Anderson did

not actively participate in the deprivation. To its detriment, the Town never addresses the

proper legal principles in assessing the its culpability by virtue of Chief Anderson. The

relevant question, overlooked by both parties, is whether Chief Anderson was

“deliberately indifferent” as the “known or obvious consequences” of his actions.

Deliberate indifference, in the context of a widespread practice theory, means “a

reasonable policymaker [would] conclude that the plainly obvious consequences of [his]

actions would result in the deprivation of a federally protected right.” Gable v. City of

Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 536 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997); Brock v. Casteel, No. 1:13-CV-01577-DML, 2015 WL

3439236, at *9 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2015); Hall v. City of Chicago, No. 12 C 6834, 2012

WL 6727511, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2012). These consequences may be plainly

obvious when one knows or should know of their existence. Wilson v. Cook Cty., 742

F.3d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 2014).

“The question of whether the defendants’ conduct constituted deliberate

indifference is a classic issue for the fact finder.” Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564,

577 (7th Cir. 1998). We cannot determine whether the evidence is so pervasive that it

forecloses a reasonable jury from finding that the Town acted deliberately indifferently

when it has failed to apply the relevant legal standards. We also note that the Town

fixates on Sheriff Anderson’s purported lack of actual knowledge without ever

addressing the fact that the determination of “conscious disregard” is not limited to

consideration of only his actual knowledge. See Wilson, 742 F.3d at 781; King v. Kramer,

680 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2012); Elliott, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 867. One of Sheriff

Anderson’s reporting officers utilized the forced catheterizations on numerous occasions,

which were documented in his incident reports. That same officer testified that he

discussed doing so with other lieutenants.[Dkt. 48-6, at 84]. Based on this evidence, a

reasonable juror is not barred from finding that Sheriff Anderson should have known of

the violations irrespective of what he actually knew.

Finally, we will not grant the Town’s motion with respect to Ballheimer’s “failure

to train” argument. The Town conclusively states that Ballheimer has not shown that a

failure to train was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation. The Town

again fails to 1) satisfy its burden of establishing that a reasonable jury is foreclosed from

finding that a failure to train was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation

and 2) address or apply the relevant legal principles of the failure to train doctrine. See

Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1347 (7th Cir. 1997).

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 87] is denied in part and

granted in part. Defendants’ motion is granted in full with respect to the individual

defendants, but denied with respect to the Monell claim. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment [Dkt. 93] is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 3/20/2020 Put Gaus Bile

SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

William W. Barrett

WILLIAMS HEWITT BARRETT & WILKOWSKI LLP

wbarrett@wbwlawyers.com

Toni M. Everton

WILLIAMS BARRETT & WILKOWSKI, LLP

teverton@wbwlawyers.com

Stephen G. Gray

ATTORNEY AT LAW

misstuffy@aol.com

Kirk A. Horn

MANDEL HORN, P.C.

khorn@mhmrlaw.com

Daniel J. Paul

WILLIAMS HEWITT BARRETT & WILKOWSKI LLP

dpaul@wbwlawyers.com

Joshua J. Rauch

MANDEL HORN, P.C.

jrauch@mhmrlaw.com

Todd L. Sallee

TODD SALLEE LAW

toddsalleelaw@yahoo.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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