Ray v. Worden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

WILLIAM JAMES RAY, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CAUSE NO.: 3:24-CV-449-JVB-APR

)

T. WORDEN, et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

William James Ray, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint against twelve

defendants alleging that they failed to protect him from attacks by other inmates. ECF 1. “A

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless,

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it

if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

In the complaint, which Ray signed under penalty of perjury, he claims that this event is

not grievable. ECF 1 at 7. Ray’s assertion that he cannot file a grievance about the event is not

accurate. The Indiana Department of Correction’s grievance policy lays out what can be grieved:

A. Matters Appropriate to the Offender Grievance Process:

Examples of issues which an offender may initiate the grievance process include, but are

not limited to:

1. The substance and requirements of policies, procedures, and rules of the

Department or facility (including, but not limited to, correspondence, staff

treatment, medical or mental health, some visitation, and food service);

2. The manner in which staff members interpret and apply the policies, procedures,

and/or rules of the Department or of the facility.

3. Actions of individual staff, contractors, or volunteers;

4. Acts of reprisal for using the Offender Grievance Process;

5. Any other concerns relating to conditions of care or supervision within the

Department, or its contractors, except as noted in this policy and administrative

procedure; and,

6. Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA).

See Ind. Dep’t of Corr. Policy & Admin. Proc., Offender Grievance Process, No. 00-02-301 (eff.

Sept. 1, 2020), available at https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/00-02-301-Offender-Grievance-Process-

9-1-2020.pdfOffender-Grievance-Process. Complaints about the actions of food service, medical,

and correctional staff are clearly appropriate to the Offender Grievance Process.

In the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Congress mandated that prisoners are prohibited from

bringing an action in federal court with respect to prison conditions “until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is designed to provide

the prison with notice of a problem and give it an opportunity to fix it. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d

709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011). Exhaustion is required even if the prisoner believes the grievance process

will not work for him. “[T]here is no futility exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement.” Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Dole v. Chandler,

438 F.3d 804, 808-809 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that exhaustion is necessary even “if the prisoner

believes that exhaustion is futile. The sole objective of § 1997e(a) is to permit the prison’s

administrative process to run its course before litigation begins.” (citations and quotation marks

omitted)). Ray’s mistaken belief that the events giving rise to this complaint cannot be grieved

does not excuse his decision not to exhaust the grievance process prior to initiating this lawsuit.

The Seventh Circuit has taken a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion.” Dole, 438 F.3d

at 809. Thus, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and

at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025

(7th Cir. 2002). “By its plain terms, the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative

remedies before filing suit; a sue first, exhaust later approach is not acceptable.” Chambers v. Sood,

956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before

administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion

to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before

judgment.” Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in

original).

“Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden of proving.”

King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015). Nevertheless, “a plaintiff can plead himself

out of court. If he alleges facts that show he isn’t entitled to a judgment, he’s out of luck.” Early v.

Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The complaint here

shows that Ray did not exhaust his administrative remedies before he filed suit, and therefore the

case will be dismissed. See Schillinger v. Kiley, No. 21-2535, 2022 WL 4075590, at *1 (7th Cir.

Sept. 6, 2022) (unpublished) (“Although failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, a district court

may dismiss a complaint at screening if the complaint, and any documents subject to judicial

notice, establish the defense so plainly as to make the suit frivolous.”).

Though it is usually necessary to permit a plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended

complaint when a case is dismissed sua sponte, see Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir.

2013), that is unnecessary where the amendment would be futile. Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588

F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . .

the amendment would be futile.”). Such is the case here.

It is legally frivolous to file a case that must be dismissed. For these reasons, this case is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

SO ORDERED on June 6, 2024.

s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen

JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT