Glessner v. Baughman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

ALDEN H. GLESSNER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 1:22-CV-00397-HAB

)

JAMIE BAUGHMAN, CORY SHEPHERD, )

INC., CITY OF DUNKIRK, and JAY )

COUNTY SHERIFF LARRY RAY NEWTON )

JR., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Alden Glessner (“Glessner”) should have stayed home on September 6, 2021.

Instead, when his friend texted him his location and his belief that he was going to jail, Glessner

was Johnny on the spot. He arrived at the scene, refused to leave, and was arrested. Glessner now

sues under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and state law alleging that Officer Jamie Baughman (“Ofc.

Baughman”), and Deputy Sheriff Cory Shepherd (“Deputy Shepherd”) used excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment and battered him during his arrest. He also sues the City of

Dunkirk (“the City”), and the Sheriff of Jay County (“the Sheriff”) on a theory of respondeat

superior liability. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 14).

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 32, 35). The

parties have fully briefed the motions (ECF Nos. 33, 34, 36, 37, 48, 49, 51-53, and 55) making the

matter ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motions for Summary

Judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

On September 6, 2021, Jamie Baughman, an officer with the City of Dunkirk Police

Department, responded to a citizen’s call of an unknown person on a nearby residential property.

When he arrived at the scene, he encountered Lucas Chapman (“Chapman”) removing items from

the residence that were not his. Ofc. Baughman identified Chapman and determined that he had

outstanding active warrants. Ofc. Baughman arrested Chapman and placed him in the back seat of

his police cruiser. At some point – no word on whether it was before or after Ofc. Baughman

arrived and placed him under arrest – Chapman sent a text message to Glessner telling him to come

to 515 East North Street in Dunkirk, Indiana and that Glessner anticipated going to jail.

As any loyal friend would, Glessner showed up to help. Ofc. Baughman approached

Glessner and asked him why he was there. Glessner advised that he was there because of

Chapman’s text message. Ofc. Baughman told him to go home. Glessner though, continued to

engage Ofc. Baughman and refused to leave the area. What happens next is disputed. Ofc.

Baughman’s version is that Glessner approached the police cruiser where Chapman was being held

and Ofc. Baughman arrested him. Glessner’s version is that he used profanity towards the officer,

refused to leave and Ofc. Baughman arrested him. Under either version, what is clear is that

Glessner found himself in handcuffs. Once Ofc. Baughman grabbed Glessner’s left hand, Glessner

voluntarily placed his right hand behind his back allowing Ofc. Baughman to handcuff him. All

parties agree that Glessner succumbed to being handcuffed without further escalation.

Ofc. Baughman walked Glessner to the police cruiser and had him stand at the rear of the

car to await transport. The two engaged in some conversation about the arrest. After a few minutes,

1 These facts originate from the Defendants’ Statements of Material Facts (ECF Nos. 34, 37) and the

Plaintiff’s responses to these statements of facts. (ECF Nos. 48, 49).

Glessner asked Ofc. Baughman to “double lock”2 the handcuffs because they were “starting to get

tight.” Ofc. Baughman did not double lock the handcuffs as requested and Glessner repeated that

they were “starting to get a little tight.” All parties agree that Glessner asked several different times

for Ofc. Baughman to loosen the handcuffs.

Deputy Shepherd arrived to transport Glessner to the Jay County jail. According to

Glessner’s time estimate, he was in the handcuffs about 15 minutes before Deputy Shepherd

arrived. (Glessner Dep., ECF No. 34-1 at 33). Deputy Shepherd did not witness any of Ofc.

Baughman’s interactions with Glessner and only arrived at the scene after Glessner was

handcuffed. Deputy Shepherd assisted Glessner into his police vehicle by touching Glessner’s arm.

While being transported, Glessner states that he complained about the handcuffs being too tight

twice and asked Deputy Shepherd to readjust them. Glessner states that Deputy Shepherd told him

to move forward on the seat. Deputy Shepherd does not recall these events and states that Glessner

complained about Ofc. Baughman or was otherwise silent during his jail transport. Glessner

testified it was about a 10-15 minute drive to the jail. (Glessner Dep. at 33).

Once he arrived at the jail, Deputy Shepherd removed Glessner’s handcuffs and turned him

over to booking. Glessner observed redness to and indentations on his wrist once the handcuffs

were removed and experienced some soreness. Corrections Officer Shadie Canterbury (“CO

Canterbury”) completed the booking process with Glessner. As part of that process, CO

Canterbury asked Glessner about his medical history and current medical health. During that

process, Glessner stated that he did not need any special care. CO Canterbury did not observe any

injuries to Glessner’s wrists when she assessed his wrists for signs of self-harm per the jail’s

2 When handcuffs are “double locked” they are unable to tighten on the wrists of the person handcuffed and are locked

in place.

standard protocol, nor does CO Canterbury recall Glessner complaining of any pain or injuries to

his wrists.

After Glessner bonded out a few hours after booking, his wrists were “very red and sore.”

He took photographs of his wrists which show some marks on his wrists. Glessner did not seek

any medical attention and did not miss any work related to his wrist soreness. To Glessner’s

knowledge, he did not file a Notice of Tort Claim relating to his claims against the Defendants.3

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its

motion and identifying those portions of designated evidence that demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After “a

properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 250 (1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

A factual issue is material only if resolving the factual issue might change the outcome of

the case under the governing law. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). A

factual issue is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict

in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In

3 The day after his arrest, Ofc. Baughman was speaking to one of Glessner’s neighbors on her front porch.

Glessner was driving past the house and saw Ofc. Baughman. Glessner stopped his truck and yelled out of

the window to Ofc. Baughman. The two men had some back-and-forth banter and then Glessner left.

Glessner filed a citizen’s complaint at the Dunkirk Police Department about this confrontation.

deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court “may not ‘assess the credibility of witnesses,

choose between competing reasonable inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting

evidence.’” Bassett v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 2d 803, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Stokes v.

Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2010)). Instead, it must view all the

evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual

disputes in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

B. Analysis

Glessner’s amended complaint alleges that he was subjected to excessive force by Ofc.

Baughman during his arrest on September 6, 2021, and that Deputy Shepherd failed to intervene

and loosen the handcuffs. He also contends that the excessive force constituted battery for which

the City and the Sheriff are vicariously liable. However, in his response to Deputy Shepherd’s and

the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment, Glessner concedes that he did not file a Notice of Tort

Claim. He further concedes that there are no state law claims against any defendants nor is he

making a respondeat superior claim against the City or the Sheriff. (ECF No. 49, ¶1 and 52, p. 1).

Following these concessions, the Court is left only with Glessner’s §1983 claims against Ofc.

Baughman for excessive force and his claim against Deputy Shepherd for failure to intervene.

1. Excessive Force

Ofc. Baughman argues that his limited conduct during the incident in question does not

rise to a level of unreasonable force sufficient to support a Fourth Amendment violation. Even if

it does, he contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Under that doctrine, Glessner has the

burden to show both “(1) that the facts make out a constitutional violation, and (2) that the

constitutional right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct.”

Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 2013). “These questions may be addressed

in either order.” Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 737 (7th Cir. 2021). “If either inquiry is answered

in the negative, the defendant official is protected by qualified immunity.” Id. (emphasis in

original) (quotation omitted).

The Court turns first to the issue of whether Ofc. Baughman’s actions amount to excessive

force. The Fourth Amendment—applied to state actors via the Fourteenth Amendment—prohibits

police officers from using excessive force when seizing a person. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 394 (1989). “Whether an officer violated a suspect’s rights depends on the reasonableness of

the use of force.” Flowers v. Renfro, 46 F.4th 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2022). Objective reasonableness

is a pure question of law. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n. 8 (2007) (“the reasonableness of

[defendant’s] actions ... is a pure question of law.”); Phillips v. Community Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d

513, 520 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Objective reasonableness of force is a legal determination rather than a

pure question of fact for the jury to decide. We defer to a jury’s determination of what occurred

during an arrest or whose testimony is credible. But ... we must independently review the jury’s

interpretation of what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”). “An officer’s use of force is

unreasonable if, judging from the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest, the officer

uses greater force than was reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrest.” Gupta v. Melloh, 19

F.4th 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Phillips, 678 F.3d at 519). The court can consider “the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he [or she] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest

by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.

An excessive force claim may be predicated upon unreasonably tight handcuffs. See Tibbs

v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2006); Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir.

2014) (“A person has the right to be free from an officer’s knowing use of handcuffs in a way that

would inflict unnecessary pain or injury, if that person presents little or no risk of flight or threat

of injury.”). In such cases, plaintiffs must present evidence of his complaints to officers, the degree

of his pain, the injuries he suffered, and whether he sought medical care. See Tibbs, 469 F.3d at

665-66 (discussing cases in which the force used in handcuffing constituted a valid excessive

force claim).

At the summary judgment stage, this can be a nuanced determination, especially when

some, but not all, of the factors are evident in the record. For example, an excessive-force claim

survived summary judgment in Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 774–75, 779–81 (7th Cir. 2003),

when the evidence showed that (1) a detainee didn’t resist arrest, disobey orders, pose a threat, and

was suspected only of minor crimes; (2) was handcuffed so tightly that she lost feeling in her

hands; (3) the defendant refused to loosen the cuffs when told of the numbness; (4) the defendant

fought with other officers over the plaintiff’s arm for half an hour and twisted her arm; and (5) the

plaintiff later had two surgeries because of the handcuffing. By contrast, the officer in Tibbs didn’t

violate a detainee’s rights when the plaintiff complained once about his handcuffs and didn’t

elaborate on his injury, numbness, or degree of pain, was handcuffed for less than an hour, and

wasn’t seriously injured. Tibbs, 469 F.3d at 666.

Certainly, the authority to arrest necessarily includes the use of some degree of physical

coercion, see Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). But to defeat summary judgment, a plaintiff must do more

than rely on discomfort and pain from tight handcuffs. Indeed, one line of demarcation between

Payne and Tibbs is the degree of injury suffered by the plaintiff. To be actionable, claims about

overly tight handcuffs generally require assertions of serious injuries, rather than mild allegations

such as redness lasting a day or two. See Tibbs, 469 F.3d. at 666; Herzog v. Village of Winnetka,

39 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 2002); see also, Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1247-48 (10th Cir.

2011) (an excessive force claim based on tight handcuffs requires the plaintiff to show “some

actual injury that is not de minimis.”).

Turning to the facts here, the Court finds Gessner’s claim falls closer to the Tibbs line than

Payne. The record, with favorable inferences drawn in Glessner’s favor, reveals that Glessner, like

Tibbs, suffered some discomfort and pain from tight handcuffs. Glessner complained once or twice

to Ofc. Baughman that the handcuffs were “starting to get tight.” But Glessner did not elaborate

that the handcuffs were painful or causing him any serious discomfort. Like Tibbs, he was

handcuffed for a short time while he was awaiting transport to the jail and in the police car while

he was being transported. There is no assertion that this was a prolonged time – by Glessner’s own

admission it was about 30 minutes – or that the length of time unreasonably caused more injury

other than soreness and discomfort. Glessner experienced some redness and soreness on his wrists

but he neither sought nor received medical care for any alleged wrist injury. Further, jail personnel

checked his wrists pursuant to their own protocol and did not observe any obvious injury.

While the Court concedes that Glessner’s crime was minor and he did not appear to be a

flight risk (recall he was arrested because he would not leave), without some corresponding

evidence of serious injury or evidence that the officer knew he was inflicting significant pain and

ignored it, see Day v. Wooten, 947 F.3d 453, 462 (7th Cir. 2020) (“the key fact is that the officer

must know the handcuffs will cause unnecessary pain or injury”), the Court cannot conclude that

Ofc. Baughman’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. See generally Sow, 636 F.3d 293

(Plaintiff’s evidence “not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether [the

defendant] used excessive force” where plaintiff failed to elaborate on any injury and did not

receive any medical treatment resulting from the use of the handcuffs).4 Ofc. Baughman is entitled

to summary judgment on the excessive force claim against him.

2. Failure to Intervene

This leaves the claim against Deputy Shepherd. Glessner asserts that he failed to intervene

to loosen the overly tight handcuffs. To defeat summary judgment in a failure to intervene, a

plaintiff must produce evidence that an officer “(1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was

using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity

to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir.

2009). But “[t]he fate of [a] plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim is closely linked to that of h[is]

excessive force claim since, by definition, if there is no excessive force then there can be no failure

to intervene.” Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2005); Turner v. City

of Champaign, 979 F.3d 563, 571 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming summary judgment on failure to

intervene claim where district court found no excessive force was used against the Plaintiff). Since

the Court finds that Ofc. Baughman did not use excessive force, Glessner’s failure to intervene

claim against Deputy Shepherd falls with it. Deputy Shepherd is entitled to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above reasoning, the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, [ECF

Nos. 32 and 35], are GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the

Defendants.

SO ORDERED on June 17, 2024.

s/ Holly A. Brady

CHIEF JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY

4 Because the Court does not find a Fourth Amendment violation, it need not address whether Ofc.

Baughman violated a clearly established right.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT