Deida v. Warden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

IVAN DEIDA,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:23-CV-38-JD-MGG

WARDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Ivan Deida, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint naming

eleven separate defendants. ECF 28. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the

action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

When the court screened Deida’s earlier complaint (ECF 17), several deficiencies

were identified. ECF 23. Deida’s amended complaint (ECF 28) alleges essentially the

same facts as his earlier complaint. Deida alleges that Dr. Michael Brumfield performed

an exploratory surgery that resulted in damage to Deida’s spleen and intestines. The

surgery allegedly caused a hernia, infection, and excruciating pain that lasted for

months. Deida does not explain why the surgery was performed, but at some point (it is

unclear when) he was diagnosed with cancer. Deida lists Dr. Brumfield’s address as at

the Oakes Memorial Hospital, but he claims Dr. Brumfield was an agent of Miami

Correctional Facility.1

As explained in the court’s previous screening order (ECF 23 at 1-2), “[i]n order

to state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants

deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under

color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). “The under-color-

of-state-law element means that § 1983 does not permit suits based on private conduct,

no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 616 (7th

Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Deida has not pled facts from which it can be inferred that Dr. Brumfield was

acting under color of law.2 Even if Dr. Brumfield was acting under color of law, Deida

has not pled facts from which it can be plausibly inferred that Dr. Brumfield was

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Under the Eighth Amendment,

inmates are entitled to constitutionally adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and

subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2)

1 Deida’s earlier complaint listed Dr. Brumfield’s address as the Miami Correctional Facility.

2 As a doctor employed by a private company, “[w]hether [he] is a state actor is a functional

inquiry, focusing on the relationship between the state, the medical provider, and the prisoner.” Shields v.

Illinois Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 797 (7th Cir. 2014). A private physician with only “an incidental and

transitory relationship with the state’s penal system” does not become a state actor, and thus subject to

suit under § 1983, by virtue of treating a prisoner. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 827

(7th Cir. 2009).

the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has

diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d

645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Deliberate indifference means that the defendant “acted in an

intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the

plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent

that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham,

394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). For a medical professional to be held liable for

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, he or she must make a decision

that represents “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,

practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not

base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008).

Inmates are “not entitled to demand specific care,” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,

940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019), nor are they entitled to “the best care possible.” Forbes

v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Neither negligence nor medical malpractice

constitute deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“[A] complaint that a

physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner.”). Courts generally “defer to medical professionals’ treatment decisions unless

there is evidence that no minimally competent professional would have so responded

under those circumstances.” Walker, 940 F.3d at 965 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Deida’s amended complaint, like his earlier complaint (ECF 17), alleges

only that Dr. Brumfield made an error during surgery that resulted in harm. While this

may amount to negligence or malpractice, it does not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference. Therefore, Deida may not proceed against Dr. Brumfield.

Deida has also sued the MCF Warden. He alleges that he sent correspondence to

the warden seeking help for his physical pain on multiple occasions, and the warden

refused to respond. He provides no further details. As already explained (ECF 23 at 3-

4), to the extent that Deida is attempting to hold the warden liable because he oversees

the facility, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). “[P]ublic employees are

responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Id. at 596. The amended

complaint does not allege that the warden was personally involved in making decisions

regarding Deida’s medical care. A supervisor can also be held liable if they “know

about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of

what they might see.” Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012).

Deida’s amended complaint, however, does not include facts from which it can be

plausibly inferred that the warden facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind

eye to any serious and unmet medical need.

Deida further contends that both the warden and Grievance Specialist Michael

Gapski interfered with the grievance process by not responding to grievances. The court

has already explained to Deida (ECF 23 at 4) that he has no constitutional right to access

the grievance process. See Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting

that there is not a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to an inmate

grievance procedure). Therefore, he cannot proceed against the warden or Gapski on

this theory.3

Deida also contends that the failure to respond to his writings violated his First

Amendment rights. The court has already explained that it did not. ECF 23 at 4-5. Deida

was able to express himself to the warden and Gapski, and their failure to respond did

not prevent him from further expressing himself in accordance with the First

Amendment.4

Next, Deida contends that Counselor Nathaniel Angle, Counselor J. Stoll, D.I.I.

Shirley Starkey, D.I.I. J. Harbough, and D.I.I. Heishmen each refused to let him inspect

envelopes prior to opening or confirm that each page is accounted for prior to staff

copying and destroying the original documents. “The Supreme Court has recognized

that prisoners have protected First Amendment interests in both sending and receiving

mail.” Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999). “Prison regulations or practices

that affect a prisoner’s legal mail are of particular concern because of the potential for

3 The court’s earlier screening order (ECF 23 at 4) explained that Deida could not proceed against Gapski

on the theory that he facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to any unconstitutional

action, because he did not include factual allegations that permit such an inference. The same is true of

the amended complaint.

4 The amended complaint, like Deida’s earlier complaint, references the Equal Protection Clause. The

court explained that the earlier complaint contains no facts to support this legal theory. ECF 23 at 4. The

amended complaint suffers from the same shortcoming.

interference with a prisoner’s right of access to the courts.” Id. “Prison regulations or

practices affecting a prisoner’s receipt of non-legal mail also implicate First Amendment

rights and must be reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.” Id. “However, merely alleging an isolated delay or some other relatively

short-term, non-content-based disruption in the delivery of inmate reading materials

will not support […] a cause of action grounded upon the First Amendment.” Id. Deida

has not identified any document that qualifies as legal mail. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry,

419 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen a prison receives a letter for an inmate that is

marked with an attorney’s name and a warning that the letter is legal mail, officials

potentially violate the inmate’s rights if they open the letter outside of the inmate’s

presence.”) The purpose of preventing prisons from opening legal mail outside of the

presence of an inmate is to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the

attorney-client privilege by ensuring that jail officials merely inspect for contraband and

do not read confidential communications between an inmate and his counsel. Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-577 (1974). Deida has only described a general policy

whereby mail is opened by custody staff and copied for the inmate prior to disposal.

This regulation is not content-based and does not appear to have implicated either

Deida’s right to counsel or right to access to the courts. Thus, the allegations are

insufficient to state a claim.

Deida also alleges that G.T.L. Kathy Smith denied him a copy of a medical

document that described the trauma that occurred during the surgery. A family

member sent the document through the GTL messaging system, Deida offered to

purchase a printout for 10 cents, and Smith refused to make the copy. Deida claims this

violated his First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The earlier screening order (ECF 23 at 1-6) noted that Deida has not explained why he

believes this violated his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Deida

has now added an additional legal provision, but his allegations suffer from the same

deficiency. They are too vague for the court to find that Deida has stated a claim.

Deida also alleges that Lea Ivers will not let him review and copy his medical

file. The court has already explained (ECF 23 at 6-7) that, while Deida should be able to

obtain copies of his own medical records, he has no constitutional right to free

copies. See Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (indigent pro

se prisoner had no “constitutional entitlement to subsidy. . . to prosecute a civil suit[.]”).

Furthermore, his dispute with Ivers over copies of his medical file does not implicate

constitutional concerns.

Deida has also sued James Stamper, a public information officer, for denying him

medical information and providing incorrect medical information. The court’s earlier

order (ECF 23 at 7) noted that Deida’s allegations were vague and did not appear to

implicate constitutional concerns. The same is true of the amended complaint.

While Deida’s amended complaint includes some additional information, it is

not materially different from Deida’s earlier complaint and it does not state a claim for

which relief can be granted. If Deida believes he can state a claim based on (and

consistent with) the events described in this complaint, he may file an amended

complaint because “[t]he usual standard in civil cases is to allow defective pleadings to

be corrected, especially in early stages, at least where amendment would not be futile.”

Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2018). However, before

amending, Deida should carefully review this order. If he is unable to address the

deficiencies pointed out in this order, then it would be futile for him to file another

amended complaint.

To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number on a Pro Se

14 (INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form which is available from his law library.

He needs to write the word “Amended” on the first page above the title “Prisoner

Complaint” and send it to the court after he properly completes the form. He does not

need to use legal phrases, cite to legal authority, or provide legal analysis; he simply

needs to explain in his own words what happened, when it happened, where it

happened, who was involved, and how he was personally injured, providing details

about what occurred but avoiding legal phrases and citations. He should use each

defendants name every time he references them in the amended complaint.

Finally, Deida filed a motion asking for a printout of the docket sheet. ECF 33.

This was unnecessary. In the future, Deida should simply write the clerk and ask for a

copy. Nonetheless, the clerk will be directed to send Deida a current copy of the docket

sheet.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Ivan Deida’s motion seeking a copy of the docket sheet (ECF 33);

(2) DIRECTS the clerk to send Ivan Deida a current copy of the docket sheet;

(3) GRANTS Ivan Deida until June 27, 2024, to file an amended complaint; and

(4) CAUTIONS Ivan Deida that, if he does not respond by the deadline, this case

will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice because the current

complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted.

SO ORDERED on May 28, 2024

/s/JON E. DEGUILIO

JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT