Manning v. Hershberger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

FORT WAYNE DIVISION

WILLIAM L. MANNING,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 1:23-CV-421-JTM-JEM

HERSHBERGER, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

William L. Manning, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. (DE # 1.) “A

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the

merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief.

Manning alleges that on September 7, 2023, he was placed in a jail transport van

to be taken from the Allen County Jail to the hospital for his weekly chemotherapy

treatment. (DE # 1 at 2.) He asked Officer Barnfield if he could sit in one of the seats

with a seatbelt, but the officer closed the van door, ignoring him. Manning was left in

the back, where there were no seatbelts. He alleges that when Barnfield turned out of

the jail parking lot, he raced across four lanes of traffic and then suddenly made a sharp

turn without braking. Manning says that, without a seatbelt, he was thrown against the

wall and hit his head and shoulder. He alleges everything from the waist up on his right

side hurt from hitting the metal wall of the van. Manning alleges there is a camera that

allowed Barnfield to see him getting thrown around, but he didn’t stop to check if

Manning was okay.

On his way back to the jail after his treatment, Manning alleges that he again

asked to sit in a seat with a seatbelt, but Barnfield made him sit in the back where there

are no seatbelts. He sues Barnfield, the driver of the van, and Sheriff Hershberger for

employing Barnfield.

As a pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment protects Manning from

objectively unreasonable care towards a substantial risk to his health or safety. Miranda

v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018). However, courts have held that the

failure to use a seatbelt, without more, does not present a substantial risk to health or

safety. See Dale v. Agresta, 771 F. App’x 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases). The

lack of a seatbelt must be combined with an action or inaction by the defendant done

with purposeful, knowing, or reckless disregard of the consequences to Manning’s

safety. Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353. Negligence is not enough; the Fourteenth Amendment

does not turn a every accident into a constitutional violation. Id.; see Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) (“Where a government official’s act causing injury to life,

liberty, or property is merely negligent, ‘no procedure for compensation is

constitutionally required.’” (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548 (1981)). In

determining whether a challenged action is objectively unreasonable, the court must

consider the “totality of facts and circumstances.” Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 819 (7th

Cir. 2020).

Here, Manning points to only one instance of unsafe driving in the trip to and

from the hospital. Courts requires more than that to allow an inference that the

defendant’s conduct rose above negligence and demonstrated reckless disregard for a

detainee’s safety. Compare Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 107 (4th

Cir. 2017) (finding a reasonable jury could conclude plaintiff was exposed to a

substantial risk of serious harm based on evidence that “he was fully shackled, unable

to brace himself for impact, and sitting without a seatbelt, in a vehicle that was speeding

and being driven in a way intended to scare and injure him, by a driver who refused

both his requests to be seatbelted and to slow down”), and Edwards v. David, No. 15-CV-

9086, 2017 WL 2653077, at *1, *5 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2017) (concluding police officer’s

conduct was objectively unreasonable when he drove through construction zone at high

rate of speed, continually took eyes off road to interrogate plaintiff, passed two

semitrucks recklessly in the construction zone, and crashed into the construction

barrier, injuring plaintiff who was handcuffed and not wearing a seatbelt), with Sealey v.

Seery, No. 922CV726LEKCFH, 2023 WL 8436024, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2023), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 922CV726LEKCFH, 2023 WL 8061185 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.

21, 2023) (“Plaintiff has alleged no facts beyond the absence of seatbelts and ‘driving at

a high speed’ that would suggest that he was exposed to conditions posing an

unreasonable risk of serious harm.”), and Karmue v. Moore, 654 F. Supp. 3d 118, 134

(D.R.I. 2023) (“Here, the incident involved, at worst, Deputy Moore’s attempt to beat a

light before it turned red—an unsafe but frankly common maneuver that is dissimilar to

the consistently erratic and highly dangerous driving that has led other courts to find a

constitutional violation, clearly established or otherwise.”). Therefore, Manning may

not proceed against Officer Barnfield or Sheriff Hershberger for a claim based on an

objectively unreasonable risk to his safety during transport.

Manning also complains about the medical care he received after he was injured

in the transport van. First, he alleges Barnfield did not check on him after he was first

injured. Then, he says the Nurses Staff Administration and an unidentified doctor did

not take him to the emergency room to get looked at, despite his complaints that his

neck and back hurt.

To establish a violation of the right to adequate medical care under the

Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee must allege: “(1) there was an objectively

serious medical need; (2) the defendant committed a volitional act concerning the

[plaintiff’s] medical need; (3) that act was objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances in terms of responding to the [plaintiff’s] medical need; and (4) the

defendant act[ed] purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly with respect to

the risk of harm.” Gonzalez v. McHenry Cnty., 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). There are no facts alleged that allow a

reasonable inference that Manning needed emergency treatment after he was first

injured. Thus, he has not plausibly alleged that Barnfield’s failure to check on him right

away was objectively unreasonable. Additionally, the grievances attached to the

complaint show that Manning received some care for his injuries, just not the care that

he sought. He does not describe his interactions with the medical staff to allow an

inference that the care he did receive, even if not the care he wanted, was objectively

unreasonable. “An inmate is not entitled to demand specific care, and medical

professionals may choose from a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing

standards in the field.” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir.

2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Without knowing more about the

treatment Manning received, there is no reasonable basis to infer that the decision not to

send him to an emergency room was objectively unreasonable.

This complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. If Manning

believes he can state a claim based on (and consistent with) the events described in this

complaint, he may file an amended complaint because “[t]he usual standard in civil

cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least

where amendment would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738

(7th Cir. 2018). To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number on a

Pro Se 14 (INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form which is available from his law

library. He needs to write the word “Amended” on the first page above the title

“Prisoner Complaint” and send it to the court after he properly completes the form.

Finally, Manning filed a motion to vacate the judgment and reopen the case

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (DE # 11.) The motion is denied as moot

because this case remains open and was never closed.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS William L. Manning until May 6, 2024, to file an amended

complaint;

(2)CAUTIONS William L. Manning if he does not respond by the deadline, this

case will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice because the

current complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted; and

(3)DENIES the motion (DE # 11) as moot.

SO ORDERED.

Date: April 22, 2024

s/James T. Moody

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT