Rumler v. Hyatte

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JUSTIN LEE RUMLER,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:21-CV-203-MGG

LT. MYERS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Justin Lee Rumler, a prisoner without a lawyer, proceeds in this case on Eighth

Amendment claims against Lieutenant Myers, Sergeant Wells, and Sergeant Moore

regarding the unsanitary conditions of his confinement. ECF 83. He alleges that these

defendants ignored his complaints about the prior occupant’s blood on the cell walls

and left him in the unsanitary cell for fourteen hours on August 20, 2020. He further

alleges that he contracted hepatitis C as a result of these unsanitary conditions. The

defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, even accepting

Rumler’s account as true, they did not act with deliberate indifference toward a

substantial risk of harm. ECF 213. Rumler also filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply

(ECF 227), which the court grants.

FACTS

The facts viewed in the light most favorable to Rumler are as follows. On August

19 and August 20, 2020, Rumler resided in the restrictive housing unit at the Miami

Correctional Facility. ECF 222-1 at 1. Sergeant Wells worked from 5:45 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

on August 20.1 ECF 213-2 at 5. Lieutenant Myers worked from 6:00 a.m.to about 6:00

p.m. on August 19. ECF 213-4. On August 20, he arrived between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00

a.m. and remained until at least 4:00 p.m. Id. Sergeant Moore worked from 6:00 p.m. to

6:00 a.m. on August 19 and August 20. ECF 213-5.

At about 6:00 p.m., on August 19, 2020, correctional staff signaled a medical

emergency because, in Cell 104, William Cox, another inmate who had been diagnosed

with hepatitis C, had cut his neck, smeared blood on the windows and the cell door,

and also left blood on the walls and floor.2 ECF 222-1 at 89-90, 92. Lieutenant Myers

oversaw the removal of Inmate Cox from the cell and called the biohazard team to clean

the cell. ECF 213-4. Sergeant Moore saw Inmate Cox’s removal from the cell and the

bloody conditions. ECF 213-5. He also saw the biohazard team cleaning the cell.3 Id.

Lieutenant Myers ended his shift after resolving the situation with Inmate Cox. ECF

213-4.

At about 2:00 a.m., correctional staff moved Rumler to Cell 104, where Rumler

observed that blood covered the cell door, including the windows and cuff port, the

1 Though Sergeant Wells attests to working only on August 19 (ECF 213-3), she appears on the

morning shift roster for August 20, and the defendants do not address this discrepancy. As a result, the

court will construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Rumler, the non-moving party, and assume

that Sergeant Wells worked on August 20.

2 Though the precise amount of blood involved is unclear, Inmate Cox’s affidavit, dated

September 22, 2020, indicates that he survived this incident. ECF 222-1 at 92. According to the incident

report, Inmate Cox was conscious when correctional staff found him and was able to explain why he had

cut himself in a fair amount of detail without any apparent difficulty. Id. at 89-90.

3 Rumler attempts to dispute this fact based on his personal observations of the cell hours later,

which suggested that it had not been adequately cleaned. ECF 224 at 10. However, the court draws a

distinction between Sergeant Moore’s attestation that he observed some effort to clean the cell and

Rumler’s representations regarding the adequacy of that cleaning effort.

back window, the sink area, and parts of the floor. ECF 222-1 at 2. At about 5:00 a.m., he

told a correctional officer about the cell conditions, and the correctional officer “told

[Rumler] that he would let [Sergeant] Moore know about the situation before [he]

finished [his] shift at 6:00 a.m.” Id. At 7:30 a.m., Rumler reported and showed the cell

conditions to Sergeant Wells as a nurse passed his medication through the cuff port. Id.

at 3. Sergeant Wells responded that “she would notify Lieutenant Myers when he

showed up for work and would go from there.” Id. At about 9:30 a.m., Rumler asked a

correctional officer to follow up with Sergeant Wells and Lieutenant Myers on whether

he could move to another cell. Id. At about 10:30 a.m., the correctional officer returned

and said that “he spoke with [Sergeant] Wells, and she stated that she could not do

anything until a movement order was put into place” and “[Lieutenant] Myers had

been notified.” Id. at 4. At about noon, Lieutenant Myers came to Rumler’s cell, and

Rumler informed him on the cell conditions. Id. Lieutenant Myers responded that he

knew of the cell conditions and “they were trying to figure something out.” Id. at 4-5. At

about 3:30 p.m., correctional staff removed Rumler from Cell 104, and he was assigned

to a new cell shortly thereafter. Id. at 6. On October 6, 2020, Rumler transferred to

another facility. Id. at 9.

On January 12, 2018, Rumler tested negative for hepatitis C. Id. However, on

January 6, 2021, Rumler tested positive for hepatitis C. Id. Rumler has not received

tattoos, failed drug screens, or been caught with drugs since his incarceration. Id. He has

not had any other contact with blood since January 12, 2018. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not every dispute between the parties makes

summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Id. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,

the deciding court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606

F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because, even

accepting Rumler’s account as true, they did not act with deliberate indifference toward

a substantial risk of harm. The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement

that deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Townsend v.

Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In evaluating an Eighth

Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong asks whether the alleged

deprivation is “sufficiently serious” that the action or inaction of a prison official leads

to “the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (citations

omitted).

On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show the defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Santiago

v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). “Deliberate

indifference . . . means that the official knew that the inmate faced a substantial risk of

serious harm, and yet disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to

address it.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008). Deliberate indifference

is “something approaching a total unconcern for a prisoner’s welfare in the face of

serious risks,” or a “conscious, culpable refusal” to prevent harm. Duane v. Lane, 959

F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992). To prevail, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant

“had actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious,

culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to

prevent it.” Santiago, 599 F.3d at 756. “[N]egligence, gross negligence, or even

recklessness as the term is used in tort cases is not enough” to state an Eighth

Amendment claim. Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2020). “Exercising

poor judgment . . . falls short of meeting the standard of consciously disregarding a

known risk to his safety.” Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 1997). Instead, the

inmate must allege “a culpability standard akin to criminal recklessness.” Thomas v.

Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 722 (7th Cir. 2021).

“[A] plaintiff must allege not only that he or she experienced, or was exposed to,

a serious harm, but also that there was a substantial risk beforehand that that serious

harm might actually occur.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). The

Seventh Circuit has equated substantial risks to “risks so great that they are almost

certain to materialize if nothing is done.” Id. at 911.

To start, the court finds that the record contains insufficient evidence to

reasonably infer that Sergeant Moore was aware that Rumler had been exposed bloody

cell conditions on the morning of August 20. The undisputed evidence shows that, on

the evening of August 19, Sergeant Moore reasonably believed that Cell 104 had been

cleaned because he saw the biohazard team cleaning the cell. Further, while the court

credits Rumler’s representations as to his interactions with a correctional officer at 5:00

a.m. on August 20, there is no indication that correctional officer followed through with

contacting Sergeant Moore before the end of the shift. Perhaps more significantly, even

assuming that the correctional officer followed through, it is unclear what the

correctional officer said to Sergeant Moore or how he said it. For example, if the

correctional officer merely placed a note on Sergeant Moore’s desk saying, “There is a

problem with Cell 104,” Sergeant Moore may not have noticed it until his next shift,

and, even if he had noticed it earlier, it would not have apprised him of the risk of harm

to Rumler.

The court also observes a disconnect between Rumler’s allegations on what the

defendants knew and the harm he suffered. Specifically, he alleges that the defendants

knew of the bloody conditions of the cell, and he alleges that he contracted hepatitis C

as a result.4 However, the record does not demonstrate that any defendants knew that

Inmate Cox had hepatitis C or knew of the risk that Rumler would contract hepatitis C

when Sergeant Wells and Lieutenant Myers left him in the cell for eight hours until they

received the proper paperwork. Sergeant Wells and Lieutenant Myers likely knew of a

generalized health risk associated with exposure to another individual’s blood, but such

a generalized health risk falls short of a substantial risk of harm. In other words, the

defendants lacked sufficient information to know that contracting hepatitis was “almost

certain to materialize if nothing was done.” In sum, the record does not demonstrate

Sergeant Wells and Lieutenant Myers were aware that Rumler faced a substantial risk

of contracting hepatitis C or of suffering any other type of serious harm.

Nevertheless, even absent knowledge of more specific and more substantial

risks such as the presence of hepatitis C, the Eighth Amendment would not allow

correctional staff to place an inmate in a cell smeared with blood over a long period of

time. This is because “[a] condition which might not ordinarily violate the Eighth

Amendment may nonetheless do so if it persists over an extended period of time.”

Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1997). While there are few cases within this

circuit involving exposure to another person’s blood, the cases discussing exposure to

bodily waste seem appropriately analogous for purposes of an Eighth Amendment

4 For purposes of this order, the court will assume that Rumler contracted hepatitis C from Cell

104. That said, Rumler offers no medical evidence to support that he contracted hepatitis C in this manner

or on the general likelihood of contracting hepatitis C in this manner. See Fed. R. Evid. 701(c) (“If a

witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is

rationally based on the witness’s perception not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”).

analysis. The concerns associated with such exposure extends beyond health concerns

and invoke general standards of dignity. See DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th

Cir. 2001) (quoted with approval in Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir.

2019)). That said, brief exposure to human waste does not violate the Eighth

Amendment. Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A single clogged

toilet does not violate the Constitution”); Balistreri v. Kast, 2017 WL 3299048, at *3 (W.D.

Wis. Aug. 2, 2017) (“[A] brief exposure to human waste, without more, does not rise to

the level of a constitutional concern.”).

To determine when exposure to another person’s blood amounts to a

constitutional concern, the court has surveyed the following cases:

• In Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit

found that an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim should have

survived summary judgment when the record demonstrated that

“when he was initially placed in the segregation unit, the walls of

his cell were smeared with human defecation, the water was not

turned on and nothing was done for three days despite [the

inmate’s] requests . . . for cleaning supplies and water.”

• In DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001), the Tenth

Circuit found that an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim should

have survived summary judgment when the record demonstrated

that “the lack of access to working toilets led to [the inmate’s]

exposure to other inmates’ urine and feces via the standing water

and also to close confinement with the odor of his own

accumulated urine” for thirty-six hours.

• In Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh

Circuit found that an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim should

have survived summary judgment when the record demonstrated

that “[t]he floor of the cell was covered with water, the sink and

toilet did not work, and the walls were smeared with blood and

feces” and the inmate “was forced to remain in the cell without a

mattress, sheets, toilet paper, towels, shoes, soap, toothpaste, or any

personal property, for six days.”

• In Wheeler v. Walker, 303 F. App’x 365 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh

Circuit found that an inmate stated a valid Eighth Amendment

claim by alleging that “for two weeks prison guards, without

explanation, ignored his requests for basic cleaning supplies while

he was exposed to a combination of a heavy roach-infestation, filth,

and human waste.”

• In Balistreri v. Kast, 2017 WL 3299048 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 2017), the

district court found that a cell flooded by a malfunctioning toilet

with urine and fecal matter for two and a half hours did not state a

valid Eighth Amendment claim.

• In Love v. Milwaukee Cnty. Jail Staff, 2023 WL 4238870 (E.D. Wis.

June 28, 2023) the district court found that a cell flooded with fecal

matter for six hours did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

• In Turner-Harris v. Johnson, 2022 WL 1620350 (E.D. Wis. May 23,

2022), the district court found that the inmate’s allegations that he

spent fourteen hours overnight in a dirty cell that smelled of

human waste and “slept on a mattress that had feces in the seams”

raised a valid Eighth Amendment concern but described the

decision as a “a close call.”

Based on the court’s survey of cases within the Seventh Circuit (and a Tenth

Circuit opinion frequently cited with approval within the Seventh Circuit), it appears

that the duration in which exposure to bodily waste arises to the level of an Eighth

Amendment concern lay somewhere between six hours and thirty-six hours. Turner-

Harris seems the most comparable case and suggests that the line might be drawn near

fourteen hours. However, the court finds that Turner-Harris is distinguishable from this

case. As a general proposition, the smell of human waste is more offensive than the

smell of blood. Further, though the record suggests that Inmate Cox had smeared many

of the surfaces within the cell with his blood, it does not suggest the presence of blood

on the bed. An unbloodied bed would have offered Rumler at least some reprieve from

the risk of physical contact with the blood. Additionally, while Rumler was left in the

bloody cell overnight,5 the defendants named in this case did not allow him to remain

in the bloody cell overnight once they learned of the unsanitary conditions. Construing

the record in the light most favorable to Rumler, Rumler notified Sergeant Wells and

Lieutenant Myers of the bloody cell conditions at 7:30 a.m., and he was removed eight

hours later at 3:30 p.m.

The record further demonstrates that, while Sergeant Wells and Lieutenant

Myers might have acted more promptly, they did not completely disregard the risk of

harm. According to Rumler, when Sergeant Wells discovered the bloody cell conditions,

she said that she would convey this information to Lieutenant Myers, her immediate

supervisor. She told another correctional officer that she could not address the

conditions until she received a movement order. That correctional officer also

confirmed that Lieutenant Myers was aware of the bloody conditions, suggesting that

Sergeant Wells had followed through with speaking to him. When Rumler spoke with

Lieutenant Myers, Lieutenant Myers represented that he was working to resolve the

situation. And when Lieutenant Myers received the order to move Rumler, he moved

Rumler. Though the defendants might have taken more drastic measures to curtail

Rumler’s exposure to another inmate’s blood, the court cannot characterize the

5 More specifically, he was placed in the cell from 2:00 a.m. and allowed to leave the cell at 3:30

p.m. Because it seems likely that Rumler’s “night” began prior to 2:00 a.m., it is unclear whether his

confinement to Cell 104 could be fairly characterized as occurring “overnight,” but the court will assume

so for purposes of this order.

defendants’ actions as akin to “criminal recklessness” or “something approaching a

total unconcern for a prisoner’s welfare.”

To recap, Rumler has not demonstrated that Sergeant Moore was aware that

Rumler had been exposed to bloody cell conditions on the morning of August 20. He

has not demonstrated that Sergeant Wells and Lieutenant Myers knew of the specific

risk of contracting hepatitis C entailed by exposure to Inmate Cox’s blood. And he has

not demonstrated that the particular circumstances of his exposure to another inmate’s

blood known by the defendants rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Next, the court considers the defendants’ argument that they are entitled to

qualified immunity. Generally, government officials are protected from civil liability

when performing discretionary functions under the doctrine of qualified immunity so

long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982); see also Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, in

order to evaluate a claim of qualified immunity, the court engages in a two-step

analysis. First, the court considers whether a plaintiff’s claim states a violation of his

constitutional rights. Then, the court determines whether those rights were clearly

established at the time the violation occurred. Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 766

(7th Cir. 2000).

For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours “must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 779 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). The unlawfulness of a particular official’s action

must be apparent “in light of the pre-existing law.” Id. A party may demonstrate that a

right was clearly established by presenting a closely analogous case establishing the

defendant’s conduct was unconstitutional or by presenting evidence the defendant’s

conduct was so patently violative of a constitutional right that reasonable officials

would know without guidance from a court. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739–40.

Here, the court reiterates that no evidence suggests that the defendants knew of

the specific increased risk posed by Inmate Cox’s blood; thus the qualified immunity

inquiry focuses on whether the law was sufficiently developed to apprise the

defendants that leaving Rumler in a bloody cell for eight hours amounted to a

constitutional violation. Here, resolving the summary judgment arguments on Rumler’s

claim required the court to thoroughly canvass Seventh Circuit law for analogous cases,

and the court reached its conclusion by meticulously distinguishing Rumler’s case from

a case that was itself a close call. Further, the court has identified no closely analogous

case establishing that the defendants’ conduct was unconstitutional and cannot find

that the defendants’ conduct was so patently violative of the Eighth Amendment that

reasonable officials would know without guidance from any court. Consequently, the

court cannot find that the unlawfulness of the defendants’ contact was apparent from

pre-existing law. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In sum, the record demonstrates that the defendants did not violate Rumler’s

Eighth Amendment rights. Further, even assuming a violation of Rumler’s Eighth

Amendment rights, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

As a final matter, Rumler seeks physical copies of the medical records produced

in discovery in this case because a flooded cell destroyed his copies. ECF 226. On

December 11, 2023, the court printed and mailed more than five thousand pages of

medical records to Rumler based on his prior request for copies due to another cell

flood. ECF 217. At that time, Rumler’s response to the motion for summary judgment

was due, and the court reasonably assumed that he needed them to litigate this case.

However, Rumler did not rely on his medical records in his summary judgment filings,

and the court did not rely on them in resolving this case. Consequently, it is unclear

why Rumler needs copies of his medical records at this stage of the proceedings. Given

the voluminous nature of the copies and given that lack of any apparent need, the court

denies the request for copies.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the motion for leave to file a sur-reply (ECF 227);

(2) DENIES the motion for copies (ECF 226);

(3) GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 213); and

(4) DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the defendants and to close

this case.

SO ORDERED on February 23, 2024.

s/Michael G. Gotsch, Sr.

Michael G. Gotsch, Sr.

United States Magistrate Judge