Douglas v. Pickens

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MONWELL DOUGLAS,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-1017-JD

E. PICKENS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Monwell Douglas, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case on two

claims. First, he is proceeding “against Officer M. Cook, Officer M. Easley, Sgt. L.

McDonald, Officer D. Martin, Captain E. Pickens, and Sgt. M. Porter in their individual

capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for subjecting him to sewage from

April 10, 2020, through April 12, 2020, in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” ECF 19

at 12. Second, he is proceeding “against Sgt. L. McDonald in his individual capacity for

compensatory and punitive damages for deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs on April 10, 2020, in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” Id. The defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF 98. Douglas filed a response, and the

defendants filed a reply. ECF 109, 111. Douglas also filed a motion for leave to file a sur-

response, and the defendants responded. ECF 112, 113.1 The summary judgment

motion is now fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

1 The court has reviewed the contents of Douglas’ sur-response, and concludes it has no bearing

of the disposition of this case. Therefore, his motion for leave to file a sur-response will be denied.

Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the

evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v.

Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). However, a party opposing a properly

supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in

its own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she

contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th

Cir. 2010). “[I]nferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice.”

Trade Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009). Summary

judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit . . ..” Springer v. Durflinger, 518

F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008).

The defendants provide an affidavit from Captain Matthew Morson, the former

Safety Hazard Manager at Miami Correctional Facility (“MCF”), and Willis Cooper, the

Physical Plant Director at MCF, who attest to the following facts: At MCF, four cells are

connected to the same pipe chase. ECF 98-1 at 1; ECF 98-2 at 1. For each pipe chase,

there are two cells connected upstairs and two cells connected downstairs. Id. Typically,

there are two inmates in each cell, so each pipe chase serves four cells and eight

inmates. Id. If any of those eight inmates makes an effort to clog their toilet, the

resulting obstruction can cause flooding in the four cells connected to the same pipe

chase. ECF 98-1 at 1; ECF 98-2 at 2. Maintenance staff fixes a clogged toilet by shutting

the water off to the four cells connected to the pipe chase and removing the clog. ECF

98-1 at 2; ECF 98-2 at 2. There is rarely a need for maintenance staff to enter a cell to fix a

clog or resulting flooding. ECF 98-2 at 2.

During the relevant time frame between April 10, 2020, and April 12, 2020,

Douglas was housed at MCF in AHU, a restricted housing unit. ECF 98-1 at 2. During

April 2020, there was a substantial increase in aggressive behavior by inmates in AHU

and toilets were frequently purposefully clogged by offenders. Id. Entry into cells in the

AHU puts the staff at risk of harm given the dangerous nature of the inmates housed

there. ECF 98-2 at 2. Accordingly, inmates in AHU stay in their cells while the clog is

repaired through the pipe chase. Id. After a clogged toilet is fixed in AHU, inmates must

wait for the flooding to subside. Id. In the interim, they are given anti-bacterial cleaning

products to clear their cells themselves. Id. This is because AHU is a segregation unit

and these inmates are required to be on lockdown at all times, except for showering. Id.

Only in the most exigent of circumstances will inmates be removed so a janitor can

clean a cell. Id. In AHU, each cell has four solid walls and a door with a one-inch gap

underneath it. ECF 98-1 at 2. Sewage cannot pool in an AHU cell by more than a few

inches unless an inmate purposefully blocks the gap underneath the door to prevent the

sewage from running out. Id. Because Douglas does not dispute these facts, the court

accepts them as undisputed.

The defendants provide only general evidence regarding how flooding in AHU

is typically handled, and do not provide any specific evidence regarding the condition

of Douglas’ cell or their actions to remedy those conditions between April 10, 2020, and

April 12, 2020. In response to the summary judgment motion, Douglas incorporates by

reference his complaint and affidavits from other inmates (ECF 109-1 at 1), which show

the following facts: Around 2:00 p.m. on April 10, 2020, the toilet in Douglas’ cell began

overflowing. ECF 20-2 at 20. Douglas and his cellmate, Victor Adamson-Scott, contacted

Officers Cook and Easley and showed them the toilet was overflowing and spilling

urine and feces all over their floor. Id. Officers Cook and Easley spoke briefly with each

other and then began serving evening chow. Id. Douglas and his cellmate began yelling

in a panic to be let out of their cell so they could eat and shower, but the defendants

continued serving chow. Id. Other toilets on the range then began overflowing, making

a huge lake-like pond in the middle of the dayroom. Id. Once Officers Cook and Easley

finished serving chow, they came back to Douglas’ cell to observe the situation, made a

face at the smell of the sewage, and then left the building. Id. Douglas and other inmates

continued to yell for the water to be cut off and to be removed from their cells, but they

were ignored. Id. At 8:30 p.m., Sgt. McDonald and Officer Martin came to Douglas’ cell.

Id. at 21. By that time, the sewage in his cell was approximately four to six inches high.

Id. Douglas had been standing in sewage since 2:00 p.m. and had been unable to sleep,

use the bathroom, take a shower, or leave his cell. Id. Sgt. McDonald and Officer Martin

kept Douglas in his cell and informed him that Capt. Pickens had been notified and was

on his way to the unit. Id.

Around 2:40 a.m., Douglas attempted to move some of the waste out of his cell,

but slipped in the water and hit his head and passed out. ECF 20-2 at 21, 33, 35.

Douglas’ cellmate yelled for three minutes at Sgt. McDonald and Officer Martin,

asserting that Douglas required medical attention, but Officer Martin only responded

that Capt. Pickens would be there soon. Id. It is not clear when Capt. Pickens arrived at

Douglas’ cell, but Douglas’ cellmate attests that Capt. Pickens was “notified” of the

issues and ignored his requests for help. Id. at 33. Douglas eventually awoke with a

major headache and could not stand without losing his balance. ECF 20-2 at 22. Douglas

and his cellmate stayed in their cell until 5:30 p.m. the next day, April 12, 2020, without

any food, clean water, place to use the bathroom, or shower. Id. When the next shift

began, staff began removing clogged items from pipes and gave Douglas sack lunches

and a shower. Id. Around 9:30 p.m., the pipes began overflowing again, which

continued until late that evening. Id. Douglas requested bleach and a mop to begin

cleaning his cell, but his request was denied. Id. Because the defendants do not dispute

these facts, the court accepts them as undisputed.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that deny inmates

“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773

(7th Cir. 2008). In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an

objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The

objective prong asks whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” that the

action or inaction of a prison official leads to “the denial of the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.” Id. Although “the Constitution does not mandate

comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to

adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene materials, and sanitation. Knight v.

Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.

2006). On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show the defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As the

Seventh Circuit has explained:

[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an

intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have

known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided

not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he

could have easily done so.

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted); see also Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (where inmate

complained about severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a “prototypical

case of deliberate indifference”).

In their summary judgment motion, the defendants raise three arguments. First,

the defendants argue the condition of Douglas’ cell was not objectively serious because

the clogging was not created by them and was “temporary in nature.” ECF 99 at 3-8.

However, the fact the defendants did not create the flooding is not relevant to whether

or not the condition was serious. Moreover, the defendants provide no evidence

regarding the condition of Douglas’ cell or the duration of those conditions, while

Douglas provides evidence his cell was flooded with several inches of sewage for at least

48 hours, leaving him unable to eat, sleep, use the bathroom, or shower. Based on this

evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude the condition of Douglas’ cell was sufficiently

serious that it denied him the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834; Knight, 590 F.3d at 463.

Second, the defendants argue summary judgment is warranted in their favor

because there is no evidence they consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious

harm to Douglas. ECF 99 at 8-11. Each defendant will be addressed in turn.

Capt. Pickens argues there is no evidence he was personally involved in any

violation of Douglas’ constitutional rights because Douglas conceded in his

interrogatory responses that he was “knocked out” while Capt. Pickens was at his cell.

ECF 99 at 8. However, Douglas offers an affidavit from his cellmate, who attests that

Capt. Pickens was notified of the flooding and ignored their requests for help. ECF 20-2

at 33. A reasonable jury could credit Douglas’ cellmate’s testimony and conclude that

Capt. Pickens was personally involved in a violation of Douglas’ constitutional rights.

Officer Cook argues there is no evidence he knew of and disregarded a

substantial risk of harm to Douglas because Douglas only spoke to him through a

locked door, so Douglas cannot show for certain that he actually spoke with Officer

Cook or that Officer Cook actually heard and understood his requests for help. ECF 99

at 9. But Officer Cook provides no evidence disputing Douglas’ testimony that he spoke

with Officer Cook through the locked door. A reasonable jury could therefore credit

Douglas’ testimony and conclude he spoke with and requested help from Officer Cook

through the locked door but was denied. Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude Officer

Cook was deliberately indifferent for ignoring Douglas’ requests for help.

Officer Easley argues her conduct did not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation because, even accepting Douglas’ claims as true, deliberate indifference

requires something more than merely ignoring his requests for help. ECF 99 at 9.

However, case law shows that a defendant may be found deliberately indifferent for

ignoring requests for help. See Board, 394 F.3d at 478 (holding that conduct is

deliberately indifferent when the defendant knew “the plaintiff was at serious risk of

being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even

though he could have easily done so”); Reed, 178 F.3d at 855 (where inmate complained

about severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a “prototypical case of

deliberate indifference”). Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude Officer Easley violated

Douglas’ rights by ignoring his requests for help.

Officer Martin argues there is no evidence he violated Douglas’ constitutional

rights because Douglas did not actually witness any of his alleged actions. ECF 99 at 10.

But Douglas provides evidence he asked Officer Martin for help around 8:30 p.m. the

day his cell first flooded, and his cellmate asked Officer Martin for help later that night

after Douglas got knocked out, and Officer Martin refused to help on both occasions.

ECF 20-2 at 21, 33-34. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude Officer

Martin was deliberately indifferent to Douglas’ health and safety.

Sgt. Porter argues her alleged conduct does not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference. ECF 99 at 10. In his interrogatory responses, Douglas asserted that Sgt.

Porter denied him the “necessary materials” and would not allow him to be moved to

another cell. ECF 55 at 3. But it is unclear from the record how Sgt. Porter was involved

in Douglas’ claim. Specifically, there is no mention in Douglas’ response, complaint, or

affidavits regarding what actions Sgt. Porter took or failed to take between April 10 and

April 12. Based on the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury could conclude Sgt.

Porter was deliberately indifferent to Douglas’ health and safety. Summary judgment is

warranted in her favor.

Sgt. McDonald argues his alleged conduct of denying necessary cleaning

supplies and access to shower and recreation did not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference. ECF 99 at 10-11. But similar to Officer Martin, Douglas provides evidence

he asked Sgt. McDonald for help around 8:30 p.m. the day his cell first flooded, and his

cellmate asked Sgt. McDonald for help later that night after Douglas got knocked out,

and Sgt. McDonald refused to help on both occasions. Based on this evidence, a

reasonable jury could conclude Sgt. McDonald’s conduct was deliberately indifferent.

Regarding Douglas’ claim that Sgt. McDonald was deliberately indifferent to a

serious medical need, Sgt. McDonald likewise argues there is no evidence he was

deliberately indifferent. But Douglas provides evidence his cellmate informed Sgt.

McDonald that Douglas had fallen in the cell and required medical attention, but Sgt.

McDonald refused to provide any assistance. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury

could conclude that Sgt. McDonald was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical

need.

Lastly, all defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because their

conduct was not clearly unconstitutional. ECF 99 at 11-12. Douglas responds that the

defendants’ conduct of forcing him to live in an environment saturated with raw

sewage and denying him cleaning materials is clearly unconstitutional. ECF 109 at 5-6.

Here, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Douglas, the defendants’

alleged conduct of leaving him in a cell filled with several inches of sewage for over two

days violated his constitutional rights based on clearly established precedent. See Taylor

v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (holding that no reasonable correctional officer could

have concluded it was constitutionally permissible to house an inmate in a cell teeming

with human waste for six days); Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007)

(holding that it was “clearly established well before 2001” that keeping an inmate in a

cell covered with water, blood, and feces for six days denied him the ‘minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities’”). Thus, the defendants cannot avoid trial on the grounds

of qualified immunity.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with regard to

Douglas’ claim against Sgt. Porter, but DENIES it in all other respects;

(2) DISMISSES Sgt. Porter from this action;

(3) DENIES Douglas’ motion for leave to file a sur-response (ECF 112); AND

(4) REMINDS the parties this case is now proceeding only on Douglas’

remaining claims: (a) against Officer M. Cook, Officer M. Easley, Sgt. L.

McDonald, Officer D. Martin, and Captain E. Pickens in their individual

capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for subjecting him to

sewage from April 10, 2020, through April 12, 2020, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment; and (b) against Sgt. L. McDonald in his individual capacity for

compensatory and punitive damages for deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs on April 10, 2020, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

SO ORDERED on May 1, 2023

/s/JON E. DEGUILIO

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT