Sayles v. LaPorte County Jail

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ERIC SAYLES,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-940-JD-JPK

LaPORTE COUNTY JAIL, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Eric Sayles, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 1. “A document

filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations

omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a

prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.

Sayles alleges that he was approved to become a trustee at the LaPorte County

Jail and added to the waiting list. ECF 1 at 2. The approval process involved a staff

meeting and background check. Id. After being approved, Sayles was told there were

several individuals above him on the waiting list to become a trustee. Id. Sayles’

approval was briefly put on hold due to him having an open wound, but it was lifted,

and he was told a trustee position awaited him as soon as there was an opening

available. ECF 1-1 at 11. He noticed several others (at least eight) being permitted to

serve as trustee ahead of him. Id. at 12. On October 5, 2022, Sayles was told in response

to a pre-grievance request that he was still on the list and that they were waiting for

openings. Id. at 16. Sayles had not been appointed to the trustee position by the time he

filed this complaint in early November 2022. ECF 1 at 2. He attributes this to his HIV-

positive status, and he is suing for discrimination. Id. at 2-3.

Anytime the government treats one group of people differently than another

group, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated. See

Ostrowski v. Lake Cnty., 33 F.4th 960, 966 (7th Cir. 2022). But unless the classification is

based on a protected class, such as race or sex, such discrimination is permitted by the

State as long as it is not irrational or used for an illegitimate reason. Stevens v. Illinois

Dept. of Transp. 210 F.3d 732, 737-738 (7th Cir. 2000). HIV-positive people do not make

up a protected class, and therefore classification based on HIV status is subject to

rational basis review. See Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 526-27 (7th Cir. 1995); Mofield

v. Bell, 3 F. App'x 441, 443 (6th Cir. 2001) (“HIV-infected inmates do not constitute a

suspect class that is entitled to special consideration under the Equal Protection

Clause.”); see also Ostrowski v. Lake County, 33 F.4th 960, 966 (7th Cir. 2022)

(classifications based on disability are subject to rational basis review). “[P]rison

administrators may treat inmates differently as long as the unequal treatment is

rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. Prison classifications are

presumed to be rational and will be upheld if any justification for them can be

conceived.” See Flynn v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 2016).

Sayles does not explain in his complaint why it is irrational to prevent him from

being a trustee because he is HIV positive, nor does he explain what a trustee does at

the jail. Other circuits have held that identifying and segregating prisoners with HIV

“obviously serves a legitimate penological interest.” Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 271

(5th Cir. 1992); see Harris v. Thigpen 941 F.2d 1495, 1517 (11th Cir. 1992) (mass screening

and segregation of HIV-infected inmates was not “so remotely connected to the

legitimate goals of reducing HIV transmission . . . as to render the policy arbitrary or

irrational”). This suggests that the discrimination here is rational. But given the

advancements in the treatment of HIV since these decisions, Sayles will be given the

opportunity to file an amended complaint explaining why excluding him from the

trustee position because of his HIV status is not rationally related to a legitimate state

interest.

The court also considers whether Sayles has stated a claim under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act applies if Sayles is a “qualified individual with a disability” who was

“denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities” from the jail or prison “by

reason of such disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Rehabilitation Act similarly provides

that no “qualified individual with a disability” may “be denied the benefits of . . . any

program” “solely by reason of her or his disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “Under the

Rehabilitation Act, a program includes all of the operations of the jail or prison. And

Title II of the ADA applies to anything a public entity does.” Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th

331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and citations omitted). For all practical

purposes here, the two statutes are the same. See Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d

667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2012).

HIV-positive status does not automatically qualify as a disability for the

purposes of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. See EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d

438 (7th Cir. 2008). Instead, a petitioner alleging discrimination on the basis of a

disability must prove that as “an individual,” he or she has a “physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1). Major life activities include, but are not limited to, “caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,

bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, communicating, and

working.” 42 U.S.C. §12102(2). The complaint does not describe any physical or mental

impairment that Sayles experiences as a result of his HIV status. It further does not link

his HIV status to substantial limitations of one or more major life activities. As a result,

the complaint does not plausibly allege that Sayles is a “qualified person with a

disability,” as is required by statute.

In addition, the complaint does not establish a basis for Sayles to recover

monetary damages for a violation of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. “To recover

damages, [he] must identify intentional conduct (and not mere negligence) by a named

defendant. [He must] plausibly allege that the defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to rights conferred by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.” Shaw v. Kemper, 52

F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022). Deliberate indifference is a two-part standard requiring

“both (1) knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely,

and (2) a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Lacy v. Cook County, Illinois 867 F.3d 847 at

863 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Deliberate indifference is

“directed to the defendants’ state of mind;” the plaintiff must prove “indifference that is

a deliberate choice by defendants.” Lange v. City of Oconto 28 F.4th 825 (7th Cir. 2022).

There is no basis in the complaint, apart from Sayles’ position on the waitlist, to indicate

why Sayles was not permitted to assume the role of jail trustee or who was responsible

for that decision.

This complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. If Sayles

believes he can state a claim based on (and consistent with) the events described in this

complaint, he may file an amended complaint because “[t]he usual standard in civil

cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least

where amendment would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738

(7th Cir. 2018). To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number on a

Pro Se 14 (INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form which is available from his law

library. After he properly completes that form addressing the issues raised in this order,

he needs to send it to the court.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Eric Sayles until May 26, 2023, to file an amended complaint; and

(2) CAUTIONS Eric Sayles if he does not respond by the deadline, this case will

be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice because the current

complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted.

SO ORDERED on April 24, 2023

/s/JON E. DEGUILIO

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT