“As a general matter, when all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the federal court should relinquish jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state claims”
How later courts described this case
- “As a general matter, when all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the federal court should relinquish jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state claims”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
SHARLETTE JIMERSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Cause No. 1:22-CV-54-HAB
)
CITY OF FORT WAYNE and )
SERGEANT SHANNON HUGHES, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
It is not an original observation to note that the modern cell phone is hardly just a phone.
It is a computer, music player, television, video game console, and, pertinent here, video camera.
Plaintiff used her cell phone to record Defendant Sergeant Shannon Hughes’ (“Hughes”)
interaction with another individual. Plaintiff alleges that Hughes violated her Constitutional rights
and Indiana state law when Hughes seized Plaintiff’s phone and blocked Plaintiff’s vehicle from
leaving the scene. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) which is
now fully briefed (ECF No. 16, 23, 28).
I. Factual Background
In May 2021, the Fort Wayne Police Department received a call of an accident involving
a Camaro, donuts, and a telephone pole. Hughes reported to the scene and approached who she
believed to be the driver of the Camaro As Hughes and the driver were having a conversation,
Plaintiff approached. Hughes alleges that Plaintiff yelled expletives at her, something Plaintiff
denies. What is clear is that Plaintiff was not happy about Hughes’ interaction with the driver and
was making her displeasure clear.
From Hughes’ standpoint, Plaintiff’s presence and conduct was making her investigation
harder. Hughes asked Plaintiff to be quiet and leave, stating that Plaintiff was being disorderly.
When Plaintiff refused, Hughes decided that the best action was to leave and allow other officers
to complete the investigation. As Hughes walked to her squad car, Plaintiff followed, accusing
Hughes of being racist. When Hughes turned to face Plaintiff, Plaintiff raised her cell phone and
began recording Hughes. Hughes objected and reached out for Plaintiff’s cell phone. Hughes
grabbed the phone, scratching Plaintiff’s hand in the process. Hughes held the phone for two or
three seconds before releasing it.
After getting her cell phone back, Plaintiff walked to a nearby van and got in. Plaintiff
found that officers had parked the car in, although there is a dispute about whether the patrol cars
were in place when Plaintiff arrived in the van or if Hughes had directed officers where to park
after Plaintiff arrived. No matter: one of the patrol cars quickly moved out of the van’s way and
Plaintiff left.
II. Legal Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The non-moving party must marshal and present the Court with evidence on which a
reasonable jury could rely to find in their favor. Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651,
654 (7th Cir. 2010). A court must deny a motion for summary judgment when the nonmoving
party presents admissible evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. Luster v. Ill. Dep’t
of Corrs., 652 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). A court’s role in deciding a motion
for summary judgment “is not to sift through the evidence, pondering the nuances and
inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe. The court has one task and one task only: to decide,
based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.”
Waldridge v. Am. Heochst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).
Facts that are outcome determinative under the applicable law are material for summary
judgment purposes. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997). Although a
bare contention that an issue of material fact exists cannot create a factual dispute, a court must
construe all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, view all reasonable inferences
in that party’s favor, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2000), and avoid
“the temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely true,” Payne v. Pauley,
337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). A court is not “obliged to research and construct legal arguments
for parties, especially when they are represented by counsel.” Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586,
590 (7th Cir. 2011).
B. Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity1 shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a
plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and
(2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). District courts have discretion to decide which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to tackle first. Person v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009).
The Court recognizes that the parties’ versions of events do not line up perfectly,
particularly about Plaintiff’s role in the confrontation. Still, the mere existence of disputed facts is
1 Plaintiff alleges violations of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Distinguishing between the two is not
critical for the qualified immunity decision. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has explained that it made “no difference that
our circuit caselaw situated the constitutional violation in the Due Process Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment.”
Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019).
not enough to defeat summary judgment. Instead, for Plaintiff to prevail, the disputed facts must
be material to the question of qualified immunity. Hernandez v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 634 F.3d
906, 916 (7th Cir. 2011). Even if the Court accepts all Plaintiff’s facts as true, the right she seeks
to vindicate is not clearly established.
Two recent decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States have clarified what it
means for a right to be “clearly established.” See City of Tahlequah, Oklahoma v. Bond, 142 S.Ct.
9 (2021); Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S.Ct. 4 (2021). Both cases emphasize that clearly
established law cannot be defined “at too high a level of generality.” Bond, 142 S.Ct. at 11. “It is
not enough that a rule be suggested by then-existing precedent; the rule’s contours must be so well
defined that it is clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).2
Fourth Amendment cases call for particular specificity, as it is “sometimes difficult for an
officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer
confronts.” Id. at 11–12. Thus, to show a violation of clearly established law, Plaintiff must identify
a case that put Defendants on notice that their specific conduct was unlawful. Cortesluna, 142
S.Ct. at 8.
Plaintiff has conceded that her Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force fails, but still
asserts that her rights were violated when her phone was seized, and she was prevented from
exercising her First Amendment right to record Hughes’ conduct. To survive summary judgment,
Plaintiff must identify at least one case that put Hughes on notice that her conduct was unlawful.
In this task, Plaintiff has failed.
2 There is some suggestion in Cortesluna that the case must come from the Supreme Court of the United States.
Cortesluna, 142 S.Ct. at 8 (“Even assuming that Circuit precedent can clearly establish law for purposes of § 1983 . .
..”)
The unlawful seizure claim is the easiest to address. Plaintiff does not discuss a single case,
no matter the level of specificity, to support her claim that Hughes violated Plaintiff’s Constitution
rights when Hughes seized the phone. (ECF No. 23 at 2–3). Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity on this claim.
The First Amendment claim is only slightly harder to analyze. Plaintiff relies mainly on
Craft v. Billingslea, 459 F. Supp. 3d 891 (E.D. Mich. 2020). But no matter how on-point Craft
may be, as a district court decision it cannot make clearly established law. Krasno v. Mnookin, ---
F. Supp. 3d ---, 2022 WL 16635246, at *23 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2022); citing Camreta v. Greene,
563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011). Craft cannot save Plaintiff’s case.
Plaintiff’s other cases do not show the clearly established law that she needs. American
Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012), stands at most for the
proposition that the public has a First Amendment right to make audio recordings of police officers
performing their duties in public. Id. at 606. It says nothing about video recordings (although they
are at least implicitly covered by the holding) or whether restricting an individual’s ability to record
for two or three seconds violates the First Amendment. Paterek v. Vill. of Armada, Mich, 801 F.3d
630 (6th Cir. 2015), addresses First Amendment claims in the context of allegations that a
municipality retaliated against an individual for statements made during a zoning dispute. It says
nothing about the conduct of police while being filmed. Plaintiff’s final case, Gekas v. Vasiliades,
814 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2016), deals with a dentist’s claim that he faced unnecessary investigations
by a state regulatory board in retaliation for speech. Again, Gekas is so far-afield of the current
fact pattern that it could not have informed Hughes’ conduct.
Simply put, Plaintiff has cited no case that would have told Hughes that her conduct was
unlawful. She has not, then, defeated Hughes’ assertion of qualified immunity. Summary judgment
for Hughes’ on all federal claims is appropriate.
C. Remaining State Law Claims
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on all federal claims. Because that disposition leads to the dismissal of all claims over
which the Court has original jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court must address
whether to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims and rule on Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment related to those claims.
As the Seventh Circuit consistently has stated, “it is the well-established law of this circuit
that the usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all
federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th
Cir. 1999); see also Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 404 (7th Cir. 2007) (“As a general matter,
when all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the federal court should relinquish
jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state claims”); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d
1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994) (“the general rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed before
trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendant state-law claims rather than
resolving them on the merits”). Yet the court of appeals has discussed “three well-recognized
exceptions” to the general rule that “when all federal-law claims are dismissed before trial, the
pendent claims should be left to the state courts.” Wright, 29 F.3d at 1252. As the court has
explained, sometimes there are “unusual cases in which the balance of factors to be considered
under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity —
will point to a federal decision of the state-law claims on the merits.” Id.
The first example that the court discussed occurs “when the statute of limitations has run
on the pendent claim, precluding the filing of a separate suit in state court.” Wright, 29 F.3d at
1251. That concern is not present here, however, because Indiana law gives a plaintiff three years
from the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds of state law claims in federal court in which to refile
those claims in state court. See Ind. Code § 34-11-8-1.
The second exception recognized in Wright applies when “substantial judicial resources
have already been committed, so that sending the case to another court will cause a substantial
duplication of effort.” 29 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341,
1347–48 (7th Cir. 1986)). Here, although the Court has devoted significant resources to the
disposition of the federal claim on summary judgment, it has not delved deeply into the state law
claims. See Davis, 534 F.3d at 654 (“the district court disposed of the federal claims on summary
judgment, and so ‘substantial judicial resources’ have not yet been committed to the case”). Thus,
while there clearly are times when “a district court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims for reason of judicial efficiency,” Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee Cty. Bd.
of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722, 732 (7th Cir. 2001), this is not one of them.
The third circumstance to which the court of appeals has pointed in which disposition of
pendent state law claims may be appropriate “occurs when it is absolutely clear how the pendent
claims can be decided.” Wright, 29 F.3d at 1251. For example, “[i]f the district court, in deciding
a federal claim, decides an issue dispositive of a pendent claim, there is no use leaving the latter
claim to the state court.” Id. In addition, if the state-law claims are “patently frivolous,” they should
be resolved right away in the federal court. Id. Still, “[i]f the question whether a state-law claim
lacks merit is not obvious, comity concerns may dictate relinquishment of jurisdiction.” Id. This
is a close call. The Court believes that Plaintiff’s state law claims are likely without merit, but it
ultimately concludes that it cannot say with certainty that they are frivolous. While Plaintiff’s state
court claims arise out of the same facts as his now-defunct federal claims, they are still subject to
distinct legal analysis.
In sum, the Court finds that none of the exceptions to the “usual practice” applies in this
case. As a result, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice
on Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismisses those claims with leave to refile in state court.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all
federal claims. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state
law claims. Those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court. With
no claims remaining, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendants and against
Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED on February 23, 2023.
s/ Holly A. Brady
JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT