Florance v. Barnett

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CHARLES W. FLORANCE III,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-CV-399 JD

CAROL C. BARNETT, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This case arises out of pro se plaintiff Charles Florance’s ultimately successful attempts to

have his student loans forgiven. Mr. Florance took out a Primary Care Loan (“PCL loan”) for

medical school under a federal program offered through the Department of Health and Human

Services (“HHS”)1. Mr. Florance defaulted on the debt, and his medical school, Indiana

University (“IU”), filed suit to collect the debt in 2019. In 2021, Mr. Florance sent IU a letter

requesting cancelation of the debt under 42 U.S.C. 292r(d), which provides for cancelation of the

loan if the borrower is permanently and totally disabled. IU did not submit a discretionary

recommendation that Mr. Florance’s loan be canceled because the school administrators did not

think Mr. Florance met the qualifications for total and permanent disability under the statute.

HHS initially denied Mr. Florance’s forgiveness request. Mr. Florance contacted a number of

parties and, within a year, HHS informed IU that it had reversed its decision and instructed IU to

cancel the loan. IU canceled the loan and dismissed its collections case against Mr. Florance.

1 Some administrative processes of the PCL loan program are handled by the Health Resources and

Services Administration, a subdivision of HHS. For simplicity, the Court has referred to both as HHS where

possible in this opinion.

Nevertheless, Mr. Florance sued four administrators at IU and two of IU’s external

attorneys, claiming that they engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional due

process rights, in violation of § 1983 and § 1985. A prior defendant, an employee of HHS, was

dismissed pursuant to a stipulation. (DE 32.) The attorney defendants moved to dismiss (DE 10)

and the IU defendants soon followed (DE 22). The Court now GRANTS both motions to dismiss

with prejudice, finding Mr. Florance has not stated a claim for relief against any defendant.

A. Facts

The following facts are pulled from Mr. Florance’s allegations, except where supplemented

or contradicted by exhibits as noted by citations to the record. In the fall of 2016, Mr. Florance

attended Indiana University School of Medicine. While a student, he received a Primary Care

Loan for $20,000 under a federal program pursuant to the Public Health Services Act and offered

through the Department of Health and Human Services. He withdrew in the following spring. In

2016, Mr. Florance pursued an unrelated determination of permanent and total disability from

the Veteran’s Administration (DE 1-1 at 1.) Several years elapsed, and on April 22, 2019, IU

sued to collect the debt. (DE 10-1 at 2.) Again, several years elapsed. The litigation remained

pending, and IU twice moved to stay proceedings, (DE 10-1 at 4, 7.) On May 12, 2021, two

years after being sued, Mr. Florance informed IU that he had recently received a permanent and

total rating of disability from the VA and requested that his student loans be forgiven. The next

week, Mr. Florance spoke to IU’s attorneys and informed them of his cancelation request. The

collections litigation remained pending. On September 30, 2021, IU filed a motion for summary

judgment in the collections case. The next day, Mr. Florance emailed IU’s attorneys and asked

them to withdraw the motion. They did not. On October 5, 2021, Mr. Florance contacted HHS to

inquire regarding the status of his student loan cancelation. The HHS employee stated HHS had

not received a cancelation recommendation from the university. On October 15, 2021, IU sent a

letter to Mr. Florance stating the information he submitted to IU “is not consistent with what the

university understands to be the applicable law,” and so the representative was not in a position

to recommend cancelation.

Not contented with this turn of events, on November 10, 2021, Mr. Florance contacted

Senator Mike Braun’s office and requested assistance with his loan cancelation. A senatorial

staffer contacted HHS and received a reply that HHS had not received a recommendation from

IU, but HHS would contact IU. Meanwhile, on November 18, 2021, IU filed a motion to stay the

collections proceedings, which the court granted on November 23. (DE 10-1 at 12.) On

December 9, 2021, HHS requested information from IU, including a recommendation or

explanation why no recommendation was offered. On December 17, 2021, IU responded in a

letter to HHS explaining that it was not able to recommend Mr. Florance for cancelation because

their research indicated he was engaged in gainful employment and thus did not meet the

statutory requirements. (DE 23-1 at 1–2.) Meanwhile, the university requested, and was granted,

a stay of the collections case pending HHS’s review of Mr. Florance’s cancelation request. (DE

10-6 at 2.) Presumably taking the university’s recommendation into account, on March 17, 2022,

HHS denied Mr. Florance’s cancelation request, writing that he was ineligible because he was

able to engage in substantial gainful activity despite his medical conditions. (DE 10-8 at 6.) IU

communicated this determination to Mr. Florance on March 23, 2022. (DE 1-1 at 6.)

Again dissatisfied, Mr. Florance contacted HHS directly one week later and requested a

hearing. On March 30, 2022, HHS wrote to IU informing the university that it was rescinding its

earlier denial and re-reviewing the case. (DE 1-1 at 7.) IU communicated this information to Mr.

Florance. (DE 1-1 at 8.) On May 26, 2022, HHS informed IU that “Mr. Florance meets the

statutory requirements for discharge of his loan” and recommended cancelation. (DE 10-6 at 2.)

IU began the cancelation and moved to dismiss its collections claims on July 5, 2022. (DE 10-6

at 2). The dismissal was granted a week later.

Mr. Florance has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985(2) and (3), alleging

the university administrators, their attorneys, and an HHS employee conspired to deny Mr.

Florance’s student loan forgiveness application because they were motivated by discriminatory

animus against the disabled. This discrimination is allegedly evidenced by the university’s

refusal to forward his requests verbatim in lieu of making their own determinations and

recommendation, the attorneys’ filing of a motion for summary judgment in the collections

action, all parties’ failure to respond to all of Mr. Florance’s emails, and one attorney’s untimely

retirement. The defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Florance’s claims, which the Court now

grants.

B. Judicial Notice of Certain Documents

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), certain documents may be considered

without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Hecker v. Deere

& Co., 556 F.3d 575, 582–83 (7th Cir. 2009). The “court may consider, in addition to the

allegations set forth in the complaint itself, documents that are attached to the complaint,

documents that are central to the complaint and are referred to in it, and information that is

properly subject to judicial notice.” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013).

The Court considers the exhibits to Mr. Florance’s complaint in rendering its decision.

See Bogie, 705 F.3d at 608-09 (“Taking all facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construing

all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, we review the complaint and all exhibits attached to the

complaint.”). The Court also takes judicial notice of the seven state court documents—including

the docket sheet, court’s orders, and stipulated partial dismissal—attached by the attorney

defendants in docket entry 10, because they are not subject to reasonable dispute. See Orgone

Cap. III, LLC v. Daubenspeck, 912 F.3d 1039, 1048 (7th Cir. 2019). A court may properly take

judicial notice of matters of public record, including court records. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v.

Lease Resol. Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The most frequent use of judicial

notice of ascertainable facts is in noticing the contents of court records.”). Judicial notice allows

federal “courts to avoid unnecessary proceedings when an undisputed fact in the public record

establishes that the plaintiff cannot satisfy the 12(b)(6) standard.” Id. The court records are thus

properly noticed.

The Court additionally considers two letters incorporated by reference to Mr. Florance’s

complaint: they are IU’s December 17, 2021, letter to HHS (DE 23-1) and HHS’s March 17,

2022, letter to IU (DE 10-8). “[T]he incorporation-by-reference doctrine provides that, if a

plaintiff mentions a document in his complaint, the defendant may then submit the document to

the court without converting defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment.”

Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012). Both letters are

properly considered because they are referenced in the complaint. See (DE 1 at ¶ 22) (“Ms.

Carol Barnett, of Indiana University’s Office of General Counsel, submitted a response to HHS

on or around December 17, 2021. This response…”); (DE 1 at ¶ 23) (“After receiving Ms.

Barnett’s response, HHS denied my PCL cancelation request.”). Further, both letters are central

to Mr. Florance’s claims; his claims arise entirely from his communications with the university

and HHS and their ensuing communications with each other. Cf. Wright v. Associated Ins.

Companies Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994) (considering agreement allegedly giving rise

to property interest in § 1983 due process case on motion to dismiss). Completeness also

instructs their consideration. See L. Offs. of David Freydin, P.C. v. Chamara, 24 F.4th 1122,

1126 n.1 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Just as a plaintiff cannot prevent a court from considering parts of a

contract that doom her claim by including in the complaint only the parts of a contract that

support her side, a party’s selection of part of a chain of communication does not prevent the

court from considering the entire chain.”); Fin. Fiduciaries, LLC v. Gannett Co., 46 F.4th 654,

663 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Incorporation-by-reference doctrine prevents a plaintiff from avoiding

dismissal by omitting facts or documents that undermine his own case.”). Mr. Florance attached

some of his communications with the university regarding his loan to his complaint and has

based his claims on the communications (DE 1-1); fairness requires the Court consider the

totality of these communications if provided with them.

C. Legal Standards

(1) Standard on Motion to Dismiss

To satisfy the federal pleading requirements, “[a] plaintiff’s claim need only provide a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief sufficient to provide

the defendant with fair notice of the claim and its basis.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074,

1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). A plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a

plausible—not merely conceivable—claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). “Pro se complaints are construed more forgivingly than a pleading prepared by a

lawyer.” Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020). “However, it is also well

established that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural rules.” Pearle

Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008). “When a complaint fails to state a claim

for relief, the plaintiff should ordinarily be given an opportunity, at least upon request, to amend

the complaint to correct the problem if possible.” Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th

Cir. 2013). “Leave to amend need not be granted, however, if it is clear that any amendment

would be futile.” Id.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all well-pleaded

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000). Facts in the complaint that disprove

the asserted claim should be considered, and the court need not accept unsupported conclusions

of law. N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir.

1998). Even while construing the allegations in plaintiff’s favor, documents properly considered

“may permit the court to determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment” when reviewing

a motion to dismiss. Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010), as

amended (Dec. 16, 2010). To the extent an exhibit or judicially noticed document contradicts the

complaint’s allegations, the exhibit controls. Forrest v. Universal Sav. Bank, F.A., 507 F.3d 540,

542 (7th Cir. 2007). A court is not bound by the party’s characterization of an exhibit and may

independently examine and form its own opinions about the document. See McCready v. eBay,

Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 891 (7th Cir. 2006). The aforementioned facts were stated as favorably to Mr.

Florance as permitted by the complaint and other materials that may be considered on a Rule

12(b)(6) motion.

(2) HHS Student Loan Forgiveness

The laws governing the forgiveness of HHS medical school loans are relevant here. One

statute and one regulation govern. Title 42 U.S.C. § 292r(d) provides: “The liability to repay the

unpaid balance of such a loan and accrued interest thereon shall be canceled upon the death of

the borrower, or if the Secretary determines that he has become permanently, and totally

disabled.” This is expounded further in 42 C.F.R. § 57.211(a):

“The Secretary will cancel a student borrower’s indebtedness . . . if the borrower

is found to be permanently and totally disabled on recommendation of the school

and as supported by whatever medical certification the Secretary may require. A

borrower is totally and permanently disabled if he or she is unable to engage in

any substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable impairment,

which the Secretary expects to continue for a long time or to result in death.”

Title 42 U.S.C. § 292r(d) and 42 C.F.R. § 57.211(a) are the only statutory or administrative

provisions relevant here. The plain language of the applicable statutes indicate cancelation of

HHS is appropriate if the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines the borrower

becomes permanently and totally disabled as defined in the statute and regulations. 42 U.S.C. §

292r(d). This determination is made by the Secretary and subject to a narrow definition: the

borrower must be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a medically

determinable impairment.” 42 C.F.R. § 57.211(a) (emphasis added). While the Secretary has

ultimate authority to determine whether the borrower is permanently and totally disabled, a

federal regulation provides that the finding is to be “on recommendation of the school,” giving

the school a discretionary role in the process. Notably, 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a)(2), which

automatically discharges the loans of those who have been determined to be unemployable by

the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, does not apply here, because the loans were issued under HHS

and pursuant to the Public Health Professionals Act, not by the Department of Education and

under the Federal Family Education Loan Program. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a)(2) (“discharging

such borrower’s loans under this subsection”) (emphasis added). Because § 1087(a)(2) does not

apply, there is no law requiring the school to make a positive recommendation for cancelation if

one is determined to be disabled by the VA.

D. Discussion

Mr. Florance’s claims fail because the defendants did not deprive him of a right, his claims

are not actionable under § 1985, and his conspiracy claims are not plausible. To be sure, Mr.

Florance has stated allegations indicating a bureaucracy that might annoy and frustrate a person,

but he has not stated a claim for legal relief, as he suffered no deprivation as required to state a

due process claim, and the disabled are not a protected class under § 1985. Mr. Florance

misunderstands the law at several junctures, no doubt compounding his frustrations: his VA

disability determination is totally unrelated to loan forgiveness under the applicable program, the

IU defendants had no statutory or Constitutional obligation to forward his claim verbatim as their

recommendation, and there is no Constitutional right to excellent and responsive customer

service from state actors.

(1) Section 1983 Claims

Mr. Florance brings procedural due process claims against the IU defendants, arguing they

deprived him of a property right by their slow, uncommunicative, and discriminatory

proceedings. These claims fail for several reasons. First, Mr. Florance was not deprived of any

right. Second, the defendants are not proper parties to this due process suit.

Mr. Florance has not stated a due process claim because he was not deprived of a property

interest. “To plead a procedural due-process claim, [plaintiff] must allege [1] a cognizable

property interest, [2] a deprivation of that interest, and [3] a denial of due process.” Palka v.

Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court will assume without deciding that Mr.

Florance could have a property interest in the forgiveness of his student loans, which does not

strike the Court as inherently unreasonable. Cf. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972) (collecting cases finding a government entitlement property right). But

Mr. Florance has not been deprived of that interest: all parties agree that his student loans were

forgiven under the eligible program. Mr. Florance hits a hard wall at the second prong of the

test—he has suffered no deprivation.

To get around this, Mr. Florance would need to state some other property interest of which he

was cognizably deprived. Mr. Florance takes a stab at this, arguing that he has a property interest

in the process of reaching his entitlement. (DE 26 at 4.) Mr. Florance seems to assert he has a

property interest in the speedy and convenient resolution of his student loan forgiveness

application, though he refuses to confirm or deny whether this is his theory of recovery. (DE 26

at 1.) These arguments fail for multiple reasons. First, while due process protects property

interests, no one has a property interest in due process, as that stretches the meaning of “property

interest” beyond all meaning. Cf. Bell v. City of Country Club Hills, 841 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir.

2016) (defining “property interest”). Aside from defying the plain meaning of “property

interest,” one could not have a property right to due process, because such a right would defy due

process analysis: it would eliminate the first prong of the test and make the remaining two

duplicative.2 The inquiry would be totally circular. Further, Mr. Florance has not provided any

support for such a right, nor could the Court locate any upon independent search. In contrast, the

available precedent contradicts such a right. Cf. McDonald v. Astrue, 465 F. App’x 554, 556 (7th

Cir. 2012) (no due process right to Social Security disability determination in less than a year).

The Court is not convinced a property right to the process of loan forgiveness, or any other

2 E.g., (1) plaintiff has a property right to due process, (2) he was deprived of that right by inadequate

process, and (3) the process was inadequate. It is nonsensical.

process, exists. Mr. Florance takes great umbrage at the idea that “all’s well that ends well” (DE

14 at 2), but in the terms of Constitutional due process, that is often the truth.3

Second, Mr. Florance proceeds under the theory that delays in the process caused him to

incur expenses, such as purchasing law books or taking the time to “actually talk to a politician,”

which he apparently construes as a deprivation of property. (DE 1 at ¶ 35.) A deprivation of

property must be more than de minimis to be actionable under the due process clause. Head v.

Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 794, 803 (7th Cir. 2000). Deprivations of liberty

or property “are not actionable under the Constitution unless they are atypical and significant in

relation to the inevitable ‘deprivations’ that people suffer as a result of contractual disputes and

the other ordinary frictions of life.” Baerwald v. City of Milwaukee, 131 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir.

1997). The doctrine of de minimis harm places outside the scope of legal relief the sorts of small

and regular injuries that “must be accepted as the price of living in society rather than made a

federal case out of.” Swick v. City of Chicago, 11 F.3d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 1993). Mr. Florance’s

minor expenses clearly fall within this category. Were these sort of de minimis expenses

actionable, every person who wins a lawsuit against the government might recover for their

expenses litigating the case. There is no support for such a conception of law, and this

inconvenience is not actionable as a property right under the Constitution.

Even if these expenses were actionable, they were caused by delay in resolving the loan

forgiveness; the Court may properly consider to what extent the plaintiff caused the delay. See

Jones v. City of Gary, Ind., 57 F.3d 1435, 1444–45 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding no due process

3 Further, Mr. Florance’s conception of his denial of due process appears to be based significantly in the

fact that various persons did not respond to all of his emails, though documents indicate defendants responded

substantially. No case has found one’s constitutional right to due process is violated by a state actor’s failing to

respond to emails, which does not fit into the notice and opportunity to be heard framework and is more accurately

described as poor customer service.

violation). Mr. Florance mistakenly believed that his student loan was subject to a provision of

an unrelated law that allowed for forgiveness if he obtained a finding of permanent and total

disability from the Veteran’s Administration. Accordingly, he did not send notice to IU that he

was seeking forgiveness of his HHS loan until he had obtained a finding of permanent and total

disability from the VA—years after he had been sued. Mr. Florance caused much of the delay

and his ensuing bureaucratic headache by failing to file for forgiveness until after he obtained the

irrelevant VA determination, which further undermines his due process claims.

Finally, were there a due process right of which Mr. Florance suffered a deprivation, he has

not sued the proper defendants. Under the applicable statute, the university does not have the

final decision-making authority regarding student loan forgiveness: that belongs to the Secretary

of Health and Human Services. Due process requires an opportunity to be heard, but the

university did not have the ability or responsibility to afford Mr. Florance a hearing; under the

relevant law, that duty belonged to HHS.4 Therefore, any defects in process are not actionable

against the university or its attorneys; they would need to be brought against the party with

authority to afford him a hearing, in this case, the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See,

e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (social security recipient brought due process

claim against Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare); Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481

U.S. 252, 255 (1987) (employer brought due process violation against Secretary of Labor where

statute assigned decision-making authority to the same); Venckiene v. United States, 328 F.

Supp. 3d 845 (N.D. Ill. 2018), aff’d, 929 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2019) (plaintiff brought due process

4 The Secretary’s final control over the PCL loan process is further evidenced by 42 C.F.R. § 57.216a(d),

which provides the procedure by which a university may obtain a notice and hearing from the Secretary in the event

the university is found no longer eligible to participate in the PCL loan program.

claim grounded in extradition against Secretary of State where statute gave the same decision-

making authority). Accordingly, Mr. Florance’s due process claims must be dismissed.

(2) Section 1985 Claims

Mr. Florance also brings claims under § 1985(2) and (3). Section 1985(2) contains two

clauses that give rise to two causes of action. Wright v. Illinois Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 40

F.3d 1492, 1508 (7th Cir. 1994). “The first clause prohibits conspiracies that interfere with

federal judicial proceedings, and the second prohibits conspiracies that ‘obstruct the course of

justice in state courts.’” Hernandez v. Dart, 635 F. Supp. 2d 798, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing

Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725 (1983)). Although Mr. Florance does not specify which

clause is at issue, the second clause is the only one that could possibly be implicated by

defendants’ actions, as the collections case occurred in state court. See Hernandez, 635 F. Supp.

2d at 809. Under § 1985(3) and the second part of § 1985(2), the defendants’ actions must be

motivated by an intent to deprive their victims of the equal protection of the laws. Kush v.

Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725 (1983). The Seventh Circuit has found this intent must be “a racial

or otherwise class-based invidious discriminatory animus.” Nowicki v. Ullsvik, 69 F.3d 1320,

1325 (7th Cir. 1995). Disability is not such a classification. The Seventh Circuit decisively

foreclosed the possibility in D’Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., which held that “[b]eing

handicapped is not a historically suspect class such as race, national origin, or sex” in the context

of a 1985(3) suit. See 760 F.2d 1474, 1487 (7th Cir. 1985). Where a plaintiff alleges animus

based on a non-suspect class, as Mr. Florance has done here, he does not state a claim under

§ 1985(3). See Ma v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 833 F. App’x 10, 14 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding plaintiff

failed to state a claim where discrimination theory was predicated on status as a parolee).

D’Amato remains good law and controls, defeating Mr. Florance’s 1985 claims. See Summerland

v. Exelon Generation Co., 455 F. Supp. 3d 646, 665 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (applying D’Amato).

Mr. Florance acknowledges the consequence of D’Amato on his action. (DE 26 at 5.)

However, he is undeterred; he asks the Court to rule in his favor, comparing the wrongfulness of

D’Amato and his alleged constitutional violation (delay of 14 months in receiving student loan

forgiveness) to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (legalizing segregation nationwide for

nearly 60 years). Mr. Florance’s assertions are groundless and, in any case, this Court is bound

by controlling circuit precedent. See United States v. Glaser, 14 F.3d 1213, 1216 (7th Cir. 1994)

(a district court within the Seventh Circuit “must follow” the decisions of the Seventh Circuit).

Because D’Amato controls, Mr. Florance has not stated a claim under § 1985.

Further, even if disability were a suspect class under § 1985, Mr. Florance’s allegations do

not support the inference that the defendants acted out of an animus towards the disabled. See

Milchtein v. Milwaukee Cnty., 42 F.4th 814, 827–28 (7th Cir. 2022) (affirming dismissal where

inference of animus was unsupported). The alleged violations of subsections of § 1985 “must be

motivated by racial, or other class-based discriminatory animus.” Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613,

617 (7th Cir. 2008). Instead, Mr. Florance alleges that the defendants acted to determine whether

Mr. Florance qualified for the program, writing, “The Defendants decided that I wasn’t the right

kind of disabled, or disabled enough, to qualify for cancelation.” (DE 1 at ¶ 30.) Determining

whether someone meets the statutory definition of disability required to qualify for a legal

protection is not discriminatory. See generally Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461 (7th Cir.

1997) (discussing the spectrum of disability while determining whether plaintiff was entitled to

the protection of the ADA as a “qualified individual with a disability”). Therefore, Mr.

Florance’s § 1985 claims also fail because his allegations do not support an inference of animus

against the disabled.

(3) Conspiracy Claims

Mr. Florance makes several scattered references to a conspiracy throughout his complaint,

though his briefing makes clear he intends to bring a § 1983 conspiracy claim.5 Of course, his

§ 1985 claims are also inherently conspiracy claims. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

n.2 (7th Cir. 2013); Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 526 (7th Cir. 2009). However, these

conspiracy claims fail for a variety of reasons. First, under § 1983, conspiracy is not an

independent basis of liability. Smith, 550 F.3d at 617. If there is no underlying constitutional

violation, a plaintiff’s claim of a civil conspiracy to violate the constitution must fail as a matter

of law. See Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2018) (to prevail on a § 1983

conspiracy claim, the plaintiff “must show an underlying constitutional violation and

demonstrate that the defendants agreed to inflict the constitutional harm.”). Because Mr.

Florance’s underlying due process claim failed, his conspiracy claims also fail. See Cefalu v. Vill.

of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 2000).

Finally, even if Mr. Florance’s underlying constitutional violations were feasible, the Court

does not find the conspiracy alleged by Mr. Florance to be plausible. As a rule, there is no

heightened standard for pleading conspiracy claims. Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007

(7th Cir. 2002). However, conspiracy claims remain subject to the pleading standard established

in Twombly and Iqbal, namely, plausibility. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007) (announcing standard in conspiracy context). “Determining whether a complaint states a

5 Though the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain language referring to conspiracy claims,

constitutional conspiracy under § 1983 is well-established in this circuit. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606,

612 (7th Cir. 2018); Wheeler v. Piazza, 364 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2019).

plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

Litigation alleging a “vast, encompassing conspiracy” must meet a “high standard of

plausibility” in order to state a claim. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009). The

Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court have “warned against permitting a plaintiff ‘with a largely

groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so

representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded

hope that the discovery process will reveal relevant evidence.’” Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of

Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421

U.S. 723, 741 (1975)). Here, Mr. Florance’s allegation of conspiracy is supported only by routine

motions practice in the collections case, one attorney’s choice to retire, and nonexistent legal

duties requiring defendants to advocate on his behalf.6

In Geinosky v. City of Chicago, the court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s

§ 1983 conspiracy claim, writing “[i]t is a challenge to imagine a scenario in which that

harassment would not have been the product of a conspiracy.” 675 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2012).

But here, it is a challenge to imagine a scenario in which the extremely ordinary conduct alleged

by Mr. Florance was the product of a conspiracy. See also Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Vill. of

Schaumburg, 930 F.3d 812, 827–28 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal where “[g]etting from

6 Mr. Florance’s conspiracy allegations are as follows: “While any one of the defendants could have simply

sent my unaltered cancelation request through to HHS, it took all seven of them not to. The administrative gameplay

was remarkably well coordinated; after the initial discussion with Ms. Springer and Mr. Everett, no other Defendant

mentioned cancelation again for months; the attorneys requested a 90-day extension of the dispositive motion

deadline in order to ‘evaluate the cancelation’, then Mr. Voorheis retired on day 70; Mr. Essel said he was refusing

to communicate with me because of the ongoing lawsuit; Ms. George sent me a perfunctory memo halfway through

the summary judgment response deadline that said absolutely nothing about what standard she was using or what

documents she’d already reviewed to reach a conclusion that ‘the required materials have not yet been submitted.’

The acts were unlikely to have been undertaken—and at that pace—without some agreement.” (DE 1 at ¶ 33.) The

Court finds Hanlon’s razor applicable: “Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by

neglect.”

these allegations to the nefarious conspiracy asserted by the [plaintiff] requires a speculative

leap, not a reasonable inference.”) Further, these allegations are contradicted by the plain text of

the documents properly considered by the Court. Rather than revealing a prejudiced conspiracy,

the letters show two legal departments considering whether an applicant qualified for a benefit

under the statutory terms controlling eligibility. And rather than reveal a pattern of harassment,

the collections case’s docket is unremarkable, showing both that Mr. Florance enjoyed a stay of

the litigation and that the university filed other motions to stay the litigation. (DE 10-1 at 4, 7,

12.) Interestingly, IU’s motion for summary judgment—a significant basis of Mr. Florance’s

alleged constitutional violation—was filed one day after Mr. Florance filed his own motion for

declaratory judgment on his counterclaims, perhaps reigniting the otherwise tepid litigation. (DE

10-1 at 10.) The Court finds Mr. Florance’s allegations do not support the inference that

defendants conspired to deny Mr. Florance’s loan forgiveness because he was disabled. These

claims fall short of the plausibility standard and are accordingly dismissed.

E. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss (DE 10); (DE

22). The Court also GRANTS the motion to seal (DE 25), as it comports with the purpose of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 The Court further finds that because Mr. Florance’s claims

are so thoroughly precluded by operation of law, any amendment would be futile, and the Court

ORDERS the Clerk to prepare a judgment dismissing Mr. Florance’s claims with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: February 8, 2023

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO

Chief Judge

United States District Court