Harris v. St Joseph Superior Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JAMIE HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-853 DRL-MGG

ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

Jamie Harris filed a pro se complaint alleging that the St. Joseph Superior Court, Magistrate

Judge Elizabeth Hardtke, County Clerk Rita Glenn, and Attorney Gerald Shidaker failed to give her

an administrative hearing before the commencement of eviction proceedings in the St. Joseph

Superior Court. She says this violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and her due process rights.

She moves to proceed in forma pauperis.

The court must first determine whether her complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Though the court must construe her complaint liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), it has “ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits

spontaneously,” Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement must contain enough factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a plausible claim, not a speculative one. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Ms. Harris’ complaint1 includes 34

1 Ms. Harris dockets the same document twice, once as her complaint [ECF 1] and again as a motion for

temporary injunction [ECF 2].

numbered paragraphs as well as an excerpt from the 1996 Federal Register, which the court has

reviewed liberally. The genesis of her claims is an eviction action that Indian Springs Apartments

brought against her in the St. Joseph Superior Court Small Claims Division for non-payment of rent.

This is not the first time that this court has heard from Ms. Harris regarding this eviction. She

previously tried to remove the state eviction case (see 3:22-cv-789 JD-MGG). The court remanded the

case back to state court as “it did not have federal question jurisdiction over the state eviction case

because there were no questions of federal law at issue in the proceeding” [3:22-cv-789; ECF 7 at 1].

Ms. Harris tried again by filing an amended notice of removal, but the court remanded the case once

more for the same reasons [id.]. In that order, the court cautioned Ms. Harris that the claims she was

attempting to assert appeared to lack merit [id. 2].

Though Ms. Harris seemed to believe that Indian Springs failed to provide an opportunity for

an administrative hearing before bringing the eviction proceedings, the federal rules she referenced

say this hearing is necessary before a public housing authority can evict a public housing tenant. The court

pointed out that Ms. Harris admitted that the record does not reflect that Indian Springs is a public

housing authority [id. 3]. Therefore, “[i]f Indian Springs is not a public housing authority, the rules and

regulations that Harris has cited would not apply to Indian Springs and would make any claims Harris

has based on violations of those rules and regulations meritless” [id.]. The court specifically cautioned

Ms. Harris not to bring meritless claims: “If Harris files a separate lawsuit that raises claims that lack

merit or claims that are not explained in detail and clearly supported with relevant facts, Harris’ claims

will simply be dismissed” [id.].

Here, Ms. Harris has attempted to raise the same claims, just against new parties. Instead of

suing Indian Springs, Ms. Harris now sues a court, judge, county clerk, and Indian Springs’ attorney.

Her claims don’t fare better as a result. First, Ms. Harris again references housing authority regulations

[¶ 17, 18] while also admitting that the defendants are not a public housing authority [¶ 22, 23, 24]. As

the court explained in some detail before, this claim is meritless.

Second, Ms. Harris attempts to sue the St. Joseph Superior Court, but this claim cannot

proceed as the court is not a proper party. A state court is an arm of the state, but not a person who

can be sued under § 1983.

Third, Ms. Harris names Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Hardtke as a defendant. Ms. Harris cannot

proceed against Judge Hardkte because judges are immune from suit. A judge has absolute immunity

for any judicial actions unless the judge acted in absence of all jurisdiction. Polzin v. Gage, 636 F.3d

834, 838 (7th Cir. 2011). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action [s]he took was

in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of [her] authority; rather, [s]he will be subject to liability

only when [s]he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359

(1978) (citation and quotations omitted).

The remaining defendants are County Clerk Rita Glenn and attorney Gerald Shidaker. In her

complaint, Ms. Harris does not explain either person’s connection to the eviction proceeding or

explain why they are personally responsible for her due process concern. See Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs.,

Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2002); Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To

recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible

for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”). Despite the court’s warning, Ms. Harris has raised

claims that lack merit or that are not explained in detail and clearly supported with relevant facts.

Ordinarily, the court should afford a pro se litigant an opportunity to cure her defective

pleadings. Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2018). In the interest of justice, the

court will allow Ms. Harris to amend her complaint if, after reviewing this order, she believes that she

can state a viable claim for relief, consistent with the allegations she has already made. See Tate v. SCR

Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We’ve often said that before dismissing a case

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) a judge should give the litigant, especially a pro se litigant, an

opportunity to amend [her] complaint”). Ms. Harris has through November 4, 2022, to file an

amended complaint.

The amended complaint must (1) contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, which is sufficient to provide the defendant with fair notice of

the claim and its basis; (2) include a demand for the relief sought; and (3) identify what injury she

claims to have suffered and what persons are responsible for each such injury. In organizing her

complaint, Ms. Harris will benefit from utilizing the court’s complaint form.2 Any amended complaint

should have the proper case number, 3:22-CV-853 DRL-MGG, and the words “Amended Complaint”

on the first page. The amended complaint will completely replace the original. See Beal v. Beller, 847

F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) (“For pleading purposes, once an amended complaint is filed, the original

complaint drops out of the picture.”). Therefore, it must set out every defendant, claim, and factual

allegation the plaintiff wishes to pursue in this action. If the plaintiff files an amended complaint, it

will be screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. If no amended complaint is filed, this action will be

dismissed without further notice or opportunity to show cause.

Ms. Harris also moves for a temporary injunction. She uses the same information from her

complaint in this motion. To obtain a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction an

applicant must establish (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) no adequate remedy

at law, and (3) irreparable harm to the plaintiff if injunctive relief is denied. Planned Parenthood of Ind.,

Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. State Dep't of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2736

(2013). For the reasons discussed above, Ms. Harris is unable to satisfy the first requirement.

Accordingly, this motion is denied.

For these reasons, the court:

2 Available at: https://www.innd.uscourts.gov/sites/innd/files/CvCmplt.pdf.

(1) TAKES UNDER ADVISEMENT the in forma pauperis motion [ECF 3];

(2) GRANTS Jamie Harris until November 4, 2022, to file an amended complaint;

(3) CAUTIONS Jamie Harris if she does not respond by the deadline, this case will be

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(ii) without further notice because the current

complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted; and

(4) DENIES the motion for temporary injunction [ECF 2].

SO ORDERED.

October 17, 2022 s/ Damon R. Leichty

Judge, United States District Court