Taylor v. Carter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

BRENT TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:21-CV-852-RLM-MGG

ROBERT CARTER, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Brent Taylor, a prisoner without a lawyer, was granted leave to proceed

against the optometrist at Indiana State Prison on a claim relating to his eye care.

When the optometrist couldn’t be identified to be served, Mr. Taylor was ordered to

provide the court with more information about him. In response, Mr. Taylor filed an

amended complaint, changing the optometrist’s name from Dr. Hobbs to Dr. Lewton.

Now the amended complaint, as supplemented by an additional exhibit Mr. Taylor

filed, is ready to be screened. The court must review the merits of a prisoner

complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. “A document filed pro se is to be

liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Mr. Taylor alleges that around July 1, 2021, he received an eye exam from

optometrist Dr. Lewton to obtain a prescription for glasses. He says that he told Dr.

Lewton that he needed a pair of glasses because he was on his last pair of contacts

and those were set to expire in two weeks. Dr. Lewton conducted an eye exam and

said he would order the glasses. He estimated that it would take 2-3 weeks for them

to arrive.

The glasses didn’t arrive in three weeks. Mr. Taylor alleges that he is legally

blind without glasses. When he tried to go without his contacts, Mr. Taylor alleges

that he would run into walls and experienced headaches from straining to see. So Mr.

Taylor continued to wear his expired contacts, which led to an eye infection. His eyes

became red, swollen, and leaked discharge. He described the pain as excruciating.

Mr. Taylor alleges that he sent a medical request to Dr. Lewton around August

1, 2021, detailing his eye infection and need for glasses. After three days with no

response, Mr. Taylor says he sent Dr. Lewton another medical request stating that

his problems were becoming more urgent, but that request also received no response.

He says a nurse told him that the complaints were in the system and it appeared that

Dr. Lewton had received the requests. The nurse, however, explained that there was

a backlog of medical requests because the old medical contractor, Wexford Health,

had ignored several pending request forms during the transition to the new

healthcare provider.

After several more days without response to his requests, Mr. Taylor spoke to

Nurse Jane Doe who handles medical grievances for the Indiana State Prison. The

nurse saw in the computer that Dr. Lewton was aware of the situation and said the

doctor would schedule him when he saw fit. He says he showed the nurse his eye and

told her that it was an emergency and that he hoped she could call someone to see

him. Mr. Taylor reports that she said no and told him that he had already submitted

too many requests. She relayed that his requests would no longer be answered

because the doctor was aware of the situation.

Mr. Taylor filed a grievance at the end of August 2021 about his need for

glasses, among other things. The grievance processor’s belated response noted that

the glasses had been ordered on August 2, 2021, a month after the eye exam. Because

those never arrived, a new order was placed on November 9, 2021. Mr. Taylor received

those glasses, though he doesn’t say when. He doesn’t allege that he still suffers from

an eye infection or that lasting damage occurred from the delay in treatment.

Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must

satisfy both an objective and subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need

was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to

that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The need for glasses

can constitute a serious medical need under the Eighth Amendment, depending on

the consequences of going without glasses. Compare Alexander v. Richter, 756 F.

App’x 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting the need for prescription glasses could be a

serious need if an inmate needed them to avoid double vision and the loss of depth

perception), with Conway v. Wexford Health Servs., No. 3:17-CV-110, 2020 WL

1433830, at *4-5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2020) (collecting cases and concluding inmate did

not have serious medical need for glasses because his prescription required only a

mild correction and the lack of glasses, while inconvenient, did not significantly

impair his daily living).

Mr. Taylor’s need for glasses could be a serious medical need, and the one-

month delay in placing the order could constitute deliberate indifference. Bit doesn’t

appear that the doctor could be held responsible for any off-site processing delays

once the order was placed. See Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451,

460 (7th Cir. 2020) (concluding prison doctor could not be held liable for delay in

receiving contact lenses because the record showed that an off-site eye surgeon’s office

was responsible for the delay). Mr. Taylor can proceed against Dr. Lewton on the

Eighth Amendment claim for the one-month delay in initially ordering his glasses.

Mr. Taylor also has plausibly alleged that Dr. Lewton’s failure to treat his eye

infection could be considered deliberate indifference. Mr. Taylor describes the pain

from the infection as “excruciating” and says his eyes were red, swollen, and leaked

discharge. Mr. Taylor doesn’t allege any lasting effects from the eye infection, but

delay in treating the pain can constitute deliberate indifference. See Dean v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 242 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that a delay in

treatment can violate the Eighth Amendment if “the delay exacerbated the injury or

unnecessarily prolonged pain” (quotation marks omitted)). Giving Mr. Taylor the

inferences to which he is entitled at the screening stage, he states a claim against

Dr. Lewton for disregarding his complaints about the eye infection.

Mr. Taylor can’t proceed against Nurse Jane Doe, to whom he says he spoke

on August 21, 2021, about his medical needs. Mr. Taylor says she handles medical

grievances. It’s unclear whether this job encompasses the authority to schedule

appointments without the doctor’s permission. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768,

779-80 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing limitations on nurse’s liability when prisoner is

also under the care of a doctor). Even if it did, the complaint doesn’t provide enough

information for the court to order service on her. Because this case will otherwise

proceed, Nurse Jane Doe will be dismissed without prejudice.1 See Rodriguez v.

McCloughen, -- F.4th --, No. 22-1259, 2022 WL 4494294, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 28, 2022)

(noting that placeholder defendants may be permissible while plaintiffs use discovery

to learn proper names); Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is

pointless to include lists of anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of

placeholder does not open the door to relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor can

it otherwise help the plaintiff.”).

Mr. Taylor akso sues several high-level officials, seeking to hold them

responsible for not remedying his problem after he wrote them letters and grievances.

To allow a claim to go forward against a supervisory official based only on letters and

a failure to intervene, the plaintiff “has the burden of demonstrating that the

communication, in its content and manner of transmission, gave the prison official

1 If Mr. Taylor believes he can state a claim against Nurse Jane Doe, he can

file an amended complaint after conducting discovery to learn more details about

her role in providing medical care at the prison and to learn more identifying

information about her. He is cautioned, however, to be mindful of the two-year

statute of limitations that applies to his claims. See Rodriguez v. McCloughen, 2022

WL 4494294, at *1.

sufficient notice to alert him or her to ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’”

Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Compare Franklin v. McCaughtry, 110 F. App'x 715, 721 (7th

Cir. 2004) (“The news that what Franklin thought was a fingernail infection was not

receiving sufficient attention would not have reasonably suggested to McCaughtry

and Wegner an excessive risk to Franklin’s safety.”), with Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d

768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015) (claim allowed to go forward against supervisory officials

because prisoner’s “coherent and highly detailed grievances and other

correspondences” gave officials actual knowledge of medical situation, which included

an untreated open, bleeding hand wound and prison medical staff’s failure to follow

outside specialist’s instructions, resulting in irreparable damage).

Moreover, an official’s role in the system affects their liability when faced with

written complaints from inmates. A defendant “cannot be hit with damages under

§1983 for not being ombudsmen.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir.

2009). High-level officials cannot be expected to respond to “clearly localized, non-

systemic violations.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1429 (7th Cir. 1996)

(dismissing claims against sheriff and director of Department of Corrections because

they involved “clearly localized” issues). A high-level official can’t “realistically be

expected to be personally involved in resolving a situation pertaining to a particular

inmate unless it were of the gravest nature.” Id. at 1428-29. An additional layer of

deference is present here; nonmedical staff may typically rely on medical staff’s

judgment regarding whether medical care is being appropriately provided. Burks v.

Raemisch, 555 F.3d at 595; see also Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 343 (7th

Cir. 2018) (“When detainees are under the care of medical experts, nonmedical jail

staff may generally trust the professionals to provide appropriate medical

attention.”).

Mr. Taylor’s attempt to broaden his claims beyond just his situation to

encompass systemic problems at the prison are unavailing. He alleges generally that

he was told “other inmates were having the same issues” with a delay in being seen,

ECF 45 at 9, and he asserts “several fellow inmates were experiencing similar issues,”

id. at 11. But this is not enough to plausibly allege a systemic problem. “[L]egal

conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim are

not entitled to [a] presumption of truth.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611,

616 (7th Cir. 2011). “The required level of factual specificity rises with the complexity

of the claim.” Id. at 616-617. Mr. Taylor doesn’t identify any other prisoner who faced

similar problems, so his general allegations of widespread issues need not be accepted

as true.

With this in mind, the complaint doesn’t state a claim on which relief can be

granted against Robert Carter, the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of

Correction. The Commissioner can’t be expected to investigate a single prisoner’s

medical complaint of this type. The same is true of Ron Neal, the Warden of Indiana

State Prison. As the head of the prison, Warden Neal could be expected to intervene

in some types of medical issues a prisoner may have, but Mr. Taylor’s allegations

couldn’t be said to be “of the gravest nature.” Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1428-29.

Deputy Warden Dawn Buss presents a closer question because the complaint

more directly alleges her particular awareness of Mr. Taylor’s issues. But her role at

the prison, and thus her responsibility to act, isn’t clear. Mr. Taylor says that she is

the “acting deputy superintendent,” ECF 45 at 6, which suggests that she might have

some responsibility for actively managing day-to-day matters of the prison. But he

doesn’t say what specific duties she had as a “deputy superintendent,” and later

alleges that she “runs the law library,” ECF 45 at 7, suggesting that her role at the

prison doesn’t encompass responding to inmate complaints. A prisoner can’t simply

“write letters to the Governor of Wisconsin and 999 other public officials, demand

that every one of those 1,000 officials drop everything he or she is doing in order to

investigate a single prisoner’s claims, and then collect damages from all 1,000

recipients if the letter-writing campaign” is unsuccessful. Burks v. Raemisch, 555

F.3d at 595.

Mr. Taylor does, however, plausibly allege that Deputy Warden Buss

retaliated against him for sending her correspondence about his medical issues. “To

establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) he

engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation

that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First

Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to

take the retaliatory action.” Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr. Taylor alleges that after he sent

Deputy Warden Buss that letter, she threatened to kick him out of his personal

development class—his only source of income—if he continued to complain about his

medical issues. He also alleges that she began to restrict his time at the law library.

Giving Mr. Taylor the inferences to which he is entitled at the screening stage, he

plausibly alleges that he engaged in protected First Amendment activity by writing

Deputy Buss a letter complaining about prison conditions and that because of that

letter, Deputy Buss restricted his law library time and threatened to remove his

source of income, which could plausibly deter future protected activity. Mr. Taylor

can proceed against Deputy Buss on a First Amendment claim.

Finally, Mr. Taylor sues Wexford Health Services and Centurion Health, the

former and current companies contracted to provide medical care in the prison. By

the time Mr. Taylor was seen on July 1, 2021, Centurion was the medical provider at

the prison. See Baldwin v. Westville Corr. Facility, No. 3:21-CV-682-DRL-MGG, 2021

WL 5759136, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 2021) (Wexford’s contract with Indiana

Department of Correction terminated on July 1, 2021, and it was replaced by

Centurion.). Mr. Taylor alleges that as Wexford was transitioning out, the company

failed to process medical requests so that when Centurion took over, there was a

backlog that prevented Mr. Taylor from being seen promptly for his eye infection.

These companies could be held liable for constitutional violations during the

time they provided medical care at Indiana prisons. See Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d

420, 422 (7th Cir. 2020). A private company performing a public function can be held

liable if its own policies caused the alleged constitutional violation. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs.,

675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012). The purpose of the official policy requirement is to

“distinguish between the isolated wrongdoing of one or a few rogue employees and

other, more widespread practices.” Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d

647, 654 (7th Cir. 2021); see also Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th

Cir. 2017) (“At the pleading stage . . . a plaintiff pursuing [a Monell] theory must

allege facts that permit the reasonable inference that the practice is so widespread so

as to constitute a governmental custom.”).

Hiccups and delays aren’t surprising in a transition to a new medical provider.

The complaint establishes that Mr. Taylor was given a prompt eye exam and glasses

were ordered. These temporary delays due to transition backlogs are not of

constitutional magnitude. Further, the delay in being seen for his eye infection cannot

be attributed to a policy or practice of either company. Instead, medical staff made

an independent decision that Mr. Taylor could wait his turn while they worked

through the backlog of medical requests.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) DIRECTS the clerk to attach the exhibits ECF 2-1 and ECF 27-1 to the

operative complaint (ECF 45);

(2) GRANTS Brent Taylor leave to proceed against Dr. Lewton in his

individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for delaying treatment of

Mr. Taylor’s painful eye infection beginning in August 2021, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment;

(3) GRANTS Brent Taylor leave to proceed against Dr. Lewton in his

individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for delaying placing the

order for glasses following the July 2021 eye exam in violation of the Eighth

Amendment;

(4) GRANTS Brent Taylor leave to proceed against Deputy Warden Dawn Buss

in her individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for threatening to

remove him from his personal development class and reducing his time at the law

library in retaliation for sending her a letter complaining of prison conditions on

October 19, 2021, in violation of the First Amendment;

(5) DISMISSES all other claims;

(6) DISMISSES Robert Carter, Ron Neal, Centurion Health, Wexford Health

Services, and Jane Doe;

(7) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service

from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means

to locate and serve process on) Dawn Buss at the Indiana Department of Correction,

with a copy of this order, the prior screening order (ECF 24), and the complaint (ECF

30-1);

(8) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service

from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means

to locate and serve process on) Dr. Lewton at Centurion Health of Indiana, LLC, with

a copy of this order, the prior screening order (ECF 24), and the complaint (ECF 30-

1);

(9) ORDERS Centurion Health and Indiana Department of Correction to

provide the full name, date of birth, and last known home address of any defendant

who does not waive service if it has such information; and

(10) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Dr. Lewton and Dawn Buss to

respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R.

10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed

in this screening order.

SO ORDERED on October 14, 2022

s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.

JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT