The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DEQUARIUS DESUNE WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v. CAUSE NO. 3:21-CV-751-JD-MGG
W. HYATTE, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Dequarius Desune Walker, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended
complaint. (ECF 12.) The court screened his original complaint and determined that it
did not state a plausible claim against any defendant. (ECF 8.) The court afforded him
an opportunity to submit an amended complaint, and he responded with the present
filing.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must screen the amended complaint and
dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter to “state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Mr. Walker is
proceeding without counsel, the court must give his allegations liberal construction.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Mr. Walker is incarcerated at Miami Correctional Facility. He alleges that on
April 5, 2021, he was moved from general population to the segregation unit to serve a
lengthy term of segregation due to a disciplinary infraction. He was taken to cell 125,
and when he arrived he told the officers who were escorting him—Officer M. Kennedy,
Officer K. Kirby, Officer J. Anderson, and Sergeant T. Beane—that he was “not allowed
to be around any offender while sentenced to segregation time.” The officers allegedly
ignored him and forced him to go into the cell, which was already occupied by another
inmate, Leonard Thomas, who was on suicide watch. The two inmates immediately
began to fight. Sergeant Beane sprayed them with pepper spray, and they were then
handcuffed and given decontamination showers.
When they were done showering, the officers began to put them back in the
same cell. Mr. Walker claims he told them that there would be “further issues” if he and
inmate Thomas were placed in the cell together. The officers allegedly ignored him and
put both inmates back in the cell. They started to remove inmate Thomas’s restraints,
and as soon as they did, he began striking Mr. Walker with the restraints. The inmates
were then permanently separated. Based on these events, he sues the four officers for
violating his Eighth Amendment rights.1
1 Mr. Walker did not list Sergeant Beane in the section where he is asked to identify the
defendants, but he clearly indicates that he is suing four defendants and includes specific allegations
about Sergeant Beane violating his rights along with the other three officers. The court must liberally
construe the complaint, and will presume the failure to list Sergeant Beane was merely a scriveners’ error.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of inmates” and to “protect prisoners from violence at
the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). However,
“prisons are dangerous places,” as “[i]nmates get there by violent acts, and many
prisoners have a propensity to commit more.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777
(7th Cir. 2008). Therefore, a failure-to-protect claim cannot be predicated “merely on
knowledge of general risks of violence in a detention facility.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d
904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, the plaintiff must establish that “the defendant had
actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious,
culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to
prevent it.” Santiago v. Wells, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). This is a high standard.
The plaintiff must show that the defendant “acted with the equivalent of criminal
recklessness, in this context meaning they were actually aware of a substantial harm to
[plaintiff’s] health or safety, yet failed to take appropriate steps to protect him from the
specific danger.” Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, “negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness as the term is
used in tort cases is not enough” to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Hildreth
v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2020). Nor does making a “mistake” or exercising
“poor judgment” satisfy the deliberate indifference standard. Giles v. Tobeck, 895 F.3d
510, 514 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, the plaintiff must allege acts or omissions by the
defendant that “cross the line from negligently enabling the attack to recklessly
condoning it.” Id.
Mr. Walker claims that when he was first placed in the cell, he told the officers
that he was “not allowed to be around any offender while sentenced to segregation
time.” (ECF 12 at 2.) This statement did not expressly put them on notice that Mr.
Walker would be in physical danger if he was placed in the cell with inmate Thomas.
For all the statement reveals, it was Mr. Walker who posed a danger to other inmates;
indeed, he acknowledges that he had been “deemed a threat to the safety and security
of the facility” based on the disciplinary infraction that landed him in segregation. In
Klebanowski, the plaintiff “testified during his deposition that he told officers twice . . .
that he was afraid for his life and he wanted to be transferred off the tier.” 540 F.3d at
639. The Circuit found that “[t]his lack of specificity falls below the required notice an
officer must have for liability to attach for deliberate indifference.” Id. at 640. So, too,
Mr. Walker’s statement about not being “around any offender” while serving time in
segregation was not specific enough about a danger posed by inmate Thomas to trigger
Eighth Amendment liability. It may have been poor judgment to put him in the cell, but
this does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Giles, 895 F.3d at 514.
Nevertheless, Mr. Walker further alleges that the two inmates did in fact get into
a fight, which was witnessed by the officers and resulted in them having to use pepper
spray to separate the inmates. Mr. Walker than expressly warned them that there would
be problems if the two were put back in the same cell. Although his statement was not
specific about a risk of physical harm, it can be reasonably understood as conveying a
risk of danger given that the two inmates had been physically fighting only a short time
earlier. The officers did not listen to him, however, and did nothing to protect him or
alleviate the danger. Minutes later, inmate Thomas attacked Mr. Walker with his
restraints, causing him pain and injury. He has alleged enough to proceed on an Eighth
Amendment claim against the officers.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Officer M. Kennedy, Officer K.
Kirby, Officer J. Anderson, and Sergeant T. Beane in their personal capacity for
monetary damages under the Eighth Amendment for failing to protect him from being
attacked by inmate Leonard Thomas on April 5, 2021, after the two inmates were seen
fighting and the plaintiff warned the officers that they should not be put back in a cell
together;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DIRECTS the clerk to request a Waiver of Service from (and if necessary, the
United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to locate and serve process on)
Officer M. Kennedy, Officer K. Kirby, Officer J. Anderson, and Sergeant T. Beane at
Indiana Department of Correction and to send them a copy of this order and the
amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);
(4) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the United States
Marshal Service with the full name, date of birth, and last known home address of any
defendant who does not waive service, to the extent this information is available; and
(5) ORDERS Officer M. Kennedy, Officer K. Kirby, Officer J. Anderson, and
Sergeant T. Beane to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted
leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED on September 12, 2022
/s/JON E. DEGUILIO
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT